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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to provide the beginnings of a' clear account of the
correspondences between the initial reception of Nietzschean ideas and selected works
of modernist writing by the Anglophone intelligentsia. In particular, the aim of this
study is to provide a framework for exploring the Nietzschean undercurrents in the work
of such figures as George Bernard Shaw, Dora Marsden, Wyndham Lewis, and James
Joyce. Departing from traditional studies of influence and their method, the present
account will examine the correspondences between the original reception of Nietzsche's
ideas and their later absorption and development in the work of these writers and
intellectuals with a special emphasis on the little-magazine culture of the period. As will
be shown, in such avant-garde forums as The Eagle and the Serpent, The New Age (and
its predecessor the Leeds Arts Club), The Freewoman/The New Freewoman/The Egoist,
one sees the cross-fertilization of Nietzschean discourses with the then-contemporary
theories of social, cultural and aesthetic egoism/individualism. These periodical and
artistic coteries illustrate the close relationship between the reception of Nietzschean
ideas and the tradition of radical literary modernism, an intellectual and artistic milieu
that was progressive, experimental, and avant-garde in nature. The aim of this thesis is
to consider and examine possible ways in which the contemporary discourses of 'radical
Nietzscheanism' interact with the aesthetic agendas of these periodicals in general- and
the individual agendas of Shaw, Marsden, Lewis, and Joyce in particular. I attempt to
contextualize the work and thought of these individuals, to situate their texts within a
larger avant-garde milieu receptive to Nietzsche, and to consider the ways in which they
affect and are affected by it.
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1Introduction
This study examines the literary reception of Nietzschean ideas in relation to
selected works of modernist literature. By considering the ways in which Nietzsche's
thought came to be associated with certain aspects of radical modernism and the literary
avant-garde, my thesis attempts to consider how writers such as George Bernard Shaw,
Wyndham Lewis, and James Joyce individually respond to this confluence. The thesis
has two primary aims. Firstly, I attempt to paint a picture of what I term 'radical
Nietzscheanism' by casting light onto the intellectual currents within which Nietzsche's
thought was first accommodated. Secondly, I examine how these individual authors
respond to Nietzschean discourses of the day - how, that is, some aspects of Nietzsche's
radical literary legacy find particular expression in their texts.
Michael Bell's recent article 'Nietzscheanism: The Superman and the all-too-
human' I points to the importance of reassessing literary modernism's engagement with
Nietzsche and the impact his work had on several modernist writers. For Bell, Nietzsche
should be valued not merely as a source of influence upon individual modernist writers
but rather for 'having articulated discursively and in advance the complex of themes and
the composite worldview that can be' deduced from a large part of modernist writing' _2
Bell rightly identifies two phases of what has come to be called Anglophone
Nietzscheanism. The first one may be said to begin at the turn of the nineteenth century
and continues through to the modernist period (although not without quite a few
I Michael Bell, 'The Superman and the all-too-human', in A Concise Companion to Modernism, ed. by
David Bradshaw (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 56-74.
2 Ibid., p. 57.
2disruptions, variations, and shifts). The next one started in the 1950's, with the attempts
of scholars, such as Walter Kaufmann, to free Nietzsche's work from its fascist
appropriations, generating a renewed interest in the scholarly community which
continues uninterrupted until this day. Although as Bell points out, the two phases are
quite distinct and should be studied in their own right, and within the context of their
respective periods, he also notes that the recent phase throws new and interesting light
on the earlier one, and more specifically on the literary developments generally grouped
under the term 'modernism'r'
A sense of the relationship between Nietzsche and the literary tradition of
modernism can be sought in early accounts of this intellectual phenomenon. For
instance, in 'Nietzsche Revisited', a series of articles published in The New Age in
1921,4 Professor Janko Lavrin, referring to Nietzsche's 'radical' literary legacy, notes:
It would be difficult to point out another philosopher or thinker of the
nineteenth century whose vogue and fate can be compared with that of
Nietzsche. Entirely ignored until the end of his literary activities, he
suddenly became the slogan and standard of radical 'modernism'; he was
proclaimed - almost in a night - the apostle of a new culture and soon after
the gospel of his Zarathustra degenerated into fashion, breeding adepts and
interpreters all over the world.'
Lavrin's account of the phenomenon is particularly interesting for the light it throws not
only on the Nietzsche's pre-war legacy (from the early 1900s until the outbreak of the
First World War), but, most importantly for my purpose here, on the particular ways
writers and intellectuals related to his philosophy. Carefully separating the positive and
negative forms of reception, namely' the literary reception and more propagandistic
3 Ibid., p. 56.
4 Janko Lavrin, 'Nietzsche Revisited. I-Nietzsche and Nietzscheans', The New Age, 10 November 1921,
pp. 21-22; 'II-Pathology and Art', The New Age, 24 November 1921, pp. 42-43; 'III-Nietzsche's
Dilemma', The New Age, 8 December 1921, pp. 65-66; 'IV-Nietzsche and Religion', The New
Age, 22 December 1921, pp. 88-89; 'V-The Twilight of God', The New Age, January 5 1922, pp.
114-115; 'VI-We Immoralists', The New Age, 9 February 1922, pp. 190-191; 'VII-The
Machiavellism of Strength', The New Age, 9 March 1922, pp. 241-242; 'VIII-II Santo', 20 April
1922, The New Age, pp. 322-323.
5 Lavrin, 'Nietzsche Revisited. I-Nietzsche and Nietzscheans', The New Age, 10 November 1921, p. 21.
3avenues of appropriation, Lavrin discusses the cultural and perceived philosophical,
psychological, and aesthetic value of his work for modem art and literature:
To many, Nietzsche was a surprising discovery because his philosophy was
not a dry logical 'system' but something more alive: an intimate
psychological document [... J [his] exaggerated and passionate subjectivism
that often gives to his books an objective significance and value, making of
Nietzsche himself a kind of symbolic figure, which it is' impossible to pass
by in dealing with the problem of the modem Individual. The second reason
for Nietzsche's fascination was the highll artistic form of his writings [... ]
the magic strength of Nietzsche as Artist.
Lavrin's observations here echo Bell's, and serve to reinforce the latter's argument
about connections between Nietzsche's legacy and the literary heritage of modernism.
For Lavrin, Nietzsche is seen primarily as a 'representative of modem consciousness' ,7
and his legacy forms part of a tradition of radical modernism expressive of the period's
cultural, artistic and intellectual aspirations: '[Nietzsche] came with his gospel of new
values just in a time of complete cultural, moral and intellectual disorientation and
confusion [...] like a refreshing wind from a more rigorous climate [... ].,8 Using,
therefore, Bell's and Lavrin's accounts as a point of departure, this thesis proposes to
understand this particular mode of literary appropriation within the context of what
Lavrin refers to as 'radical modernism', as well as the positions of some specific
modernist writers within this kind of tradition.
The presence of Nietzsche in Anglophone writers has been the subject of
numerous studies. Studies on individual authors, such as Bohlmann Otto's, Yeats and
Nietzsche: An Exploration of Major Nietzschean Echoes in the Writings of William
Butler Yeats.' Cecilia Bjorken's, Into the Isle of Self: Nietzschean Patterns and
Contrasts in D. H. Lawrence's The Trespasserl'' and Colin Milton's, Lawrence and
6 Ibid., p. 21.
7 Ibid., p. 21.
8 Ibid., p. 21.
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Otto Bohlmann, Yeats and Nietzsche: An Exploration of Major Nietzschean Echoes in the Writings of
William Butler Yeats (London: Macmillan, 1982).
10 Cecilia Bjorken, Into the Isle of Self: Nietzschean Patterns and Contrasts in D. H. Lawrence's The
Trespasser (Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press; Bromley: Chartwell-Bratt, 1996).
4Nietzsche: A Study in Influence." all deal, in considerable detail, with theoretical
affinities between Nietzsche and modernist writers such as Yeats and Lawrence. A
broader survey of the phenomenon of literary influence can be found in Nietzsche in
Anglosaxony: A Study of Nietzsche's Impact on English and American Literature by
Patrick Bridgwater.V and Nietzsche in England: The Growth of a Reputation: 1900-
1914 by David S. Thatcher.l ' both of which appeared in the early 1970s. Thatcher's
study is organized around a list of selected intellectuals and writers who all in their own
ways contributed to the reception of Nietzsche in England. His study is divided into five
chapters, discussing the early responses of such writers as John Davidson (1857-1909),
G. B. Shaw (1856-1950), W. B. Yeats (1865-1939), and A. R. Orage (1873-1934). Both
studies arrange their material around individual authors and attempt to quantify the level
of Nietzsche's influence on their writing and intellectual development. Only in the case
of intellectuals such as Drage, however, do we get a sense of the broader context in
which such an interest develops, where the discussion extends to take into account other
quite important figures gathered around the artistic and periodical coteries Drage helped
organize (important in terms of their connection to Nietzsche's British legacy). For
instance, there are brief but informative accounts of such Nietzscheans as Oscar Levy,
the editor of the authorized translation of Nietzsche's works in England, and passing
references to other early commentators and translators like Paul Cohn, Judah Benjamin,
Paul Selver, J. M. Kennedy, and A. M. Ludovici. The last two are discussed in greater
detail, mainly due to the fact that their books on Nietzsche were published around the
same time as texts by other important early Nietzsche disseminators and provide fertile
ground for interesting comparison.
II Colin Milton, Lawrence and Nietzsche: A Study in Influence (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press,
1987).
12 Patrick Bridgwater, Nietzsche in Anglosaxony: A Study of Nietzsche's Impact on English and American
Literature (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1972).
13 David S. Thatcher, Nietzsche in England: The Growth of a Reputation 1900-1914 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1970).
5Bridgewater's survey has an even wider scope but is less contextually informed. It
begins with such figures as John Davidson (1857-1909), George Moore (1852-1933),
Edwin Muir (1887-1959), and D. H. Lawrence (1885-1930) and reaches across the
Atlantic to include Jack London (1876-1916), Eugene O'Neill (1888-1953), John Gould
Fletcher (1886-1950), and Wallace Stephens (1879-1955). When it comes to 'the men
of 1914', Wyndham Lewis, T. S. Eliot, James Joyce, Ezra Pound - whose relationship
to Nietzsche proves much more ambiguous - Bridgwater acknowledges the difficulty in
identifying direct influences. In the case of Lewis and Joyce, for instance, he limits the
discussion to early references in letters and works, remarking how, overall, their interest
proved in the long run 'superficial', how' Nietzsche had been little more than a passing
whim.'!"
While both surveys offer a valuable reference source on Nietzsche's literary and
cultural legacy, they are by no means exhaustive, and, in spite of their virtues, they
leave many areas in need of further examination. Written in the 70s, they reflected the
then-current tendencies in literary studies, approaching the subject in terms of 'literary
influence'. Focused primarily on studying the analogies existing between these writers'
texts and Nietzsche's, they tried to determine the kind of influence that his philosophy
exerted on them. As a result these studies leave out broader questions of context,
namely the potential link between a literary text and the broader artistic-intellectual
milieu in which Nietzsche was originally received and of which most writers were an
active part. The more recent 'materialist' trend in literary studies and cultural studies
generally is particularly useful, in my view, in helping move past some of the lacunas of
earlier studies like these. The recent 'materialistic tum', as Peter Brooker and Andrew
Thacker call it in their introduction to The Oxford Critical and Cultural History of
14 Bridgwater, p. 142.
6Modernist Magazinesl? indicates a direction in contemporary literary studies towards
more culturally and historically informed models of analysis. 'Cultural materialism', a
term originally coined by Raymond Williams, is an approach that emphasizes the
interactions between cultural creations such as literature and their historical context,
including social, political and economic circumstances. In the guise in which it is
adopted and reformulated by scholars like Jonathan Dollimore, Alan Sinfield, Andrew
Milner, and George Bornstein, it promotes an understanding of literature and
intellectual culture in general as a perpetually dynamic system of relationships, through
a focus on the material conditions within which textual and intellectual agendas were
originally cast.
The development of such new approaches, alongside the recent trend in modernist
scholarship towards the study of periodical culture, make it possible to review earlier
ways of addressing questions of influence, reception and interpretation. Especially with
regard to Nietzsche's literary reception, little periodicals may be a way of bridging the
divide between the author-based focus of traditional ideas of influence and the current
insistence upon the importance of context in contemporary research - helping to
reassess the ways by which we understand and evaluate terms such as 'literary
influence'. 'Little periodicals' is a term used to describe the plethora of small
publications which defined themselves in opposition to mainstream culture, often
serving as platforms for particular radical and avant-garde coteries, groups, and schools.
As Charles Allen, F. J. Hoffman, and' C. F. Ulrich note in The Little Magazine: A
History and a Bibliography, little magazines were mostly meant as forums of
innovation and experimentation, gathering places for radical writers and intellectuals,
IS Peter Brooker and Andrew Thacker, 'General Introduction', in The Oxford Critical and Cultural
History of Modernist Magazines: Britain and Ireland 1880-1955, ed. by Peter Brooker and
Andrew Thacker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 1-26 (p. 5).
7the "'irreconcilables" of our literary tradition', instrumental in the advancement of new,
experimental and iconoclastic views, social, political and aesthetic.l''
As this thesis aims to show, the study of little periodicals proves particularly
useful when trying to devise a framework for examining the factors that helped
determine the character of Nietzsche's evolving radical avant-garde tradition. In terms
of their importance within the study of literary texts, they allow an enlargement of our
scope to include, besides the specific relation of an author to particular ideas, the wider
context within which these ideas developed, offering fresh ways of exploring the
relation between intellectual history and literary production. Brooker and Thacker
propose that together with other 'related artistic activities and forms of independent
production', little magazines constitute 'the dialogic matrix of modernism' providing
contemporary documentation of the ongoing literary and cultural activity, opening up
the complex layers and social dynamics responsible for the making and the unmaking of
certain intellectual traditions: 17 'Periodicals functioned as points of reference, debate,
and transmission at the heart of an internally variegated and often internationally
connected counter-cultural sphere [...] a network of cultural formations. ' 18
Given the background outlined above, this study first of all sets out to supply
information about the cultural and intellectual context within which Nietzsche's literary
reception occurs. Consistent with Bomstein's approach of 'examining modernism in its
original sites of production', 19 my method is to consider the discursive context of
certain avant-garde coteries associated with Nietzsche's emerging legacy - attempting
to identify the image of radical Nietzscheanism in the cultural and intellectual
discourses that surround it. In line with my focus on the interrelated aspects of
16 Charles Allen, Frederick J. Hoffman, and Carolyn F. Ulrich, The Little Magazine: A History and a
Bibliography (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 72.
17 Brooker and Thacker, pp. 2-3.
18 Ibid., p. 2.
19 George Bomstein, Material Modernism: The Politics of the Page (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), p. 1.
8Nietzsche's reception and literary modernism, my study will begin by exammmg
selected little artistic and periodical coteries, all of which were in some way responsible
for the dissemination of Nietzschean ideas in England. Little magazines such as The
Eagle and the Serpent (London, 1989-1903), The FreewomaniNew FreewomaniThe
Egoist (London, 1911; 1912-1913; 1914-1919), The New Age (London, 1907-1922), as
well as its progenitor, the Leeds Arts Club, provide a basis for a fresh historically
informed look at the development of the conception of Nietzsche among literary and
avant-garde circles. These publications present us with an opportunity to study in depth
the dynamic and evolving character of radical literary Nietzscheanism: from early turn-
of-the-century responses, where Nietzsche serves to furnish progressive notions of
egoism, creative genius and regeneration, to a later, more theoretically-focused
discourse of Nietzscheanism, as seen for instance in Dora Marsden's editorials in The
Freewoman, with Nietzschean notions of genealogy, subjectivity and introspection
centered primarily on then-current theories of dualism and individualism.
I have chosen to focus on these periodicals not only because of their direct
relation to the authors under examination here but also because of their role in
documenting the changing image of radical Nietzscheanism through their respective
discourses of radical egoism/individualism (sexual, social, aesthetic). Given the space
constraints, I have not included in my discussion Margaret Anderson's The Little
Review, an important American mediator between Nietzsche, radical thought, and
literature. My discussion instead has beenfocused on providing a context for the history
and evolving tradition of what constitutes 'radical egoism/individualism' and its
affiliations with Nietzschean philosophy in Britain. In terms of the origins of this
tradition, in Culture and Anarchy David Weir suggests how the beginnings of modern
radical individualism lie within Nietzsche's model of individualism - one of the main
reasons for his appeal among 'those artists at the fin de siecle whose increasing
9marginalization from society could be taken to certify their "advanced" status in it. ,20
The periodicals selected help substantially to expand on Weir's point and elucidate
further connections between Nietzsche, avant-garde, and individualism. Furthermore
they help to provide convincing evidence for a continuous and critical preoccupation of
writers and intellectuals such as G. B. Shaw, Dora Marsden, Wyndham Lewis, and
James Joyce with the philosopher and his tradition - which carries us into the modernist
period.
A glance at the pages of The Egoist raises some of the questions that inform my
study. In the advertisement page from the September 1918 issue it is announced that
bound volumes of the long-defunct periodical The Eagle and the Serpent are now
available by The Egoist Limited: 'it will cost you £1' _21 Next to that there are order
forms for Tarr, Wyndham Lewis's first novel, which had appeared in serial form in the
periodical the year before, as well as James Joyce's A Portrait of an Artist as a Young
Man, also previously serialized in the Egoist. What impression can be drawn from such
a curious ensemble? What can we make of the fact that The Egoist, a former feminist
anarcho-individualist review and, by then, an official organ of literary modernism,
decided to include in its order list The Eagle and the Serpent, the earliest coterie that
dared to talk about Nietzsche and radical egoism in England? And what about Joyce and
Lewis? Given the fact that they had both - at least in their youth - showed sympathy for
Nietzschean views, an interest which, as I will try to demonstrate, continued to manifest
itself in the portraits of artists and egoists in their fiction, what can we conclude about
the ways in which they responded to such traditions, and how do they contribute to
them?
20 David Weir, Culture and Anarchy: The Aesthetic Politics of Modernism (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1997), p. 169.
21 'Ads Section', 1 September 1918, The Egoist: An Individualistic Review. Volume 4, 1917-1919 (New
York: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1967), 1 September 1918, p. 122.
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This thesis follows both a chronological and a thematic order. Chapter One
focuses on particular networks of Nietzschean activity in England - The Eagle and the
Serpent, the Leeds Arts Club, and The New Age. Taking into consideration the
specifically Nietzschean agendas of particular periodical and artistic coteries, as well as
those of some of the individuals involved in them, this chapter examines the expressions
of Nietzschean radical egoism within the avant-garde milieu and sets up a large part of
the intellectual and cultural context for this study. More analytically: Part I of this
chapter, opens with a discussion of The Eagle and the Serpent and examines its role in
both reflecting and forming the complex ways in which Nietzsche's name came to be
intertwined with socially and aesthetically progressive concerns of the period. This
periodical provides a vast array of information pertaining to the early reception of
Nietzsche in an English context. It serves both as an introduction to the phenomenon of
Nietzsche's dissemination, reflecting its diversity. It also helps to establish valuable
links between early radical Nietzscheanism and other later intellectual coteries, such as
the Leeds Arts Club and The New Age. Starting with this early agent of Nietzschean
egoism, in Part II my discussion broadens geographically to take in account the Leeds
Arts Club, another early forum of dissemination, which assimilated Nietzsche into its
cultural project. I offer a brief discussion of its cultural politics with reference to some
of its principal members and contacts (Mary Gawthorpe, Alfred Orage, Holbrook
Jackson, and George Bernard Shaw) in order to explore its underlying connections with
both the radicalism of The Eagle and the' Serpent and with later Nietzschean organs
such as The New Age and The Freewoman. Part III goes on to review the contribution of
The New Age to Nietzsche's growing reputation in England. It is examined for its
importance as another principal locus of Nietzschean dissemination in England,
particularly in terms of its affiliations with literary modernism. It is studied for the
valuable insights it provides into the complex and diverse ways in which the early
11
Nietzschean advocates appropriated Nietzsche, and into the plethora of responses
Nietzsche's legacy would elicit from variegated groupings, not only of the left but, as
names like Levy and Ludovici suggest, of the conservative right. In this context I
discuss selected articles by contributors such as G. B. Shaw, Dr. Charles Whitby, Alfred
R. Randall, Angelo S. Rappoport and Janko Lavrin, in which Nietzschean individualism
is defended as a kind of cultural pharmakon, an alternative to notions of cultural
degeneration and decadence.
Chapter Two is concerned with G. B. Shaw and his response to concurrent
Nietzschean radical trends as evidenced in the portraits of Nietzschean egoist radicals in
The Philanderer (written 1893; published 1898), The Devil's Disciple (1897), and Man
and Superman (1903). Shaw's portrayal of these Nietzschean radicals is analysed as
response to contemporary notions of radical socialist individualism and notions of
artistic freedom. In the light of Shaw's role in the formation and dissemination of a
socialist Nietzschean ethic (as discussed in Chapter One), I examine the extent to which
these types of Nietzscheans portray an emerging kind of social and artistic
consciousness, a consciousness formed out of the trials and often failures of Shaw's
heroic supermen.
Chapter Three examines the ways in which Nietzschean thought provided a kind
of egoist platform for articulating demands for sexual and cultural emancipation and re-
evaluation in The Freewoman. Part I begins with an examination of how Nietzsche was
perceived within early feminist discourses and looks at which aspects of his thought
aroused popular interest. For the purposes of this inquiry I have concentrated on such
articles as G. L. Harding's 'Spinsters in the Making' and his derogatory analysis of
educated women as 'superwomen of the intellect', as well as feminist pamphlets like
Samuel George's In Woman Super-man?, for these are typical examples of the
fashionable and rather crude discourse of feminist Nietzscheanism. Part II and Part III
12
discuss how The Freewoman's Nietzschean discourse provides a counter-discourse to
popular forms of Nietzscheanism among feminists and anti-feminists alike. A careful
examination of articles by D. Marsden, Dr. Whitby, H. Cecil Palmer, and J. M.
Kennedy, allows insights into a more subtle type of individualism - subtle in the way it
uses Nietzschean theory to challenge such Edwardian discourses of sex-radicalism and
progressive trends of 'superwomanhood', and to also re-define them through a
discourse of anti-dualism and creative selfhood.
Taking into consideration these contemporary debates on Nietzsche in the context
of radical egoism and aesthetics, Chapter Four examines the sex politics of Wyndham
Lewis's Tarr. Its main focus is the individualistic artist and, also, gender relations.
Lewis's examination of the theme of sex-duality in the novel (which, as I will argue, is
grounded in a Nietzschean Apollonian/Dionysian aesthetic model) significantly
contributes to then contemporary discussions about individualistic politics and aesthetic
vitalism. First, focusing on Lewis's featuring of the two contrasting female characters,
Bertha and Anastasya, I suggest that Lewis is preoccupied with the prevailing
Nietzschean aesthetic ideas about art and sexuality. In my opinion, Tarr aims to
problematise such rigorous distinctions between art and life, an idea prevalent in early
modernist aesthetic debates that dealt with art and Nietzsche, as seen for instance in
Shaw's early drama, where men of genius (both artists and revolutionaries) are
portrayed as either obstinate (and abstinent) egoists or failed radicals, resigning
impulsively to the female characters and their 'Life Force'. As I argue, the prevalent
notion of the artist-genius, that of the artist as a kind of Egoist-celibate, wedded to art
for life, is reconceived through Lewis's individualistic pair, Tarr and Anastasya. Tarr's
distinctive sexual politics, both in relation to Lewis's characterization of Anastasya as
well as Tarr's vitalistic ethic, is in my opinion offered as a kind of study in 'egoism'.
Instead of offering another solitary artist, one irreversibly obliterated by the fear of
13
'woman' and what this represents, Lewis proposes Tarr as his 'superman=chimpanzee'
and casts Anastasya as Tarr's equal and a fellow egoist. This untypical pair of egoists (a
man and a woman) triggers interesting questions regarding then prevalent ideas of
individuality and sex politics. In this respect the novel offers fascinating insights into
Nietzschean aesthetic and individualistic notions of the period.
Chapter Five examines James Joyce's reworking of the figure of the artist-egoist
in Stephen Hero and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. I attempt to contextualise
Joyce's interest in egoist aesthetics within a certain kind of radical Nietzscheanism
contemporary to the writer while focusing on Joyce's ongoing preoccupation with
different models of egoism, as evidenced in the character of Stephen Dedalus. More
specifically, a comparison between the extrovert, radical and cosmopolitan spirit, which
is so characteristic of Stephen Hero's proto-egoism, and the self-immersed, almost
reclusive outlook of the published version, suggests Joyce's complex positioning within
a certain literary tradition, permeated by Nietzsche's presence. Overall, then, this
chapter is an account of Stephen's different 'visions' of egoism: it evaluates the extent
to which the 'visions' might be taken as an indication of Joyce's critical engagement
with the emerging trends of radical Nietzscheanism in the context of modernity, this
engagement being both inward and outward-looking.
14
Chapter One
Nietzsche's reception in England (especially in periodicals)
1.1 The Early Century Nietzschean Context: The Eagle and the Serpent (1898-
1903): Nietzsche, Radical Egoism and the Avant-Garde
This part of the chapter begins with an overview of The Eagle and the Serpent, the
earliest English little periodical concerned with the philosophy of Friedrich
Nietzsche. An examination of this London-based periodical serves as a kind of
prelude to my study; it frames the heterogeneous cultural field of Nietzsche's early
reception. As I aim to show, The Eagle and the Serpent, although only a short-lived
experiment, stands out as a particularly useful document, shedding light on the early
intellectual and cultural context in which Nietzsche's thought was accommodated. It
is not only a source of information about this initial phase of Nietzsche's reception,
but also provides clues about the dissemination of Nietzsche among radical and
avant-garde circles. As this chapter aims to demonstrate, its importance lies in its
affiliations with early British Nietzscheans; in the information it provides about the
Nietzschean literature available at the time; and in conditioning, at least to some
degree, the reception of his ideas in radical and literary coteries of the time.
As will be argued, in order to appreciate The Eagle and the Serpent's broader
contribution, it is necessary to consider iri detail the periodical's distinct brand of
Nietzschean egoism. Surveying the traits and characteristics of this peculiar
periodical opens a window on an early moment in literary history. I will also attempt
to show that in the periodical's attempt to merge anarchist politics, socialist ethics,
and Nietzschean individualism, one may see the fascinating and multifaceted origins
of a form of early radical Nietzscheanism. This part of the chapter, then, serves as a
15
good starting point towards a more adequate impression of the early radical agenda
associated with Nietzsche's Anglophone reception. It gives some of the reasons for
the distinct fascination with Nietzsche amongst artistic and literary circles, and offers
valuable information about the origins of literary egoism/individualism in relation to
Nietzschean thought. These observations will prove particularly interesting when I
later examine the later phase of Nietzsche's reception, as encountered in The
Freewoman and the respective brand of radical individualism proposed therein.
While the cultural value of the periodical has been greatly downplayed by
Thatcher and Bridgwater,' Michael Bell's recent survey of Nietzsche's impact on
modernist culture notes this periodical's role as one of the two principal loci of the
dissemination of Nietzschean thought in an English context - the other being The
New Age, which I treat elsewhere in this study' Indeed, in terms of its role in the
early diffusion of Nietzschean thought, The Eagle and the Serpent can be credited for
its launch of an independent translation project of Nietzsche's work. The Eagle and
the Serpent printed, in instalments, Thomas Common's English translation of the
first part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, as well as small fragments from works such as
The Case of Wagner, On the Genealogy of Morals, The Gay Science, and Beyond
Good and Evil. Another project of the periodical, its initiative towards establishing
the so-called 'people's universities', or 'Nietzsche clubs', is also suggestive of the
periodical's role as an early disseminator of Nietzschean thought, providing valuable
connections with other concurrent mediums of Nietzsche an dissemination such as the
Leeds Arts Club.
The Eagle and the Serpent was launched in 1898, and publication ceased in
1903. In his cultural survey of the 1890s, Holbrook Jackson, a renowned literary
'As discussed in the general prologue, the recent tum of modernist literary studies towards the study
of periodical culture makes possible the shift away from traditionalist 'studies of influence' and
their one-dimensional treatment of Nietzsche's relation to literary modernism.
2 Bell, pp. 61-62.
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critic and one of the two founding members of the Leeds Arts Club (an early milieu
that combined radical politics, arts, and Nietzsche), remembers it as 'the earliest
British journal avowedly upholding an egoistic philosophy;' As it proclaimed, the
paper was dedicated to the study of the concept of egoism. There was a variety of
articles on the subject: discussions on the subject of egoism versus altruism, egoism's
social, political, and aesthetic ramifications and its links to contemporary aesthetics
and literature.
The Eagle and the Serpent was primarily the effort of John Basil Barnhill
(1864-1929) who under the fictitious name Erwin McCall aimed to initiate an
interest in philosophic egoism by introducing the individualism of Friedrich
Nietzsche to an English audience. Barnhill, or 'Volcano', as he preferred to sign
most of his editorial commentary, intended the periodical to be a forum for those
interested in studying the concept of egoism and the possible application of it in
areas such as politics, ethics, sociology, arts, and literature." With some help of the
anarchist writer Malfew Seklew, who appears to have served occasionally as co-
editor from 1900 onwards, Barnhill would develop an impressive network of
correspondence with intellectuals interested in Nietzsche and philosophic egoism. G.
B. Shaw, Thomas Common, Havelock Ellis, professor Henry Lichtenberger, the
Wagnerian critic and scholar Walter Crane, the writer W. H. Mallock, all offered
occasional letters. Radical individualists such as H. H. Levy (editor of Personal
Rights of London), Benjamin R. Tucker, James L. Walker (the writer of The
Philosophy of Egoism) also contributed their opinions on certain occasions.
3 Holbrook Jackson, The Eighteen Nineties: A Review of Arts and Ideas at the Close of the Nineteenth
Century (London: Grant Richards, 1913; London: Cresset Library, 1988), p. 156.
4 It might be hypothesized that the American Barnhill adopted the pseudonym to avoid confusion with
his other interests. He was a libertarian writer and editor of various polemic journals. His
papers and correspondence is now in the Labadie Collection at the University of Michigan.
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Because of its experimental form and ambiguous agenda, this periodical is
quite difficult to define. Edward Carpenter sent his 'best wishes' and the Academy
(of London) hailed it as 'the quaintest of new journals'< G. B. Shaw, who became a
subscriber after Barnhill sent him a copy of the first number, noted how 'the journal,
as far as I can judge, promises to be sufficiently foolish to make people think; and its
quotations are excellent." As both its title and its first subtitle suggested, the
periodical chose to describe itself as a radical review whose aim was to expound a
vitalistic philosophy of egoism. As the caption below its title indicated, in this form
of egoism, the pride of the eagle, 'the proudest animal under the sun', and the
wisdom of the serpent, 'the wisest animal under the sun' (according to Nietzsche's
prophet, Zarathustra), 'were set out to reconnoitre'. As its title advertised, The Eagle
and the Serpent espoused a 'Philosophy of Life as Enunciated by Nietzsche,
Emerson, Stirner, Thoreau, and Goethe' struggling 'for the Recognition of New
Ideals in Politics and Sociology, in Ethics and Philosophy, in Literature and Art'.
This rather long title would have A. R. Wallace suggest: 'Your title is too long!
Cannot you reduce it to two [key notions]? Why not THE EGOIST? Motto -
"Wisdom and Self-Reliance't"
The periodical echoed the calls of Nietzsche, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry
Thoreau, as well as Casanova, Ibsen and others for a life lived deliberately and in
opposition to the voices of normality, respectability, and conformity. Its format
reveals its focus to be more cultural than political. However, it was adamant in its
allegiance to the American little radical periodical Egoism, 'the only pioneer organ of
egoism', with its shared stated purpose: to 'make the Ego - the I, the master rather
5 'Benedictions and Maledictions', The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 June 1898, pp. 46-48 (p. 48).
6 G. B. Shaw, Letter, The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 April 1898, 'Comments on The Eagle and the
Serpent', p. 21.
7 Alfred R. Wallace, Letter, The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 April 1898, 'Comments on The Eagle and
the Serpent', p. 21.
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than the slave of its environment'i'' as well as to Benjamin R. Tucker's anarchist
Liberty.' With reference to the latter, it saw itself as Liberty's delegated authority in
England, carrying forward some of the views and attitudes adopted there. The
periodical's stress on internationalism, its emphasis on social reform, as well as its
opposition to the political means of achieving social goals, are indicative of such
aspirations. One of the aspects of this internationalism was the periodical's great
emphasis on continental literature and culture. Special numbers on French literature
were planned to appear, promising translations of Montaigne, Stendhal, Chamfort,
and Rabelais as well as on Nietzsche and modern dramatists, Ibsen, Shaw, and
Maxim Gorki. From all 'these however only a special number on Nietzsche managed
to materialise.
The Eagle and the Serpent seemed quite capable of sustaining itself, at least for
a time, despite its uneasy finance. In the 1899 February issue Barnhill reassured his
readership that 'the editor can keep The Eagle and the Serpent afloat as a quarterly
with his present support' and implores subscribers to help financially: 'Money talks.
Pledges of aid may be sent to E. McCall, 23, Linden Mansions, Highgate Hill,
London.' 10 This victory was only short-lived and, despite the periodical inclusion of
star contributors like Shaw, uneasy finance and shortage of contributors necessitated
the occasional omissions of certain issues (mainly the ones pertaining to literature) in
the following years. Publication finally ceased in 1903. The abysmal financial state
of the periodical would be frequently satirized by Barnhill himself. In the editorial
8 There are regular advertisements for Egoism, a monthly periodical published in Oakland, California
by Georgia and Henry Replogle from 1890-1898. The advertisement reads: EGOISM:
Egoism's purpose is to make the Ego - the I, the master rather than the slave of its
environment.' The Eagle and the Serpent and its publishing company 'Eagle Publishing
Company, Fleet Street, 185, London, E.C, England', was their London agent. 'Ads Section',
The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 February 1898, p. 14.
9 Liberty was the first American periodical to publish Nietzsche in 1892 as well as G. B. Shaw, whose
essay 'A Degenerate's View of Nord au' (later reprinted as The Sanity of Art) appeared there in
1895.
IQ Barnhill [writing as McCall], 'Notes and Announcements', The Eagle and the Serpent, 12 February
1899, p. 101.
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column 'Saving the World' from 1901 he gives a clear indication of its chronically
insolvent condition:
In reply to many letters sympathetic and otherwise: Please make our
grave (which certainly will be our first and possibly our last resting
place) by the side of a laughing sycamore tree and on a plain slab,
without frills erect this epitaph: HERE LIES (AS USUAL) THE
EDITOR OF THE EAGLE AND THE SERPENT, the most gifted
borrower the world has ever seen. He touched nothing which he did not
'milk'. He left his promissory autograph in every known language and
encircles the earth with a coterie of creditors on whom the sun will never
set. We hope we ne'er shall look upon his like again
[Signed] MANY MOURNERS AND MORE CREDITORS.!!
A short life span would be the natural lot for a periodical of this kind. Given its
financial instability, its engagement with radical politics and its vexed relationship
with mainstream public, it is a wonder how it managed to sustain itself for a period
of almost five years. The passage above, though ostensibly a lament, is really a boast
of the non-conventional, almost bohemian attitude towards money. Its parody
suggests in a way its degree of originality and radicalism, reinforcing its image as an
honest and uncompromising publication which, irrespective of its financial
difficulties, refused to make compromises with public taste. This idea was of course
connected with the radicalism and avant-gardism it represented. In the column
'Benedictions and Maledictions', a 'Paris Bohemian' notes: 'The Eagle and the
Serpent is sharp enough to make the right sit up, the dull collapse; it is vulgar enough
to dismay the scholarly, scholarly enough to disgust the vulgar', and adds: 'In
London it ought to be a roaring success.,!2
In a small section called 'Finding Ourselves Out' quotes by famous writers are
provided, confirming the periodical's rocky relationship with a larger, mainstream
public and an equally rocky relationship with conventional journalism: "'The public
II McCall, 'Saving the World: Answers to Earnest Light-Shunners', The Eagle and the Serpent. I July
1901, p. 48.
12 Paris Bohemian, Letter, The Eagle and the Serpent, 12 February 1898, 'Benedictions and
Maledictions', p. 106.
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is a great ass." - Carlyle I "That prodigious ass - the British public." - Huxley I "The
public - how many fools does it take to make a public?" - Chamfort I "The people is
a beast of muddy brain." - Campanella.' 13 Further, in 'Finding the Journalists Out' a
New York journalist (who prefers to maintain his anonymity) confesses:
There is no such thing as an independent daily press. We are all slaves!
[... ]. The business of the journalist is to distort the truth; to lie outright;
to pervert; to vilify; to fawn at the feet of Mammon, and to sell his
country and his race for his daily bread. We are all tools and vassals of
rich men behind the scenes [... ]. We are intellectual prostitutes, and our
time, our talents, and our possibilities are all the property of other men. 14
Therefore, one might argue, although not a little periodical in the conventional sense
(as it did not publish modern literature other than the translations of Nietzsche), it
does share some of the little periodical's most common features: it defined itself in
opposition to the larger surrounding cultural environment and expressed discontent
and scepticism concerning popular press and its control of public opinion.
Related to its plan to 'save the world' was its project of introducing Nietzsche
to 'young students of egoism', at least, partly through translation projects. The two
volumes of The Eagle and the Serpent contain the first part of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra as well as translated extracts from other works previously not
available. IS The June 1899 Number launched Thomas Common's translation of
'Zarathustra's Prefatory Discourse', a proj ect followed up in the October issue (15th
October), which was a special 'Nietzsche Birthday Number'. In this issue, Common,
a frequent contributor to the periodical and one of Nietzsche's first English
translators, complained that the official publication of the English edition of
Nietzsche was conspicuously delayed by the London firm which had acquired the
13 New York Journalist, Letter, The Eagle and the Serpent, 12 February 1899, 'Finding Ourselves
Out', pp. 101-102 (p. 101).
14 Ibid., p. 101.
15 In the column 'Notes and Announcements' of the December issue 1898 we read that: 'Those who
desire to see the completion of the translation of the first part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra can
forward that end by sending to Mr. Thomas Common, 112, George St., Edinburgh, a
contribution to the Translation Fund', 'Notes and Announcements', The Eagle and the Serpent,
1 December 1898, pp. 85-86 (p. 86).
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rights. He also complained about the high price of the first three volumes. The Eagle
and the Serpent with its independent commitment to publish Nietzsche (starting with
Thus Spoke Zarathustra), hoped to resolve this by providing translations at a lower
price and at a faster pace than that of its authorized translators, thus making his
works more easily accessible to a wider audience.
A similar independent project of translation had been initiated in France in
such avant-garde Parisian reviews as Le Banquet and Le Mercure de France, as early
as 1893. These two periodicals were formed by young intellectuals who via such
translation projects sought to claim Nietzsche's growing legacy for their own
purposes. In discussing the avant-garde reception of Nietzsche in France, Christopher
Forth notes that 'the controlling influence of the [French] avant-garde In the
publication of Nietzsche was of central importance for the formation of the
philosopher's public image.' Nietzsche, he says, would be perceived as 'part and
parcel of this radical sector of French letters.' 16 The logic behind the French
translation project was not all that different from Barnhill's, who via the periodical
hoped to initiate an interest in the philosopher for 'young egoists', thus promoting a
radical and avant-garde understanding of him.
The periodical liked to fantasize a certain project of cultural revival inspired by
a Nietzschean social ethic of self-creation and self-knowledge. It aspired to be a
'guide, philosopher and friend', to respective 'students and apostles of egoism.' 17
Several files of so-called 'radical literature I were prepared as part of its education
project.l'' The periodical proposed the study of Zarathustra alongside Benjamin
16 Christopher E. Forth, Zarathustra in Paris: The Nietzsche Vogue in France. 1891-1918, (Dekalb,
Ill.: Northern Illinois Press, 2001), p. 37.
17 Thomas Common, Letter, The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 April 1898, p. 16.
18 'Our Loan Library' section contains 12 different files of literature. The editor says: 'Pending the
forming of local libraries, we have decided to start a small circulating library for the purpose of
propagating our ideas. The small fee charged goes towards maintaining The Eagle and the
Serpent', 'Our Loan Library', The Eagle and the Serpent, 1 December 1898, p. 89. The
circulating library was part of the P.U (People's University), which as Barnhill notes is advised
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Tucker's Instead of a Book: a Fragmentary Exposition of Philosophical Anarchism
as well as books of renowned anarchists such as Proudhon and Bakunin, advancing
the understanding of Nietzsche alongside principles of radical individualism and
anarchism. In this context Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra wo':!ld acquire a
particularly radical meaning. Understood in connection to such literature this book
would stand for the liberation of the self from any form of authority, be it religion,
property, or government. In addition to this portrait of Nietzsche as a radical, the
additional inclusion of studies by Lichtenberger, Brandes and Ellis (on top of the
proposed curriculum) conveys the central role aesthetics played in this Zarathustrian
insurrection. Focusing on the subjective and respectively the introspective character
of Nietzsche's philosophy, those studies interpreted his work as signalling a break
with old philosophical tradition, highlighting those elements in Nietzsche which
support free self-determination and creativity. Although all these writers' exegesis of
Nietzsche suggest fascinating links between his philosophy and a turn-of-the-century
ethos of creative individualism, the writer who perhaps provides the most direct
connections between Nietzsche, radical egoism and culture in the context of the
periodical, is the American anarchist John Beverley Robinson. Robinson on several
occasions wrote for the anarchist periodical Liberty and also wrote a number of
essays on philosophical egoism published elsewhere. He is probably best known for
translating into English Pierre Joseph Proudhon's most important book, General Idea
of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century.' In his essay 'Egoism' he points out the
importance of Nietzsche and Max Stirner for modern egoism:
Modern egoism, as propounded by Stirner and Nietzsche, and "expounded
by Ibsen, Shaw, and others is [...] the realization by the individual that he
to 'meet fortnightly or monthly for mutual discussion'. Its object was to 'afford the masses the
means of self-enlightenment and self-advancement, which a selfish aristocracy has deprived
them of [...J. In the first instance it will organise in all centres of population Radical circulating
libraries of such books', 'The People's University', The Eagle and the Serpent, I December
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is an individual; that as far as he is concerned, he is the only individual
[...]. The most profound egoist may be the most complete altruist; but he
knows that his altruism is, at the bottom, nothing but self-indulgence.
But egoism is more than this. It is the realization by the individual
that he is above all institutions and all formulas; that they exist only so
far as he chooses to make them his own by accepting them [...]. All the
ideals which men generally think are realities, you have learned to see
through; you have learned that they are your ideals. 19
Robinson's references to both Nietzsche and Max Stirner in the passage above in
relation to philosophic egoism are not at all surprising. Turn-of-the-century
discussions over Nietzsche and Stirner's kinship abound - both were seen as
prophets of individualism. As Lawrence S. Stepelevich notes, a good reason for this
was the fact that Stirner's revival was 'concurrent with the discovery and publication
of Nietzsche in the Anglophone world - with Stirner playing the role of a proto-
Nietzsche. ,20 What also quickened the 'Stirner renaissance' was an interest in
anarchy. Although some declared Stirnerite anarchists (such as John Henry Mackay)
dismissed Nietzsche's aristocratic egoism as non-systematic and in many ways as
abusively contradictory to Stirner's original message, other anarchists, like Emma
Goldman saw both as prophets of contemporary anarchism. In 1906, Goldman
published Mother Earth, a monthly journal in which she covered current affairs from
anarcho-feminist perspective and reprinted essays by writers such as Nietzsche and
Leo Tolstoy. Her views on Nietzsche and anarchism are perhaps best reflected in her
autobiography, in an anecdote she recounts between her and James Huneker:
One evening we were gathered at Justus's place at a farewell party.
James Huneker was present and a young friend of ours, P. Yelineck, a
talented painter. They began discussing Nietzsche. I took part, expressing
my enthusiasm over the great poet-philosopher and dwelling on the
impression of his works on me. Huneker was surprised. 'I did not know
you were interested in anything outside of propaganda,' he remarked.
'That is because you don't know anything about anarchism,' I replied [...]
19 John Beverly Robinson, 'Egoism' (Reedy's Mirror, 1915; repro London: S. E Parker, 1988), pp. 1-2.
Robinson was one of the most important figures in American individualistic anarchism. For
more on Robinson and added bibliographical information see James J. Martin, Men Against the
State (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles Publisher, 1970).
20 Lawrence S. Stepelevich, 'The Revival of Max Stirner', Journal of the History of Ideas, 35 (1974),
323-328 (p. 324).
24,
[Nietzsche's] aristocracy was neither of birth nor of purse; it was of the
spirit. In that res~ect Nietzsche was an anarchist and all true anarchists
were aristocrats.' 1
To return to Robinson's essay. Radical egoism, as this writer understands it, draws a
parallel between the philosophy of Nietzsche and Stirner, and the drama of Ibsen and
Shaw - the egoism of the former finding expression in the social aesthetics of the
new modern drama of the latter.22 G. B. Shaw's article for The Saturday Review,
partly reprinted in The Eagle and the Serpent, adopts a similar perspective. There the
writer remarks how:
Nietzsche's criticism on morality and idealism is essentially [...] at the
bottom of Ibsen's plays. His pugnacity, his power of putting the merest
platitudes of his position in rousing, startling paradoxes; his way of
getting underneath moral precepts which are so unquestionable to us that
common decency seems to compel unhesitating assent to them, and
upsetting them with a scomful laugh.r'
Shaw's observation about the intrinsic link between Nietzsche and Ibsen was also
shared by The Eagle and the Serpent. In the February issue, 1898, Nietzsche receives
a similar kind of treatment. In it Nietzsche is mentioned as the 'master-builder'
philosopher of a new age. 'We believe', Barnhill says, 'as one of the greatest
21 Emma Goldman, Living My Life, 2nd edn (New York: Knopf, 1932; New York: Penguin Books,
2006), p. 126. This debate over Nietzsche's and Stimer's kinship is still current today. John P.
Clark notes how the question of Stimer's influence on Nietzsche has received a great amount
of attention' in view of the obvious similarities between the writings of the two thinkers in both
style and content' (p. 13). In the topic of Stimer's philosophy and how it further relates to
some of Nietzsche's principal tenets Clark takes notice of how Stimer's stress on the unique
ego foreshadows Nietzsche's emphasis on the creative individual - with 'the former's
Unmensch [...] [as] a prototype for the Ubermensch of the latter' (p. 14). Furthermore the critic
observes how both thinkers attempt to show the pursuit of power underlying human
motivation. At any rate, he concludes, Stimer's analysis of Christian morality and altruism and
his call for an egoistic ethics can be seen as a preface to Nietzsche's latter's development of the
genealogical method with its demand for a re-evaluation of existing values (p. 13-14). John P.
Clark, Max Stirner's Egoism (London: Freedom Press, 1976).
22 The rise of modem drama and the introduction of Nietzsche into a radical milieu are parallel
phenomena. Such early affinities between Nietzsche and radical egoistic thought and, in
extension, the association of his philosophy with the modem drama of Ibsen and Shaw would
not be without justification. Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy, a theoretical treatise on Greek
tragedy and modem art (as exemplified in the opera of Wagner) would have made an informed
impact on writers and aesthetes as early as the 1890s. For more see Allen, Hoffman, and
Ulrich, p. 72. Also, Georg Brandes's essay on Nietzsche must be credited for being the earliest
theoretical work proposing links between Nietzsche and contemporary art and culture.
23 G. B. Shaw, 'Nietzsche in English', The Saturday Review, 11 April, 1896, p. 374; repro [extract],
The Eagle and the Serpent, 1November 1898, p. 77.
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prophets of Egoism he [Nietzsche] is one of the master-builders of the future.'24 Such
allusions to the philosopher indicate the extent to which members of both radical and
anarchist camps seem to have used Nietzsche's war against ideals and morality as a
support for a new philosophical 'immoralism'. It seems that Nietzsche's vehement
critique of herd morality and moral imperatives (as crystallized in a genealogical
critical methodr" was employed in these radicals radical re-evaluation and anti-
idealism which turned morality on its head. Robinson writes: 'The ordinary man -
the idealist - subordinates his interests to the interests of his ideals, and usually
suffers for it. The egoist is fooled by no ideals.'26 Nietzsche's new 'science of
morals'<' favours 'examination, interrogation, dissection, vivisection' and is used
accordingly to attack the Christian morality and its articles of faith, such as, for
instance, altruism and pity.28 Nietzsche's proposal for a modern philosophical
method and a new typology of morals, his philosophical project of both investigation
and destruction of prevailing ideals, common practices, and accepted presuppositions
would at the time have held particular interest for fellow 'vivisectionists', aesthetes,
and radicals alike. In the case of radicals like Robinson, Barnhill, and Shaw, this
impression of Nietzsche as a 'vivisectionist' of modern morals was inexorably bound
with a wish to promote a new social egoistic aesthetic. This attacked the tendency of
a Christian-based ethic to praise altruism, pity, self-abnegation, selflessness, and
humility. In one of its first issues the editor of The Eagle and the Serpent makes the
observation:
24 The Eagle and the Serpent 15 February 1898, p. 7. .
2S Nietzsche's three treatises in On the Genealogy of Morals, "'Good and Evil," "Good and Bad"',
"'Guilt," "Bad Conscience," and the Like' and 'What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals'
concentrate on the deadly dominion of this kind of morality and its likely origins.
26 Robinson, p. 2.
27 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Part 5. On the Natural History of Morals', in Beyond Good and Evil, ed. by
Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.
75-93 (p. 76).
28 This modem science of 'vivisection' of morals is given further elaboration in Part 5 of Beyond
Good and Evil.
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We trust that we have sufficiently indicated the type of altruism against
which the proudest animal under the sun and the wisest animal under the
sun wage uncompromising warfare [...] the altruism by which the
exploited are taught to bless (and curse not) the Shylocks who
despitefully use them and to enter an imaginary heaven through the
pu(t)rifying process of a living hell_29
Barnhill's observation strikes a rather strident Niezschean chord. As the passage
above indicates, egoism as understood by the editor would help to educate 'the
exploited' so they can one day rise above 'herd morality', namely, institutionalised
morality and altruistic ethics. Inspired by the pride and wisdom of Zarathustra's two
favourite animals, the periodical would place its ideal of an anti-Christian ethic
against the ethics of altruism, in an effort to distinguish itself from the moral code of
the herd which denies the creative individual the potential to outgrow the limitations
society imposes. In articles such as 'Altruism - That is the Enemy'r'" 'altruism' is
thought as being synonymous to 'exploitation'. In fact, altruism and exploitation are
like 'siamese twins', 31 and this theme underlines the core argument of the attack.
Other columns such as 'The Religion of Egoism', 'The Calvary of Egoism', 'The
Land of the Altruists', 'Many Letters of Egoism versus Altruism', the editorial notes
'Finding Myself Out', 'The Altruist Lie in a Nutshell', all offer opinions on the topic.
Books on the ethics of egoism such as John Badcock's Slaves to Duty were
advertised in The Eagle and the Serpent, a book promising to 'demolish and place
respectfully on ice the various "Duty" fetishes by which the average man is
enslaved. ,32
29 Barnhill [writing as Volcano], 'The Land of the Altruists', The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 April
1898, pp. 20-21 (p. 21).
30 Volcano, 'Altruism - That is the Enemy', The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 February 1898,.pp. 3-5.
31 Ibid., p. 3.
32 John Badcock Jr., Slaves to Duty (London: Reeves, 1894; repro Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles,
1972). Badcock was a libertarian writer who along with Barnhill and Malfew Seklew
pioneered radical egoism in Britain during the last decade of the nineteenth century. In his
book, acknowledging Nietzsche and Benjamin R. Tucker as his inspiration, Badcock launched
a sustained attack against 'duty', as a disguise for the power of some men by others and as an
obstacle to the individual's self-determination. As S. E. Parker notes in his introduction to the
new edition, Badcock played an active part in the 'free currency' and 'free love' movements of
the 1890s. The editor of Liberty Benjamin Tucker wrote about Slaves to Duty: 'A unique
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Although The Eagle and the Serpent would soon shift its focus to more cultural
and literary matters, a Nietzschean-inspired rationale would colour early pieces such
as 'Our Egoist Prime Ministers'. Targeting current politics, Barnhill rejects
Salisbury's economic policies regarding trade unions, discarding the prime minister's
measures as nothing less than altruistic sophistry." In addition to such general issues
as government corruption and hypocrisy, the rejection of external authority and the
majority rule, The Eagle and the Serpent touches on specific social problems they
sought to remedy. Articles such as 'Can the Poor be Saved by the Pity of the Rich?',
for instance, were meant as assaults on so-called 'state altruism' .34 In this article such
Christian practices as charity and benevolence are attacked as insufficient state
measures masking the urgent issue of poverty. According to Barnhill low living
standards and inhumane working conditions could not be solved through 'benevolent
acts' alone; proper state action and awareness was what was truly required."
In certain British socialist quarters, the periodical's debate between egoism and
altruism was interpreted as a discourse of equality and self-reliance. Seen from a
political perspective, Nietzschean egoism of this kind points to a way of living
compatible with their own project of social amelioration. Quoting an article from the
left-wing Clarion, Barnhill notes the favourable reception of The Eagle and the
Serpent's creed of egoism:
In the Clarion (March 19), Dr. Wallace called attention to the fact that E.
AND S. looks at altruism and egoism from the standpoint of how best to
stop exploitation [...]. He finds 'our title to mean 'self-reliance and
wisdom'. He quotes approvingly our 'Creed and Aim', and adds that our
addition to the pamphlet literature on Anarchism in that is assails the morality superstition as
the foundation of the various schemes for the exploitation of mankind' {In Charles A. Dana,
Proudhon and the Bank a/the People (New York: 8enj. R. Tucker, 1896), p. 69}. S. E. Parker,
'Introduction', in Slaves to Duty (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1972), pp. 3-6. It has to be
noted that the original publication included an appendix consisting of the essay 'Egoism' by
Robinson.
33 McCalI, 'Our Egoist Prime Ministers', The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 February 1898, p. 7.
34 McCalI, 'Can the Poor be Saved by the Pity of the Rich', The Eagle and the Serpent, 1 September
1898, pp. 61- 62.
35 Ibid., p. 61.
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demand for egoistic or self-interested action on the part of the exploited
means simply 'that we are the fools if we choose landlords, capitalists,
soldiers or lawyers to govern us [...J, In originality the Ea!le and the
Serpent is very refreshing. I hope it may meet with support'. 3
While for some socialists this egoistic outlook on the egoism-altruism question
seemed to find a parallel in their socialist ethos of equality, the periodical's
ambiguous editorial policies, its literary agenda and relentless comedy purposely
rendered political fraternizing almost impossible. The relations between Nietzsche
and politics at the time were very complex, but it is clear that Barnhill envisaged the
development of a Nietzschean egoistic ethic which would help dissociate
Nietzschean philosophy from direct political or economic formulas. In response to
some Nietzscheans whom Barnhill identifies as 'orthodox', this new kind of
Nietzschean school offered its adherents a very different conception of Nietzsche,
one which hoped to overcome political and economic convictions.V
Barnhill meant The Eagle and the Serpent as a model 'small periodical' and as
part of a group of other small publications, all of which were aimed at being
'intellectual symposiums, inviting the opinion of diverse political and social groups,
for the sake of argument and the elaboration of their theories.' He liked to think that
such wide-ranging contributions would help making its issues 'a feast of reason and a
flow of soul. ,38 The American anarchist Malfew Seklew (and later associate editor of
the periodical) praised The Eagle and the Serpent as being 'almost an ideal of a
reform publication' .39 He also praised it 'for its ability to pitilessly examine self,
systems and sciences.' Seklew and other radicals would credit The Eagle and the
Serpent for being 'candid' and 'open', and for being cautious against political
daydreaming, 'the Godly gush of the come-to-Jesus "reformers"'. Seklew concludes:
36 A. R. Wallace, Letter, The Eagle and the Serpent, 'Comments on The Eagle and the Serpent', 15
Apri11898, pp. 21-22 (p. 21).
37 McCall, 'A Warning to Nietzscheites who Believe in Rent and Interest', The Eagle and the Serpent,
15 February 1898, p, 5.
38 McCall, 'Editorial Note', The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 February 1898, p. 9.
39 Malfew Seklew, 'Benedictions and Maledictions', The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 June 1898, p. 47.
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I recommend it because it is not afraid to shock its readers by exposing
the vices of the parasites who have a paradise here, nor lampoon the
follies of the proletarian, who in this purgatory so eagerly swallows the
shallow-minded sophisms of soothsaying sky-pilots and sycophantic
sciolists.
Indeed, while the periodical advocated social amelioration and self-emancipation, it
eschewed political ideas which evoked utopian models of society or nostalgia for a
remote and idealised political past. In the issue of June 15, 1898, the editor made the
observation:
We may observe that an expansion of the cerebrum would not hurt most
of us and that dreams of an era of universal benevolence belong rather to
the realm of poesy than to that of social science.t"
The periodical's overall style and editorial policies, as well as the kind of
Nietzschean egoism it advocated, were fundamentally conditioned by this concern.
This position is embodied in the various editorial policies, its ethic of open debate, as
well through a self-reflective style, which rather than providing objective truths and
solutions, questioned itself constantly by way of comic prose and self-parody.
Opposite to the serious and often romantic tone political propaganda employs,
Barnhill's periodical made a caricature out of its politics. Editorial Notes as 'Saving
the World' are indicative of how the periodical choose to present its ambitions in
mock-heroic language - a typical attitude of the periodical, which before the first
year's end would decide to drop its first subtitle for the more suitable The Eagle and
the Serpent: A Journal of Wit, Wisdom and Wickedness. The Eagle and the Serpent
seems to have aimed laughter as an apptopriate weapon against ideological
dogmatism and naive progressivism. Flamboyant editorial notes giving advice on
'How to Attain Will-Power', 'How to Play the Game of Life',41 stand as evidence of
its editor's ability to laugh at his own pretensions to seriousness. In the editorial
40 McCall, 'Benedictions and Maledictions', The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 June 1898, p. 47.
41 'A University of Love, Love as Music and Will-Power', The Eagle and the Serpent, 1 September
1902, p. 63. In fact the editor promises lessons on all these topics for 3/6, or a dollar bill
adding: 'For Terms address the Editor', ibid., p. 63.
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column 'Messianic Disillusionments' with the subtitle 'The Confessions of a
Disgusted Saviour', Barnhill takes great care to make a mockery out of the
periodical's messianic hopes. Humorously recalling the prophet's famous saying in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra 'to learn how to laugh at yourselves, ye higher men, as one
must laugh', Barnill advises potential future reformers to do the same, adding
further:
We resume our apology for saving the world - there is nothing, perhaps,
which calls for more apology [...]. Every reformer must have thought of
himself, in the apt lan~uage of Nietzsche's 'Zarathustra', as a kind of
'kind-hearted old fool'. 2
A fascinating mix of scepticism, positivism and self-parody runs through the
periodical, furnishing its cry for reform, self-emancipation, and regeneration. Its
light-hearted look at modem politics and culture was a staple of its egoistic politics
suggesting a deep-seated conviction that in this epoch of transition, in which God,
and along with him all forms of beliefs and convictions have ceased to be
convincing, perhaps the only sincere approach may be that of a self-parodist. A
Zarathustrian-like humour combined with a sceptical (though affirmative) spirit
seems to have been integral to The Eagle and the Serpent's project of regeneration -
indicating a sober, yet positive approach regarding the future and the new age yet to
dawn. Nietzsche's own philosophical style provides perhaps a good example for
assessing the kind of political scepticism the periodical adopted. In The Anti-Christ
Nietzsche indicates that scepticism is a necessary device of the future philosopher-
reformer.f
42 'Messianic Disillusionments: The Confessions of a Disgusted Saviour', The Eagle and the Serpent:
Special Issue on Why do the Ungodly Prosper, [1902(?)], pp. 79-80.
43 In fact Nietzsche distinguishes between two types of scepticism. There is the 'weak' form of
scepticism that characterizes the thought of contemporary philosophers, whose scepticism
prevents them from committing themselves to anything (sections 204-7 of BGE) in whom
Nietzsche detects a kind of paralysis of the will. The second 'stronger' type is characteristic of
the philosopher of the future (sections 209-11). For further discussion, see Paul 1. M. van
Tongeren, Reinterpreting Modern Culture: An Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche's
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One should not let oneself be misled: great intellects are sceptics.
Zarathustra is a sceptic. The vigour of a mind, its freedom through
strength and superior strength, is proved by scepticism. Men of
conviction simply do not come into consideration where the
fundamentals of value and disvalue are concerned. Convictions are
prisons [...]. A spirit which wants to do great things, which also wills the
means for it, is also a sceptic."
The September issue, 1900, dedicates a large part on the subject of 'the death of
God' and Zarathustra's new philosophy of the future. It reprints a famous passage
from Book Three of The Gay Science where Nietzsche refers to the event of the
death of God and its consequences:
When Buddha was dead his shadow still continued to be seen for
centuries afterwards in a cave, in an immense frightful shadow. God is
dead; but, as the human race is constituted there will perha£s continue to
be caves for millenniums in which his shadow will be seen. 5
The passages reprinted discuss in detail 'the greatest modem event - that "God is
dead,'" namely 'the belief [that] the Christian God has become unworthy of belief,
and the ensuing problem of nihilism, the question of whether 'existence [has] then a
significance at all. ,46 According to Nietzsche, the death of God is a historical and
cultural phenomenon which 'has now began to cast its first shadows over Europe',
and involves nothing less than a demolition of the basic structures of belief and value
upon which European thought has been founded.
The third passage offered by the periodical for study discusses in detail
Schopenhauer's type of pessimism. It selects a passage from The Gay Science in
which Nietzsche attacks Schopenhauer in favour of a new philosophy based on
Philosophy (West Lafayette, Ind., [Great Britain]: Purdue University Press, 2000), and in
particular 'Nietzsche's Sceptical Critique of Scepticism', pp. 148-154, Chapter Three.
44 The Anti-Christ, Section 54, p. 184. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-
Christ, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 2003).
45 'Nietzsche on Atheism, Pessimism, Schopenhauer, & c.', trans. by Thomas Common, The Eagle
and the Serpent, I September 1900, pp. 6-7.
46 Ibid., p. 6.
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affirmation.V This includes Nietzsche's proposal for an ethic of affirmative
pessimism, in exchange for Schopenhauer's ascetic resignation. In the advent of the
'death of God', the passage reads:
Our hearts [...] overflow with gratitude, astonishment, presentiment and
bright; our ships can at last start on their voyage once more 'in face of
every danger; every risk is again permitted to the knowing one; the sea
the sea, again lies open before us; perhaps there was never such an 'open
sea' .48
This affirmative ethic embodied in Nietzsche would be of particular importance in
connection to the periodical's overall project of cultural regeneration. In the
'Reformer's Discouragements and Consolations', Barnhill imagines himself as a
radical reformer armoured with two great weapons, music and Nietzsche:
For ourselves we find two great consolers-music and Nietzsche [...] the
earnest reformer must indulge plentifully in consolation (always a sort of
wise dissipation, perhaps) ifhe could escape the mad house.49
The importance Barnhill ascribes to philosophy and art is shown in this passage
above. In order to gaze into the horrible abyss of modern culture the ideal reformer
needs to be armed with the beneficent power of music and Nietzsche. A certain
element of cheerfulness and gaiety is also required by the reformer. The spirit of
gravity of the old tables of Law, namely, of old values and convictions, should be
replaced by a Zarathustrian ethic of affirmation and cheerfulness. Borrowing a
passage from the Twilight of the Idols Barnhill uses Nietzsche to support this:
It requires no little skill to maintain one's cheerfulness when engaged in
a sullen and extremely responsible business; and yet, what is more
necessary than cheerfulness? 'A Transvaluation of all Values', that note
of interrogation, so black, so huge that it casts a shadow on him who sets
it up - such a doom of a task compels one every moment to run into
47 As Nietzsche says in the passage quoted here, in Schopenhauer we deal with a philosophy haunted
by the shadow of religion, one which provides scarcely more than a 'compromise, a persistence
in and adhesion to the very same Christian-ascetic moral perspectives' it struggles to
overcome, ibid., p. 6.
48 Ibid., p. 6.
49 McCall, 'Reformer's Discouragements and Consolations', The Eagle and the Serpent, IS February
1898, p. 10.
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sunshine, to shake off a seriousness which has become oppressive, far too
oppressive. Every expedient is justifiable for that purpose. 50
Barnhill's image of the ideal reformer as a cheerful dancer seems to allude to
Zarathustra, the 'laughing prophet', who incites his 'higher men' to laugh and
dance." Without a doubt, the role of art and particularly music plays a vital role in
the kind of social reform that Barnhill advances. His reference to music and
philosophy emphasizes his basic assumption that without a love of culture social
action is impossible. Such a hypothesis is further supported by Nietzsche in Ecce
Homo. There Nietzsche likes to envision the Dionysian 'party of life' of the near
future:
That party of life which takes in hand the greatest of all tasks, the higher
breeding of humanity, together with the remorseless destruction of all
degenerate and parasitic elements, will again make possible on earth that
superfluity of life out of which the Dionysian condition must again
proceed. I promise a tragic age the supreme art in the affirmation of
life. 52
That kind of Dionysian philosophy which Nietzsche describes above is a kind of
vitalism. It is what Nietzsche calls affirmative pessimism, pessimism of affirmation
out of the spirit of life - the only temperament proper for the future philosopher,
artist and reformer. This 'superfluity of life' and its celebration, in the form of either
Dionysian joy or Zarathustra's child-like innocence is central to Nietzsche's vitalistic
philosophy and serves as a critical response to the modern condition of nihilism and
its affects. As he tells us in Beyond Good and Evil this 'superfluity' possesses of
'formative, curative, moulding and restorative forces', 'a sign of great health' which
'grants to the free spirit the dangerous privilege of living experimentally and of being
allowed to offer itself to adventure.'
50 Ibid., p. 10.
51 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. by Graham Parkes (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), p. 259.
52 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is (London, New York: Penguin
Classic Series, 1992), 'The Birth of Tragedy' ,4, p. 52.
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In this Dionysian-like, affirmative form of Nietzschean politics one finds much
in connection to the question about The Eagle and the Serpent's cultural politics and
the kind of Nietzschean aesthetics it advocated. The Eagle and the Serpent was
aimed at 'Free Spirits or Spirits Struggling to be Free' and as the editor declared in
the issue [...] it was committed to 'a philosophy of life'. Its basic creed and aim was:
Three thousand years of sorrowful experience make the foregoing
propositions too evident to us. The object of THE EAGLE AND THE
SERPENT is to make them equally evident to all mankind. We stand for
the art of life and the life of art - we stand for that freedom which is the
life of art and can alone teach us the art of living. When we have
converted a body of believers to these views, then our mission will have
- begun. 53
The periodical's philosophy of life has a number of points and applications. Its
repeated references to a philosophy of will, love and life, all attempt to approach the
larger problems with which it is concerned, namely, its concern with modern culture
and the modern individual. Articles on egoism and aesthetics, egoism and the 'sex
question' suggest some of the various applications Nietzschean egoism might have in
current matters, art, politics, aesthetics, and ethics. Editorial notes such as 'the
Infernal Feminine, or, Love as War' ,54 and various extracts from Nietzsche's works
followed by questions and topics such as 'Should Philosophers Marry?', or, 'A
Sexual Appreciation of Luther, Goethe, Kant, Schopenhauer' ,55 suggest this kind of
affirmative joyful ethic. In them Nietzschean egoism is seen as a kind of philosophy
of joy and of life, advancing an ethic of commitment. It is a creed which advances
perpetual creation, constant self-seeking and' demands purpose, knowledge and
strength. Egoists should be like Zarathustra's higher men, who do not sacrifice
themselves as the herd morality advices them to, and express themselves in
opposition to it. A proper egoist should be like Nietzsche's 'higher men', an
53 McCall, 'Our Creed and Aim', The Eagle and the Serpent, 1 September 1898, p. 50.
54 Volcano, 'The Infernal Feminine, or, Love as War', The Eagle and the Serpent, 1 September 1898,
p.51.
55 'Extracts from Nietzsche', 1 October 1900, The Eagle and the Serpent. pp. 15-16.
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individual who does not see reality as a burden or as something to be lamented and is
respectively in harmony with it. As a higher man and free spirit he should believe
neither in guilt nor would he look to the heavens for a "thou shalt - he is not a
believer.' He echoes Zarathustra's doctrine of the body and selfhood: 'Ego, sayest
thou, and art proud of that word. But the greater thing - in which thou are unwilling
to believe - is thy body with its great sagacity; it saith not "ego", but does it. ,56 This
image of Zarathustra as a prophet of affirmation, self-creation and vitalism, and
respectively of Nietzsche as a prophet of the new age, seems to have supplanted the
periodical's broader concern with modem culture, supporting its project of self-
education and inspiring modem free spirits to live experimentally and courageously
during times of transition. An example of this can be seen in the December issue,
1898. In an article by Barnhill, 'The Religion of Egoism' we read, '[b]y the egoist-
philosopher (Hail to thee! death-dedicated apostle!) we mean the man who has the
courage to proclaim the law of universal gravitation in ethics - that each ego is the
centre towards which all things gravitate' , and goes on to say:
EMERSON the Egoist said: 'All laws are laughable but those which men
make for themselves.' It is time to say that all Bibles are to be rejected
save that which we write for ourselves. The Bible of Jesus, of Goethe, of
Heine, of Emerson, of Whitman, of Thoreau, of Nietzsche, - all these
may help us somewhat but we must have pride enough to demand a Bible
not borrowed from the neighbours. A slave might rest content with a
Bible writtten by another, the free man must write his own. Vicarious
suffering, vicarious salvation are out of date [...]. The Egoist learns to
say: - 'You too, have a divine record' [...] we demand an original, an
egoistic, salvation [...J, Jove and the lions never weep, but often laugh.
'The artist only reaches the last summit of his greatness [...] when he
learns how to laugh at himself - he alone can go forward. 57
The periodical not only preached but also attempted to put this kind of affirmative
Nietzscheanism into practice. It recognized that for such a reform to take place, a
56
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 14.
57 McCall, 'The Religion of Egoism (I.) A Prayer for more Bitterness. (II.) A Bible not Borrowed
from the Neighbours. (III.) An Egoist's Confession of Faith in Himself. (IV.) The Calvary of
Egoism', The Eagle and the Serpent, I December, 1898, pp. 82-85 (p. 82).
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new form of social education should be provided, one which would involve the
assessment of prevailing norms and evaluations, while enhancing the development
and advocacy of alternative modes of social life. An upheaval in ideological values
was what was truly needed and this could happen only via a quiet revolt, a slow and
gradual revolution in the ways the individual perceived himself and his surroundings.
In accordance with such a vision, The Eagle and the Serpent proposed the forming of
'people's universities', or 'Nietzsche clubs' whose members would meet fortnightly
or monthly for mutual discussion with the aim to 'study the problems of social
reform and the subject of Egoism'. The issue from June 1898 provides a list of the
newly-founded 'egoist clubs' and gives names and addresses of their secretaries:
Malfew Wilkes, 11, Hounds Gate, Nottingham. W. Robinson, 135,
Willoughby Street, Bew Lenton, Nottingham, Leonard Hall, 43, Alma
Street, Eccles., near Manchester. H. M. Reade 27, Walter Street,
Hightown, Manchester. J. N. Green, 40, Leyton Park Road, Leyton,
Essex. W. J. Robins, 195, Polygon, St. Pancras, London. C, Moorhouse,
11, Handley Street, Sheffield, Henry Bool, 69, E. State Street, Ithaca,
N.Y., U.S.A. J. Greevz Fisher, 78, Chapel Allerton, Leeds. Messrs.
Jaggard's Library, 39, Renshaw Street, Liverpool/"
This is a long and impressive list and includes the names of the people interested in
forming egoist-Nietzsche clubs in cities like Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool,
Nottingham, London. Such projects were interestingly commented upon by men of
letters such as Shaw himself, who in a letter of support to the journal in the
November 1898 wrote:
[... ] It is noteworthy that the Fabian society was formed by the division
of a pre-existing group into two sections; one, the Fabian society, taking
up the political and economic side of the social question; and the other,
then called the Fellowship of the New Life, and still in existence as the
New Fellowship, taking up the ethical and philosophical side. The result
is noteworthy. The Fabian society has exercised a great influence, and
has attained, perhaps, the maximum of success possible to such
organizations. The New Fellowship, though composed largely of the
same men, has exercised practically no influence at all, because it had
really no new ideas [... ]. It was not until after 1889, when Ibsen and
58 MCCall, 'An Egoist University and Circulating Library', The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 June 1898,
p.43.
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Nietzsche began to make themselves felt, that the really new idea of
challenging the validity of idealism and duty, and bringing Individualism
round again on a higher plane, showed signs of being able to rally to it
men beneath the rank of the geniuses who had been feeling their way
towards it for centuries. Had the Fellowship started with any glimmering
of this conception, their history might have been different. As it is, seems
to me quite possible that a Nietzsche society might hit the target that the
Fellows of the New Life missed, and might repeat on the ethical plane
the success of the Fabian society on the political one.
Yours faithfully, G. B. Shaw.59
Both Thatcher and Bridgewater quote Shaw's letter in full and take it to be the
inspiration behind Orage's and Jackson's formation of the Leeds Arts Club four
years later.6o Shaw hoped that this form of 'Nietzsche societies' might provide the
right balance between the ethical and philosophic tenets of societies such as the
Fellowship and the vision of political renewal shared by Fabians. In such examples
like Shaw's one sees how Nietzschean egoism was taken to provide a kind of
alternative social discourse, one likely to reconcile the intrinsic tensions between
politics and culture.
The Eagle and the Serpent came to an abrupt end in 1903. However this is no
indication that the periodical had not been on the whole successful in its program and
cause. The Eagle and the Serpent was the first London little periodical which
identified in Nietzsche an individualistic element. It supplied the basic material for
an engagement in the philosophical parameters of egoism (by way of Nietzsche) and
its possible applications. Its aim was to propagandise egoism, individualism, and
freedom of expression, not just become the mouthpiece a particular ideology and was
tolerant of social heterogeneity and difference. The emphasis was on an ethic of
creativity, insurrectionism and will power: it was the individual first and foremost
that ought to realize his potential and seek his liberation, his self-amelioration,
59 G. B. Shaw, Letter, The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 April 1898, 'Nietzsche as a Social Reformer: Or,
the Joys of Fleecing and Being Fleeced', p. 27.
60 For more see Thatcher, pp. 186-187, as well as his account of Holbrook Jackson and the Leeds Arts
Club, pp. 233-235; Bridgwater, pp. 64-65.
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through the cultivation of his mind and soul. Its principal task was to find a means to
express a new social ethic which would stand for the liberation of the human mind
from all forms of authority except that of the self - a task which it thought would be
best achieved via a Zarathustrian ethic. In this respect, its advocating of Nietzschean
egoism as an agent of social formation may have been meant not as an alternative
ideology, but as an alternative to ideology; an ethic co-opted by radicals, anarchists,
and artists alike, centering only on the promotion of the very ethic of individualism
and freedom it envisioned. My aim in this chapter has been to provide a basis for a
discussion of this unique variety of egoism and its related Nietzschean radicalism.
My aim in the following chapters will be to demonstrate that an interest in these
radical and egoistic elements did not disappear with the periodical. Although its
project of 'saving the world' remained incomplete, this element of egoism seems to
have continued to exercise its influence upon Nietzsche's functioning within radical
and literary circles. Elements of its radical legacy seem to be retained in later
Nietzschean forums like the Leeds Arts Club, which in 1903 would launch its own
project of a Nietzschean 'underground'. And fifteen years later The Eagle and the
Serpent would again appear in regular advertisements in The Egoist which offered
bound files for sale alongside contemporary literature such as Wyndham Lewis's
Tarr and James Joyce's A Portrait.
1.2 Holbrook Jackson and The Leeds Arts Club as an Early Platform of G. B.
Shaw's and Nietzsche's Philosophic Outlook
As pointed out before, the central aim of this chapter is the examination of
Nietzsche's radical legacy in the context of the emerging 'new age'. In the previous
section we saw how as early as 1898 The Eagle and the Serpent combined
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individualist radicalism with an interpretation of Nietzsche allied to the periodical's
broader vision of cultural and social education. Following my analysis of fin de
steele periodical culture, this part begins with a discussion of the growing fascination
with Nietzsche beyond the space of this particular periodical into the cultural field
and the broader circulation of Nietzschean themes among British left-leaning circles.
After the demise of the periodical an interest in Nietzschean radicalism continued
and it again appears in such artistic coteries as the Leeds Arts Club. In this context,
Nietzsche was ideologically embraced by some socialists for whom Nietzsche's
affirmative and engaging rhetoric became synonymous not only with rebellion and
the destruction of the old order but also fired their millennial hopes and aspirations
about reform and change in the advent of a new age.
Initiated by socialists such as Alfred R. Orage, Holbrook Jackson and their
circle of friends, the Leeds Arts Club adopted Nietzsche as a theoretical weapon
originally intended to strengthen and provide an inspiration for their overall socialist
project of cultural renaissance. In this Arts Club, as I intend to show, we see clear
traces of an early type of Nietzscheanism, a Nietzscheanism which advocated a new
social ethos of action, vitality and creativity via the cultivation and development of
the individual. Jackson and Orage believed that the various social ails of the day
could not be fixed through the established political process. They saw reform as
possible only through a cultural revaluation of society as a whole. In addition, they
saw culture as integral to the process of regenerating society - culture as a vehicle of
re-evaluation and re-construction and their understanding of Nietzsche was
inseparable from their belief that economic and political change alone was
insufficient to meet the spiritual and social necessities of the coming upheaval.
After an introductory sketch of the history of the Leeds Arts Club, which
constituted an early attempt to set up something akin to a 'Nietzsche society' as
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proposed by The Eagle and the Serpent, I tum my attention to the particular way in
which Holbrook Jackson, a Fabian socialist and a co-founder of the club, saw the
philosopher. Jackson's championing of a Shavian-Nietzschean anti-bourgeois
aesthetic, 'a new modem philosophic egoism" that praised eccentricity, creativity
and individuality, is a particularly interesting example of early radical
Nietzscheanism, providing links between the early radical Nietzscheanism of the
Eagle and the Serpent and that of modernist writers such as George Bernard Shaw.
Jackson co-opted certain Nietzschean themes in his writings and projects with the
purpose of animating a certain new cultural ethos - one particularly close to G. B.
Shaw's early assessment of Nietzsche. By interpreting Nietzsche through the modem
aesthetic school of Ibsen and Shaw, as well as through the prism of Barnhill's
egoism, Jackson hoped to make Nietzsche a source of inspiration for a cultural
reassessment of socialism, whose objective was to place the concept of the individual
at the centre of any social, cultural, or intellectual betterment.
It was through the enthusiasm and initiative of Alfred. R. Orage and Holbrook
Jackson that the Leeds Arts Club came into being. The men met one day in 1900, in
Walker's Bookshop at Briggate, Leeds. An account of this is given by Jackson in the
preface to his biography of Bernard Shaw:
My dear Orage - You will remember how, some years ago, we were
thrown together by the Fates in that smoky chaos which is known to
geographers and others as Leeds [... ]. It was in a book-shop [... ] after a
while I heard you throw the intelligence department of the emporium out
of gear by inquiring for a volume by a modem writer, well enough
known among thoughtful people, but evidently a dark continent to
Leeds.62
According to Phillip Mairet, Orage's biographer, Orage was most probably inquiring
about the very expensive volume of Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Jackson,
61 Holbrook Jackson, All Manner of Folk: Interpretations and Studies (London: Grant Richards,
1912), p. 16.
62 Holbrook Jackson, Bernard Shaw (London: Grant Richards, 1907), p. 9.
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who was himself already a keen Nietzsche enthusiast offered to lend Orage his
vclume.t' A firm friendship and intellectual partnership would ensue, of which were
born the Leeds Arts Club (founded in 1903), the Fabian Arts Club (1907), and The
New Age (1907).
According to Tom Steele, Orage had taken little notice of Nietzsche's work
until he met Jackson, who had himself come across Nietzsche in The Eagle and the
Serpent'" A lace merchant and a Fabian socialist, with various connections within
the Fabian community, Jackson had moved from Liverpool to Leeds a year earlier.
Although Leeds was one of the fastest-growing cities in the country, he felt rather
dissatisfied with the limited cultural and intellectual resources the place offered to
young intellectuals. He felt that in Orage he had found a kindred spirit, one capable
of appreciating the impoverished state of the arts and the society in general. Their
intellectual kinship was spontaneous.
Soon, a certain circle of friends would be formed around them: young men,
socialists, intellectuals and the like, all seeking an outlet for expressing openly and
fully their new and controversial ideas on culture and politics. Jackson writes: 'we
turned quiet corners of local cafes into temporary forums, often extending the lunch-
hour in a way quite heretical in Yorkshire. ,65 The Leeds Arts Club was born out of
these discussions. Jackson conceived the Leeds Arts Club as a cultural soundboard
for the disaffected urban intelligentsia, a space for dialogue and self-expression. For
him, dialectics, the art of discussion and debate and, by derivation, the investigation
of truth by discussion, were an important tool of social reform. Convinced that 'the
worship of abstract ideas, be they never so beautiful, must end', and that the 'aim of
63 Philip Mairet, A. R. Grage: A Memoir (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1936), p. 21.
64
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the modern world should be the marriage of idea and action' ,66 he seems to have
based his vision of a perfect discussion forum on the timeless ideal of the Athenian
Agora. In one of his early critical essays we read:
The aim of the Greeks was to connect ideas with common affairs. That
was the meaning of all their great discussions [...]. No thought; not even
the most sublime, is complete in itself, and the value of an idea can only
be determined by the test of practice. 67
This idea and the central place accorded to a life of action (as opposed to a life of
contemplation and studied abstention) underpin the agenda of the club. Jackson's
perception of Nietzsche not as a kind of contemplative anchorite but rather as a
philosopher-combatant, an exponent of 'militant personalism' ,68 would develop in
parallel with this idea. In addition, Jackson's (and by extension, the club's)
advancement of Nietzsche as an antidote to the decadence of middle-class morality
would add considerably to the spirit of avant-gardism, eccentricity and insurrection
that permeated the club. As Steele points out, Holbrook Jackson always thought that
the ostensible, but not admitted aim of the club was to 'reduce Leeds to
Nietzscheism' .69 The doctrine of the club may be summed up in its syllabus. It
proposed to study 'the ideas expressed in art and philosophy, religion, and politics,
and to consider these ideas in their actual bearing upon social life' .70 The underlying
principles upon which the club was established, particularly its urgent demand to
insert ideas into daily life and to promote 'constructive', edifying criticism 'deep into
the evils of modern urban life', were made plain in its manifesto. It stresses
[...] the association of art and philosophy with actual life [...] however
destructive its criticism of modern social conditions may be, their final
aim is not destruction but construction."
66 All Manner of Folk, p. 23.
67 Ibid., p. 23.
68 Ibid., p. 17.
69 Steele, p. 68.
70 Ibid., p. 48.
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As Steele notes, 'part of the Club's excitement was its dedication to "life as
experiment"', which was incidentally the title of one of Jackson's talks to the club.
'No Victorian Shibboleth, it seemed was safe [...]. All values were to be
transvalued.tf Overall, the Club expressed the tendency of young intellectuals to
depict themselves as a kind of secret intellectual aristocracy, who together embarked
upon the task of invigorating and reshaping the current conceptions of morals,
society, and ethics. Phillip Mairet's memoir of Orage and Jackson's early days in
Leeds confirms this:
There was plenty of real gaiety among the men, doubtless encouraged by
Nietzsche's Joyful Wisdom. But behind such words as those above, half-
jest and half-earnest, there were real moral conflicts, personal ethical
dilemmas, and - in the atmosphere the club produced - not a little
flouting of conventions and libertarian experience.f
Intended as a radical alternative against academicism on the one hand and philistine
mentality on the other, the group sought to introduce modem writers such as
Nietzsche, Ibsen, and Bernard Shaw and to provide a public voice for non-conformist
ideas. For Jackson one of the central aims of the club was to attack pedantic
philosophy and academic art and, equally, to emphasize the importance of applying
artistic ideas to life.74 There were special nights when G. K. Chesterton, Edward
Carpenter or George Bernard Shaw would attend and give lectures. Mairet adds:
For the Leeds Arts Club was a sensational success. The local bourgeoisie
were flabbergasted when the shocking views of such as Nietzsche, Ibsen,
and Shaw were acclaimed in their midst by this heterodox seminary, and
advocated with a mixture of aestheticism, moral earnestness, and egoistic
flippancy. They went away horrified, and yet returned again unable to
withstand the temptation of such outrageousness.f
72 Steele, p. 258.
73 M . 2arret, p. 5.
74 Ibid., p. 13.
7S Ibid., p. 25.
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Such success inspired people in neighbouring towns, such as Bradford and
Hull, to form their own cluba" Isabella Ford, the pioneer socialist and feminist, was
one of the Club's earliest members and for a while, a leading member of its
committee." As her biographer notes, the Leeds Arts Club encouraged her to share
her views on both socialism and literature. In this Arts Club she found a congenial
environment for developing and expanding her ideas. It 'gave her a much-needed
breathing space at a time when her life as a political agitator, was becoming more
and more hectic.,78 Her interest in literature and particularly in Ibsen and modem
drama (whom she regarded as a forerunner of socialist thought) found an enthusiastic
and well-prepared audience."
According to Mary Gawthorpe, another early member, 'it was stimulating,
refreshing and nourishing to be a member of the Leeds Arts Club, circa 1904. ,80
Gawthorpe was a Yorkshire born woman of working-class background and, like
Orage, a primary schoolteacher. Arguably her involvement in it had a strong
influence upon her later development. Gawthorpe, both as a suffragette and political
activist, as well as the founder and co-editor (together with Dora Marsden) of the
anarcho-feminist review The Freewoman, was energized by her early experiences in
the club. The Freewoman, as Chapter Three reveals sustains important connections
between the early forms of radical Nietzscheanism, feminism and modem literature.
Alongside its project of political and cultural emancipation, the journal advocated a
certain militant individualism. It may be argued that the club may have been
instrumental in arousing Gawthorpe's interest in the social and aesthetic aspects of
individualism, an interest which is stated in one of her letters to Marsden where she
76 Ibid., p. 26.
77 She was a close friend of Edward Carpenter and member of the ILP. She was a socialist activist, as
well as a novelist and journalist.
78 June Hannam, Isabella Ford (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 88.
79 Ibid., p. 88.
80 Mary Gawthorpe, Up Hill to Holloway (Penobscot, Me: Traversity Press, 1962), p. 197.
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contemplates the radical agenda of The Freewoman.81 In this letter, alongside her
suggestion to corroborate with Huntly Carter and Allen Upward (both New Age
connections) as well as Dr. Whitby and Rebecca West, she sketches out the new
shape of the periodical as a vehicle of individualism: 'If I had the means and you
were not averse from the proposals I would make The Freewoman a fighting weapon
for pure disinterested individualism on such lines as this. ,82
While it is Orage who is traditionally credited with developing the Nietzschean
side of the Club, Jackson, in practice, played an equally active role. In her memoirs,
Gawthorpe writes: 'Holbrook Jackson [was the one] responsible for introducing both
Nietzsche and the volumes [of Nietzsche] to the Leeds Arts Club. ,83 For individuals
like Gawthorpe, the radical activism that Jackson's Nietzscheanism typified would
perhaps have seemed a more attractive alternative to Orage's mystical interpretation.
It must be pointed out, that while both Jackson and Orage found in Nietzsche a
modern cultural educator, there are important differences in the ways these two men
chose to pursue their Nietzscheanism. Orage's would be nourished by an interest in
theosophy, and a certain idealistic socialist ethic which reminded G. K .Chesterton of
'Wo B. Yeats's own fascination with mysticism.t'" Jackson's, on the other hand,
81 As Bruce Clarke points out, despite Gawthorpe's inability to take up any major editorial
responsibilities for The Freewoman due to poor health caused mainly by the severe
maltreatment she endured during the WSPU demonstrations, she continued to do much work
behind the scenes. Her connections with A. R. Orage and his circle turned out especially
useful. According to Clarke, Gawthorpe played a 'pivotal early role in moving Marsden toward
the literary orbit of The New Freewoman.' Bruce Clarke, Dora Marsden and Early
Modernism: Gender, Individualism, Science (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
1996), p. 91.
82 Ibid., pp. 91-92.
83 Gawthorpe, p. 201.
84 Orage was an active member of the ILP Club where he was a popular lecturer and debater. Together
with socialism and political journalism he would develop a parallel interest in Theosophy and
would become a prominent speaker in the theosophical platforms of the North. As Pierson
notes, 'like [Edward] Carpenter and others in the socialist movement he was blending the
mysticism of the east with the evolutionary optimism of late Victorian culture.' Stanley
Pierson, British Socialists: The Journey from Fantasy to Politics (Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 1979), p. 36. Spiritualism, psychology and politics would mix in a unique way within
Orage's type of Nietzsche an ism, producing a strongly visionary philosophy. His first book on
Nietzsche, Consciousness, Animal, Human, and Superman (London: Theosophical Publishing,
1907) was based on a series of lectures given to the Theosophical Lodges of Leeds and
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emphasized the radical, artistic and individualistic side of Nietzsche's philosophy. A
possible source for this might have been The Eagle and the Serpent to which Jackson
subscribed. Another source was his friendship with George Bernard Shaw, whom he
must have met through the Fabian Society.
As Jackson admitted later in his seminal study The Eighteen Nineties: A
Review of the Art and Ideas at the Close of the Century, Nietzsche was seen as a
reaction of dismay and agitation of the younger generation against the 'soul-sickness'
of a fin-de-steele culture of decadence." In his view, Nietzsche and, in particular,
Nietzschean egoism, would express the new generation's search for alternatives to
European decadence. He notes that, as early as the turn of the century, '[Nietzsche's]
idea that the highest of all things is not mankind but the self, the individual ego' was
an important source of inspiration. Jackson credits Nietzsche alongside Stirner and
Ibsen with introducing this new belief in the self. He says:
The decadence was a form of soul-sickness [...J, But there was also
another form of the soul's unrest which sprang out of an excessive
vitality straining at the leash of custom. Itwas the unrest of an age which
had grown too big for its boots."
For Jackson, this literary tradition in general and Nietzsche in particular
expressed a demand for 'new conceptions· of life and morality and mankind', the
unrest of the age', its need to redefine existing values.87 In addition, Jackson saw
Nietzschean egoism as a significant force to be taken into account. This we can see
from both his critical essays from the period, and his involvement in the Club's
aesthetic manifesto. Although there are interesting correspondences between
Manchester. For Orage the conception of Nietzsche an 'Overman' came to express a conviction
of a higher state of being and awareness. Orage's Nietzscheanism is a fairly well worked line
of research. See Tom Steele, Alfred Drage and The Leeds Arts Club; Stanley Pierson, British
Socialists: The Journey from Fantasy to Politics; and Tom H. Gibbons, Rooms in the Darwin
Hotel: Studies in English Literary Criticism and Ideas, 1880-1920 (Ned lands, W. A.:
University of Western Australia Press, 1973).
85 The Eighteen Nineties, p. 160.
86 Ibid., p. 160.
87 Ibid., 160.
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Jackson's appropriation of the philosopher and the Nietzschean egoism of The Eagle
and the Serpent - his would be of a less anarchistic kind - consistent with his
broader socialist program. Less interested in the political side of Nietzsche, he placed
the emphasis on the aesthetic and cultural value of his philosophy, ultimately
choosing to read him through the lens of the radical egoism oflbsen and Shaw.
Man and Superman, G.B. Shaw's most serious attempt towards a study of the
Nietzschean concepts of the Overman and the will-to-power, was published in 1903,
the year the Leeds Arts Club opened its doors. Jackson, who was developing a
reputation as a literary critic and a free-lance journalist, was a personal friend of
Shaw and later his first authorized biographer. Shaw, for whom socialism involved
far more than a new economic and political scheme, had something of an established
reputation within this circle as a schismatic. As Ian Britain in Fabianism and
Culture: A Study in British Socialism and the Arts, c. 1884-1918 notes, Shaw's high
position in the hierarchy of the [Fabian] society, would not stop his rallying against
his fellow-Fabians, whom he often accused of 'philistinism'. Shaw's attack was
primarily directed against what he saw as the 'Fabian Society's restricted political
scope which seemed to neglect altogether such areas as culture and the arts' .88
Shaw's letter to The Eagle and the Serpent, in which he supports the periodical's
proposal of Nietzsche societies, also makes a similar point about the need to consider
integrating arts, philosophy with politics and social life. For some of the more
artistically inclined Fabians, like Jackson an~ Shaw, neither the Webb's 'scientific'
brand of Socialism nor their own conception of reforming society by gradual
humanitarian state legislation appeared tractable or effective without a parallel
emphasis on culture and education. Jackson made a related point about function,
arguing that a politico-economic socialist scheme would be insufficient without the
88 Ian Britain, Fabianism and Culture: A Study in British Socialism and the Arts, c. 1884-1918
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 9.
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involvement of arts and culture. In a letter to the secretary of the society, Edward
Pease, Jackson complains that he 'had always felt that the society had focused upon
the scientific and political aspects of socialist propaganda at the expense of Arts and
Philosophy'. In this letter, he claims that
[the society's] potential had been narrowed by a permeating 'traditional
atmosphere characterising society's Executive; the higher echelons of the
society whereas having developed a sound socialist attitude towards
politics and sociology refused to do the same for the domain of arts. 89
According to Jackson, the two paths to solving this problem were Shaw's
socially conscious aesthetic and Nietzsche. Jackson saw Shaw and, by extension,
Nietzsche as the advocates of a new philosophy of 'vitalized action', a philosophy
capable of providing answers to the problems posed by the modem social system,
'which had become a chaos and a desolation, as our urban surroundings constantly
reminded us'. 90 In the context of the Leeds Arts Club, these two directions became
inextricably entwined through the kind of aesthetic Orage and Jackson promoted. As
Mairet notes, 'their project was for a movement of cultural reform. It was to be
primarily aesthetic in its motives, but with much more far-reaching aims. ,91 While
Orage was elaborating his Nietzscheanism mainly through his interest in mysticism
and psychology, Jackson sought to animate the Club's vision of aesthetic reform via
a Shaw-Nietzsche alliance. Jackson's early determination to advance Shaw as the
champion of socially conscious modem art, counterposed to both the bourgeois
culture and the urban mentality, coexisted with his Nietzscheanism.
89 It is important to note here that the Fabian Arts Club, which had been founded on similar principles
by Orage and Jackson in 1907, was a further crystallization of this shared desire for a forum
where the role of arts and culture could be discussed. Mairet informs us that a special Fabian
Arts Group was founded which held its meetings in Clifford's Inn and at a room in Fleet Street.
Holbrook Jackson became honorary secretary. The membership included those Fabians who
were somewhat disaffected with the Webbs's ideas: Bernard Shaw, Sydney Olivier, H. G.
Wells. Lowes Dickinson, Aylmer Maude, Gerald Gould, and Dr. Eder, were some of its
prominent members. Most of them gave lectures, as did star guests like W. B. Yeats, Belloc, G.
K. Chesterton, and Professor Lethaby. Despite its success, this Arts group's independent and
anti-traditional tendencies would soon cause too much discomfort to the parent party, and swift
action was taken to break off its official connection with the club. Mairet, p. 36.
90 Shaw, p. 12.
91 Mairet, p. 22.
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One of the emphases of the Club was the promotion of modem drama, which
for Jackson held a particular slgniflcance.f Jackson emphasized the function of the
theatrical medium as a social force, a useful tool of education and political change, a
potential 'vehicle of social reform' and presented Shaw as a pioneer of the New
Drama movement. On the s" December 1904 he delivered a talk on Bernard Shaw
which intended as a kind of introduction to 'a radically new cultural politics'. From
the surviving programs (currently in the Leeds Public Library), it appears that
Jackson's was interested in studying the role held by Shaw's drama with an emphasis
on reform in private and public life. From looking at the material in the Leeds Arts
Club Archive, it seems that Jackson's continued to promote Shaw's new drama even
after 1907, when he and Orage moved to London. Although a year earlier Jackson
had resigned from the post of Honorary Secretary (a place soon after taken by A. W.
Waddington and Miss A. K. Kennedy), he continued to advocate Shaw's theatre as
the wellspring of a new radical cultural aesthetic. A programme from 1909, io"
December, announces a lecture by George Bernard Shaw on 'Art and the Nation' .93
This lecture was given in the University Hall, College Road, Leeds and was chaired
by Jackson. The programme is furnished with an introduction which describes Shaw
as one of the 'most original, the most fascinating and the most provocative of
contemporary minds'. He is praised as having established a 'new tradition [...J [of]
social theatre'; 'his plays, novels, essays, and lectures are all suggestions for a way
out.' Jackson saw that Shaw's theatre was a comprehensive criticism of the modem
social system, a 'fearless' and 'honest' one, an aesthetic medium bold and strong in
its devotion to realism and modernity. This modem, anti-idealistic and anti-
92 Steele also mentions that 'it was through this idea that play-writing and production became
important activities, leading to the Club's sponsoring a Playgoers society in 1907 for the
promotion of drama and Opera and eventually in 1925 Leeds Civic Playhouse', pp. 70-71.
93 Lecture Program, G. B. Shaw, 'Art and the Nation', 10 December 1909, Leeds Public Library. The
Leeds Arts Club Archive.
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traditionalist aesthetic would enable the audience to 'look at our age in this frank
way and not through the eyes of historic myth, literary convention or outworn
tradition.' This was a eulogy to Shaw in which the latter's socially conscious
aesthetic was regarded as a valuable ally against the 'ugliness, wastefulness, and the
cruelties of our social system.'
In works such as All Manner of Folk: Interpretations and Studies as well as
George Bernard Shaw, Nietzsche is primarily interpreted through the prism of
philosophic egoism adopted by affiliated thinkers such as Ibsen and Shaw.94 All three
thinkers are valued as principal examples of a type of new philosophic 'militant
personalism', which, far from being academic, 'laughs at all theories which will not
stand the test of personal practice [... ] it believes in action, in living its philosophy
and practicing its idealism. ,95 As Jackson explains, 'militant egoism' signified a new
type of modernist philosophic egoism, an avowedly dynamic one where mere
philosophical speculation and discipleship would be discarded. This kind of
individualism also underpins Jackson's thoughts regarding contemporary art
criticism and the overall judgement of the value and quality of art. He writes:
Criticism is the art of comparing the ideas and actions of others with
one's own, and whether it be personal or impersonal it is always in the
nature of the confession of selfon the part of the critic. Some critics have
been fully conscious of this natural outcome of their art. The well-known
words of Anatole France will come readily to the mind. 'As I understand
it', he says, 'and as you allow me to practice it', criticism, like
philosophy and history, is a sort of romance, and all romance, rightly
taken, is an autobiography."
And concludes: 'It is not my intention to propagate a doctrine or to seek converts to a
point of view; my desire is merely to indicate a process in the psychology of
94 Opening with a passage from Nietzsche All Manner of Folk is a highly intuitive critical study of
literary figures such as Poe, Whitman, Carpenter, and Thoreau. Jackson devotes a whole
chapter to Nietzsche, whom he considers in the light of this philosophical and literary tradition.
9S All Manner of Folk, p. 17.
96 Ibid., p. 18.
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personality. ,97 From the above it is evident that Jackson recognizes the subjective
element in all knowledge, philosophy, history, and, in extension, in art and aesthetic
criticism - while stressing the role of individual psychology in the process of
interpretation and reflection. Talking about the need to revolutionize art criticism in
light of new modem aesthetic currents, Jackson discusses the value of an aesthetic
that could potentially find a way of harmonizing the two realms of contemplation and
action, idea and practice. The new artistic attitude is embodied in Bernard Shaw and
in particular in the emphasis he puts on action rather than on contemplation.
According to Jackson, Shaw's critique of reason." his view of the intellect and
morality as a phenomenon limiting the free exercise of thought, and, in turn, his
advocacy of a 'return to the instinctive life' ,99 serves to introduce a new aesthetic
which suggests new directions at imagining and constructing reality. Jackson sees
this new modem aesthetic most explicitly embodied in Bernard Shaw, whom he sees
as the exponent of a new individualistic art of performance, action, and
experimentation.
These associations between Shaw and modem aesthetics are further pursued
and systematized in his book on Shaw, a study meant primarily as an exegesis to this
new philosophic and aesthetic outlook that the dramatist proposed.l'" In it Jackson
sets his argumentation primarily through a Nietzschean theoretical framework to
advance Shaw as an exponent of a new socially conscious individualistic aesthetic.
97 Ibid., p. 18. .
98 Jackson writes in Shaw: 'Shaw, recognizing the errors of the age of reason, advocates the era of the
will. Just as we must look upon the institutions as the tools of a generation to be discarded or
improved upon by succeeding generations, so must we recognise that the intellect and its
methods of expression are, in the same way, means of life, and not ends in themselves', pp.
232-233.
99 Ibid., p. 225.
100 Shaw had authorized Orage and Jackson to write a critical biography of him, although eventually
the book appeared under Jackson's name only. Their shared vision of politics and aesthetics is
crystallized in this part-critical study, part-biographical venture, which was simultaneously a
tribute to Shaw as 'Social Playwright', Shaw as 'Fabian', and Shaw as '(Dionysian)
Philosopher'. Jackson was purposely recruited by Shaw to help propagandise for him, and this
critical study is evidence of that, with Shaw co-ordinating the publication and providing
meticulous corrections before its final publication.
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According to Jackson Shaw's drama followed the tradition of Ibsen and Nietzsche
and was destined to merge together these writers' aesthetic into a coherent system.
According to the critic, Shaw's plays were not merely social criticism - instead
they were meant to introduce a new kind of philosophy. In this critical study, Shaw
emerges as an egoistic philosopher, a thinker of a new, Dionysian order, preoccupied
with life and its essence. According to Jackson, Shaw's social theatre would be part
of this tradition which if 'not exactly beyond good and evil, is at least beyond any
good and evil other that which is generated in the individual.' 101 Rather than simply a
socialist dramatist, Jackson presents Shaw as a new type of iconoclastic reformer,
who like Nietzsche is not afraid to philosophise with a hammer:
Many of those who appreciate his ideas as well as his wit complain at
times that Shaw is more destructive than constructive [... J the modern
reformer is of necessity an iconoclast first and a builder afterwards. But
there is plenty of evidence in Shaw's case at least that iconoclasm is
followed immediately by construcuon.!'?
Jackson's analysis sought to pinpoint the individualistic, unconventional and radical
aspects of Shaw's aesthetic ethic and his theorizing was heavily inspired by a
Nietzschean idiom. 'The Philosopher' chapter examines Shaw's philosophical
system in detail, paying particular attention to the notions of 'Life Force' and 'world-
will' with recurrent allusions to Nietzschean theory.
In particular, Nietzsche is linked with such Shavian characters as Dudgeon and
Tanner, who are contrasted with the cast of 'Ibsen's plays, which depict and
symbolize the net of convention and destiny in which all men are caught. [...J
Bernard Shaw's [...] characters have tasted with more appreciation the fruit of the
knowledge of good and evil.' The critic adds: 'They don't only taste, but are inclined
to enjoy. Shaw's philosophy is the expression of this attitude towards life.' 103 In his
101 Shaw, p. 30.
102 Ibid., p. 23.
103 Ibid., pp. 201-202.
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view, Shaw's conception of life is akin to Nietzsche's, for whom life is overcoming,
the transformation and constant experiment with itself.
In this study, Jackson made creative use of the Nietzschean concepts of the
will-to-power and the Ubermensch, by attempting to make them speak for a new
vitalistic aesthetic, as initiated by Shaw. He saw the Shavian concept of the Life
Force as the most profound idea in this philosophy, an idea which Shaw shares with
Nietzsche. 'The central idea in his philosophy is the conception of the underlying
energy of life as the world-will. He has conceived this as a force, the Life Force - as
he calls it - eternally seeking expression by instruments of greater certainly and
power.' 104
In particular he relates Nietzsche's concept of the will-to-power with Shaw's
advocacy of a 'return to the instinctive life' as well as with the latter's repudiation of
moralism as expressed in the form of 'Duty':
The Life Force grows out of order following upon right action [...J, His
[Shaw's] repudiation of duty makes it clear that right action is not
something following upon authoritative concepts. It does not spring out
of 'ought' or 'should.' And, on the other hand, his negation of all
formulas - the golden rule is that there are no golden rules' - makes for
the abolition of all arbitrary distinctions in such considerations. It
actually throws the thought of action upon the individual. Instead of
saying to man, as the moralists did, 'Do what you ought to do', he says,
'Do what you want to do' [... J the repudiation of Duty is the first step
towards progress. lOS
For Jackson this philosophy of self-reliance and self-reflection of Nietzsche and
Shaw could help towards a personal and cultural development, through an insistence
on individual creativity and experimentation. 'It is important', he writes, that 'we
should be ourselves, especially in an age like the present, when the majority of
people are content to live second-hand lives.' 106 For Jackson, Bernard Shaw's
vitalism advocates 'as boldly as Nietzsche' a philosophy of desire and instinct. He
104 hS aw, p. 202.
105 Ibid., p. 220.
I06All Manner of Folk, p. 14.
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sees both as being exponents of a new philosophy that affirms action,
experimentation and joy - one that counteracts decadence, passivity and 'negation',
as opposed to Schopenhauer, who 'did not imagine that life was the remedy, but
death.,107 In that sense, Shaw's advocacy of the concept of the Life Force and of a
return to the instinctive life is the recognition that the only genuine motive force of
life lies in instinct. 'Man', he argues 'by substituting duties for instincts, has actually
sterilized life's power of growth - has thrown the Life Force into the necessity of
having to perpetually repeat the same forms instead of creating new ones.l08
'Therefore, it is the business of man to become conscious of the aim of life by
contemplation and experiment. He must not seek the fruits of action, but action
itself. ,109In Shaw, Jackson professed that what Shaw's philosophical attitude would
have established was 'a cultivation of the will for change', as well as 'the critical
sense of the individual', both necessary components 'for the social mechanism to be
activated.' 110This social aesthetic was not meant to preach in the sense in which the
moralist preaches. Its value rather rests in its potential to inspire, vitalize the modern
individual to re-evaluate his current condition, and provide a stimulus for arousing
the individual to action. In an article in Rhythm, 'A Plea for Revolt in Attitude'
Jackson envisions a new kind of modern art which takes its cue from Nietzsche, for
whom art served as a kind of instrument, a 'stimulus, a sort of tonic of the will', and
Bergson, who sees art as an instrument of suggestion:
This new artistic attitude will recognize art both as an instrument of
suggestion and a stimulus of the will, the spirit, the imagination and it
will demand from it the transference of its suggestion and stimulus to its
own actions. Those who adopt the attitude will no longer content
themselves with praise of art. If art suggests anything and they like it,
107 Shaw, p. 210.
108 Ibid., p. 225.
109 Ibid., p. 232.
110 Ibid., pp. 201-202.
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they will seek the thing suggested. Thus will art be re-valued, and the
new value will not end 'in a dream but in an action. III
In the second part of this chapter I have addressed some of the main reasons
why Nietzsche came to be endorsed by certain active socialists. The Leeds Arts Club
is an example of such an endorsement. There, Nietzschean motifs came to be
incorporated into the agenda of radical socialism. I have examined the Leeds Arts
Club as an early example of Nietzschean activity in England and the growing
appreciation that socialists like Jackson expressed for Nietzsche's radical philosophy.
The Leeds Arts Club represents an early attempt of young intellectuals to engraft
Nietzsche into an agenda of cultural and intellectual radicalism. It was a group of
individuals who saw in culture, Nietzsche and the arts an ideal accompaniment to
their dream of social regeneration. This kind of radical Nietzscheanism was often
preoccupied with overcoming the legacy of an overtly moral Victorian age, plotting
the overthrow of long-established idols and old ways of life. For some more
artistically oriented socialists, such as Jackson, Nietzsche provided a language that
helped him give expression to the more radical, intellectual and aesthetic side of their
socialism. In particular, his understanding of Nietzsche not only as a kind of
philosopher of action, will, and individuality but also as a kind of cultural educator
greatly supplied the dream of cultivating a new self-willed socialist consciousness.
Nietzscheanism of this sort then proposes Nietzsche both as a kind of educator and
tonic. Strengthened by the social vision of Shaw it was supposed to provide a certain
social remedy to the chaos and morbidity of modem life. Jackson's own
advancement of a Shavian-Nietzschean engaged aesthetic hailed the virtues of
experimentation in life and art as the proper path towards individual self-
advancement.
III Holbrook Jackson, 'A Plea for Revolt in Attitude', Rhythm, 1 (1911),6-10 (p. 10).
56
1.3 From Ego-Mania to Ego-Latria: Selected New Age Aesthetic and Cultural
Responses to Nietzschean Egoism (1907-1921)
The third early principal location of Nietzschean dissemination that I will be
discussing is The New Age journal, which appeared as Drage and Jackson's joint
project in 1907. The New Age's favourable response to Nietzsche takes several
forms. There is its close collaboration with some of the key early Nietzscheans.
There is the array of articles dealing implicitly or explicitly with Nietzsche. There are
recurrent allusions to him and his philosophy in the correspondence columns on
cultural, aesthetic, social and political topics. Lastly, there is the form of the
periodical itself, its editors' shared commitment to a new cultural aesthetic, a certain
ideological imperative going back to the early days of the Leeds Arts Club and the
Nietzschean spirit that informed it. In this transition, from the more spatially-specific
Nietzscheanism of the Leeds Arts Club coterie to the one underlying the enterprise of
The New Age, one begins to see, as I will argue, the integration of an earlier socialist
ethic into the broader intellectual agenda of modernism, and the subsequent
development of Nietzsche's ideas and legacy to later writers and thinkers.
The significance of The New Age 'as a conduit of Nietzschean ideas with
literary modernism is recently noticed by Michael Bell, who noted the value of the
periodical both as a forum of literary modernism and as key medium for circulating
Nietzschean ideas in an English context.112 Indeed in the pages of the periodical we
will find a profusion of references to Nietzsche - with Nietzschean concepts
informing a number of then-current aesthetic and cultural discourses. However, since
it is not possible to discuss all of them here, I have selected four examples which
illustrate the existence of vital and explicit connections between Nietzsche, literature,
112 Bell, p. 62.
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and culture - particularly in relation to concurrent aesthetic trends and discourses of
degeneration/regeneration. There four examples are: George Bernard Shaw's The
Sanity of Art, 113 a pamphlet study addressing Max Nordau's Degeneration; 'Sex and
Superman' by Dr. Charles Whitby and Alfred R. Randall related to the issue of the
Superman ideal, genius and sexuality; 114 Angelo S. Rappoport's article 'Nietzsche,
Ibsen, Kierkegaard', 115 a favourable study of Nietzschean individualism and its
relation to modem culture and aesthetics, approaching it through the tradition of
Ibsen and Kierkegaard; and 'Nietzsche Revisited', 116 by Janko Lavrin, who finds in
Nietzsche's so-called 'pathological subjectivism' his own creative alternative to the
degeneration of modem culture. I analyze these articles focusing on their positive
response to notions of egoism/individualism which serves to counteract prevalent
mainstream ideas of degeneration and decadence - like the ones spawned by
Nordau's Degeneration. All these New Age articles tum Nordau's original
conception on its head by exploring the various positive and affirmative uses of
Nietzsche's individualism.
For its editors The New Age was an attempt to extend their intellectual and
professional horizons beyond Leeds. The two men had moved to London as free-
lance journalists in 1906. A year later, they bought The New Age, a small Christian
socialist periodical, which had been declared bankrupt earlier that year. They had
financial support by G. B. Shaw and Lewis Wallace. Shaw contributed five hundred
113 George Bernard Shaw, The Sanity of Art: An Exposure of the Current Nonsense of Artists Being
Degenerate (London: The New Age Press, 1908).
114 Charles J. Whitby, 'Sex and Superman', The New Age, 27 April 1911, pp. 621-622; Alfred E.
Randall, 'Sex and Superman', The New Age, 4 May 1911, pp. 20-22; Charles J. Whitby, 'Sex
and Superman', The New Age, 11 May 1911, p. 46; Randall E. Alfred, 'Sex and Superman',
The New Age, 18 May 1911, pp. 69-70; Charles 1. Whitby, 'Sex and Superman', The New Age,
25 May 1911, pp. 94-95; Charles J. Whitby, 'Sex and Superman', The New Age, 29 June 1911,
p.213.
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pounds which came from The Doctor's Dilemma royalties. Wallace, a financial
banker with whom Orage shared theosophical interests, matched his contribution.
Shaw's eagerness to be of assistance on this project was not restricted to offering
money but at the same time he was reluctant to be publicly associated with the
journal. In one of a series of letters to Jackson on this subject from July 1907, he
writes: 'Don't put my initials in it. I must not lend my name to an attack on the
Cabinet just now.' 117
As Pierson has suggested, the establishment of The New Age could be seen as
an extension of the Leeds Arts Club's effort to nurture a shared discursive space
which would enhance man's artistic and spiritual life as well as his economic and
political being.118 As Jackson later confessed to Drage, The New Age would be a
concrete way of advancing their intellectual expedition further: 'We have pitched our
tents in London, and our intellectual partnership has been concentrated in a still more
practical way in our co-editorship of The New Age.' 119 The earlier Nietzschean spirit
underlay the broader socialist project of the periodical. Some measure of this
undercurrent can be drawn from the first editorial by Jackson and Orage, titled 'The
Future of the New Age'. 120 This editorial served as a kind of manifesto for the
periodical's future agenda. As self-proclaimed 'genuine philosophic reformers', the
editors saw as their chief task the bringing together of a group of individuals who
shared an interest in renewing modern ethics, and not necessarily much else. 'First in
imagination and then in fact' this was a renewal which had as its basis 'the will of
man'. In their manifesto Drage and Jackson dream of The New Age as a kind of
'commonwealth of free and responsible individuals'. In keeping with the spirit of the
117 The Holbrook Jackson Library: A Memorial Catalogue: With an Appreciation by Sir Francis
Meynell(Bishop's Stortford: E. Mathews, 1951), p. 63.
118 Pierson, p. 197.
119 Ibid., p. 65.
120 Holbrook Jackson and Alfred R. Orage, 'The Future of the "New Age''', The New Age, 2 May
1907, pp. 8-9.
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Leeds Arts Club, the editors insisted in making it a model forum of open discussion
and free dialogue. Their aim as stated in their manifesto was to promote a kind of
discursive community which far from confining its pages to dogmatic statements
would instead invite 'the services of "men of good intent" of every shade of
opinion' .121 Using a characteristically Nietzschean phraseology, they go on to say:
Believing that the darling object and purpose of the universal will of life
is the creation of a race of supremely and progressively intelligent
beings, The New Age will devote itself to the serious endeavour to co-
operate with the purposes of life, and to enlist in that noble service the
help of serious students of the new contemplative and imaginative
order.122
What this passage seems to suggest is that The New Age was informed by an
Ubermensch ethic not unlike the one seen underlying the cultural agenda of the
Leeds Arts Club. The two editors seem to have managed to integrate their earlier
Nietzschean vision within the cultural (and socialist) agenda of the new periodical,
promoting what Ann L. Ardis has described as 'a neo-Nietzschean view of art and
philosophy as vital evolutionary forces,.123 The difference between this periodical
and other leftist radical reviews of the time was that from the very beginning Orage's
and Jackson's vision was less about economics and politics than for a kind of
revolution of both the collective and individual spirit. It was about the breeding of a
modern social conscience, which, through the 'great forces of literature, art and
121 Ibid., p. 9. This attitude of openness is evident in the periodical's attitude towards then-current
fashionable strands of Nietzschean thought, to which it served as a kind of platform. From very
early on The New Age came to harbour a range of contradictory Nietzschean viewpoints,
forming a mosaic of varied ideas indicative of the intellectual climate of London Bohemia. The
heterodox community of New Age. Nietzscheans formed under Orage's encouragement,
exemplifies further the attitude endorsed there, what Ann Ardis argues was an unshakable
conviction in 'the principle of unbounded and open-ended discursive interaction'. Ann L.
Ardis, 'Democracy and Modernism: The New Age under A. R. Orage (1907-21)', in The
Oxford Critical and Cultural History of Modernist Magazines, ed. by Brooker and Thacker, pp.
205-225 (p. 220). Orage offered Levy and his circle of friends (mostly Nietzsche devotees and
collaborators in his translation project) a platform for their conservative position on politics,
aesthetics and current affairs, with some, as for instance Ludovici, holding permanent columns.
This brought them frequently at odds with the socialist worldview espoused by most of the
journal's contributors, including Orage himself.
122 Ibid., p. 8.
123 Ardis, p. 214.
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philosophy', would help spread the ideas of self-betterment and cultural
reformation.l'"
It is not difficult to see how such a notion came about. Early Nietzschean ideals
portraying the self as an infinitely growing, actualizing potential, mixed with then-
current cultural and social discourses regarding progress and regeneration. In his
1906 study Friedrich Nietzsche: The Dionysian Spirit of the Age125, Orage adopts
Nietzsche's concept of the Superman and blends it with his own millennial discourse
of reform and regeneration. Observing how 'all life is either ascendant or
decadent',126 he discusses the condition of 'current humanity', which shows signs of
a spiritual regression: it does not 'possess any qualities, lacking intelligence and
will.' In this state of consumption, he says, there it is vital necessary to establish new
standards for the evolution of the modem consciousness: 'we have first to develop a
caste of mind that shall be qualified to undertake the creation of a superior race.' 127
"'The Superman" ifhe is to appear at all, must be willed - in plain words, and must
be bred.' 128
This leitmotif of affirmative utopia was intended to make The New Age
especially attractive to young intelligentsia. For the young, progressive and
artistically-minded audience The New Age would come to represent a kind of battle
standard for the educated revolutionary. A sense of this spirit is given in Storm
Jameson's memoir. Recalling her youthful days as a student in London, she writes:
And talk - my God, how we talked. Generations since ours have talked
as feverishly, but not with our confidence, or our illusions. The
difference between them and us is that we knew we were at the frontier
1M .
'The Future of the "New Age''', p. 8.
125 Alfred R. Orage, Friedrich Nietzsche: The Dionysian Spirit of the Age (London: T. N. Foulis,
1906).
126 Ibid., p. 50.
127 Ibid., p. 73.
128 Ibid., p. 68.
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of a New Age [... ]. We were socialists of a sort [... ] Orage's New Age
was our Bible, the source of half our ideas - the less anarchical half.129
In this intellectual climate it is not surprising than Nietzsche would quickly become
integrated into the broader discourse of regeneration The New Age advocated. From
very early on Nietzschean egoism would be brought to bear upon debates about the
state of modern culture and aesthetics, and more specifically on whether or not
contemporary art is indicative of a condition of either the degeneration, or the sanity
of modern culture. The originator, or at least, the great popularizer of the concepts of
'degeneration' and 'egomania' in contemporary aesthetic and cultural discourses,
was Max Nordau, a German doctor and an art critic. His Degeneration (1893 in
German; 1895 in English), a pioneering medico-cultural treatise on modern art and
ideas was met, at least at first, with enormous interest. The book was dedicated to
Caesar Lombroso, Professor of psychiatry and forensic medicine at the Royal
University of Turin, and claimed to be an attempt 'at a really scientific criticism' of
the contemporary decadent art as symptomatic of a wider cultural degeneration.
Nordau saw art and philosophy as the principal conduits through which an epoch
communicates its values and mores. He was greatly disturbed by the prevailing
attitudes in art and philosophy, and railed at length against fin de steele artistic
grandmasters such as Wilde, Tolstoy, Zola, Whitman and Nietzsche, trying to prove
that most of them were physiological and psychological degenerates. For him 'they
all show the same lacuna, inequalities, and malformations in intellectual capacity, the
same somatic and psychic stigmata.' 130
In Degeneration Nordau devotes a whole chapter to Nietzsche's work, which
he examines as a record of the philosopher's psychological and physiological disease
- a disorder he terms as 'egomania'. For Nordau, egomaniacs were social and moral
129 Storm Jameson, The Journey from the North (London: Collins Press, 1969; Virago: 1970), pp. 65-
68.
130 Max Nordau, Degeneration (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), p. 241.
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'invalids', in whom the healthy consciousness of the self is lacking completely. Since
the sufferers were thus entirely incapable of taking into account the external world,
the 'not-I' of societal norms and objective principles, their value-judgment became
entirely blurred.131 The degenerate is akin to Robinson Crusoe, 'who in his
imagination lives alone on an island, and is at the same time a weak creature,
powerless to govern himself. The universal moral code does not exist for him'.' 132
One point of the essay which is of particular interest is Nordau's analysis of
Nietzsche's style of writing. In his 'Egomania' chapter Nordau paid particular
attention to Nietzsche's text and provided a close psychiatric reading of some
passages based on his theory of degeneration. According to Nordau, Nietzsche's
style implied that his philosophy was not the product of a conscious, rational mind
but rather the result of unconscious, instinctual drives. In fact the language employed
by Nietzsche reveals a writer totally immersed in the self and the self's unconscious,
a sign, undeniably, of an egomaniacal want of altruism and the uncontrollable
overflowing of instinctual urges. Nordau professed that without a doubt Nietzsche's
language was that of unreason, coloured by extreme emotions not tethered to reality,
but by the 'excitation of the centres forming motor presentations'v'<' Moved by the
'senses', it was the opposite of rationalized, conceptual thought and therefore the
language of a hysteric; This record of 'chronic obsession', 134which if approached
from the perspective of psychiatry, might be said to indicate abnormal stirrings in the
unconscious, a mind (and certainly a body) resistant to the external reality was in
fact, he contends, a pathological record of repressed emotions and 'fugitive
ideation,135 which remain unknown or enigmatic even to Nietzsche. Further, his
131 Ibid., p. 249.
132 Ibid., p. 259.
133 Ibid., p. 461.
134 Ibid., p. 459.
135 Ibid., p. 463.
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vocabulary, his obsessive allusions to laughter, and at the same time the text's
disruptions, its inconsistencies, the inclusion of 'wholly incomprehensible,
meaningless sounds', 136 reveals the extent to which his unconscious tries to mask its
suffering and despair through a discourse of playfulness and health. Underlying the
facade of laughter and pride is the hysteric fear of an unconscious will expressing its
impotence and frustration. In the concluding remarks to the chapter on egomania he
notes: 'I have devoted very much more space to the demonstration of the
senselessness of Nietzsche's so called philosophical system than the man or his
system deserve.' 137 Nietzsche and his work is a paradigmatic example of a 'sexually
psychopathic nature" 138 guilty of 'confound[ing] the conscious with the unconscious
man', and of representing the individual 'not of knowledge and judgment, but of
blind craving, requiring the satisfaction of his lascivious instincts at any price [...] not
the moral, but the sensual, man.' 139
Nordau's attack on modem art as pathological, sensual, and egotistic and hence
a reflection of decadent times was bound to provoke a reaction among the
intelligentsia, and sure enough it did. Almost immediately after the English
translation appeared G. B. Shaw published 'The Sanity of Art: An exposure of the
Current Nonsense about Artists being Degenerate' (1895). His essay was one of the
first Anglophone polemics against Degeneration. It appeared in the American
anarchist newspaper Liberty as a 113 page long letter to its editor Benjamin R.
Tucker. In 1908 Orage and Jackson asked Shaw's permission to reissue 'The Sanity
of Art' as the first in a series of intended pamphlets on culture and the arts to be
136 Ibid., p. 463.
137 Ibid., p. 452.
138 Ibid., p. 452.
139 Ibid., p. 471.
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published by the New Age press in co-operation with the Fabian Arts Group, which
they had themselves helped to create the previous year.140
This essay counters Nordau, whom Shaw puts down as one of the typical
'philologico-medical triflers', 141a typical bourgeois philistine - and explores the
many ways in which Nordau's analysis can be re-evaluated and given a more
constructive conclusion. Turning the thesis of degeneration on its head Shaw argues
that art in this form has potential for generating sanity, highlighting its capacity for
renewal and a kind of Nietzschean becoming, as it were.
Although in the original essay there are no explicit reference to Nietzsche, the
emphasis being primarily on figures such as Wagner, Ibsen, and Schopenhauer (The
Quintessence of Ibsenism had appeared a couple of years earlier, in 1891, and The
Perfect Wagnerite in 1898) - however the 1908 preface suggests otherwise. In it
Shaw argues:
I know no harder practical question than how much selfishness one ought
to stand from a gifted person for the sake of his gifts or on the chance of
being right in the end. The Superman will certainly come like a thief in
the night, and be shot accordingly; but we cannot leave our property
wholly undefended on that account. On the other hand, we cannot ask the
Superman to add a higher set of virtues to current respectable morals; for
he is undoubtedly going to empty a good deal of respectable morality out
like so much dirty water, and replace it by new and strange customs,
shedding old obligations and accepting new and heavier ones. Every step
of his progress must horrify conventional people; and if it were possible
for even the most superior man to march ahead all the time, every
pioneer of the march must be crucified [...]. In my last play, The Doctor's
Dilemma, I recognised this by dramatising a rascally genius [artist].142
As if trying to correct the earlier omission, Shaw's new preface goes on to make
explicit reference to Nietzsche's Superman ideal, the innate 'selfishness' that this
doctrine entails, as well as its relation to the aesthetics of his latest play, as shown in
his employ of a morally and physiologically degenerate (consumptive) artist. As
140 G. B. Shaw, The Sanity of Art (London: The New Age Press, 1908).
141 Ibid., p. 88.
142 Ibid., p. 9. My emphasis.
65
Shaw notes in the new preface, The Sanity of Art provides the fundamental for
approaching the question of 'the eternal strife between the artist-philosophers and the
Philistines.t'Y Shaw's essay was on the whole a defence of modern art, expressing at
the same time dissatisfaction with standards of public taste and the kind of art
designed to satisfy it. What is more, it exhibits his overall concern about the artistic
medium, advocating the need for art to be free of moral judgment - to be
autonomous and self-regulated, while, at the same time, confirming its social reality
and function.
Overall, in Shaw's account, an aesthetic of moral individualism in which art
serves as a means to elevate man beyond an externally imposed system of laws and
public opinion, is the sole authentic aesthetic imperative. In the essay Shaw notes
further how:
Creeds and laws come to be regarded as applications to human conduct
of eternal and immutable principles of good and evil; and breakers of the
law are abhorred as sacrilegious scoundrels to whom nothing is sacred.
Now this, I need not tell you, is a very serious error.144
Shaw's aesthetic theory relies on some Nietzschean 'beyond good and evil' ideal and
uses Henrik Ibsen and Maxim Gorki as its primary examples. As opposed to
'philistine art' which covers up and perpetuates the outdated morals and customs,
Shaw sees in the art of Ibsen and Gorki a kind of aesthetic through which one may
start doubting the sacredness and stability of existing moral systems, the 'immutable
principles of good and evil.' 145 As Shaw argues further, modern art, its disregard for
convention, etiquette and propriety is potentially a powerful tool, one capable of
shocking the individual out of his slavery to outdated codes of conduct and customs.
Gorki scandalizing New York for instance'<" is one such case in whom one sees the
143 Ibid., p. 9.
144 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
145 Ibid., p. 52.
146 Ibid., p. 13.
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urge to move beyond the hypocrisies of current institutions (the institution of
marriage in his case), or the case of Ibsen who was first received 'with a shriek of
horror' .147'Every step in morals is made by challenging the validity of the existing
conception of perfect propriety of conduct', he notes, adding how dissent and
'heterodoxy'I'" in taste and opinion as well as free will and creativity are invaluable
tools in opening up the potential of one's own subjectivity - facilitating its
emergence.
Further, Shaw borrows a quote from Georg Brandes, 'to obey one's senses is to
have character [... ] he who allows himself to be guided by his passions has
individuality',149 to support the idea that the 'will' is superior to 'reason': 'placing
reason and morality above the individual "will" is 'a damnable error', he says.150Art,
according to him, proves successful only when it achieves to reflect the highest
aspirations (as for instance in Wagner) and the deepest aversions (Ibsen) of which
human nature is capable, without the comfortable mask of reason and decorum. What
is truly needed, he maintains, is an art which allows a clear insight into human
nature; an art that sets the wheels of progress in motion capable of inviting one to
stand back and take an honest look beyond 'laws, religions, creeds, and systems of
ethics' .151In his conclusion to the essay he writes:
We can now, as soon as we are strong-minded enough, drop the Nirvana
nonsense, the pessimism, the rationalism, the supernatural theology, and
all the other subterfuges to which we cling because we are afraid to look
life straight in the face and see in it not the fulfilment of a moral law or of
the deductions of reason, but the satisfaction of a passion in us of which
. . I h 152we can grve no rationa account w atever.
Another defence of art against notions of moral and aesthetic 'degeneration'
comes from Dr. Charles Whitby, a frequent contributor to The New Age and The
147 Ibid., p. 39.
148 Ibid., p. 39.
149 Ibid., p. 39. My emphasis.
150 Ibid., p. 56.
151 Ibid., p. 46.
152 Ibid., p. 59. My emphasis.
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FreewomaniNew Freewoman. His senes of letter rejoinders to The New Age
published under the title 'Sex and Superman' is a further instance where Nietzschean
terminology is drawn into discussions pertaining to cultural and aesthetic matters.
This 'Nietzschean epistolary' appeared in the form of seven consecutive letter
rejoinders to the editor from April 27 to June 29, 1911. 'Sex and Superman' is a
discussion about the relation between artistic creativity and morality, and in
particular the relationship between art and sexuality, a topic Whitby approaches
through the discourse of psychology. His letters serve as a response to one of Alfred
E. Randall's earlier articles to The New Age in which Randall had made a comment
that 'those who regard sex as a paramount interest are not supermen, but
"fornicators",.IS3
Arguing against the equation of art and morals, Whitby uses the concept of the
superman as a kind of aesthetic trope to challenge Randall's comments about
aesthetic impurity and decadence. Artists should not be judged by conventional
standards of morality since
[...] men have the qualities of their defects: hence the vices of great men
are part of their equipment. Mr. Randall will hardly deny that the works
of men like Stendhal, Wilde, and Verlaine owe much of their excellence
to those very qualities from which the moralist shrinks in horror.IS4
Expanding upon the question of whether the artist's value is to be estimated by
measure of common moral standards or genius of craft, he contends that such
distinctions are not satisfactory, for art is by definition the product of instinctual
passion. Drawing on the notion of the superman, Whitby discusses writers like
Byron, Stendhal, Dante as some of the great 'supermen' of craftsmanship and
artistry, and argues for the close relation between sexual drives and artistic creativity
in their work:
153 Whitby, p. 621.
154 Ibid., p. 46.
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Sir, [... ] I must go on to say that from my point of view Byron was also
one to whom sex (in the concrete, you understand) was of paramount
importance. For Mr. Gribble has made it quite clear that it is to Mary
Chaworth that the world owes Byronism - the quintessential product of
the genius of her thwarted lover. Dante vowed in youth that he would one
day write of Beatrice what had never yet been written of any woman, a
resolve which was carried into execution in the 'Divina Commedia'. He
therefore, like all those su?ermen [... ] was evoked by the sex stimulus (in
my sense of the words). IS
Ironically, Whitby says, the true daemon of genius in all these individuals was
nothing less but the figure of their beloved, the 'feminine' in disguise, a sexual
passion internalized and expressed as an eternal aesthetic ideal. In all of these
examples of supermen-artists one sees clear evidence of 'the sex stimulus' channeled
and sublimated into an art of pure and timeless beauty - an insight, that, as he
concludes, makes imperative that we begin to drop such common misconceptions
b d i rt 156a out pure an impure a .
A faith in the self and in tum, a trend of ego-latria ('latria' is the Greek term
for faith) was also expressed by other New Age contributors. A favourable
impression of individualism and Nietzsche can be seen in 'Nietzsche, Ibsen, and
Kierkegaard' published the same year as The Sanity of Art. Rappoport, a lecturer on
Modem Literature at Birkbeck College, London, takes up a discussion about Ibsen,
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, whom he calls the 'three Argonauts of the ideal'. 157
According to him, all three were advocators of the notion of individualism. Their
philosophic egoism and broader subjectivism emerged, he argues, primarily as a
response to the broader spirit of their age:
The first port where all three landed was that of Individualism, of self-
realization. They had appeared in an age [... ] which had crushed the
development of free personality, making the individual as Emerson said
'to be reckoned in the gross, in the hundreds of thousands, of the party,
the section to which he belongs' .158
155 Whitby, p. 213.
156 Ibid., p. 213.
157 Rappoport, p. 429.
158 Ibid., p. 429.
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Rappoport notices the differences between them. Whereas Ibsen's and Kierkegaard's
philosophy was looking forward for a kind of polishing of values, 'not for a new
morality, but for a revised one [... ] remaining within the walls of the ancient
structure' 159 - Nietzsche's Dionysian philosophy, on the other hand, dared to 'laugh'
at the 'corpse of religion, morality and culture.' He was set on a quest for the Greek
educational ideal of 'kalokagathon', 160 the platonic notion of physical, moral and
mental perfection. Like Shaw, Rappoport draws a connection between the doctrine of
the Ubermensch and the affirmative egoism that underlines Nietzsche's ethic:
'Individualism, Egoism, Self-consciousness, and Self-realization' are the basis the
teaching of the 'Superman, the homo singularis, the Ubermensch': 161 Nietzsche, the
'grand amoureux' 162 as he describes him, aimed to put forward a new type of man, a
superman distinctly different from Ibsen and Kierkegaard's, one determined to break
down the bridge between past humanity and the future, and to invent himself anew.
For Rapopport, Ibsen's types, as found in Hedda Gabler and Rosmersholm are,
in some ways, dramatic projections of his ideal supermen. However, to the question
whether they are of the same intellectual material as Nietzsche's, he replies in the
negative.163 The fundamental difference, between them is that Nietzsche's
philosophical tenets offer a sense of affirmative overcoming and redemption, and
suggest a new rhetoric of power and strength by which the individual may live
according to his aesthetic principles. While Ibsen and Kierkegaard, in their effort to
criticize and revise morality, still remain entangled 'within the walls of the ancient
structure'v" Nietzsche breaks down the philosophical bridge behind him and strives
to attain an aesthetics beyond good and evil. His philosophical ideal should not be
159 Ibid., p. 429.
160 Ibid., p. 429.
161 Ibid., p. 408.
162 Ibid., p. 429.
163 Ibid., p. 429.
164 Ibid., p. 429.
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seen as immoralism per se, Rapopport informs us, but rather as, 'a state of moral
innocence [... ] where what is beautiful is also moral', breaking the bridge behind
him and past tradition.l'"
Janko Lavrin, another New Age contributor provided with another fascinating
reading of Nietzsche's case of 'degeneration', what he designates as being a case of
'artistic pathology'. In 1921 Orage, who had assumed full responsibility of the
periodical after Jackson's departure, asked Lavrin to include the latter's monograph
on Nietzsche, Nietzsche-An Approach, as part of The New Age series on culture and
art. A Lecturer of Slavonic Studies at Nottingham University, Lavrin had already
published various 'psycho-critical' studies on contemporary writers such as Ibsen
and Dostoyevsky, all of which were generally very well received by The New Age
coterie.
In the second instalment titled 'Pathology and Art', Lavrin dwells on the
subject of Nietzsche's 'pathology', 166 and in particular on the debate of degeneration
and creativity:
One of the subtlest problems of the psychology of artistic creation is the
relation between 'insanity' and genius, or - to put it more modestly -
between pathology and art [...]. At any rate if we take modem Art or
Literature, we find that many of its important representatives were on the
verge of abnormality, or of a complete degeneracyl'"
The mention of degeneracy in this context is revealing. Drawing its material from the
contemporaneous developments in the fields of psychology and literary criticism,
Lavrin revisits the case of Nietzsche's degeneration both in terms of its aesthetic as
well as its cultural value. Nietzsche's philosophy is interestingly described as 'an
intimate psychological document' which transcribes its pain and suffering into his
work. At the same time Nietzsche is perceived as the embodiment of the exceptional
165 Ibid., p. 429.
166 'Nietzsche Revisited. II-Pathology and Art', p. 42.
167 Ibid., p. 42. My emphasis.
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individual-genius, as well as the philosopher convalescent par excellence. As Lavrin
argues, Nietzsche's style of philosophizing is 'personal',168 'subjective' and proceeds
from the 'dark cellar' of his unconscious.l'" and, as in the case of artistic creation,
'through which one "confesses" or 'discharges the accumulated inner pressure', it is
. . 170a continuous uncovenng.
However, far from seeing it as a record of imbecility and hysterical delusion, as
Nordau did, Lavrin attributes restorative, therapeutic powers to this new form of
'subjective' philosophy. As he maintains, the driving force behind his philosophy is
his insatiable thirst to recover: '[H]is penetrating analysis, his morbidly moody
temperament, his biting satire, his dithyrambs and ecstatic hymns to Life' indicate
rather a new type of life ethic, which 'is always the expression of one's personal vital
needs, and a reaction against accumulating suffering.' 17l For Nietzsche philosophy is
practiced as a form of therapy, expressing a will to recuperate. In this sense,
Nietzsche is figured as the convalescent tragic philosopher in whom life is still
affirmed, despite its adversities and innate malaise. Lavrin adds:
The problem of Nietzsche as the representative of modern consciousness
is of far greater interest than that of Nietzsche as mere 'philosopher'.
Moreover, as soon as we approach him in this way, we cannot pass by
the question: What is Nietzsche's place in modern life and culture? What
is really tragic and really vital in him from the standpoint of our present
spiritual needs and crisis? In short, what can our post-war period learn
from his dilemma, his striving and his failure?l72
In his article 'The Tragic Individual', published immediately after the conclusion of
the war he provides his own answers to these questions: 'Many comfortable old
illusions have been destroyed during the last four years; many philistine "ideals" and
ideologies have been drowned in blood [...]. The naked Reality showed its Medusa
168 Ibid., p. 43.
169 Ibid., p. 43.
170 Ibid., p. 43.
171 Ibid., p. 42.
172 Lavrin, 'Nietzsche Revisited. I-Nietzsche and Nietzscheans', pp. 21-22.
72
head', he notes. I73 Drawing on Nietzsche, in whose philosophy he sees a kind of
ethic of strength, individuality, and tragic affirmation, he argues that for modem
culture to overcome the 'spiritual philistinism' to which it has succumbed, it is
essential that the modem individual approaches life as Nietzsche did, through a
'robust' 'creative will' and tragic perspective.!"
The pessimistic attitude is merely negative and therefore uncreative,
while the tragic attitude is an overcoming of pessimism through
pessimism itself. A tragic individual approaches life, not through a ready-
made optimism or sentimental idealism, but by bravely facing our
existence in its most negative aspects, and consciously striving to
transform it just because of its vulgarity and evil [...]. It is perhaps the
only attitude that leads to a creative transvaluation and transformation of
life.175
This first chapter has attempted to throw some light on the early discourses on
Nietzsche and individualism in the context of what Lavrin has termed radical
modernism. As shown, The Eagle and the Serpent, the Leeds Arts Club and its
brainchild, The New Age, are particularly interesting sites for the light they throw on
the form of these discourses, providing a crucial framework for beginning to unravel
the unique ways in which Nietzschean themes and notions found their way into
contemporary aesthetic and cultural idiom. The following chapters build on and
expand on the individualistic aspects of this tradition and its various manifestations.
173 Lavrin, 'The Tragic Individual', The New Age, 25 April 1918, pp. 502-503.
174 Ibid., p. 503.
175 Lavrin, 'Nietzsche Revisited. II-Pathology and Art', p. 44.
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Chapter Two
G. B. Shaw's Social Drama and Nietzschean Aesthetics: Portraits of Nietzschean
Socialist 'Radicals' in The Philanderer (written 1893; published 1898), The
Devil's Disciple (1897) and Man and Superman (1903)
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I documented The Eagle and the Serpent's radical reading of
Nietzsche and the impact of Nietzschean discourse in the Leeds Arts Club as well as
in the thought and work of some active socialists, Holbrook Jackson and Alfred R.
Orage. While drawing on selected articles from The New Age, I demonstrated the
growing importance of Nietzschean thought in contemporary aesthetic and cultural
discourses - particularly with reference to then-fashionable notions of vitalism and
individualism. I also showed how Nietzschean discourse served to furnish then-
current notions of regeneration. With this in mind, I now want to explore in some
detail G. B. Shaw's engagement with Nietzsche. In particular I want to examine the
respective 'portraits' of radical individualists in The Philanderer, The Devil's
Disciple, and Man and Superman. I see Shaw's portrayal of Nietzschean radicals in
these three plays as a response to contemporary ideas of radical socialist
individualism. This response is framed predominantly in terms of the writer's
preoccupation with modernist aesthetics, questions of selfhood and theories of
cultural evolution.
The ideological relationship between Bernard Shaw and Nietzsche has been
explored by David Thatcher and Patrick Bridgwater. Both their studies take
considerable interest in Shaw's play Man and Superman (1903) which, as they argue,
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served as a catalyst for popularizing certain Nietzschean ideas within an Anglophone
milieu such as the notion of the Ubermensch.
Both scholars discuss the intellectual kinship between Shaw and Nietzsche.
What they fail to do is to take into account the intellectual context within which
Shaw's drama emerges. Their readings tend to present the Shaw-Nietzsche nexus as
a highly problematic intellectual misalliance. For instance, in discussing Man and
Superman, Thatcher acknowledges Shaw's key role in the dissemination of
Nietzschean themes in the Anglophone setting; yet he also writes: 'Shaw [... ]
wrongly enjoys [... ] the popular reputation of having been influenced by Nietzsche.' I
Similarly, for Bridgwater, Shaw's engagement with Nietzschean ideas in Man and
Superman stems not so much from a genuine understanding of Nietzschean
philosophy as from his desire to give his existing fascination with Ibsen and Wagner
a new fashionable twist. Bridgwater sees Shaw's superficial Nietzscheanism as
divorced from the writer's socialist ethos. As Bridgwater concludes, 'in social and
political terms he [Shaw] regards him [Nietzsche] as "inept".,2
Thatcher, on the other hand gives a more charitable interpretation. He states,
with reference to Man and Superman and Major Barbara, that Shaw 'probably had a
better first-hand acquaintance with Nietzsche's work than he has generally been
given credit for or even that he himself, for various reasons, wished to admit.':' He
reads Man and Superman as a conscious attempt to inject Nietzschean terminology
into a socialist ethic: 'grafting the Nietzschean figure to a socialist programme the
superman helped Shaw to hold fast to a belief in Socialism.,4 Nonetheless such an
alliance presents this scholar with inherent paradoxes: socialist ideals prove unsuited
for Nietzsche's brand of aristocratic individualism. For Thatcher, Shaw's attempt to
I Bridgwater, p. 59.
2 Ibid., p. 63.
3 Thatcher, p. 217.
4 Ibid, p. 200.
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bring Nietzschean ethics under a socialist aegis remains an enigma - as he sees
socialism and Nietzschean philosophy as mutually exclusive. In this chapter I
examine Shaw in the context of the emerging radical Nietzscheanism as discussed in
Chapter One. As I will demonstrate there are important links between Shavian and
Nietzschean versions of radicalism that have not been followed through and which
require attention. Both Thatcher and Bridgwater fail to notice the references
(sometimes explicit, sometimes implied) to Nietzschean individualism in Shaw's
own descriptions of some of his earliest plays.
2.2 The Philanderer (written 1893; published 1898)
At the end of the nineteenth century Nietzsche was becoming an increasingly
important figure among the intelligentsia. Shaw's early letters, prefaces and Eagle
and the Serpent contributions reveal a concern with Nietzsche that predates by some
ten years the conception of Man and Superman. While Man and Superman
(published in 1903, staged in 1905) was certainly Shaw's best orchestrated attempt at
introducing Nietzsche to an English audience, it was by no means the first one. The
first reference to Nietzsche and in particular to what Shaw calls the 'new socialist-
Nietzsche generation' appears in The Philanderer (written 1893, published 1898,
staged 1905). This, as Shaw would confess later in a letter to William Archer, was
partly an attempt to put onto the theatre stage what he called 'the new socialist-
Nietzsche generation.t ' More references to Nietzsche appear in another early play,
The Devil's Disciple, in whose preface Shaw draws links between the main
characters 'diabolonian ethics' and Nietzsche's beyond 'good and evil' morality.
More direct connections between Shavian and Nietzschean individualism can be
5 Letter to William Archer from 24th January 1900. In Collected Letters/Bernard Shaw, ed. by Dan H.
Lawrence (London: Reinhardt, 1965-88), II, p. 138 .
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drawn from a letter in The Eagle and the Serpent from 1898 where Shaw presents his
notion of the superman. This chapter goes on to examine the different types of
radical individualism as embodied by the various modem 'supermen' and
'superwomen' of these three plays. My intention is to highlight some of the key
features of these types of individualism. In particular, I want to focus on how they
relate to Nietzsche and contemporary Nietzschean trends as well as how they may
have offered a fertile ground for Shaw's drama.
As mentioned above, early traces of Shaw's preoccupation with Nietzsche, or
rather Nietzscheanism, may be found in The Philanderer. In a letter to William
Archer Shaw has this to say about the play:
In The Philanderer [... ] I put on the stage for the first time a
dramatization of those three generations which we have both seen arise:
the old fashioned pious people, the generation of Ms Fawcett, Lydia
Becker, Stuart Mill & c, and the new Socialist-Nietzsche generation?
The Philanderer is Shaw's second play. Written in 1893 (in three months, March-
Junej ' it was found to be technically unsuitable and was not performed until much
later (1905)8. However, in 1898 it was published as part of the collection of
Unpleasant Plays. As Susan Carlson notes, The Philanderer is, arguably, one of the
least studied Shavian plays. The play has been largely ignored by critics who regard
it as being a 'dated' comic portrait of the contemporary fashions and trends."
Described by Shaw as a 'topical comedy', 10 the play is set in the early eighteen-
nineties and is a humorous, albeit somewhat crude, portrait of the fashionable
bohemian Londoners. Most of the play is set in an Ibsen Arts coterie, and the action
involves several love affairs, one of the most interesting being that between Leonard
6 Ibid., p. 138. My emphasis.
7 Anthony Matthews Gibbs, A Bernard Shaw Chronology (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 109.
8 Ibid., p. 163.
9 Susan Carlson, Women and Comedy: Rewriting the British Theatrical Tradition (Michigan:
Michigan University Press, 1991), p. 97.
lO George Bernard Shaw, Plays Unpleasant, ed. by Dan H. Lawrence (London: Penguin Classics,
2000), p. 97.
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Charteris (the eponymous philanderer) and Grace Tranfield. Act I opens in Grace's
living room, where the couple is being discovered by Julia Craven, one of the many
victims of Charteris's 'philanderisms'. The rest of the play takes place in the library
of the Ibsen Club, of which all three characters are members.
While, on the surface, the play appears to be a wry response to the Ibsen craze
of the day, Shaw's reference to Nietzsche in the letter to Archer indicates that there is
a lot more to it. While current scholarship has somehow failed to notice the Ibsen-
Nietzsche nexus that underlies the play, contemporary reviews of the play seem to
have been more perceptive in this respect. In 1905, H. L. Mencken, the American
literary critic and editor of The Smart Set, for instance, discussed the playas a
commentary on contemporary individualistic Nietzschean trends. He observed how
The Philanderer was written in an age of 'groping individualism', representing 'a
pack of individualists at war with the godly': II
But when Shaw wrote The Philanderer a wave of groping individualism
was sweeping over Europe, the United States and other more or less
Christian lands [...]. Poor old Nietzsche had something to do with this
uprising. His ideas regarding the orthodox virtues, mangled in the mills
of his disciples, appeared on every hand. Iconoclasts, amateur and
professional, grew as common as policemen.
Very naturally, this series of phenomena vastly amused our friend
from Ireland.12
As has been shown in the previous chapter there are several close points of
connection between the emergence of modem individualism and the vogues for
Nietzsche and Ibsen. Correspondences between Ibsen and Nietzsche may be seen as
early as 1889 - when Georg Brandes, the eminent Danish critic, and a dedicated
champion of Ibsen published his study on Nietzsche, 'Friedrich Nietzsche: An Essay
II Henry Louis Mencken, George Bernard Shaw: His Plays (Boston; London: 1. W. Luce, 1905), pp.
28-29.
12 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
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on Aristocratic Radicalism'. I3 Brandes has been rightfully credited for being
Nietzsche's first exegete, introducing him as a kind of philosopher of aristocratic
radicalism and individualism. He put down a solid theoretical foundation for other
early interpreters in European intellectual circles. For Brandes, who had a personal
relationship with both men'" and claims that they regarded him as 'ally', 15 Nietzsche
emerges as a kind of philosopher of independence and individualism - a pioneer of
'radical aristocratism' concerned with what might be called 'the problem of the
'cultural philistinism' .16 In his study both Ibsen and Nietzsche are described as
contributors to 'the development and the moulding of the individual personality', 17 as
pioneers of the new morality and culture - and, as Brandes characteristically notes,
deciding 'which of them has had the deepest effect on the contemporary mind' is
quite difficult.IS The connection of both men with individualism and anti-idealism is
something that Shaw also notes in his letter-proposal concerning the formation of
'Nietzsche-Egoist' Clubs to The Eagle and the Serpent. As he argues there:
It was not until after 1889, when Ibsen and Nietzsche began to make
themselves felt, that the really new idea of challenging the validity of
idealism and duty, and bringing Individualism round again on a higher
plane, showed signs of being able to rally to it men beneath the rank of
the geniuses who had been feeling their way towards it for centuries."
Interestingly, references to Ibsen and Nietzsche as pioneers of the 'new individual'
can be found in contemporary periodical culture as early as 1894 - and specifically
in Lucifer, a London theosophical-literary review edited by Annie Besant. In two
13 Brandes's designation of Nietzsche's philosophy as 'aristocratic radicalism' was met with
enthusiastic approval by Nietzsche. In a letter to him from 1887 he writes that this analogy was
'the cleverest thing' I have yet read about [myselfJ)'. For a discussion of Brandes'
championing of Nietzsche see Ernst Behler, 'Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century', in The
Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, ed. by Bernd Magnus and Kathleen H. Higgins
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 281-322 (p. 289). .
14 He was a personal friend of Ibsen although his correspondence with Nietzsche began quite late,
only two years before the latter's lapse into insanity.
15 Georg Brandes, Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. by A. G. Charter (London: Heinemann, 1914), p. 108.
16 Ibid., p. 14.
17 Ibid., p. 108.
18 Ibid., p. 108.
19 G. B. Shaw, Letter, p. 27.
79
Lucifer articles in the January issue, 1894, Ibsen and Nietzsche are discussed as
exponents of a new notion of selfhood. Both thinkers are associated with ideas of
will-power and individualism: in the case of Ibsen, this is expressed for instance in
Rosmersholm, where one sees the new individual of a 'dauntless and undivided
Will';20 and, in the case of Nietzsche respectively, in the lesson of Zarathustra, who
teaches how a high-minded man can find his own self and develop it:
Self-education of this kind is deliverance from all those commonplace
opinions which since his youth have been at work to destroy his
greatness and originality; therefore this self-education is called the
'assertion of the self and is a living antithesis of the doctrine of the
abnegation of self.21
Jackson's writings in 1909 summed up the reception of Ibsen and Nietzsche, and
placed it within the context of a tradition of philosophical individualism. The critic
saw both men as part of a long tradition of modern philosophic individualism which
they helped to revolutionise. As he argues, they were both involved in initiating a
new form of modern individualism, what he terms as 'militant personalism' - an
ethic grounded upon a polemic, dynamic and self-affirming rhetoric that advocates
'authenticity', 'eccentricity' and self-actualization. It is a new and important gospel
'especially in an age like the present, when the majority of people are content to live
second-hand lives' ,22 and Jackson expresses his disappointment by the crudely
'fashionable' application of it among sections of the intelligentsia:
We have many instances of the sort of thing in the advanced circles
which receive inspiration from the(ir) works [... ]. The devoted egoists of
those entertaining coteries have so enthusiastically abandoned themselves
to the dicta of their philosophic heroes, have so insisted upon themselves
in accordance with the principles laid down by their masters, that they
have ended by becoming nothing more than irritating echoes.r'
20 Otway Cuffe, 'Ibsen's Works in the Light of Theosophy', Lucifer, 15 January 1894, pp. 388-394 (p.
394).
21 G. H., 'Friedrich Nietzsche and his Zarathustra Gospel', Lucifer, 15 January 1894, pp. 423-427 (p.
425).
22 All Manner of Folk, p. 16.
23 Ibid., p. 17. My emphasis.
80
This intellectual context suggests that during the time Shaw's play is set both
thinkers were understood as part of a continuous tradition of individualism whose
latest prophets they were. In The Philanderer, one can look for echoes of this nascent
culture, which are filtered through Shaw's somewhat caustic sense of humour. More
than simply a farce on fashionable Ibsenism, I believe, the play engages with modem
notions of selfhood, creating a light comedy about the uses and sometimes the abuses
of individualism, revealing both weaknesses and strengths in the action, and,
respectively, the inaction, of some of its protagonists.
As Charteris informs us at the beginning of the play, admission to the Ibsen
Club is a very serious matter. Rules are very strict. Only 'unmanly men' and
'unwomanly women' are accepted:
CHARTERIS The rules of the Club forbid [manliness and womanliness].
Every candidate for membership must be nominated by a man and a
woman, who both guarantee that the candidate, if female, is not
womanly, and if male, is not manly.i"
This is not without reason. This rule seems to be part of the kind of advanced agenda
associated with the philosophy of the Club. As we soon find out via Charteris, a sort
of Don-Juan and the Club's self-appointed philosopher, the Ibsen coterie is meant as
a place for those seeking a safe haven from modem conventional attitudes, especially
from the kind of 'suffering nobly endured and [the kind of] sacrifice willingly
rendered by womanly women and manly men.,25 Instead, the members of the Club are
meant to be educated in the advanced un-romantic, un-idealistic, un-altruistic, un-
stereotypical new way - and to act accordingly. In this atmosphere, the proper
etiquette is to be as unmanly (if a man) and as unwomanly (if a woman) as possible,
in other words to be as unstereotypical and as individual as possible. Romantic ideals
24 The Philanderer, p. 118.
25 Ibid., p. 118. My emphasis.
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of love and virtue are hence strictly forbidden: they are utterly 'abhorrent,26 because
they are all old conventions. Sentimental deviants, so to speak, are reported to the
Club's committee for misconduct, as we soon find out. In Act III for instance, we
witness a humorous scene where Julia, one of the least unconventional members of
the Club, is reported by Grace who suspects her for being not as 'unwomanly' as she
claims:
JULIA (through her tears) She's going to have me expelled from the
club; and we shall all be disgraced. Can she do it, Daddy?
CRAVEN Well, really, the rules of this club are so extraordinary that I
don't know. (To Grace) May I ask, Mrs. Tranfield, whether you have
any complaint to make of my daughter's conduct?
GRACE Simply that Miss Craven is essentially a womanly woman, and,
as such, not eligible for membership.t
Arguably, the most diligent exponents of this philosophy are the couple
Charteris-Grace, both, in a way, caricatured definitions of the New Man and the New
Woman. Defying stereotypes and traditional sex roles, Shaw casts them as comical
portraits of the new gender-free individual who try to think and, what proves even
harder, to live the modern way. The play opens with the couple 'making love' and
the stage instructions read:
A lady and gentleman are making love to one another in the drawing-
room of a flat in Ashley Gardens in the Victoria district of London. It is
past ten at night. Incandescent lights, well shaded, are on the piano and
mantelpiece. Near the piano is a sofa, on which the lady and gentleman
are seated affectionately side by side, in one another's arms.28
Grace's drawing room serves as an idyllic set for what proves to be one of the rare
occasions of romance between the two, a -place where rules are temporarily
suspended. In a style that seems to burlesque the conventions of melodrama,
Charteris and Grace speak of their love: CHARTERIS (impulsively clasping- Grace)
'My dearest love.' GRACE (responding affectionately) 'My darling. Are you happy?'
26 Ibid., p. 118.
27 Ibid., p. 157.
28 Ibid., p. 99.
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CHARTERIS 'In Heaven.' GRACE 'My own,;29 before they suddenly become
conscious of the folly of the whole affair: CHARTERIS 'That must positively be my
last kiss, Grace, or I shall become downright silly. Let us talk. Releases her and sits a
little apart from her. ,30A few moments later and with his senses coming back to him
Charteris hurries to revoke his love vows: CHARTERIS (he folds his arms and adds
firmly) 'My happiness depends of nobody but myself. I can do without you.,31 'No
woman is a property of a man' Grace gracefully will say in return, 'a woman belongs
to herself and nobody else. ,32
With such half-serious, half-flippant remarks, the play opens with the two main
characters doing what they seem best at: talk. In a style that parodies romantic love
the scene introduces a major motif of the play: the reversal of gender stereotyping
and the quest for selfhood - expressed in both these characters' frustrating search for
the right path to choose: the love of the self or the love for each other. As becomes
quickly apparent both Charteris and Grace have quite a bit of a philosophic streak.
Charteris calls Grace his 'little philosopher'< and he himself enjoys the title of the
'great philosopher' among the coterie. As soon as love-making stops, they go back to
their philosophizing. Deeply immersed in their theories, and true devotees to the
'unmanly' and respectively the 'unwomanly' cause, to 'the rational view - our
view' ,34they see love as downright blasphemy - love in its old sentimental form is
seen as crude hypocrisy, as 'too big a risk'." As Charteris hurries to remind Julia:
CHARTERIS As a woman of advanced views, you were determined to be
free. [...J Accordingly, you reserved the right to leave me at any time
if you found our companionship incompatible with - what was the
29 Ibid., p. 99.
30 Ibid., p. 100.
31 Ibid., p. 140.
32 Ibid., p. 103.
33 Ibid., p. 103.
34 Ibid., p. 104.
35 Ibid., p. 107.
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expression you used? - with your full development as a human
being/"
Unlike Shaw's model Don Juan, John Tanner, who as Shaw informs us in the
'Epistle Dedicatory'{' of Man and Superman, has 'discovered a moral in his
immorality' and who is an affirmative sceptic, 'no longer assert[ing] himself by witty
negations' nor 'concerned merely 'for the freedom of his own instincts'r" - Charteris,
it may be argued, comes off as a parody of egoistic excess, a mere philanderer. A
master of philosophical theories, and a skilled sophist, a comedian and an ironist with
too much wit and too little faith, Charteris likes to make game of all this
advancement and its pretentious ways. Unlike Tanner, the lover of reality (as it will
be shown further), Charteris claims not to like truth: 'as a philosopher it is my
business to tell other people the truth; but it's not their business to tell it to me. I
don't like it. It hurts.,39 Individualism, as advocated by him is a philosophy Charteris
milks for all it is worth, exploiting it to the best of his abilities. He has no trouble
using it to woo some women (Grace) and discourage others (Julia) - forgetting how
this freedom of his will must be exercised not only freely but also responsibly.
Although Charteris is the 'official' philosopher of the club, it is perhaps Grace
the character who best deserves the title. Proclaiming herself as the 'New Woman'
she loves lecturing others about the new morals and the new kind of love. As she
tells Charteris: GRACE 'I gave her [Julia] a lecture on her behaviour which she will
remember to the last day of her life.' CHARTERIS (approvingly) 'That was right
darling.' .40 Just like Charteris, she is an ardent champion of the club's principles.
However, unlike him, she also seems to believe in them. A true devotee to the cause,
Grace is resolute in her convictions: to love someone 'too much' is to abandon
36 Ibid., p. 108.
37 George Bernard Shaw, 'Epistle Dedicatory', in Man and Superman, ed. by Dan H. Lawrence
(London: Penguin Classics, 2000), pp. 7-38 (p. 14).
38 Ibid., p. 14. .
39 The Philanderer, p. 140.
40 Ibid., p. 161.
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oneself, and to her this seems 'terrible'. Love is a kind of war, a struggle for 'power',
as she tells Charteris in Act III
GRACE Yes Leonard; but I'm an advanced woman [oo. J. I quite agree
with your ideas [oo.J. I am much in earnest about them too; and I will
never marry a man I love too much. It would give him a terrible
advantage over me: I should be utterly in his power. That's what the
New Woman is like. Isn't she right, Mr. Philosopher?
CHARTERIS The struggle between the Philosopher and the Man is fearful,
Grace. But the philosopher says you are right.
GRACE I know I am right. And so we must part."
Towards the end of the play, Grace, withdraws her love, for fear of losing her
'advantage', her 'power' over herself, providing a very sound philosophical
explanation. Love (in this case sexual passion) she seems to suggest, is a power-
struggle, a struggle of two individual wills, and is, in practice, self-destructive.
Despite being 'the only possible woman' for Charteris, she knows she has to be
heartless. 'Sitting down, placidly', she announces:
GRACE I am not at all miserable. I'm sorry; but I shan't break my heart.
CHARTERIS No; yours is a thoroughbred heart: you don't scream and cry
every time it's pinched. That's why you are the only possible woman
for me.
GRACE (shaking her head) Not now. Never any more.
CHARTERIS Never! What do you mean?
GRACE What I say, Leonard.f
It might be argued that this passage is an instance of Shaw making fun of Grace and
her rigid egoistic 'commandments', as it were. Grace's 'Thou shall not love'
rationale seems to deploy a vocabulary very similar to that of early Nietzschean
egoistic discourse in what seems to me an uneasy blend of ethics of selfhood and
self-development. Her observations about love and sexual passion seem to betray a
Nietzschean spirit not untypical of the early discourse we see in such periodicals
such as The Eagle and the Serpent, and more specifically in pieces as 'The Infernal
Feminine, or, Love as War' and 'Why Women Need Egoism'. In such early articles
41 Ibid., p. 141.
42 Ibid., p. 140.
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one discovers fascinating examples of early egoistic debates which discuss love and
sexual passion through a Nietzschean prism - evidence of proto-Nietzschean
feminist ideas that come up again, only much later, in such places as The
Freewoman.
'The Infernal Feminine, or, Love as War,43 written by 'Volcano' (a pseudonym
for the editor) alludes to Nietzsche's notion of love as set forth in The Case of
Wagner. In his essay on Nietzsche, Brandes had noted how Nietzsche came to
replace Schopenhauer's 'Will to-Life' and Darwin's 'Struggle for Existence' by one
new concept, the 'will-to-power', which Brandes defines as 'life seek[ing], not self-
preservation alone, but self-increase' .44 Employing this idea the article goes on to
discuss sexual love as a manifestation of this will-to-power, an eternal battle of wills,
and thus as 'fate, es fatality, cynical, innocent, cruel-and thus true to nature'. This is
a new kind of love: love as nature, as will, devoid of any 'sentimental veneer' or
'hypocritical sentimentalizing', not the over-romantic kind of love Nietzsche saw in
Wagner's Tristan and Isolde, but rather of the amor fati kind Nietzsche saw in
Bizet's Carmen.
[Nietzsche's] conception of love is (the only one which is worthy of a
philosopher) is rare; it distinguishes a work of art among thousands of
others. For, on an average, artists do like all the world, or worse even,
they misunderstand love [...]. People imagine they are unselfish in love
because they seek the advantage of another being, often in opposition to
their own advantage. But for so doing they want to possess the other
being [... ]. And, indeed, it is high time to give our languid lovers, poets,
and their lasses a conception of love worthy of a philosopher and a
scientist [... ]. Those who are shocked to hear that love is the war of the
sexes [... ]. Whenever two WILLS are forced into constant association -
conflict is inevitable.45
Being at the same time innocent and cruel, bitter and creative, this new kind. of love
needs also a new kind of woman:
43 Barnhill, 'The Infernal Feminine, or, Love as War', The Eagle and the Serpent, I September 1898,
pp. 51-52 (p. 51).
44 Brandes, pp. 35-36.
45 'The Infernal Feminine, or, Love as War', pp. 51-52.
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If a woman intends [... J self-possession (body possession), speaking as a
man we tell her candidly that she will find the eternal vigilance in the
price of liberty. She will find that to defend herself against the wiles and
the assaults of the foxy sex to which we have the honour to belong, she
must wage war to the hilt of the knife.46
In The Philanderer Grace experiences passionate love as conflicted and problematic
- as a state of ceaseless war and subsequently as a threat. It appears that her outlook
on sex as a power struggle borrows Nietzschean notions such as the will-to-power
not to celebrate passion (as Nietzsche does himself) but to prove love an
impossibility. Grace's militant egoism is marked by this paradox. The kind of pro-
love sentiment evoked in The Eagle and the Serpent seems somehow to be lacking in
Grace. The way she sees it, loving 'the Carmen way', so to speak, seems much too
burdensome, much too overwhelming. The comedy issuing from Grace's somewhat
Lysistratean ethic, her rigid determination to withhold her love in revolt against male
power, what is interpreted as emotional incompetence by Julia, 'I suppose it is better
to be like you, with a cold heart and a serpent's tongue. Thank heaven, I have a heart
[ ... J you are a coward',47 she tells her - raises interesting questions concerning the
play's intentions. In a sense, Grace's somewhat ascetic ideas, the determination with
which she decides to 'sacrifice' 'love' for 'self, seem intended as a sharp remark, a
tragicomedy of the new freewoman, the woman who will love whom she wills, but
ironically must not marry whom she loves. As Grace seems to suggest, for her the
path from womanhood to selfhood must be a love-less one yet one she has to take. In
rough terms the play is a comic reversal of the romantic plot. The play examines the
individualistic conceptions which inform the two protagonists. Instead of concluding
with the couple's union it ends with their separation. In the last scene, when all
obstacles are overcome (Julia accepts defeat and marries Paramore), Grace bids
Charteris goodbye.
46 Ibid., p. 52.
47 The Philanderer, p. 157.
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Grace's applied 'unwomanliness' (i.e. egoism) however might be revealed to
be 'Nietzschean' for yet another reason. Here is the description Shaw gives us of
her:
The lady, Grace Tranfield, is about 32, slight of build, delicate of feature,
and sensitive in expression. She is just now given up to the emotion of
the moment; but her well closed mouth, proudly set brows, firm chin, and
elegant carriage show plenty of determination and self respect. 48
A fair few critics think that much of the charm of The Philanderer lies in its
autobiographical character.l'' As Gibbs informs us, the play's opening scene and the
love-triangle (Grace-Charteris-Julia) are based upon an actual incident in Shaw's life.
On the evening of February 4, 1893, Mrs. Patterson (Julia in the play) burst into
Florence Farr's (Grace) living room, finding Shaw there - a quite heated episode that
apparently marked the end of the relationship with Patterson. A month later he would
begin writing the play, which he had by then resolved to call 'A Philanderer'. Shaw
at the time was involved with both women, although he was trying to disentangle
himself (albeit futilely) from Patterson and what he felt to be her possessiveness. 50
One may argue that real events and people just served as an incidental inspiration for
what is essentially just a piece of socially conscious satire. Nonetheless, such
information is not irrelevant to my purposes here. It is quite interesting to consider
with reference to Shaw's Socialist Nietzschean generation comment, what might be
the connection between the fictional egoist in the play and Florence Farr (the real
character behind Grace). At first sight, there are some obvious parallels between
them. They are of the same age (Farr was also 32 in 1892, when Shaw started
writing) and both in a sense new freewomen a la mode. Farr, at the time, was mostly
known as a performer of Ibsen and an avid Ibsenite herself. She played Rebecca
West in the first English production in 1891. An actress, writer, mystic, socialist and
48 Ibid., p. 99.
49 Carlson, p. 97.
50 Gibbs, p. 109.
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a feminist, she had met Shaw in the evening gatherings of the Socialist League at
May Morris's house in Bedford Park, London in 1890 (one possible 'blueprint' for
the Ibsen Club perhaps?). Farr, highly independent (both economically and
intellectually), strong-willed and opposed to conventional morals, 'especially sexual
and domestic morals' (as Shaw would later put it) resisted traditional gender roles.
Completely disenchanted with the limitations of married life, as well as with its
realities, she obtained a divorce from her husband, a fellow actor, and, not
particularly keen on repeating the same mistake again, remained single ever
afterwards. Paradoxically, while Farr remained sexually very active - Shaw refers to
her 'Leporello list' _51 not only abstained from marriage but also according to her
biographer, described herself as a kind of female 'hermit'.52 As Mary Greer notes
Farr does not seem to have been particularly enthusiastic about the portrait of Grace.
Her novel, A Dancing Fawn, which appeared in 1894, includes a parody of her affair
with Shaw - possibly, Greer argues, as a retaliation for Shaw's treatment of her in
The Philanderer. 53 Grace might well have had something in her of the wilful,
individualistic Farr who doesn't seem to have shared Shaw's idea that a true
superwoman needs her 'Tanner', who went on to write a novel Life Among the
Supermen (never published however) and this was most likely a scoff at her life
among Shaw and Yeats, and her love-struggle with them.i" Interestingly, Thatcher
51Shaw described his early acquaintance with Farr as such: 'She had no bounds to her relations with
men whom she liked, and, already had a sort of Leporello list ofa dozen adventures, none of
which, however, had led to anything serious. She was in violent reaction against Victorian
morals. And when the impact ofIbsen was felt in this country, and I wrote somewhere that
"home is the girl's prison and the woman's workhouse,' I became persona grata with her.'
Florence Farr, Bernard Shaw, and W. B. Yeats Letters, ed., by Bax Clofford (Shannon: Irish
University Press, 1971), p. 87.
52 Josephine Alexandra Johnson, 'Florence Farr: A Biography of a New Woman' (unpublished
doctoral Thesis, University of Leeds, 1972), p. 348.
53 Mary Greer, Women of the Golden Dawn: Rebels and Priestesses (Rochester: Park Street Press,
1995), p. 130.
54 It is common knowledge among Shaw's scholarship that she persistently resisted Shaw's
Pygmalion-like attempts to mould her into his image of the ideal actress, for which, Greer
notes, it seems Shaw never forgave her. This kind of struggle to extricate her 'self from Shaw,
not unlike Grace in the play might have been a key theme of an unfinished novel Life Among
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notes how Florence lectured on several occasions at the Leeds Arts Club. Her
militancy and her Nietzscheanism (she was 'an advocate of Nietzsche', according to
her biographerj'" can be seen later in her contributions to The New Age. It may be
argued that for an advanced egoist and a feminist Nietzschean like Farr (whose
interests ranging from socialism to feminism, mysticism, eugenics and literature),
Shaw's Nietzscheanism posed several questions. Her opposition to Shaw and his
Nietzscheanism is most evident in some early New Age articles. In 'G. B. S. and New
York',56 Farr, clearly uninspired by Shaw's modern superwoman (Anna in Man and
Superman) says that, like most of Shaw's other women, she too is 'ornamental. ,57
Possibly, she was also less than impressed by the Shavian idea that women can only
be mothers of the superman and cannot aspire to superhumanity themselves, as
expressed in Anna's maternal cry for the superman at the end of the play. Her
criticism of Shaw's ineptitudes as a Nietzschean continued in her review of Orage's
new book on Nietzsche, Consciousness: Animal, Human, and Superman. This
review, dated 1907, is, on the whole, favourable. It is a short semi-spiritual, semi-
psychological analysis of Nietzsche's superman ideal, in which, Farr alludes to
Shaw's Man and Superman:
England has been trembling on 'the verge of the Socialism that levels
down for half a century; and the shade of Nietzsche, more powerful in
death than ever in life, overshadows the great reforming movement and
informs it with aristocratic spirit [... ]. Mr Orage' s mind is equipped by
nature [... ] to give us a far clearer idea of Superman or Aristocratic
Consciousness than we gather from the songs of Nietzsche or from
Shaw's great classic, Man and Super-man.58
In reaction to Shaw's take on the superman idea, she stresses the female regenerative
aspect inherent in this concept, arguing that the superman is in fact 'Woman': .
the Supermen, from which however only a small fragment survives. For more see Greer, pp.
130-133; 310-311.
55 Johnson, p. 285.
56 Florence Farr, 'G. B. Shaw and New York', The New Age, 23 May 1907, p. 57.
57 Ibid., p. 57.
58 Florence Farr, 'Superman Consciousness', The New Age, 6 June 1907, p. 92.
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This state of consciousness, now identified by leading modem thinkers as
the state called superman, is mystically feminine [... ]. It is often been
said jokingly that Superman is Woman; but it is only woman in her
symbolic sense of wisdom as the field of the new birth we all await. 59
Shaw's notion of the superman is traditionally sought in Man and Superman as
represented in the union of John Tanner, Shaw's philosopher-genius and Anna, the
embodiment of the 'Life Force'. However, a rough interpretation of the concept is
offered in a letter Shaw wrote to The Eagle and the Serpent in 1898. In the special
issue 'Why do the Ungodly Prosper?' the editor put forth the question of whether
'might is right' .60 Shaw's letter-reply reads: 'whether might is right is not an issue
since the most powerful will prevail, whether it is right or wrong' .61 As Shaw argues
in his letter-response to Barnhill, what appears to be the real evil is the ostensible
'rightness of the masses', which precludes the advancement of the individua1.62
Despite the obvious need for improvement, social and cultural amelioration cannot
be maintained, as long as the modem age allows 'the rule of a standard Morality'. He
writes:
But under the rule of a standard Morality evolution is limited by the fact
that at a certain point of development the individual in whom the advance
is manifested (say the Superman) is attacked and destroyed in the name
of Right by other less developed individuals; so that in effect the race
does will its own destruction on the plane of the Superman. And the
attack presents itself to these less' developed ones as an attack of right on
might [".]. So much of the Superman of action.I"
According to Shaw, as long as the 'will of the masses' (i.e. mainstream culture)
reigns, individuality cannot be exercised freely, and thus evolution comes to a halt.
The average man's' attempt to destroy the advanced individual, and, at the same
59 Ibid., p. 92. My emphasis.
60 Barnhill, 'Our Sphinx's Fatal Question: Why Do the Ungodly Prosper?', Eagle and the Serpent. No.
18. Special Issue on Why do the Ungodly Prosper, [1902(?)], pp. 68-73.
61 Shaw's letter appears in this column under the heading: 'Not the Pope but Mr. Bernard Shaw' - and
Barnhill remarks: 'We had hoped to present our readers with a Papal Bull on this subject, but
can only offer them a few of the Irish variety from Mr. G. B. Shaw', p. 69. G. B. Shaw, Letter,
Eagle and the Serpent. No. 18. Special Issue, pp 69-70 (p. 69).
62 Ibid., p. 69.
63 Ibid., p. 69.
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time, the effort of the individual-superman to rise beyond the average man's level is
essentially the battle of good versus evil, of old culture and new culture, regeneration
against apathy and decay. The true individual of action (superman) is proven in his
battle against such evils, against the 'right' of mainstream culture and the 'right' of
established conventions - an eternal seeker of his own sense of righteousness. This
problem, namely, the battle between private will and the will of the community, the
righteousness of the many versus the righteousness of the one, is an idea that
underlies much of The Devil's Disciple, as I will argue further.
2.3 The Devil's Disciple (1897)
In discussing Shaw's early plays, Jackson notes how The Devil's Disciple was
Shaw's first attempt to put forth the concept of the superman. As he argues in his
study of Shaw, in the actions of 'Dick Dudgeon, Shaw's 'embryonic superman' we
discover 'the real Shaw hero - the man who knows what he wants and wills his way
to it', 'the incarnation of self-expression rather than self-suppression.' As Jackson
tells us: he (Dudgeon) is a 'forerunner of the genuine Shaw conception of Man, who
is really undeveloped Superman. ,64
It appears that Jackson's remark about the Nietzschean overtones in the play
was not miles from what Shaw originally intended. In an introductory note written by
Shaw for a Viennese performance of the play titled 'A Devil of a Fellow: Self-
Criticism', Shaw refers to Nietzsche in relation to the play's exposition of puritanical
attitudes" The German translation of Shaw's introductory note was published in the
64 Shaw, p. 190.
65 G. B. Shaw, 'A Devil ofa Fellow: Self-Criticism', SHAW: The Annual of Bernard Shaw Studies, 20
(2000),247-252. This is the first publication of the original English text.
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Viennese paper Die Zeit (a forum of Viennese Fabians)," on 22 of February 1903,
three days before the opening of The Devil's Disciple. In it he makes particular
reference to Nietzsche: 'The real test of Viennese criticism will be its understanding
of the character of the Puritan. Only a Puritan can understand Nietzsche. ,67
In addition, the original preface to the play also reveals correspondences
between Nietzsche and so-called 'diabolonian ethics', as embodied in the figure of
Dick Dudgeon. Dudgeon, the 'devil's disciple', is symbolizing 'our newest idol, the
Superman, celebrating the death of the godhead. ,68 As Shaw points out, his
conception of Dudgeon's avowed Diabolonianism is meant as a continuation of the
iconoclastic tradition of John Bunyan, William Blake and Nietzsche:
Let those who have praised my originality in conceiving Dick Dudgeon's
strange religion read Blake's Marriage of Heaven and Hell [... ]. But they
need not go back to Blake and Bunyan. Have they not heard the recent
fuss about Nietzsche and his Good and Evil Turned Inside Out? [...]
There was never a play more certain to be written that The Devil's
Disciple at the end of the nineteenth century. The age was visibly
. h i 69pregnant WIt It.
The Devil's Disciple is the first of the three Plays for Puritans. The action is
taking place during the American Revolution in the town of Websterbridge, in New
Hampshire. In a truly Nietzschean beyond good and evil mode, the play tells us the
story of Richard Dudgeon, a self-professed anti-Christ (and egoist) turned Saviour
(and altruist) on his deathbed. For reasons that remain unclear Dudgeon has a
reputation of a 'bad man,.70 When Essie, the youngest member of the family, asks
about the nature of his wrongdoing, Judith, the priest's wife, tells her: You must not
66 In fact the paper was edited by Isidor Singer and Heinrich Kanner, both members of the Viennese
Fabian Society.
67 'A Devil of a Fellow: Self-Criticism', p. 252. The document had been in the possession of the
Shaw archives in the British Library and was published only recently, in 2003.
68 G. B. Shaw, 'Preface', in Three Plays for Puritans. The Devil's Disciple, Caesar and Cleopatra,
and Captain Brassbound's Conversion (London: Constable and Company, 1947), pp. xxiv-
xxv.
69 Ibid., p. xxv.
70 G. B. Shaw, The Devil's Disciple, in Three Plays for Puritans, ed. by Dan. H. Lawrence
(London: Penguin Books, 2000), pp. 41-126 (p. 106).
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ask questions about him, Essie. You are too young to know what it is to be a bad
man.,71 A 'smuggler' by profession and a 'devil' by faith,72 we learn that he has left
his town to 'live with gypsies', and that 'he has no love for his mother and his
family'. 'A reprobate' and a 'lost sinner', according to his puritanical mother, and the
town's outcast 'to whom the respectable people won't speak,73, he seems to have
deliberately broken off the ties both with his family and his community. As we soon
find out his dissent is on his own terms. The structure of the play is built upon a
fundamental dichotomy. The seeming 'goodness' of the 'Old Puritanism' as
represented by Mrs. Dudgeon, versus the apparent evil nature of Dudgeon himself.
This man is a self-professed priest of 'the other order [... ] the Devil' s Disciple'. As
he tells Essie, his niece:
RICHARD I was brought up in the other service; but I knew from the first
that the Devil was my natural master and captain and friend. I saw that
he was in the right, and that the world cringed to his conqueror only
through fear [... ]. I prayed secretly to him; and he comforted me, and
saved me from having my spirit broken in this house of children's
tears.74
In Act I Dudgeon returns to his home town upon hearing the news of his father's
death. As lawyer Hawkins informs him, the will makes him the sole inheritor and the
new master of the house, much to his mother's chagrin. Dick, as a genuinely
unrepentant prodigal son tells her that from that moment onwards the house will be
the church of his devilish joyful gospel, bidding Essie to follow him:
RICHARD [ ... ] from this day this house is his [the devil's] home; and no
child shall cry in it: this hearth- is his altar; and no soul shall ever
cower over it in the dark evenings and be afraid."
In Act II Dudgeon pays a visit to his neighbour, Antony Anderson, the Presbyterian
minister of the town. Anderson leaves the house to attend to Mrs. Dudgeon who is
71 Ibid., p. 55.
72 Ibid., p. 55.
73 Ibid., p. 106.
74 Ibid., p. 66.
75 Ibid., p. 66.
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dying and leaving Dudgeon alone with Judith, Anderson's beautiful and much
younger wife. Not a moment later, British soldiers rush into the house in search of
Anderson. They are ordered to arrest the Reverend with the intention of hanging him
as an example for the town's insurgence. Finding Dudgeon there the soldiers
naturally mistake him for Anderson and he seems reluctant to contradict them.
Despite his abdication of the old faith he acts according to the Christian duty of
loving one's neighbour (perhaps a little too much, judging from his behaviour
towards the priest's wife) and allows the soldiers to take him instead.
As discussed in the first chapter, radical Nietzscheanism as expressed in such
loci as The Eagle and the Serpent, was, to a great extent, informed by philosophical
egoism. In this frame, Nietzsche emerges as an exponent of radical egoism and a
preacher of a new 'joyful' serpent-like philosophy of beyond good and evil. As
James Walker argues in his Philosophy of Egoism'? (a book Barnhill recommends to
all his readers), the doctrine of individuality, as understood by radical egoists, is
meant to wage war against the theocracy of the idea, which is in fact a blind
adherence to a morality based on a good and evil division. Philosophic egoism serves
to reveal the so-called 'logomachy of the Moralists.' 77 As Walker argues in his book,
such Moralists have 'right and wrong, good and evil, Altruism and Egoism in their
brains as opposites'; with them 'facts must be opposites, absolute opposites all the
way through. This distinction is the moralists' rhetorical weapon, the driving force
behind all their categorical 'thou-shalt' imperatives, such as the Christian virtue of
duty, obedience, forgiveness, and sacrifice:
The Moralists, or Altruists, come with a tale of Duty, or moral obligation
[...]. It is horrifying to them that I act on consciousness of satisfaction,
on genial impulse, on calculation of gain, and not in submission to the
Moralistic judgment of 'conscience'. 78
76 James L. Walker, The Philosophy of Egoism (Denver: Katherine Walker, 1905).
77 Ibid., p. 23.
78 Ibid., p. 26.
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Thus, what the radical egoists, like Nietzsche, believed, is that true conscience is
innate and individual, rather than conditioned and communal.
According to Jackson, Dick Dudgeon, who 'steps on to the stage surrounded by
all the appurtenances of histrionic romance and does just what he wants to do,
following the opposite to the conventional God, the Devil,79 is one such egoist. By
an intelligent conceptual shift, the play shows that the puritanical sense of goodness
in the context of the play is inadequate, if not hypocritical. In discussing the
Christian doctrine of unselfishness in the light of Nietzsche's aristocratic radicalism,
Brandes gives a clear definition about conventional moral notions of unselfishness
and self-sacrifice:
Then there is the doctrine of unselfishness. To be moral is to be unselfish.
It is good to be so, we are told. But what does that mean - good? Good
for whom? Not for the self-sacrificer, but for his neighbour. He who
praises the virtue of unselfishness, praises something that is good for the
community but harmful to the individual. And the neighbour who wants
to be loved unselfishly is not himself unselfish. The fundamental
contradiction in this morality is that it demands and commends a
renunciation of the ego, for the benefit of another ego.80
Discussing morality in relation to Nietzsche's notion of the superman-genius,
Brandes notes: 'The free, exceptional man' who 'feels in his innermost being that he
cannot be compared with others is charged as being "immoral" because he broke
with the tradition which the others regarded with superstitious fear.,81 In a similar
tone, Jackson, in his discussion of Shaw's notion of the superman argues how
'[Shaw's] moral hero does not say, as Goodness and Virtue said in the old plays,
"Behold, I am good because I like goodness,", but "Behold, I am good because I am
myself".82 From the above, one may infer, that Dudgeon, a model unrepentant
prodigal son and prototypical dissenter, a character intended to mock convention and
79 Shaw, p. 190.
80 Brandes, p. 24-25.
81 Ibid., p. 26.
82 Shaw, p. 147.
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the prescribed orthodoxies of many of his fellow townspeople, seems, one may
argue, to be cast as an example of the new immoral, or rather, 'beyond-moral'
virtues that Shaw envisions, and which in turn, Brandes and Jackson typically
associate with Nietzsche's egoist-superman.
As Shaw would write to Ellen Terry on March 13, 1897, Richard is 'superior
to religion and morality as typified by his mother and his home [".] [and] love as
typified by Judith. ,83 In Act II, Judith visits Dudgeon in the Town Hall, where he is
held awaiting trial and tries to talk him out of his decision to sacrifice himself. When
he once more refuses, she asks him for a reason:
JUDITH Oh, why will you not be simple with me - honest and
straightforward? If you are so selfish as that, why did you let them
take you last night?
RICHARD (gaily) Upon my life, Mrs. Anderson, I don't know. I've been
asking myself that question ever since; and I can find no manner of
reason for acting as I did.
JUDITH You know you did it for his sake, believing he was a more
worthy man than yourself.
RICHARD (laughing) Oh! No: that's a very pretty reason, I must say; but
I'm not so modest as that. No: it wasn't for his sake.
JUDITH (after a pause, during which she looks shamefacedly at him,
blushing painfully) Was it for my sake?84
Truly amazed by such a selfless action (from such a selfish man), she tells him
that for such a deed there has to be a motive. ,Was it duty or perhaps love that made
him act so? To this Dudgeon bluntly responds:
DUDGEON You know how much I have lived with worthless men-aye,
and worthless women too. Well, they could all rise to some sort of
goodness and kindness when they were in love.
The word love comes from him with true Puritan scorn/"
And he goes on to say:
RICHARD What I did [".] I did in cold blood [".]. I had no motive and
no interest: all I can tell you is that when it came to the point whether I
would take my neck out of the noose and put another man's into it, I
could not do it. I don't know why not: I see myself as a fool for my
83 Bernard Shaw, Collected Letters 1874-1897 (London: Max Reinhardt, 1965-1988), I(1965), p. 734.
84 The Devil's Disciple, p. 91.
85 Ibid., p. 94.
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pains; but I could not and I cannot. I have been brought up standing by
the law of my own nature; and I may not go against it, gallows or no
gallows. I should have done the same for any other man in the town,
or any other man's wife. Do you understand that?86
As Richard reveals to Judith, it was, after all, nothing but blind instinct that prompted
him to act that way. As he tells to a frustrated, heart-broken woman in love, his act
was neither a proof of love, as she secretly hoped, nor a testament of altruism, as
common morality might see it. Driven not by a certain heroic code, nor a kind of
romantic ideal, this act of genuine 'altruism' was in fact the product of a 'cold' blind
will - the result of being true to his 'own nature.' It can be argued that in a sense,
Dudgeon is conceived as the prototypical 'superman-man of action' as Shaw defines
him in The Eagle and the Serpent, a model radical egoist lacking in good
'conscience' as typified by convention. In simple words, Dudgeon acts morally
because he obeys a personal moral imperative - not because of an extrinsic 'have to',
but of an intrinsic 'will to'. Brandes's analysis of moral conscience and
individualism may be interesting to consider in terms of the model of egoistic
conscience Shaw presents us with:
But what of the voice and judgment of conscience? The difficulty is that
we have a conscience behind our conscience, an intellectual one behind
the moral [... ]. We can see quite well that our opinions of what is noble
and good, our moral valuations, are powerful levers where action is
concerned; but we must begin by refining these opinions and
independently creating for ourselves new tables of values.f
Such understanding of morality may be seen as comparable to the kind of conscience
typified by the character of Dudgeon who is in his way subject to a puritan
conscience, a strict individual conscience requiring high personal standards -
standards superior to the ones customary 'rightness' dictates. His conscience is
intended as a new free moral conscience, expressive of an egoistic ethic of will and
strength imposed by the individual and no other. By defining himself against the
86 Ibid., p. 94.
87 Brandes, pp. 25-26.
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'right' ethic of his community, and by proving himself in essence 'good', the play
poses questions about our conventional understanding of ideas such as 'heroism'
'duty' and 'love', and the way in which they are traditionally applied. Contrary to
conventional stereotypes of romantic heroism, Shaw purposely proposes a godless
saint, a heretic turned saviour, calling attention to the artificiality and often the
hypocrisy underlying traditional moral conceptions of goodness and badness. It can
be argued that overall the play is about challenging traditional ideals of good and
evil. What Dudgeon's diabolonian individualism affects is exactly this. His portrayal
as the quintessential 'evil' and the discovery of his essential goodness in the end are
there to suggest, that the morality of good and evil is much more complex an issue
than the audience might have thought.
To summarise what I have argued in this chapter, I have, so far, suggested that
in Shaw's early drama in general, and in the two plays discussed above in particular,
one sees evidence of a preoccupation with then-current Nietzschean attitudes and
trends. While The Philanderer comes across as an early satire on the fashionable
attempts at egoism, such works as The Devil's Disciple show a more serious
engagement with Nietzschean radicalism on Shaw's part. It is possible, I believe, that
there exists an interplay between The Devil's Disciple and other forms of radical
Nietzscheanism, and it would have been worthwhile, if space had allowed, to look in
more detail for likely correspondences between them." Unfortunately because of
88 Critics like Hannes Schweiger and James Hulse have convincingly demonstrated how the play was
initially intended for a socialist audience. Hannes Schweiger, 'Bernard Shaw's Contributions to
the Culture and Politics of Fin de Steele Vienna', SHA W: The Annual of Bernard Shaw 's
Studies, 25 (2005), 135-146; and James Hulse, Revolutionaries in London (Michigan:
Clarendon Press, 1970). According to Schweiger, the play was Shaw's conscious attempt to
present himself as a progressive and unconventional socialist playwright violating the
traditional conventions of drama, especially romantic drama (p. 135), while Hulse, notes how
the figure of Dudgeon synopsizes Shaw's effort to 'reform the theatre by assaulting its
favourite illusions and by introducing an unconventional ethic', p. 134. I believe that it would
be interesting to consider, if time had allowed, The Devil's Disciple within the frame of Shaw's
evolving social aesthetic. There is a ongoing preoccupation with Nietzschean vitalism in the
work of Shaw, as is evident in other plays from that period, and it would have been interesting
99
practical limitations further discussion of such connections falls outside the scope of
this thesis.
2.4 Man and Superman (1903)
Let us now consider Man and Superman. As Jackson further noted in his study of
him, Shaw's art theorizing during the period 1898-1903 would be marked by a
reconsideration of the aesthetics and overall function of social drama/" Indeed, Man
and Superman, the play following The Devil's Disciple, typifies such concerns,
signalling Shaw's shift towards a more subtly propagandistic aesthetic agenda. As it
will be shown, in this play, 'the most recognisably "Nietzschean" of all Shaw's
plays,90 according to Thatcher, the notion of Superman acquires a more concrete
shape and substance - it becomes Shaw's basis for elaboration on such ideas as 'Life
Force' and' Art-Philosophy', which, in their tum, provide further insights into the
kind of philosophy that underpins Shaw's vitalistic social aesthetic. Interestingly
enough, the play was defined by Shaw as a philosophic comedy. It was first
published in book form in 1903 and contains Shaw's 'Epistle Dedicatory' to a former
colleague, which serves as a kind of preface. Shaw also includes a somewhat lengthy
revolutionary tract called 'The Revolutionist's Handbook and Pocket Companion'
and a small supplement of aphorisms, titled 'Maxims for Revolutionaries'. It seem
logical to assume that John Tanner, the revolutionary of Man and Superman and the
fictional author of 'A Revolutionary's Handbook and Pocket Companion' (published
as an appendix to the play), was meant as the 'superman' character in the play. It
may be argued, albeit somewhat tentatively that Tanner, like Dudgeon, is in a way
to compare and contrast it with the more anarchical tones of Nietzschean radicalism, as echoed
in The Eagle and the Serpent.
89 Jackson p. 173.
90 Thatcher, p. 189.
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following in the tradition of Shaw's supermen-rebels. Indeed, he seems to have
retained some of the radical qualities of his predecessor. His fate as a superman-
egoist, however, proves less glorious. As Shaw tells us, Tanner, a sworn
revolutionary as well as 'a member of the Idle Rich Class', 'comes to birth as a
stage-production of the tragic-comic love chase of a man by a woman [... ] he is the
quarry instead of the huntsman. ,91 In the last act, Tanner is romantically ambushed
by Anna Whitefield's seductive power (Shaw's 'Everywoman' and 'Life Force'),
and their love struggle turns into a comedy act, with Tanner desperately trying to free
himself from her enticing grip:
TANNER I will not marry you. I will not marry you.
ANN Oh, you will, you will.
TANNER I tell you, no, no, no.
ANN I tell you, yes, yes, yes.92
Finally, at the end of Act IV, Shaw's superman, still human-all-too-human, lets
himself be enchanted, this time admitting surrender:
ANN Well, I made a mistake: you do not love me.
TANNER (seizing her in his arms) IUs false. I love you. The Life Force
enchants me. I have the whole world in my arms when I clasp you.
But I am fi~hting for my freedom, for my honor, for my self, one and
indivisible. 3
As the plot of the play stands, Shaw's intentions are not particularly clear, and the
comedy that ensues from the Tanner-Anna power-struggle as well as the tone of the
conclusion (the universe laughing at Tanner - 'Universal Laughter')", might make
one wonder whether this is meant as a parody of Nietzschean egoism or not. The last
scene famously ends with Shaw's superman accepting defeat, and a triumphant Anna
imploring him to carryon with his rebel talk, with his own and the universe's
laughter in the background.
9) Man and Superman, p. 18.
92 Ibid., p. 205.
93 Ibid., p. 205.
94 Ibid., p. 209.
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Man and Superman a 'comedy and a philosophy', is, admittedly, one of
Shaw's most elaborate and complex plays. It was conceived by 1901, written by
1902, and published a year after. The play consists of four acts. It is important to bear
in mind that Man and Superman has been traditionally treated as two distinct plays, a
comedy of manners consisting of Acts I, II and IV, and Act III titled 'Don Juan in
Hell', a kind of philosophical contest between the Devil and the notorious Don Juan.
As an advertisement from The New Age from May 1907 announced, daily evening
performances of Man and Superman were taking place during the month of June at
Court Theatre, London, Don Juan in Hell in tandem with The Man of Destiny, staged
h h M . , 95as a separate s ow at t e atinee,
A theatre review from Haden L. Guest, the regular drama critic for The New
Age, may give a sense of how Don Juan was received by the theatre-goers of London
at the time. This is his account of the play: 'the play lasts two hours, the discussion is
abstract, the views expressed there are often violently anticonventional, and yet
everyone stays on. ,96 In his review, Guest spends most time complaining about the
length of Don Juan's philosophical speeches, about how 'one is obliged to follow
very closely', as well as about the unconventional lighting: 'it is only distracting to
sit in the light looking into darkness', he says at some point. Yet while at first he
finds much about the play offputting, on the whole he has to admit to the charm of
the dark, somewhat decadent, languid interior: the stage 'in darkness [... ] draped
with heavy curtains', 'Dona Ana in exquisite dress in the middle, Don Juan on one
side, and the Statue and the Devil on the other'), and the review concludes with the
remark that he must see the show again.
Don Juan in Hell, that is, Act III of Man and Superman, can be termed as a
play within a play, and consists of the unconscious Tanner's. dream of himself as Don
9S 'Ads section', The New Age, 30 May 1907, p. 72.
96 Haden L. Guest, 'Man and Superman', The New Age, 13 June, 1907, p. J08.
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Juan in his own version of afterlife. Arguably, the dream device is used not only to
reveal the truth in the outer story (the truth behind Ann's pursuit of Tanner - and the
reason he finally surrenders to her) but, perhaps most importantly, as a lesson in
Shavian philosophy, presented in the form of a long debate between Don Juan, a
proponent of the Life Force - and the Devil, a pessimist of the old school and a
confirmed hedonist. In the Hell Scene we abandon realism and enter the land of
fantasy and philosophic speculation. The formal debate starts with a contest in
persuasion over the purpose and nature of existence - ending with Don Juan's
ascendancy to Heaven, another great loss for the Devil's populist Party. 'THE DEVIL
(gloomily) His going is a political defeat. I cannot keep these Life Worshippers: they
all go. ,97 Shaw, in a note he wrote in June 1907, describes the scene as follows:
'The scene', an abysmal void, represents Hell, and the persons of the
drama speak of hell, heaven and earth as if they were separate localities
.[ ]. It must be remembered that such localizations are purely figurative
[ ]. Modern theology conceives heaven and hell, not as places, but as
states of the soul."
Interestingly enough, in the Shavian otherworld, Christian notions of eternal
punishment and damnation are denuded of their traditional connotations; the
otherworld is a 'city much like Seville' ,99 as Don Juan jokingly tells Don Ana, and
newcomers are advised to renounce all hope. Above the gates Dante's classic
warning urges, 'leave every hope behind, ye who enter.' 100 This state of
consciousness is immutable - timelessness and eternity run supreme. Shaw's 'higher
theology' declares Heaven and Hell not as fixed metaphysical localities in a reality
far beyond but as states of individual consciousness - and the quarrel of Don-Juan
97George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman, ed., by Dan. H. Lawrence (London: Penguin Classics,
2000), p. 171.
98 G. B. Shaw Collection. British Library. 65156 S. Vol. IS (ff. 86). Shaw's handwritten draft for a
program intended for the performance of the play, titled 'Don Juan in Hell' and dated [June 1907?]. It
begins: '[A]s the scene may prove puzzling at a first hearing to those who are not to some extent
skilled in modem theology, the Management have asked the Author to offer the Court audience the
same assistance that concert goers are accustomed to receive in the form of an analytical programme.'
99 dMan an Superman, p. 127.
100 Ibid., p. 133.
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and the Devil is actually a philosophical enquiry into the notion of being and
becoming, self-creation and evolution.
Shaw's preoccupation with such ideas can be traced in one of his letters to
Archer. As he puts is, Man and Superman is framed within a 'theory of circles', a
philosophic notion which has been 'one of the staples of Pessimism ever since
Pessimism existed.' 101 The philosophical idea of circles, a philosophical idea that
goes back to Heraclitus and underpins both Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's versions
of pessimism'l", is embodied in the character of Anna, Shaw's quintessential symbol
of the Life Force. This notwithstanding, it is mainly in Don Juan in Hell that we truly
get a sense of the philosophic implications of such an obscure term - where we have
Don Juan, 'a confirmed Life Force Worshipper', (like Nietzschej'f", defending the
notion against the stoic nihilism of the Devil. In order to appreciate Shaw's
references to Nietzsche in the play, particularly where the notion of Life Force is
concerned, I will once more resort to Brandes who in his essay sums up the
difference between Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's pessimism. As Brandes notes,
there are different kinds of pessimism, and Schopenhauer represents what Nietzsche
would later come to think of as nihilistic pessimism. In response to Schopenhauer's
pessurusm of renunciation Nietzsche proposes a pessimism of 'healthiness', a
pessimism 'derived from strength, from exuberant power', substituting
Schopenhauer's notion of the will-to-live for a new one: will-to-power.l'"
Nietzsche's engagement with Schopenhauer's pessimism is, in essence, an attempt to
deal with the sickness of the modern age, the 'degenerate and enfeebled instincts of
101 Collected Letters, II, p. 359.
102 Thatcher detects a preoccupation with pessimism in Shaw's formulation of the Life Force: Shaw
'convert[s] Schopenhauer's malevolent Wille into a benevolent Life Force [...]. Man and
Superman is an illustration of this line of thought. ' p ..
103 Man and Superman, p. 172. While watching Don Juan depart for Heaven, the Devil laments how
Nietzsche 'also came here [Le to Hell] first, before he recovered his wits. I had some hopes of
him; but he was a confirmed Life Force worshipper', p. 172.
104 Brandes, p. 21.
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decadence' .105This sickness manifests itself in a variety of ways, primarily through
aesthetic idealism and historical optimism. Brandes goes on to elaborate: 'only he
who has learnt to know life and is equipped for action has use for history and is
capable of applying it' .106
My interpretation is that the Devil is the decadent, nihilistic pessimist of the
play. Fully conscious of the irrationality of human life, the 'blundering of the life
force', that is, the impersonal, blind force of nature, he constantly dwells on the
futility and crudeness of human life. Being the Devil, he argues that no explanation
can be given for why things are the way they are, and there is no getting out of it.
The inescapable knowledge of life's eternal recurrence, of the never-ceasing
purposeless oscillation with every moment 'repeated [... ] a thousand times,'107 is
profoundly wearing: 'when you are as old as lam', he tells Don-Juan, 'when you
have a thousand times wearied of heaven [... ] and a thousand times wearied of hell
[... ] you will discover the profound truth [... ] Vanitas vanitatum.' 108And he
concludes his theory of nihilism by saying: 'You will discover the profound truth of
the saying of my friend Koheleth, that there is nothing new under the sun.' 109
Although the disease of life is undoubtedly great and without a remedy -
salvation is not only possible, but certain, for all those who trust in Devil, we soon
find out. In Shavian Hell, the realm of romantic art, of beautiful lies, of ideals, of
transcendence, and illusion, life as play-acting carries on but without its physical
burden. In a beautiful semblance of life which goes on as 'perpetual romance, a
universal melodrama', 'appearance' becomes 'beauty', 'emotions love', 'sentiments
heroism', and 'aspirations virtue' .110Shaw's Devil, a true aesthete decadent, invents
105 Ibid., p. 20.
106 Ibid., p. 20.
107 Man and Superman, p. 168.
108 Ibid, p. 168.
109 Ibid., p. 168.
110 Ibid., p. 140.
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his own satanic heaven to compensate for the will of life to 'death' and 'ugliness': 'I
could give you a thousand instances' he tells to Don Juan, 'but they all come to the
same thing: the power that nerved Life to the effort of organizing itself into the
human being is not the need for higher life but for a more efficient engine of
destruction.' III Neither life, an 'infinite comedy of illusion' 112 has intrinsic value, nor
nature possesses a 'brain', a higher intellect to direct it upwards. Consequently any
effort towards progress is unavailing - and a philosophy that tells one differently
vulgarly 'unbecoming'. The Devil to Don Juan:
THE DEVIL Well, well, go your way, Senor Don Juan. I prefer to be my
own master and not the tool of any blundering universal force. I know
that beauty is good to look at; that music is good to hear; that love is
good to feel [oo.]. It is universally admitted in good society that the
Prince of Darkness is a gentleman; and that is enough for me. As to your
Life Force, which you think irresistible, it is the most resistible thing in
the world for a person of any character [ ] [invented by the] naturally
vulgar and credulous, as all reformers are [ ].113
As I have already pointed out in the previous chapter, Shaw's early art theory
expresses the need for a new vitalistic social aesthetic with a therapeutic,
regenerative and educational end. Fearing nihilism and degeneration, Shaw in The
Sanity of Art argued that, unless humanity wants to drown itself in Schopenhauer's
gloom, 'we will have to drop the Nirvana nonsense, the pessimism, the rationalism,
the supernatural theology, and all the other subterfuges to which we cling' out of the
fear for the irrational, the fear to look 'life straight in the face.' 114 This modem
sickness becomes all the more obvious in the aesthetic decadentism that he sees
contaminating the culture of his contemporaries. In the introductory note to The
Devil's Disciple, Shaw reiterated his case for the need to resuscitate culture via an art
of vitality and will:
III Ibid., p. 144.
112Ibid.,p.168.
113Ibid., p. 170.
114 The Sanity of Art, p. 59.
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I suspect Vienna of being romantic and artistic: two things which are for
me the abomination of desolation. Happiness and beauty are said to be
almost as highly esteemed in Vienna as they are in London. I am not
particularly fond of either [... ]. One thing at least I can promise to the
Viennese playgoer. He will not be pestered in my plays with beauty,
happiness, goodness, badness, romance, or any such nonsense. My work
has only one subject: Life; and only one quality: the interest of life. us
As Jackson noted in his Shaw book, Shaw the playwright cannot be divorced from
Shaw the Fabian: his aesthetic philosophy is directly tied to his broader social
concerns - 'his plays are critical and dramatic statement[ s] of social disease' .116 As
the critic argues, the Shavian aesthetic is first and foremost an attempt to deal with
'the current state of affairs', with the malaise of modernity which manifests itself in
many ways. Jackson writes: 'there are no illusions left with regard to social and
cultural progress'; the theory of 'finality in politics, religion, or art, is an illusion.' 117
Modern culture can only be regenerated through 'the constant challenging of current
conditions', through a constant overcoming of 'what is accepted and fixed.' us Man
and Superman, according to Jackson, articulates this problem philosophically. There
Shaw, the 'Dionysian philosopher', relegates 'base sociology [... ] to the preface or
appendix, where it takes the form of commentation upon the philosophic content
which now holds his stage.'!"
This Dionysian 'way', and how it relates to the notion of the artist-philosopher,
is most clearly and explicitly outlined in the 'Epistle Dedicatory'. There, Shaw draws
a distinction between romantic art and the art of the artist-philosophers, the latter
being 'the only artists I [Shaw] take quite seriously].] [... ] Even since, as a boy, I
first breathed the air of the transcendental regions at a performance of Mozart's
Zauberflote, I have been proof against its garish splendours and alcoholic
115 'A Devil ofa Fellow: Self-Criticism', p. 252.
116 hSaw, p. 158.
117 Man and Superman, p. 173.
118Shaw,p.158.
119 Ibid., p. 158.
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excitements.v'j" For Shaw, the artist-philosopher suggests an aesthetic counter-
model. Against the 'Tappertitian', 'sane' 'sentimentalism' of Dickens', the
'transcendentalism' of Mozart, and even the irreligious 'will-less pessimism' that
typifies Shakespeare's Hamlet121- Shaw juxtaposes the art of the artist-philosophers:
'Bunyan, Blake [... ] Goethe, Shelley, Schopenhauer, Wagner, Ibsen, Morris,
Tolstoy, and Nietzsche'. These are some of the writers for whom he feels the closest
kinship, 'whose peculiar sense of the world [he] recognise[s] as more or less akin
to [his] own.' 122In an age divested of faith and vision, art's and philosophy's crucial
function is to uplift the will of the modern individual, so that when he looks back
'from the brink of the river of death, over the strife and labour of his pilgrimage',
will still say: 'yet do I not repent me.' 123
Nietzsche's diagnosis of modernity from the lens of art as formulated in The
Will to Power may help clarify some of the points raised above. In 'Book Three:
Principles of a New Evaluation' Nietzsche distinguishes between two types of art: 'a
false romantic art', a style of art which is meant to arouse 'beautiful feelings'; and
the presumably truer art of the 'grand style', characterised by a certain Dionysian
pessimism of the strong. The first is a symptom of spiritual decline, of the unhealthy
state that modernity finds itself in, of a 'forward-downward' spiral in which all
'instinct for life destroys itself in a conflagration of 'Christianity', 'nihilism', and
'physiological decadence,.124 Against this kind of 'religio-moral pessimism' which
120 Man and Superman, p. 29.
121 Ibid., p. 29. He tells us about them: 'In all their fictions there is no leading thought or inspiration
for which any man could conceivably risk the spoiling of his hat in a shower, much less his
life', p. 29.
122 Ibid., p. 29.
123 Ibid., p. 32. Recognizing the unique role of art in the progress of society Brandes also argues how
'salvation lies in a real aristocracy', the aristocracy of highly gifted individual geniuses who act
as 'educators', as interpreters of the particular age - mentioning Ibsen, Maeterlinck, Nietzsche,
among others, as unique cases of individuals through whom 'culture is revived', p. 13.
Interestingly Brandes, also, like Shaw in the Epistle, identifies in the philosophy of such artists-
individuals a certain type of 'will' lacking in contemporary culture.
124 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books,
1968), p. 449.
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takes refuge in the form of beauty, Nietzsche puts forth the 'tragic artist', the bearer
of a profound 'aesthetic Yes' to 'the terrifying, the evil; and the questionable in
life' .125 Summing up the conception of art as laid out in The Birth of Tragedy,
Nietzsche notes: 'metaphysics, morality, religion, science - in this book these things
merit consideration only as various forms of lies. [...] Man, the artist-man as well,
must once again become 'master of "material" - master of truth!' 126 The 'tragic-
Dionysian state' seems to describe a consciousness fully aware of this inescapably
'material' truth, yet one which 'commands' and 'wills', which desires to become,
grow, and shape, i.e. to affirm and create, 'to become master of the chaos one is,.127
In Don Juan in Hell, all these ideas are invoked once more, this time through
the philosopher-protagonist, Don JUarI. In the course of the Hell scene, the
confrontation between the Devil and Don JUarI unfurls into a complex philosophical
argument over the relationship between life and action, theory and practice, art and
philosophy, will and power: Don JUarI becomes the Devil's arch-nemesis - his amor
fati life philosophy being his armour against the all-consuming existential angst of
hell. As Shaw tells, us in the 'Epistle Dedicatory' his new philosophically minded
Don JUarI reads 'Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, studies Westermarck, and is
concerned with the future of the race'. Having ultimately 'discovered a moral in his
125 Ibid., p. 451. In Joshua Foa Die's 'Tragedy, Pessimism, Nietzsche' there is an extensive analysis of
Nietzsche's relation to Schopenhauerian aesthetics and tragedy. In particular, his analysis
focuses on what he calls 'the Dionysian spirit of Pessimism' as the essential core of the
Nietzschean aesthetics in drama, arguing for the 'political productivity of a Nietzschean
pessimistic ethic'. As he maintains, Nietzsche's 'creative pathos' lies in that, 'while other
pessimisms (such as Schopenhauer's) also conclude that the universe has no order and human
history no progress, Dionysian pessimism is the one that can find something to like about this
situation' (p. 112). What lies in the heart of Nietzsche's aesthetics of drama is his attempt to
overcome the Schopenhauerian aesthetic pessimism. Notwithstanding Nietzsche's admission of
Schopenhauer's truth, his philosophy is aimed to fight the negativism and nihilistic spirit this
realization has lead to, by counterpoising a 'Dionysian spirit of Pessimism' as an alternative
aesthetic. Nietzsche, by consciously employing a version of 'courageous pessimism' he yearns
to move away from Schopenhauer's resignation (p. 107). Joshua Foa Die, 'Tragedy,
Pessimism, Nietzsche', in Rethinking Tragedy, ed. by Rita Felski (Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 104-126.
126 The Will to Power, pp. 45-452.
127 Ibid., p. 444.
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immorality', he cannot afford to be a sceptic and thus adopts an affirmative position
so that he can 'save himself from cipherdom.' 128Nietzsche in The Will to Power,
'Book Four: Discipline and Breeding', prays for the artist reformer of the 'first rank'
of 'will' who will one day 'make the creative will prevail'. 129This kind of desire is,
one might argue, implicit is Don Juan's contemplation of the Life Force and may be
sought in his very definition of a 'philosophy of life', 130as he calls it. The belief,
namely, in a man-centered universe - a profound confidence in Man's ultimate
ability to construct his own path to meaning through experience: 'where there is a
will there is a way, [...] whatever Man really wishes to do he will finally discover
a means of doing.'131 As such in the end he decides against the Devil's entreaties
to a diabolical kind of innocence (the plea to inaction, to acceptance, to simply
'being') and laughs at his warnings. The all-too-conformable life beyond the real,
promising 'romantic delights' at the price of merely 'being' runs contrary to the
philosophic affirmation he espouses. Being cast as Shaw's model 'master of
reality',132 Juan assails the idealistic aestheticism espoused by the Devil and the
'romantic man' - warning that a worship of ideals separated from life is chimerical
and reveals a degenerating life: 'DON JUAN I thanked him [the romantic artist] for
teaching me to use my eyes and ears; but I told him that his beauty worshipping and
happiness hunting and woman idealizing was not worth a dump as a philosophy of
life. ,133 Contrary to the romantic man who worships 'woman' always from a
128 'Epistle Dedicatory', in Man and Superman, p. 14. My emphasis.
129 The Will to Power, p. 501.
130 Man and Superman, p. 154. .
131 In relation to this the 'Epistle Dedicatory' alarmingly notes that there can be no hope for any sort
of social betterment, any chance for 'progress' or substantial 'education' without the
cultivation of a social type of 'will'. Shaw says: 'Any pamphleteer can show the way to better
things; but when there is no will there is no way'. Further down he makes a point about the
inadequacy of current educational and religious institutions to 'raise the mass above its own
level' as well as talks about the urgency of 'breeding political capacity', without which any
notion of Democracycannot function adequately, p. 24.
132 Ibid., p. 139.
133 Ibid., p. 154. My emphasis.
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distance, Don Juan boasts about how he takes life (that is, 'Woman') 'without
chloroform', without soporifics: 'DON JUAN [ ... ] I was not duped. I took her without
chloroform.' 134As Nietzsche tells us in The Will to Power, 'there is only one world,
and this [world] is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, without meaning - a world
thus constituted is the real world.,135 Shaw's Don Juan, having been schooled in the
Nietzschean and Schopenhauerian tradition, is conscious of this seemingly hopeless
and chaotic reality, the blundering of the Life Force. He also has knowledge of Hell
and its devilish ways (namely, salvation through indifference, resignation and
perpetual 'being'), and knows what the punishment is for those who disobey the
Devil's will: 'the end will be despair and decrepitude, broken nerve and shattered
hopes [... ] the punishment of the fool who pursues the better before he has secured
the good.' 136Faithful to his amor [ali type of philosophy he says in return: 'DON JUAN
But at least I shall not be bored. The Service of the Life Force has that advantage, at
all events. So fare you well Senor Satan.' 137 The play ends with Don Juan' speech in
Shavian Nietzscheanism, and a quite positive, pregnant tone: 'ANA I believe in the
Life to Come (Crying to the Universe). A Father! A Father for the Supermanl'{"
To conclude: the three Shavian plays under discussion here, The Philanderer
(1893), The Devil's Disciple (1897), and Man and Superman (1903), are all to some
extent in dialogue with Nietzschean contemporary radical ideas and themes -
charting a progression in Shaw's engagement with the idea of the superman. In the
first part I discussed the presence of contemporary individualistic ideas behind The
Philanderer. As I argued, on one level The Philanderer playfully critiques a turn-of-
the-century 'trendy' type of Nietzscheanism, offering an amusing portrait of the
134 Ibid., p. 154. '
135 The Will to Power, p. 451.
136 Ibid., p. 170.
137 Ibid., p. 170.
138 Ibid., p. 173.
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tensions that traverse such communities of advanced individualists. At the same time,
the story's closeness to real life-characters as Florence Farr may perhaps suggest the
playas a kind of personal satire. Just as Charteris, the philander-philosopher, appears
to be lightly mocking the others in the play, so does Shaw, poking fun at the
impracticalities of such advanced views, and the often barren-like egoism they end
up creating. Interestingly in such early portraits of egoists, who see love as the end
of individuality, one gets a taste of such later fictional Nietzscheans as James Duffy
of Dubliners, also famous for his theorizing on 'the painful case' of human bonds.
As I have tried to show, the second play examined here, The Devil's Disciple
contains a different engagement with notions of the radical egoism and the
Ubermensch. This play constitutes a departure from the Nietzschean comedy of The
Philanderer, suggesting an enhanced and more serious engagement with Nietzschean
individualism and morality. Through the character of Dudgeon, a devil proven saint,
the play aims to subvert mainstream conceptions about good and evil, egoism and
altruism, morality and immorality - challenging the seemingly divine character of
our moral standards. To some degree, through this figure Shaw welcomes his readers
to reflect on traditional ideals of heroism, virtue, altruism, and Christian love -
reconceptualising morality not as the will of a higher (divine) authority, but rather as
an intrinsic necessity of the human self.
Man and Superman is a more complete and sophisticated engagement with the
idea of the Superman and Nietzschean philosophy, bringing together Shaw's
aesthetic and cultural aspirations regarding regeneration and advancement. In this
particular play, Shaw uses Nietzschean ideas as a kind of springboard for developing
his own philosophical notions of the artist-philosopher and the Life Force. Don Juan
in the play is the culmination of Shaw's engagement with the notion of the superman,
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presenting him as a kind of the artist-philosopher, the life affirmer who is going to
shape, affirm the 'will' of the race upward, securmg its progress.
Chapter Three
Nietzschean Individualism and the Ethic of Self-creation in The Freewoman
3.1 Introduction: Dora Marsden and Radical Egoism
This chapter discusses The Freewoman in the context of what I have termed 'radical
Nietzscheanism'. As demonstrated in Chapter One, connections between an early
tradition of radical egoism and Nietzschean philosophy can be traced to such coteries
as The Eagle and the Serpent. I argue that, in this context, Nietzsche can be
understood in terms of an early tradition of philosophic egoism advocating
intellectual rebellion, self-education, and re-evaluation. As this part of the thesis will
demonstrate, certain aspects of this early Nietzschean tradition are still relevant and
can be detected in the style and spirit of The Freewoman. Some ten years later, after
The Eagle and the Serpent ceased publication, a new periodical dedicated to
expounding the doctrine of philosophic individualism appeared, this time with a
commitment, as its editors proclaimed, to 'lay bare the individualistic basis of all that
is most significant in modem movements including feminism'.'
I This is from 'The Sheet of the One Thousand Club Membership: Establishment Fund', publicizing
The Freewoman's resuscitation under a new title (The New Freewoman). [Originally
published in Oakley House, Bloomsbury Street, London]. Besides informing the
incorporation of new contributors as well as the addition of Rebecca West as assistant
editor, it puts emphasis on the fact that the new periodical wishes to continue the
philosophical program started by The Freewoman: 'In these circumstances it appears
unnecessary to attempt a lengthy explanation of the policy and the character of the new
paper. It will be sufficient to say that The New Freewoman will be the only journal of
recognized standing expounding the doctrine of philosophic individualism either in
England or America. Editorially, it will endeavour to lay bare the individualistic basis of all
that is most significant in modem movements including feminism. It will continue The
Freewoman's policy of ignoring in its discussions all existing taboos in the realms of
morality and religion. It will regard itself free to lay open any question to debate, and will
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Traditionally The Freewoman has been understood primarily in terms of its
connections to Edwardian feminism - a dissident feminist voice in the record of the
British Suffragist movement. More recently, however, there has been some
discussion about whether there is a connection between the early feminist radical
politics and the increasingly literary orientation of the periodical. The recent and
well-informed thesis of Cary Frankin, 'Dora Marsden and the Politics of Feminist
Modernism'v' reassesses The Freewoman's place in the context of literary
modernism, placing it well within the modernist literary nexus, as being of principal
interest in the unfolding of this later tradition. According to her, Marsden's
individualistic brand of radical politics (what she argues to be an alloy of
Nietzschean and Stirnerian elements);' were a 'natural corollary of her belief in the
need for new modes of writing that were more candid, intuitive, and psychologically
dense than realist poetry and prose." In essence, The Freewoman itself constituted
an avant-garde manifesto for what Marsden called "'the new temper", a leftist, proto-
modernist politics and aesthetics that blended her commitment to women's and
worker's emancipation with her interest in eccentric, psychologically introspective,
anti-realist writing." For Franklin, The Freewoman's individualistic, anti-
traditionalist, and anti-realist agenda, its concern with psychology and aesthetics,"
accurately captures the turn towards a more sexually frank, reflexive and vitalized
in its open platform give us a ready a welcome to capable adverse criticism as to support of
expressed opinions, editorial or other. The New Freewoman undertaking is entered upon in
the full knowledge that the philosophy of which The Freewoman was the vehicle has
roused a vital interest among a steadily-widening circle of thinking people, and it is
particularly on account of the further knowledge that this circle has widened even since The
Freewoman ceased to appear, that we are prepared to assume gladly the responsibility.'
London, British Library, Harriet Shaw Weaver Papers. 57355-57357.
2 Cary Franklin, 'Dora Marsden and the Politics of Feminist Modernism' (unpublished doctoral thesis,
University of Oxford, 2002).
3 Ibid., p. 132.
4 Ibid., p. 217.
5 Ibid., p. 9.
6 Franklin accurately points out The Freewoman's symbiotic relationship with psychology, drawing
connections between London's burgeoning psychoanalytic community and Marsden's feminist
avant-garde in the years before World War One.
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writing - an aesthetic agenda traditionally understood mainly in connection to the
more distinctly literary form of The New Freewoman and The Egoist.
A similar argument for continuity is encountered in Bruce Clarke's Dora
Marsden and Early Modernism: Gender, Individualism, Science. Clarke detects an
explicit 'egoistic' literary current running consistently from the early days and
continuing undisturbed in The New Freewoman. As he points out: 'The transition of
Marsden's interests from political feminism to philosophical and creative
individualism was also operative in The Freewoman [... ] no manipulations on
Pound's part were needed to bring about its growing literary orientation.Y Overall,
Clarke's study stresses the need to reassess the interconnections between Marsden's
evolving egoism and the individualistic cultural politics of early modernism.
Extending the classical assertion of Michael Levenson and Floyd Dell about the
overriding influence of Max Stirner on Marsden's thought, he highlights the
importance of considering Marsden's course of development alongside the broader
cultural nexus of philosophical and aesthetic individualism.' Drawing attention to
such texts as Egoists: A Book of Supermen, a collection of literary essays by James
Huneker originally published in the avant-garde little coterie Mademoiselle New
York, as well as The Eagle and the Serpent in London," Clarke classes Marsden's
egoism alongside the ideological concerns of early twentieth-century literary and
political culture, and argues for the familiarity of Marsden with this particular radical
milieu.l''
7 Clarke, p. 98.
8 'Levenson's assertion in A Genealogy of Modernism that 'The New Freewoman's principal and
overriding concern was to "trumpet Stirnerian egoism, and the rhetoric was deafening (66)"
[... ] is overstated', Clarke points out, ibid., p. 222.
9 Ibid., p. 222.
10 Ibid., p. 222. It has to be noted that while Clarke situates Marsden's egoism within this tradition and
cites the particular example of The Eagle and the Serpent as an instance of it - this is not
followed further.
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Clarke's suggestion, that in order to understand Marsden's egoism we need to
examine the legacy of radical egoism (philosophic and aesthetic) more closely, is
particularly relevant. Consequently, in this chapter I look specifically at The
Freewoman's initial emphasis on anti-idealism, anti-moralism, individual selfhood
and agency, to determine the kind of relationship which might exist between the
concurrent discourses of egoism and Marsden's periodical.
As will be shown, in The Freewoman, Nietzschean individualism becomes the
centerpiece of a discussion of sex ethics and self-realization. The Freewoman
provides evidence both of the impact of such radical discourses upon Marsden and of
her propensity to expand them in the service of her own interests. There is an attempt
on the part of Marsden and other contributors to revise, or re-value, the conception of
the selfhood through a Nietzschean discourse of feminist individualism. All The
Freewoman articles under discussion here provide an alternative discourse of
individuality and empowerment, one radically opposed to the gender-based logic of
Edwardian discourses of emancipation.
In particular the first part of this chapter explores the extent to which
Marsden's radical conception of egoism serves as a counter-narrative that aims to
overcome the dualism of contemporary conceptions of selfhood and gender. More
specifically, in her 'New Morality' articles Marsden investigates the values and the
assumptions that lie embedded in the construction of male and female identity,
radically revising the gender-determined, power-oriented rhetoric of Edwardian
feminism. As it will be shown, Marsden's genealogical formula in these articles
results in the devising of a new morality and psychology of the self, a theory of
selfhood that reveals quite interesting analogies with the later gender-free models of
individualism encountered in The New Freewoman.
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3.2 Edwardian Conceptions of Super-womanhood and Sex-dualism: G. L.
Harding 'Spinsters in the Making', Samuel George's Is Woman Super-man?
A quick look into The Freewoman's early issues suggests a lively interest in
Nietzsche, mostly in articles dealing with feminine psychology, sexuality and
morality. There were more than a few those who expressed their frustration with the
increasingly Nietzschean-spirited tone of the periodical, particularly in relation to the
periodical's advocacy of a 'new morality'. An instance of this can be seen in such
columns as 'Asceticism and Passion'. A letter from a female subscriber objects to the
periodical's 'new morality', a morality which as she notes, is inspired by Nietzsche:
I see no advancement for women along the lines of a laxity in sex matters
equal to that which characterizes men [... ]. 'Genius' says Emerson, 'is
always ascetic, and piety and love. Appetite shows to finer souls as a
disease, and they find beauty in rites and bounds that resist it.' And to
quote a more modem authority, Bernard Shaw argues that the production
of his best work necessitates a partial asceticism [... ]. In advanced circles
nowadays to speak of anything sexual as 'immoral' is to proclaim oneself
a back number [... ]. Alles ist erlaubt' [All is permitted] we must cry with
Nietzsche if we would be truly modem. I I
Especially neologisms like the 'superwoman' provide the material for debates
between feminist and antifeminist camps. An interesting piece of anti-feminist
literature can be seen in the December issue. G. L. Harding's 'Spinsters in the
Making,12 draws attention to a new type of womanhood, the newly emerging college
woman, and is particularly remarkable for the Nietzschean terminology it uses.
Drawing on the notion of the 'super-woman', the article claims to provide insight
into the psychology of this new category of womanhood. As Harding argues, college
women seem to have gone too far in abandoning their femininity for the exchange of
II E. M. Watson, 'Letter to the Editors', The Freewoman, 8 February 1912, p. 231.
12 G. L. Harding, 'Spinsters in the Making', The Freewoman, 14 December 1911, pp. 66-68.
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education and independence. These attitudes are mostly evident in such categories of
women as the modem college woman, his new 'superwoman of the intellect' as he
labels her. This is the picture Harding paints of her:
The college woman, in her youth at least, is inclined to be rather superior,
to be intolerant of views other than her own, and disposed to. lay down
the law [... ]. The right to the cultivation of her individuality, which she
justly claims, results frequently in egotism and self-absorption [... ].13
Harding openly objects to the 'unnaturalness' that such education/career oriented
models of individuality display. In general, his article warns against the degenerating
physiological and psychological effects such attitudes might produce, based on the
premise that intellect in women (in male doses) is unfit for the female constitution,
and proves fully inefficient in cultivating a healthy sense of selfhood. His reasoning
is quite simple. Based on the supposition that women are by nature different from
men (women are by nature intuitive and maternal while male nature typifies intellect
and reason), he contends that, by seeking to approximate men, women end up
slipping into a role for which they are not naturally fit. His emphasis on the different
but complementary nature of men and women leads him to argue that modem
women who try to possess too much of the 'male' intellect not only transgress their
natural and social role (their nurturing role) but also fail as individuals. This is what
he thinks about the category of the intellectual superwoman, his modem 'spinster in
the making':
Again, work and the multiple interests of College life will have absorbed
all her thoughts and energies, and, moreover, have seriously sapped her
vitality. She knows, feverishly and earnestly, that she is a Worker, and
remembers only feebly, occasionally, and rather resentfully, that she is a
woman too. In this attitude of mind, intellectually well equipped,
emotionally starved, and therefore sentimentally or neurotically. inclined,
she enters upon a new phase of life, as an independent and responsible
individual.I4
13 Ibid., p. 67.
14 Ibid., p. 67.
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By trying to approximate the life of a man she is inevitably driven to a restless and
dissatisfied life, because 'only half of her nature is allowed development'. As long as
this new type of superwoman, the 'educated, intellectually well-trained superwoman
of high morals and character', expends her 'will' in order to advance her intellect
than the qualities truest to her nature, she runs the risk of degenerating into another
type, that of the' defeminised spinster':
Type 1. - THE COLLEGE WOMAN [... ]. Intellectually well trained,
morally above suspicion, with a high sense of duty and responsibility, she
would seem to be,par excellence, man's ideal companion and help-meet.
Celibacy, nevertheless, is her usual lot in life. IS
Although 'first-rate men' need 'first-rate women', and vice versa, this kind of false
model of selfhood leads woman to compulsory celibacy." Harding's employment of
the concept of 'superwoman' proves to be interesting for several reasons. The article
is more than an example of Edwardian misogynism, which aims to counter new
models of individuality and self-actualization as proposed by feminists. It is also
interesting for the kind of sexual theory it invokes. In trying to show the weaknesses
of such false models of womanhood, he draws on a theory of gender difference not
uncommon at the time. Based on a model of human behavior that accepts the natural
opposition of the sexes, he argues not against women elevating their nature (after all
the morally advanced man, the 'superman' needs a 'superwoman'j'", but rather
against their emulating the nature of men. Selfhood, for him, is determined by
biology, and by woman's most immediate and true destiny lies in her role with her
powers of fertility. As such, the kind of superwoman who, through higher education,
tries to transcend her nature (and her position) through higher education, degenerates
into a 'type described so often as an inferior imitation of man', a second-rate
15 Ibid., p. 66.
16 Ibid., p. 67. '[F]irst-rate women must have first-rate men. Again I admit the truth of this [...]. After
all, the possession of a degree, even a good one, is not in itself a proof of all-round excellence.
Complex human beings are not merely intellectual machines [...]. Supermen want superwomen
and it would be just as well perhaps for both sexes to realise that', (p. 67).
17 Ibid., p. 67.
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individual in whom the female nature of womanhood is somewhat denied. IS As
Harding warns, modem superwomen run the danger of becoming de-humanized and
de-sensualized through 'abstract knowledge and book-learning': 'life as it is lived by
the great mass of humanity scarcely touches her at all, she is absorbed in various
causes and missions, and, seeking self-realisation, she finds self-limitation.' 19 He
concludes:
such epithets as 'learned pig', 'defeminised spinster', 'unsexed woman'
are frequently bestowed upon highly educated women, and though these
are certainly rude, and possibly exaggerated, there is no smoke without
fire.2o
Lucy Delap has argued in 'The Superwoman: Theories of Gender and Genius
In Edwardian Britain', that the development of the idea of the 'superwoman'
indicates the impact of Nietzschean and egoist ideas upon the women's movernent.t'
As she argues, such ideals capture some important features of Edwardian feminist
thought, animating a certain rhetoric of feminism - and, in particular, that of egoism
and emancipation. Nonetheless, she argues, this is not to suggest that 'superwoman'
was an unproblematic or a consistent idea, and concludes that overall it provides an
'enigmatic and confining intellectual framework through which to conceive of
women's emancipation' _22 As she argues, while it was meant as a vehicle for broader
feminist aspirations, it drew on the older discourse of 'genius' and sexual polarity. It
may be useful to briefly consider the likely links between Harding's imagery with the
older portraits of superwomen envisioned by Shaw and Orage. Notwithstanding its
apparent misogynism, this model of womanhood is, I believe, not distinct from the
kind of ideal superwomanhood envisioned earlier on by Shaw or even Orage who
notes that for Nietzsche 'Man', is 'the warrior and the type of the will-to-power' and
18 Ibid., p. 67.
19 Ibid., p. 67.
20 Ibid., p. 67.
21 Lucy Delap, 'The Superwoman: Theories of Gender and Genius in Edwardian Britain', The
Historical Journal, 47 (2004),101-126.
22 Ibid., p. 126.
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'Woman', is the principle of the conservation and the will to live': 'it is in man that
woman finds her own meaning and purpose, - a meaning and purpose that she could
not discover without him. For while man is a means to the world, woman is a means
to man. ,23 In fact, it might be argued that this gendered logic reverberates the kind of
vitalism proposed in Man and Superman - the union of 'intellect' and 'Life Force',
Tucker and Anna, and Shaw's view of woman as 'mother' in the perfection of the
human race. It seems to me that overall, Harding's argument is intended not as an
attack on the ideal of the superwoman per se but rather on this particular type of
superwoman - the superwoman who craves intellect over life - which, for him,
represents a false paradigm of progress. All these examples capture, at least to some
extent, the gendered logic underneath these Nietzschean ideals and concepts as
disseminated within the intellectual and progressive milieu. Harding's article in
particular suggests that, by that time, this Nietzschean idiom had come to describe a
certain new ideal of womanhood representing individuality and brains. The article
draws on the medical discourse of degeneration; it also sheds light on the mainstream
understanding of gender and, by extension, selfhood in Edwardian Britain, as based
on difference and polarity.
A more 'mainstream portrait of the 'superwoman', one catering for a more
conventional educated taste can be found in such feminist booklets as for instance in
Is Woman Super-manl'" - a sort of self-help, self-empowering manual of
comportment for advanced women. This is an advertisement for the book which
appeared in Votes/or Women:
This little brochure will be heartily welcomed by all lovers of absolute
Truth, particularly those who are interested in the emancipation and
upliftment of woman to the side of man. Everyone who wishes to help
forward the emancipation of women should read and circulate this
23 Alfred R. Drage, Nietzsche: In Outline and Aphorism (London: T. N. Foulis, 1911), p. 49. See 'Man
and Woman' chapter, pp. 41-51.
24 Samuel George, Is Woman Super-Man? (London: The Power Book, 1915).
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booklet as far as possible, as it gives indisputable Truth which has never
before appeared, and which is, therefore, likely to be of immense service,
because it shows conclusively that woman is the 'super-man' which the
world is looking for to-day [... ].25
As its writer argues, 'the reason why, after so much has been written by thousands of
able people, no progress has been made toward amelioration of the conditions under
which women suffer, is because they have never grasped the fundamental Truth of
the equality and complemental nature of the sexes. ,26 The writer argues for a re-
evaluation of the mainstream patriarchal stereotypes that look upon women as simply
'household-equipment'. The natural differences between men and women do not
suggest that man is to be regarded as superior and woman as inferior. His main
argument is that, in spite of their inherent contradictions, man and woman
complement each other, and they should learn how to use their differences to their
own advantage. Continuing to insist on the complementarity of genders and the
standard polarity of woman/body man/mind, the book advertises itself as the modem
guide to woman's call for equality, a kind of manual that will help her grasp the
ultimate 'Truth' and establish herself as man's equal. As in the case of Harding, the
kind of framework that informs his logic also indicates the frequent inability or
unwillingness of the Edwardians to conceive selfhood outside the limits of sex
differences and mainstream norms. Despite its seemingly egalitarian flair, it echoes
the same rigidly polarized sexuality that enables Harding's misogynistic logic:
Man can never rise to become woman, woman can never descend to
become man. Those who, as some are doing, try to change their natures
will be bitterly disappointed, for such a thing is absolutely impossible.
Women will never be able to do entirely what men have done, neither
will men be able to do what women have done. It seems, therefore, to be
necessary that we get a perfect understanding of our original endowments
and the powers that have arisen from their use. As soon as we understand
our inherent natures we shall be in a position to do our parts in life
without friction on account of our sex. When we do away with our
present ideas of superiority, inferiority, and inequalities of rights on
25 'Ads Section', Votes/or Women, 19 November 1915, p. 62.
26 George, p. 4.
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account of sex we shall see ourselves and our opposites in a new and true
light?7
Not surprisingly, in this context, the superwoman ideal is construed as a more
mainstream figure - a modem alternative to the old 'angel in the house'. This
modem woman has now to educate herself appropriately to fulfill her. role as a
perfect companion, bringing spiritual balance (not tension) to the marital union. A
curious mixture of dietary advice, psychological and mystico-religious jargon, it
promises to help the modem superwoman achieve the right equilibrium - an
intellectually and physically fulfilling union - through perseverance and will-power:
Of recent years we have heard much from various sources about 'super-
man' [... ]. The true idea behind 'super-man' being 'over man' arises
with such thoughts as are in this article, whether 'super-man' will not be
woman in activity in the spiritual place in the spiritual age [... ]. In fact,
woman is inherently the super-man which has been conceived by some
minds of the present day. Just as man was found to be complete on the
material side as the result of the process of evolution, so at the present
time in mind, he has by woman's help become complete, but can go no
further forward in fact, the tendency of his mind has lately been toward
devolution and destruction. This can be seen everywhere to-day, and the
reason is: because he has set her help aside. But the scene is changing,
and to-day we find woman bidding fair to show heself to be the superior
or 'super-man' because of her superior super-mental and spiritual powers
[... ]. These are the women who are alive to their real nature, whose
minds have been illuminated from above [... ].28
Intended more as a kind of marriage manual than a pamphlet for the female cause, it
is an interesting piece of literature which professes to defend the new womanhood
against patriarchy, while perpetuating masculinist assumptions under a new name.
The dualistic point of view is masked, when the author writes as if trying to restore
the natural order, apparently in support of the call for women's parity with men.
Recasting the notion of the Ubermensch in a discourse of sexual dualism allows the
same old gender dynamics to be remolded into a new rhetoric of empowerment and
emancipation.
27 Ibid., p. 3.
28 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
123
3.3 Dora Marsden's 'Master Morality' and Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of
Morals
In the examples discussed above, the debate about woman's individuality and
emancipation - its Nietzschean rhetoric of the superwoman - seems to rest upon a
certain discourse of gender difference. As Bruce Clarke informs us, the ideology of
sexual difference was heavily ingrained in Victorian and Edwardian understandings
of selfhood and underpinned much of the psychological and sexological theories of
the period.i" For Clarke, the development of Marsden's individualism, from the kind
of 'Nietzschean conception of feminism' in The Freewoman to the genderless
egoism of the New Freewoman, offers a challenge to this kind of dualism.i" This part
considers the early type of Nietzschean feminism that Clarke and others have
detected in Marsden in relation to this Edwardian discourse of sex dualism, and
indicate the difference in point of view which separates Marsden's Nietzscheanism
from more mainstream discourses of super-womanhood and selfhood like George's
and Harding's. My discussion of 'Bondwomen'," 'Commentary of Bondwomen'r'r
and 'The New Morality' series/3 considersMarsden's feminist individualism in light
of Nietzsche's theory. In particular, I will show how Marsden's version of master
morality moves away from the biological polarized gender reasoning of such
discourses. Through revising the notion of the genius-individual Marsden proposes a
re-evaluation of sex standards and normative ideas about identity. One of the points
29 Clarke, p. 61.
30 Ibid., p. 61.
31 Dora Marsden, 'Bondwomen', The Freewoman, 23 November 1911, pp. 1-2.
32 Dora Marsden, 'Commentary on Bondwomen', The Freewoman, 30 November 1911, pp. 21-22.
33 Dora Marsden, 'The New Morality 1', The Freewoman, 14 December 1911, pp. 61-62; 'The New
Morality II', The Freewoman, 28 December 1911, pp. 101-102; 'The New Morality III', The
Freewoman, 4 January 1912, pp. 121-122; 'The New Morality IV', The Freewoman, 11
January 1912, pp. 141-142, 'The New Morality V', The Freewoman, 11 January 1912, pp. 141-
142.
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she aims especially to make is that it is our moral prejudices rather than our biology
that predetermines our 'nature' and 'constitution. In Marsden's 'New Morality'
series as well as in 'Bondwomen' and 'Commentary to Bondwomen', I detect
interesting correspondences between Marsden's new psychology of
womanhood/selfhood and Nietzsche's genealogical method. As I will try to
demonstrate, Marsden's new individualistic ethic utilizes Nietzsche's master-slave
dialectic to problematise dualistic ideals of femininity, ideals that are deep-seated
and take various forms.
This part of the chapter offers a close analysis of some of Marsden's
Freewoman leader articles, in particular 'Bondwomen', 'Commentary on
Bondwomen', and her 'New Morality' series. In all these articles, I will try to
demonstrate that we see clear evidence of Marsden's early affiliations with a
discourse of individualism. She understands a model of selfhood as incorporating
Nietzsche's conception of master-slave morals in order to question normative
understandings of gender. Through that she aims towards introducing a new method
of moral psychology that envisions a redefinition of the self. Initially, Marsden
addresses the question of free will and agency, and their importance in the shaping of
the 'creative' free individual, whom she calls interchangeably 'artist', 'genius', and
'freewoman'. In 'Bondwomen' and 'Commentary to Bondwomen', she is concerned
with different types of psychology, a master one ('free' conscience) and a slave one
('bonded' conscience), and focuses on two polar categories of womanhood,
'bondwomen' and 'freewomen'. In 'The New Morality' articles she addresses the
question of how the free and bonded consciousnesses first arose, before addressing
the question of how the latter consciousness (the slave one) became bound up with
the Christian ethic of 'self-renunciation'. In 'The New Morality II' she focuses on
the doctrine of 'self-renunciation' and discusses the relationship between
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'asceticism' and 'passion' in a manner that, as I will attempt to demonstrate, suggests
interesting connections with Nietzsche's respective discussion of ascetic morals in
Essays II and III of the Genealogy. Two key concerns of 'The New Morality' series
are the question of how 'asceticism' is related to 'creativity' and 'genius', and the
potential for a fruitful and reciprocal relationship between introspection and
experience in the development of one's individuality.
A preliminary discussion of Nietzsche's master and slave morality is necessary
before I begin my analysis. In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche advances and
deepens the original hypothesis of the master-slave types of morality first
encountered in Beyond Good and Evil. As he would say in another instance, the three
essays in the Genealogy offered the 'psychology of the antithetical concepts of a
noble morality and a ressentiment morality, the latter deriving from a denial of the
former. ,34 Again, in Ecce Homo Nietzsche describes the essays in On the Genealogy
as 'three decisive preliminary studies of a psychologist for a revaluation of all
values. ,35 Broadly speaking, the aim of Nietzsche in that work is to examine the
value of values, their source, and original purpose through a kind of genealogical
narrative that hopes to get to the root of our moral psychology and ethical reasoning.
In the first essay, "'Good and Evil", "Good and Bad''', Nietzsche embarks on
an examination of the origins of 'good' and 'evil'. Contrary to what was at the time
argued by moral philosophy, 'good' does not originate amongst those to whom
goodness was shown. Nietzsche is highly skeptical about the belief that the moral
value of 'good' is built on the ethics of compassion or 'selflessness' (Christian
values). "'Originally" - they decree - "unegoistic acts were praised and called good
34 Nietzsche tells us this in The Anti-Christ, Section 24, p. 146.
35 Ecce Homo, 'The Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic', p. 85.
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by their recipients, in other words, by the people to whom they were usejul",.36
Challenging this assumption he contends that we are looking in the wrong place for
the origins of the concept' good': in reality the judgment' good' does not derive from
those to whom 'goodness' is shown. As he tells us:
Now for me, it is obvious that the real breeding ground for the concept
'good' has been sought and located in the wrong place by this theory: the
judgment 'good' does not emanate from those to whom goodness is
shown! Instead it has been 'the good' themselves, meaning the noble, the
mighty, the high-placed and the high-minded, who saw and judged
themselves and their actions as good, I mean first-rate.V
In other words, according to him 'good' as a value originates in the morality of the
aristocracy, the noble type of man.38 For Nietzsche, perhaps not surprisingly, this
type of nobility can be sought in the Classical tradition. A morality of 'self-
glorification' takes pride in the 'abundance of power': 'the noble type of man feels
himself to be the determiner of values [... ] he creates values through his faith in the
self, his pride in self, through his 'basic animosity and irony towards "selfishness"';
all these are typical features of the noble constitution, according to Nietzsche.39 For
Nietzsche, the genesis of the value 'good' is not a derivative of an unegoistic
morality; rather, it is there to designate power, creation, and strength - a joyous and
free constitution that springs from a 'triumphant affirmation of itself [... ] the noble
method of valuation: this acts and grows spontaneously, seeking out its opposite only
so that it can say "yes" to itself even more thankfully and exultantly' .40 In the
Genealogy, Nietzsche is using the actual historical example of the Greco-Roman and
Judeo-Christian tradition as examples of master and slave types. One represents the
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Essay I: "Good and Evil", "Good and Bad"', in On the Genealogy of Morals,
ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 11.
37 Ibid., p. 11.
38 Nietzsche discusses the noble type of man as the determiner of egoistic values in more detail in
Beyond Good and Evil, section 260. The Cambridge edition of On the Genealogy of Morals
includes all the relevant material in a separate section under the title, 'Supplementary Material'
with related extracts from Beyond Good and Evil, p. 155.
39 Ibid., p. 155-156.
40 Nietzsche, 'Essay I', Section 10, p. 20.
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life-affirming; the other, the life-denying, ascetic ethic of Judaism and Christianity.
However, the terms 'master' and 'slave' are not used only to designate historically
specific sets of values. He uses them to denote different modalities/attitudes of
individual existence and to designate different manifestations of the will-to-power. A
master morality is essentially a morality where the will-to-power operates without
meeting serious obstacles. Finding no particular resistance, by virtue of belonging to
the powerful, it creates its values through itself and for itself - from whatever the
will wishes to affirm. The will of the masters is active in the sense that it possesses
sufficient strength to enable free self-expression and free-determination of own
values and desires. By contrast, the slave type of morality is a morality which is
reactive - its power stems from defining itself in through opposition to the masters.
For Nietzsche the term 'slave morality' is not there to indicate mere subservience. In
fact, Nietzsche argues that the 'slave revolt in morality' ,41 which began with the
advent of Christianity, and is still ongoing, is evidence of the slave morality's
enduring power. The successful value-reversal of 'good' and 'bad' is the ultimate
victory of the slave's morality over that of his master's. In slave morality the tables
of law are no longer the same but are reversed, with the values of 'good' and 'bad'
now coming to serve the interests of the slaves. As a result, the formerly 'good' traits
of the nobles, such as courage, strength, egoism, as the self-regarding virtues of
autonomy and responsibility, are not only undermined but demonized and labeled
evil. This constitutes the origins of an age-long moral system of 'usefulness'Y - a
slave ethic of utility aimed at self-preservation. This utility ethic, and the values
associated with it - self-sacrifice, self-renunciation, altruism, and meekness are in
41 Ibid., p. 20. For Nietzsche's discussion of the Christian revolt in morals, see the whole of Section
10.
42 Beyond Good and Evil, section 260, p. 156, in 'Supplementary Material to On the Genealogy of
Morals'. Nietzsche there notes that 'Slave morality is essentially a morality of usefulness. Here
is the source from which that famous antithesis, "good" and "evil" emerged', p. 156.
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turned deemed 'good', for they are based on different valuations, reflecting the
powerless situation of the slave.43 What is, however, most distinctive about the two
opposing moralities is that while the former is founded on strength, and the latter on
weakness, both are animated by very similar drives (namely, the will-to-power) and
are equally capable of exerting this power - except that the latter obtains what it
wants in a different way from the former. This situation, for Nietzsche, is best
illustrated by the Judeo-Christian tradition which has traditionally asserted its power
and authority through ideals of weakness, humility and chastisement. Although this
is a morality originating in feelings of powerlessness, however, it is by no means less
powerful than the morality of the masters. While in the master morality the will-to-
power is exercised without encountering obstacles, as 'natural force', that is - in the
morality of the oppressed the will-to-power (its instinct for freedom) is forced back,
becomes incarcerated within itself and discharges itself only indirectly: as spiritual
force. This repressed instinct of power is what Nietzsche ultimately terms as 'bad
conscience' where 'goodness [becomes] woven together with the concept of God' .44
After having delineated the origins and principal features of 'master' and
'slave' types of morality/consciousness, the second essay "'Guilt", "Bad
Conscience" and Related Matters', turns its attention to the notion of 'bad
conscience'. 'Bad conscience' arises out of the suppression of the active instincts in
the individual; it is a restricted instinct which finding no other outlet, turns against
itself in self-denial:
this instinct of freedom forcibly made latent [... ] forced back, repressed,
incarcerated within itself and finally able to discharge and unleash itself
43 As Lawrence J. Hatab notes in Nietzsche's Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal
Recurrence (New York; Routledge, 2005), '[t]he immediate condition of the slave is one of
powerlessness and subservience; the master is a threat to the very existence and well-being of
the slave; in effect the slave lacks agency and so the initial evaluation is a negative one: the
"evil" of the master is in the foreground, while what is "good", the features of the slave's
submission, is a reactive, secondary judgment', p. 40.
44 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Essay II: "Guilt", "Bad Conscience" and Related Matters', in On the
Genealogy of Morals, Section 21, p. 62.
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only against itself: that, and that alone, IS 'bad conscience' in its
beginnings."
Nietzsche distinguishes two different manifestations of 'bad conscience'. In its
early form it is indissoluble part of the slave's conscience, and forms itself in
opposition and reaction to the value-systems originally set by the master's.code. It is
intrinsically tied with what Nietzsche calls the 'ascetic ideal', and in its reactive, sick
form it becomes ressentiment, 'an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most
fundamental prerequisites of life' .46 In Nietzsche's argument, the creation of values'
and the notion of 'bad conscience' are inextricably intertwined. In such reactive
state, the ascetic type of consciousness can lead to the 'will to nothingness' ,47 which
is fundamentally ascetic and self-denying, translating its negation into forms of faith
(religious, artistic, political, etc) which deny the individual his natural self, in
exchange for spiritual, 'divine', or metaphysical comfort. Philosophic nihilism,
aesthetic idealism and the Christian belief in the after-life is, are according to
Nietzsche are all manifestations of the reactive resentful phenomenon of slave
morality, and stand in stark contrast, to the active forms of 'bad conscience' that
Nietzsche envisions in his conception of the free sovereign ego."
To return to The Freewoman: in 'Bondwomen', Marsden begins her narrative
of master and slave moralities by distinguishing between two different types of
individuals, 'Bondwomen' and 'Freewomen'. She writes: 'Bondwomen are
distinguished from Freewomen by a spiritual distinction. Bondwomen are the women
45 Ibid., Section 18, p. 59.
46 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Essay III: What do Ascetic Ideals Mean?', in On the Genealogy of Morals,
Section 28, p. 120. .
47 Ibid., p. 120.
48 It is important to note that Nietzsche does not see 'bad conscience' as merely a reactive
phenomenon. As he argues further in the second essay, bad conscience is a 'sickness', but a
'sickness' as 'pregnancy is a sickness' ('Essay II', Section 19, p. 60). This 'sickness' is of key
significance to his understanding of life as a kind of continuous askesis towards self-becoming.
See Typer T. Roberts, Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, Religion (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998) and Simon May, Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on Morality (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002).
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who are not separate spiritual entities - who are not individuals.,49 As she informs us
in the following article that appeared on the next issue, 'Commentary on
Bondwomen', the 'free' and 'bond' types differ from each other in one main point:
the former has the 'essential attribute of genius', whereas the latter is by nature - and
most importantly by choice - of a slavish constitution, in the sense that it lacks a
personal 'vision'r'" In the 'Commentary on Bondwomen' that appeared in the next
issue Marsden attempts to provide clearer definitions for such terms. For her,
'genius' denotes:
[... ] an individual revelation of life-manifestation made realizable to
others in some outward form. So we hold that anyone who has an
individual and personal vision of life in any sphere has the essential
attribute of genius, and those who have not this individual realization are
without genius. They are therefore followers - servants, if so preferred.
We called them Bondwornen.i'
Of course, Marsden goes on to add, it cannot be expected of all women to learn how
to become Freewomen - in the same way that it cannot be expected of all men to
become Freemen: 'Not for one moment do we wish to support the view that all
women will be free, any more than all men are free. ,52 Even if circumstances
permitted it, not all individuals are endowed with the same creative 'force' ,53 the
same degree of 'creative power' that wou~d 'enable them to make their individual
revelation communicable. ,54 For this reason not all individuals get 'their chance to
become artists' and masters of themselves. 55 Yet, while it is possible for both men
and women to become 'masters' of sorts, women have the great disadvantage of
49 Marsden, 'Bondwomen', p. I. My emphasis.
50 Marsden, 'Commentary on Bondwomen', pp. 21-22.
51 Ibid., p. 21.
52 Ibid., p. 22.
53 Ibid., p. 22.
54 Ibid., p. 21.
55 Ibid., p. 21.
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always having been 'slaves' - they are always conscious of their task as 'followers',
as 'believers', as 'the law abiding', 'the moral', etc.56
For note, though some men must be servants, all women are servants, and
all the masters are men. That is the difference and the distinction. The
servile condition is common to all women. It is because woman is so
useful to man - his comforter. 57
The biological function of woman as a mother, comforter, nurturer, and helper - and
the canonization of it (by both men and women), forms a key part of how she is
perceived by herself and others. She has come to believe that she is not an individual,
a free agent, but rather a compliment. 'How women have fallen into this position is a
moot point', Marsden further notes:
Probably in her desire for love continued, for protection, for keeping the
man near her, she slipped into the role of making herself useful to him,
serving him, giving him always more love and more, more service, until,
one the one hand, she acquired the complete 'servant' mind, and he, on
the other, gained the realization that her 'usefulness' was of greater
moment to him that the fret of the tie which retained him. 58
According to Marsden, what seems to have most likely happened is that women have
allowed their individuality to be compromised. In their efforts to secure protection,
women, wittingly or unwittingly, allowed themselves to be molded into the image of
the 'Comforter'. First by necessity, then by choice, Woman diligently set about the
task of creating herself in the image and likeness of a 'higher law', be that man,
religion, morality or whatever. As such, the psychology of the 'follower', 'the law-
abiding', 'the believer' is impressed upon her - she has obtained, unconsciously or
deliberately, the psychology of the servant, the one who accepts rather the one who
creates values. 59 'Bondwomen' according to Marsden are those women who are 'not
56 Ibid., p. 21. In 'Bondwomen' Marsden tells us that woman has been informed that she is a
'follower', a 'believer', 'the law abiding', 'the moral', 'the conventionally admiring.' Through
'Religions, philosophies, legal codes, standards of morals' women are reminded of their role
and value as 'servants', 'living by borrowed precept, receiving orders, doing hodmen's work',
(p. 1).
57 Marsden, 'Bondwomen', pp. 1-2.
58 Ibid., p. 2.
59 Ibid., p. 2.
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individuals. They are complements merely. By habit of thought, by form of activity,
and largely by preference, they round off the personality of some other individual,
rather than create or cultivate their own.' Then she adds: 'Most women, as far back
as we have any record, have fitted into this conception, and it has borne itself out in
instinctive working practice.Y" As in Nietzsche's slave-type of morality, those
women have embraced a morality of utility (a slave morality that is), wherein they
are called 'good' because they are 'good' for something, they are useful, meek and
submissive; they practice obedience towards a law and tradition established from old;
because they do what is customary as ifby nature:
For this protected position women give up all first-hand power [... ]. All
the power they achieve is simply derivative [... ]. A morality begotten in
a community where one-half are born servants may glibly say that it is
woman's highest role to be a comforter of men and children; but is it the
truth, and men and women both must learn it, that while to be a human
poultice is to have great utility, it does not offer the conditions under
which vivid new life-manifestations are likely to show themselves, either
in the 'Comforter' or the 'Comforted' .61
Throughout her commentary, the master-slave model is employed for several
purposes. Here, in particular, Marsden's account of the origins of moral valuations
deals with traditional morality as a social phenomenon, arising out of an ethic of
mutual utility. Marsden assumes that relations between women and men have been
grounded upon such an ethic of usefulness. Women give up their freedom for
comfort, and, men, in their turn trade their own for conveniences brought by
women's servitude. For Nietzsche, as we saw, the Christian values of 'love',
'compassion' (Christian love and compassion are different from their pagan
equivalents, as Nietzsche argues) are value-judgments stemming originally from a
feeling of powerlessness and fear. For Nietzsche, as for Marsden as well, the notion
of 'slave morality' denotes a morality of the 'herd', which emphasizes the instinct of
60 Ibid., p. 1.
61 Ibid., p. 2. My emphasis.
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self-preservation and interprets as 'good' only that which can best enable stability
and equilibrium. For Nietzsche, 'herd' morality or rather the 'morality of custom' ,62
as he refers to it in the Genealogy, is essentially ancillary. And, in contrast to the
master ethic, which creates value-judgments based on individual will, this kind of
morality has a utilitarian basis at its foundation, providing the ethical grounds for
raising the good of the many above the good of the individual.
Similar to what Nietzsche argues, in 'Bondwomen' as well as in her Morality
series, Marsden draws attention to the related valuations of 'good' and 'weak' with
regard to traditional feminine models of femininity, and the ethic ofutility/usefulness
which underpins them. She notices the function of such valuations in relation to the
preservation of the master-slave hierarchy. In 'Bondwomen', she discusses how
critics of women, the 'opponents' of women, as she calls them, have argued that
women 'have allowed themselves to be used' and that, 'as the whole have shown
'nothing save servant attributes' .63 'He [the man who sees himself as master] would
have sacrificed himself to nothing, save his own ideas.' 'She [the woman who sees
herself as a servant], has always "revelled" somberly in sacrificing herself :64 'out of
his own experience of her, he knows her to be a follower [,] ... this in itself is
implying [her] lack of wants, and this in tum implying lack of ideals. ,65 Marsden
observes that this view, which underlies this common criticism of women by men, is
also often employed as evidence of woman's moral 'goodness': she is (so they claim)
by nature 'law-abiding', 'moral, 'pure', chaste, compassionate, unegoistic etc.
Woman's defenders (men as well as women) associate this ethic of weakness with
the feminine ideal. Woman's so-called 'goodness' is proven in her virtuous self-
denial, in her ability to sacrifice herself for 'duty, for peace, husband, parents,
62 Nietzsche, 'Essay II', Section 2, p. 36.
63 Marsden, 'Bondwomen', p. 1.
64 Ibid., p. 2.
65 Ibid., p. 1.
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children' .66 As Marsden points out in 'The New Morality' series, whether in the form
of criticism or in the form of praise, this evaluation of woman's inherent 'goodness'
perpetuates an ideal of femininity fundamentally inimical to the development of
woman's genuine self, her individuality. In such ideals as 'the mother figure' for
instance, and in the cult of sentimentality that surrounds this image, we can trace,
according to Marsden, 'the responsibility for most of the social ills from which we
suffer' .67 Fundamentally, what in her view underlies such valuations is a deep-seated
gender dualism, which is expressed in various forms. It can be seen in full power in
the psychology of the modem suffrage movement and the ethics it brings about and,
in some way, lends inspiration to the women's modem movement of revolt. In the
'Commentary on Bondwomen', Marsden draws attention to the suffragists' claims
for equality as an important illustration of this phenomenon, and distinguishes the
cult of the Freewomen from that of the Suffragists.
The cult of the Suffragist takes its stand upon the weakness and
dejectedness of the condition of women. The cult of the Suffragist would
say, 'Are women not weak? Are women not crushed down? Are women
not in need of protection? Therefore give them the means wherewith they
may be protected. Therefore, give them the means wherewith they may
be protected.' Those of the cult of the Freewoman, however, while
granting this in part, would go on to say, 'In spite of our position, we feel
within us the stirrings of new powers and of growing strength [... ].
[Freewomen] do not require protection; they need liberty. They do not
require ease; they need strenuous effort. They themselves are prepared to
shoulder their own [... ]. Thels accept them willingly, because of their
added opportunity and power. 8
It appears that for Marsden, the modem movement of suffragism seeks to derive its
power from the same value-judgments that caused woman's 'fall' in the first place.
In such a discourse lurks the logic of the old morality - the one responsible for most
of the social ills. As she tells us in 'The New Morality 1', 'we therefore seek to
formulate no morality for superwomen.' Instead, 'we are seeking a morality which
66 Ibid., p. 2.
67 Marsden, 'The New Morality IV', p. 141.
68 Marsden, 'Commentary on Bondwomen', p. 22.
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shall be able to point the way out of the social trap we find we are in' .69 And she
continues, 'this duality [... ] will cease to exist only when women sink back into the
position of females with nothing beyond, or when they stand recognized as "masters"
among other "masters", considering their sex just as incidental concern as men
consider theirs' .70
In 'The New Morality I' and 'The New Morality II', Marsden's 'master 'and
'servant' types of morality are centre stage. There, Marsden is concerned with men's
and women's moral and social values and with the likely origins of our present-day
attitudes. In these two articles, she argues that there seems to be a distinction within
the moral reasoning that governs men and women respectively. The moral code
which men have always followed is one based on an ideal of 'self-realisation',
Marsden argues in the first essay. This ethic of self-realization allows them to lead
their life as agents, as masters whose duty is the satisfaction of their own natural law,
which is the 'desire' and 'ideal' to 'satisfy the wants which the consciousness of his
several senses gives rise to. ,71 Men's moral code relies on one being master of one's
will, a free agent, and for such individuals this 'vision for attainment' is, basically a
'sensuous' 'pagan'. 72
However, when it comes to women, Marsden says, 'moral matters have been
wholly different'. 'Women', by contrast, 'are wholly Christian, and have assimilated
the whole genius of Christianity.Y' A woman's 'inner self, her values and virtues,
are circumscribed by laws which she 'did not make and which (at least initially) she
had not the power to unmake. In fact, her understanding of herself is bound up by a
faith inculcated, since time immemorial, through the encouragement and sanctions of
69 Marsden, 'The New Morality I', p. 62.
70 Ibid., p. 62.
71 Ibid., p. 62.
72 Ibid., p. 62.
73 Ibid., p. 62.
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moral and religious tradition. While man is driven directly by the power of the
senses, woman is driven by the less tangible power of the intuitive faith, at the
expense of her senses. Men, in Marsden's view, have created their values in
accordance to their 'inner desire', their ideal of virtue being primarily self-regulated,
but women have traditionally defined themselves and their virtue in terms of
'Christian' ideals.i" It is my view that Marsden's narrative here touches upon some .
of the issues discussed by Nietzsche in Essay II and III of the Genealogy. I believe, it
is important to pay close attention to her discussion of the female 'faith', especially
with reference to the notions of self-renunciation and asceticism, as they pre-empt
her later discussion concerning 'passion', the senses and creativity. These notions are
crucial in understanding her broader project of a new master morality and the image
of selfhood it imagines.
Before I carryon my discussion of Marsden, I would like to briefly examine
the related concepts of 'bad conscience' and 'ascetic ideal' in Nietzsche. In the
second essay Nietzsche talks about the genesis of moral and social consciousness.
The individual's 'consciousness' is conceived as a process of 'internalization',
namely a process of forced socialization through which the individual's primary
'instinct of freedom' is 'forcibly made latent' by the system of law and punishment,
in order to secure the benefit of the community.f 'This instinct of freedom' ,76 when
it finds itself involuntarily forced back by society's norms is given a new form: what
Nietzsche calls 'bad conscience'. As Simon May argues in Nietzsche's Ethics and his
War on Morality, Nietzsche's concept of 'bad conscience' in its general form denotes
the pain resulting from one's unsublimated 'masterly' passions. It is 'bad' not
74 Ibid., p. 62.
75 'Essay II', Section 17, p. 59.
76 Ibid., p. 59.
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because it is ethically bad, but because the agent experiences it as unpleasant. 77
./
Specifically, this concept refers to the 'inner life' formed through this long process of
socialization." For Nietzsche, it is what gives rise to our inner experience of
ourselves, a chamber of self-torture and the womb of imaginative self-creation all at
once, and despite its 'natural' origins, it finally leads to the ideas which are contained
in the notion of the soul, which is traditionally seen as the divine element within us:
'all instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards - this is what I call the
internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his
"soul"'.79
In Essay III of the Genealogy, 'What do Ascetic Ideals Mean', we learn that
the state of 'bad-conscience', this condition of psychological self-alienation', 80 is tied
to what Nietzsche refers to as the 'ascetic ideal.' In the beginning of the essay
Nietzsche poses the question 'what is the meaning of the ascetic ideal'. He does not
proceed to give us a clear definition; instead, he defines this 'meaning' in terms of
the concept's various functions and utilities." For Nietzsche there are various
psychological (and physiological) reasons for endorsing the ascetic ideal.82 One very
important reason is that it provides 'bad-conscience' with a place where it can vent
its cruelty freely; it brings the will-to-power to the surface (in the form of ascetic
passion, artistic passion, and so forth) and in so doing it preserves it. In the form of
77 May, pp. 60-61.
78 'Essay II', Section 22, p. 63.
79 Nietzsche, 'Essay II', Section 16, p. 57.
80 Roberts, Contesting Spirit, p. 56.
81 There are many uses for it and Nietzsche's analysis is quick to indicate that it can be employed
respectively by various types of individuals both as life-enhancing and life-denying force. (in
his analysis Nietzsche discusses the types of the 'ascetic-priest', the 'artist/philosopher', and
the 'slave' respectively).
82 For the purposes of my analysis here, I will only concentrate to the life-enhancing meaning of the
ascetic ideal. However, for Nietzsche the ascetic ideal is a highly complicated philosophical
and aesthetic question. I will return to this concept in my last chapter where I discuss it in
relation to the 'aesthetic asceticism' of Stephen Dedalus in Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a
Young Man. A very good synopsis of the meaning of the ascetic ideal is offered in David
Owen's Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, (Montreal and Kingston: Me Gill-Queen's
University Press, 2007).
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the ascetic ideal, thus, 'the will' is ultimately 'saved'. 83The ascetic ideal's capacity
for creativity, 'of strongly life-enhancing expressions', may be seen, according to
May, in Nietzsche's 'enormous emphasis on discipline, and in general, in his
conception of the 'healthy soul'. 84 Nietzsche draws an explicit analogy between
ascetic 'self-discipline' and concepts such as 'sublimation', 'culture', 'autonomy',
'freedom', 'self-overcoming', and 'soul'. As May tells us, for Nietzsche 'no
achievement is possible [...] without eliminating distractions to one's primary ends
[... ] any creative passion presupposes great emotional order in the self, the
elimination of inferior emotions and senses."
Interestingly, there are various references to asceticism and the ideals of self-
renunciation in Marsden's essays, which are tied to her conception of the old as well
as the new morality. The topic is first discussed with regard to woman's moral and
social makeup, which, as we have already seen, for Marsden is nothing less than a
manifestation of the slave-cum-master morality of Christianity. Such ideals are,
without a doubt, implicated in the kind of virtues that have cast women into the
current position of servitude. In relation to Christian virtue and chastity, Marsden
sees the ascetic virtue as the most potent embodiment of woman's 'weakness',
manifesting itself in a mistrust of life and the senses. But for Marsden the ascetic
ideal is definitely not just that. When taken out of the old moral sphere, it comes ·to
signify something else. There are interesting references to asceticism in relation to
Marsden's concept of 'inner permanent life-reality', or 'living spirit',86 two terms
used interchangeably to refer to the inner forces within the self (Marsden's own take
on the will-to-power). As I will try to show below, Marsden diagnoses the ascetic
self as a symptom of the masterly powers within the self, a creative illness of a
83 Nietzsche, 'Essay III: What do Ascetic Ideals Mean', Section 28, p. 120.
84 May, p. 83.
85 Ibid., p. 84.
86 Marsden, 'The New Morality V', p. 162.
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tormented inner 'will'. Marsden, in a similar way to Nietzsche, understands the
ascetic conscience as the site of various conflicting forces within the individual:
which hint at an inner voice which struggles to express itself somehow.
The theme of asceticism within the frame of moral psychology is touched upon
in Essay I of 'The New Morality' series, where Marsden discusses the process of
internalization of morality in women. As she puts it:
Resting for support upon a religion, their moral code has received its
sanction and force from within. It has thus laid hold upon consciousness
with a far more tenacious grip. Their code has been subjective,
transgression has meant a darkening of the spirit, a sullying of the soul.
Thus the doctrine of self-renunciation, which is the outstanding feature of
Christian ethics, has had the most favorable circumstances to ensure its
realization, and with women it has won completely - so completely that
it now exerts its influence unconsciously. Seeking the realization of the
will of others, and not their own, women have almost lost the instinct for
self-realization, the instinct in achievement in their own persons."
In the passage above Marsden is concerned with the psychology of woman's moral
code, discussing it as a kind of expression of 'bad conscience', as woman's 'bad
faith' so to speak. Marsden here is not quite clear as to what truly happened or how
the Christian ethics of self-renunciation came to acquire such a moral authority, or
how they became so appealing to women. She informs us that the ideal of conduct
underlying the moral psychology of women is driven by the power of her 'faith' in
the Christian ideal, by her attempt to become 'good' and 'pure'. As she tells us. in
'The New Morality II': 'man's view of life is sensuous [oo.J woman's is ascetic [oo.J
[they J are the "social ascetics" par excellence' .88 What seems of particular
significance to Marsden is the zeal with which woman endorsed such a code: 'the
doctrine of self-renunciation [oo.J has won completely' - so completely in fact that
morality has ceased to be something imposed from the outside. According to her, a
psychological shift has taken place. The previously external religious code has
87 Marsden, 'The New Morality 1', p. 62.
88 Marsden, 'The New Morality II', p. 101.
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become, interestingly enough, 'subjective', as Marsden points out. In other words,
what she seems to suggest is that over the course of time morality became
internalized - was 'burned' into woman's consciousness (to borrow a Nietzschean
metaphor), ultimately reinscribing itself as ascetic ideal.
Women, as we have said, are the social ascetics. They have become
ascetic through their long exercising of restraint. They have restrained
themselves in order to remain 'pure'. They have remained pure because
men like them 'pure', and men's likings in this manner are backed up by
women's religion, which, while being women's, is man-founded, man-
expounded, and man-administered."
As suggested already, the interrelated concepts of 'bad-conscience' and the ascetic
ideal are explored in Essay II and III of the Genealogy. The ascetic ideal holds a very
important psychological function, as through it several kinds of instincts (bad-
conscience) are allowed discharge. Interestingly, for Nietzsche these instincts are
'masterly' because they are, in essence, the instincts of an unconscious will-to-
power. Therefore the 'ascetic' as a type of consciousness does not denote
'weakness', nor is it part of an organism in which force or passion is absent. Rather,
the ascetic conscience is a surface symptom of the deeper working of uncanny,
controlling, underlying forces which 'dress' themselves up in a spiritual costume. For
Nietzsche, in other words, 'bad-conscience' as 'ascetic ideal' is essentially the will
exercising its power as idea, as law over the body and the animal instincts in man; it
seeks its freedom through the sublimation of instinct and desire; it imposes form; it
demands hardness, discipline and struggles to posit, through brutal self-denial, an
existence it considers to be of a superior, purer, higher kind, to the present one. What
is more, it cultivates the capacities for self-reflection and accounts for the
'internalization' of the individual. Nietzsche warns us: 'We must be wary of thinking
disparagingly about this phenomenon, by reason of its initial painful ugliness. At
bottom it is the same active force which is at work on a more grandiose scale in those
89 Ibid., p. 101.
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potent artists and organisers [... ] the true womb of ideal and imaginative events,
finally brought to life. ,90
Broadly speaking, Nietzsche's ascetic ideal, whether in its life-denying or life-
affirming form, indicates a simultaneous movement of the 'will' away from what it
finds wanting in life and towards a higher value, a new valuation of life and of 'this
world' as SUCh.91Through the ascetic ideal (Nietzsche considers the term broadly and
includes artistic and philosophic asceticism in his discussion) a certain redirection
and refinement of instinctual senses into higher forms of creation or ideas may be
accomplished. Although this process is initially forced by an external entity (the
society), it may become responsible for life-formation and value re-evaluation, but
1·· ffi . t92on y In Its a irmatrve sta e.
For Marsden, as we have already seen, women have always been the 'social
ascetics', seeking support and power in the doctrine of 'self-renunciation'. In 'The
New Morality' series she spends a great deal of time explaining the life-denying
qualities that a virtuous life of moral chastity entails. And yet, she seems to suggest,
asceticism in its pure, unalloyed, non-moralistic sense possesses some unique
advantages. Divorced from a moralistic frame, it can be seen in a new light. For a
start, she argues, the ascetic ideal and its related doctrine of self- renunciation, is
inexorably linked with 'power' and the possibility of its 'realization' .93 In the power
of restraint, as Marsden tells us, one can detect an underlying force, which is only
now starting to become conscious of its potential. As she tells us:
90 Nietzsche, 'Essay II', Section 18, pp. 59-60.
91 As May points out: 'Anything structured by the ascetic form - whether it is life-enhancing or life-
denying - is, therefore, stretched across an inflexible gradient of value, one end of which the
agent necessarily devalues and the other end of which he necessarily "strives" towards (by
comprehending, becoming, expressing it)', p. 83.
92 For a further discussion on the affirmative status of the ascetic will see May. Deleuze's discussion
of the active and reactive form of forces in Nietzsche's philosophy is also important to
understand the potentially active direction of the Nietzschean will-to-power. See Gilles
Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983).
93 Marsden, 'The New Morality II', p. 101.
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Men have insisted upon this caste of 'pure women' because they
themselves were afraid of the senses. For men had given rein to the
.f
senses, and, having tried them, men knew their dangers. Hence they kept
the women from them, incidentally inculcating in women the power of
restraint, for which women should be duly grateful, as they will be when
they realize the power which accrues therefrom .[... ] [M]any women are
. li [this] 94commg to rea ize t IS .
Through this doctrine of self-restraint, this cruel self-discipline, they may have lost
much but also they 'have gained something', 'different in kind, and doubtless higher
in quality than what they have lost. ,95Understood as a kind of askesis of the self, as a
certain kind of practice which intensifies the abilities of concentration and the
arrestation of the immediate senses, asceticism is directly linked with the faculty of
intuition, Marsden argues. Through the ascetic ideal, woman has developed a new
faculty: 'We refer to the development of woman's intuitive faculty [... ]. Woman's
restraint, with its resultant sensitiveness, has brought a faculty whereby we shall one
day piece the veil which separates us from the mystery of creation. ,96Marsden will
attempt to clarify this point further in 'The New Morality II' essay. There, Marsden
argues that in certain forms of faith one discovers an inward creative force, the
sublimation of a certain emotion, what she describes as 'passion'. It can be
encountered in such intense forms of faith as religion and love and is directly linked
with the intuitive faculty referred to above. For her 'passion' as creative energy is
distinguished from passion as mere 'desire', or as 'sensuality' .97By passion, 'we do
not speak of the turbulent excitation of sense'; rather, we speak for the 'arrestation of
all the powers of sense by an object or cause,.98 As she tells us:
All passion has an intensifying power: the passion of power, the nearest
to creation; the passion of religion, the most ineffable; the passion of
great causes, the most spacious; the passion of love, which is creation in
itself. All these forms of passion put human consciousness in vibrant
94 Ibid., pp. 10 I-I 02.
95 Marsden, 'The New Morality 1', p. 62. My emphasis.
96 Ibid., p. 62.
97 'The New Morality II', pp. 102.
98 Ibid., p. 102.
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communication with the powers which have made human
consciousness."
While earlier Marsden condemns the ascetic hatred of the body, here she talks
approvingly of the practice of self-restraint and self-discipline, seeing them as
instrumental in the development of the faculty of intuition.
Passion is a rare thing, and more valuable that is rare [... ]. It is the first
suspension of the senses which produces the susceptibility which
becomes sensitive in a higher degree to every added manifestation to
which the senses may become alive [... ] it rivets attention, and it is in the
riveted attention which gives knowledge of the open avenue along which
creative vibration communicates. Along this avenue the consciousness of
the created is in intimate touch with the creative power. Herein the power
of sense intensifies a hundred-fold.l'"
Her emphasis on the importance of the 'arrestation' and the 'elevation' of the senses
here seems particularly poignant. Drawing on a vocabulary of physiology and
aesthetics, she seems to interpret 'passion' as a moment of 'aesthetic arrest', which
reveals the forces in operation within human consciousness. Passion, she seems to
argue is a form of sublimation, an important self-regulating, elevating force which
involves seeing through human illusions into the deep recesses of individual
consciousness: '[passion] disintegrates the outer husk of semblance and lays bare the
forces which produce their illusion.' 101 The upshot of all this is that passion typically
helps bring into communication the various forces forming the human consciousness.
Through 'passion', in other words, one is allowed insight into the inner mechanisms
of the conscious self, and the various forces which control it. Whereas Nietzsche uses
the term 'soul' to refer to this inner consciousness, she employs the term 'living
spirit' to avoid any confusion with the concept of the Christian soul (for her the soul
is living, becoming organic). For Marsden, 'restraint with its resultant sensitiveness',
its retentive and discriminatory powers, are essential in any effort to understand
99 Ibid., p. 102.
100 Ibid., p. 102.
101 Ibid., p. 102.
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one's own psychology, 'the mystery of [one's] creation' .102 Drawing on the theory of
d
the artist-genius from the 'Commentary on Bondwomen' essay, she notes the
significance of this faculty in the development of the self as an artist: 'through this
sense, they will make their greatest revelations of life-manifestations to the world.' 103
Having established that, Marsden returns to the subject of women's
moral psychology to suggest that while this faculty is of great value, 'it has been
bought at a high price, so high indeed as to annul almost its entire virtue.' As she
tells us: 'Women have the intuitive faculty, without the experience upon which to
practice it. They are as a Paderewski would be without an instrument.' 104 Whereas
men 'regard the senses as gifts', women, being incarcerated within a slave tradition,
see their senses 'as a means to an end', as she will add later, with a punitive, guilty
eye. lOS What seems to lie at the heart of the problem for Marsden is that woman in
this process of socialization has almost entirely lost 'the instinct for self-realization,
the instinct for achievement in [her] own person.' Her desire is still incarcerated
within the walls of the old morality, by a slavish 'bad conscience', so to speak:
'There is a genuine pathos in our reliance upon the law in regard to the affairs of our
own souls. Our own belief in ourselves and in our impulses is so frail that we prefer
to see it buttressed up.' 106 In assimilating the psychology of the servant, women have
always had their passion felt through something other than themselves (man, law,
religion). Intuition allows insights into the 'voices' of the inner self, a self with its
own demands and desires, but, at the same time, women are trapped by the loud
clutter of the outer:
102 Marsden, 'The New Morality I', p. 62.
103 Ibid., p. 62.
104 Ibid., p. 62. The comparison of woman to an artist is very interesting here. The ascetic's power of
restraint is, in a sense, also to be found in art. The passionate askesis of the body, which is
encountered in the ascetic, the shaping power of the individual spirit over its nature is
comparable to the aesthetic vision of the artist, who in tum forms material reality into an
aesthetic image of his own liking and imagination.
105 Ibid., p. 62.
106 Marsden, 'The New Morality III', p. 122.
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The long stroll of history is epoch-marked by such instances of the
jealous guarding of the claims of the inner voices against those of the
outer. It is a curious fact that almost all such advocacies of the inner
reason should have been made in respect of external communal concerns
such as religion, patriotism, or the commonwealth, that is, they have been
inspired by belief in things and persons rather than by belief in the
individual self.107
It seems that what we can draw from all this is that in order for woman's passion to
come 'alive', as it were, to recuperate the instincts for 'sense-gratification', the entire
basis of her moral psychology needs to be uprooted. In order for her to break free
from these 'outer voices', either those of external authority, or those of her own 'bad-
conscience' (in Nietzschean terms), woman has to learn to rely on a new faith, the
belief in the individual self. For woman to become free and a 'genius' she needs to
learn to rely upon 'the self: 'the self has to guarantee therefore the reality of the
idea, the worth of the idea, and the strength of purpose to carry the idea into
effect' .108For this she will need to become her own artist, her own value-creator, to
try to find her own 'inner conviction' through being capable of 'living intensely',
seeking 'life', 'try[ing] its value' .109Marsden is adamant that the individual cannot
become conscious of his or her 'inner conviction', nor distinguish between which
values are 'right' and which are 'wrong' - to draw on Nietzsche, one will not be able
to 'become what one is', without life experience and knowledge. As she points out:
As we said at the outset of the article, many women are coming to realize
their own psychology, and are abandoning the old mistrust in life, with
its impulses and pleasures. They are beginning to realize that capacity for
sense-experience is the sap of life, and to the height of their attainment in
the scale of being. 110 . .
If we take all this together, it can be argued that the new moral psychology
Marsden proposes advises at the same time a turn inward, in the realm of emotion,
and a turn outward, in the realm of experience. It is both introspective and vitalistic
107 Marsden, 'The New Morality V', p. 162.
108 Ibid., p. 162.
109Ibid., p. 162.
110 Marsden, 'The New Morality II', p. 102.
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and values the powers of self-reflection and the importance of the 'living spirit'. The
,
latter for Marsden is nothing less than an outward flow of the self s creative power, a
sign of its capacity to imagine something beyond the immediate, and express itself in
the form of an ideal. It may be said that Marsden's envisioning of a free
consciousness, guided by experiment and self-reflection, is a consciousness similar
to that of Nietzsche's 'sovereign man' .111 It is a consciousness capable of a true re-
evaluation of its previous condition, which feels innocent and strong enough to
become a creator of new valuations and virtues.
As we have already seen the issue of independent value and self-creation arose
in the first essay ('Bondwomen') when Marsden considered the question of the kind
of selfhood to which the freewoman type aspires. Central to her conception of the
freewoman there was the question of agency, creativity, and strength. In this
particular article she sought to separate her ideal of a free-willed individual from a
consciousness which was passive, bonded, and servile to ideals that are not of the
'self. In place of this bonded consciousness, she sought to erect a new ideal of
selfhood, a new free consciousness, confident, and self-sufficient. In this essay,
Marsden drew on the discourse of 'genius', to discuss the free, artistic, spiritual,
model of individuality she envisioned for The Freewoman. Genius there was defined
as the ability to assert oneself as 'an artist', as an individual who, by developing the
faculty of an 'inner reason' (intuition of life-experience), may develop the potential
for self-expression and self-knowledge.I'? In sum, Marsden envisions a creative
spirit (the new individual), who, through experience and self-reflection will seek the
III Nietzsche, 'Essay II', Section 2, p. 37.
112 Marsden, 'Commentary on Bondwomen', p. 21. As she continues to say: 'Our contention is that
life should supply the conditions which would enable this native endowment of vision to make
itself communicable to others, and we consider that so many women appear ordinary, not
because. they are ordinary, but because they are bundled pell-mell into a sphere in which they
can so no special gift; and because they are expected to be so bundled, they are deprived of the
training which would enable them to make their individual revelation communicable, that is, of
their chance to become artists' ( p. 21).
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realization of its autonomous ideal, a spirit strong enough and capable enough to
'record' his own value, 113 becoming its own master:
Nothing but thing - the sense of quality, the sense that a woman has gifts,
the sense that she is superior, a master - can give her the strength [... J to
seize the 'love' in passing, to suffer the long strain of effort, and to bear
the agony of producing creative work. Having this sense, they will learn
that freedom is born in the individual soul, and that no outer force can
either give it or take it away [... J. For none can judge of another soul's
value. The individual has to record its own.114
In a way, Marsden's address to the new freewomen echoes Nietzsche's address to
his 'free spirits', those who, as he tells us in the Genealogy, are 'of another faith'; the
spirits which are 'strong enough and primordially strong enough to give an incentive
for contrary valuations and for 'eternal values' to be valued another way round'. 115
Like Nietzsche who teaches 'man that the future of mankind is his will, dependent on
human will', 116 she teaches the woman the necessity of faith in the individual self,
and incites her to recognize her inner potential, her inner power, to find the means to
cultivate it. In effect in the trope of the freewoman she envisions a self-conscious
condition and a self-mastery.
Overall Marsden's new moral psychology envisions a morality of free
autonomous, responsible 'masters'. It entails the gift of deep self-knowledge and the
ability to construct one's identity in accordance with 'an individual and personal
vision of life'. It seeks to set 'limits to the sphere and the working area of external
authority', so as to, one day, overcome the 'friendly shelter and protection oflaw and
convention', the obedience to the cause of an ideal, 'unless they are impelled by
some inner conviction.' 117 It has to start by cultivating a trust in the senses, a trust in
113 Marsden, 'Bondwomen', p. 2.
114 Ibid., p. 2.
115 Nietzsche, 'Essay II, Section 2, p. 152.
116 Ibid., p. 152.
117 Here Marsden is referring to all kinds of ideals, socialism, liberal anarchism included: 'The single
pioneer is followed by the "followers" who "organize" the thought of the first comer. That is,
they level it down; they pack the new wine into the old bottles, harness the new spirit to the old
machine; strangle the new freedom before it is well-nigh born [... ]. Every revolution seems to
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one's value and one's unique desires. The self/free spirit has to cultivate the trust in
,/
the freedom of will and individuality. It has to become aware of a pure self, one
unalloyed by convention: to tum inward and shed light onto whatever one's genuine
passion (or will) might be. At the end of the 'New Morality' series she sums up her
new cult of individuality, through which woman one day will become her own
master:
Each change necessitates the belief in one's personal individuality and
judgment [... ]. We have used the word 'anarchy', where we might easily
have used such a word as 'individuality', of set purpose. We have done
this deliberately, in order to make clear the truer sense of direction and a
truer perspective. Until this is done, we, and especially we women, get a
wholly wrong sense of values. We are putting wrong valuations of worth
on things [.... ]. The law and the moral code have loomed larger than the
living spirit-material through which these work. So, by setting limits to
the sphere and working area of external authority, we have endeavoured
to make clear the inner permanence of life-reality to which external law
administers as a servant, but may not dictate as a master [.... ]. To
Freewomen this conception is becoming clearer. It is to face life unafraid,
to welcome its emotions, to try their value, to be alive and capable of
living intensely; to seek life, and that more abundantly; and, if there is a
price to be paid for it, to be ready with the toll.118
3.4 New Discourses of Radical Nietzscheanism: John M. Kennedy, 'The
Psychology of Sex'; Henri Lichtenberger, The Gospel of the Superman; Charles
W. Whitby, 'Tragedy of the Happy Marriage'; Edmund. B. Auvergne, 'The
Case of Penelope'
In this part I focus on three other Freewoman contributors, whose articles extend the
connection between Nietzsche, psychology and an ethic of self-creation, providing
hence a wider context for understanding the accommodation of Nietzsche in this
follow this cycle-crash and disorder, bloodshed and great sacrifice, one great soul's realization
of liberty, one brief glint from off a new idea, then back to the new-old tyranny. And that as far
as we have got. [... ]. The bishop speaks the truth. He is speaking truth when, for instance, he
says, "it would be a gross error to confuse Socialism with Anarchism. The Anarchist refuses to
be governed at all. The socialist aspires to be governed too much.'" 'The New Morality V', pp.
161-162.
118 Ibid., p. 162.
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particular tradition of individualism. 'The Psychology of Sex' by J. M. Kennedy.l'"
the eminent Nietzsche translator and New Age contributor, is one such example that
provides a commentary on suffrage and feminist politics through an individualistic
lens. Overall, Kennedy's article is a critical examination of the 'consciousness' of the
feminist movement. It attempts to transcribe the radical ethic of creative
individualism within the feminist discourse. As Kennedy saw it, there is a notable
distinction between the psychology of the suffragists and the feminists:
The distinction between the Suffragists and the Feminists amounts to
this: the Suffragists are those women who want voting powers for the
redressing of economic grievances and for the purpose of raising woman
to the level of man in a purely materialistic sense. The Feminists are
those who pay less attention to the securing of the vote - who are,
indeed, not particularly anxious to vote at all - for the reason of their
grievances are not of the economic but of the spiritual order. They do not
wish merely to elevate woman to the level of men for purely financial
reasons. They do not wish for economic freedom merely; but for sexual
freedom. 120
According to him suffragists and feminists alike are those women who want to raise
woman to the level of man: the suffragists in a purely materialistic sense, via the
acquisition of the vote; and the feminists, in a spiritual sense, through sexual and
intellectual emancipation. According to him, however, despite the claims to
emancipation and freedom, both kind of attitudes prove limiting, especially in terms
of their 'servile' reliance on 'causes', 'ideas', and 'morals'. 'Anyone who wishes to
bring about greater intellectual plus moral freedom for both sexes cannot look to the
suffragists for support. Imagine the suspicion awakened in the mind of the average
woman by the very expression "moral freedom.",121 And at the same time, referring
to the growing popularity of Nietzsche among feminist circles, he points out:
Neither, however, can we appeal to the feminist for support [... ]; for the
feminists are merely 'interested' in whatever happens to be the fashion at
the moment - Bernard Shaw, the revival of Samuel Butler, Nietzsche,
1191. M. Kennedy, 'The Psychology of Sex', The Freewoman, 23 November 1911, pp. 14-16.
120 Ibid., p. 14.
121 Ibid., p. 16.
150
Bergson. In very few instances indeed do the disciples prove worthy of
the masters they have chosen to follow for the moment; and in either c~se
they cannot be persuaded to take an interest in the body.I22
Neither the moral servitude of the suffragists nor the intellectual servitude of the
feminists, as shown in the way the latter 'obediently' follow any new theory offered
to them as the new gospel, can help the woman's disinterest or hatred for 'the body'.
The same kind of distinction can be seen in the case of men: 'It must be
acknowledged, of course, that males may now, to a very great extent, be divided in
the same manner'. The 'bete humaine', the male equivalent of the suffragist,
according to Kennedy, 'does not necessarily believe in Christian dogma, but
unhesitatingly follows the precepts of Christian morality [and] [... ] abjures the body
and develops a mind which is necessarily superficial.' 123'None of these types of
individuals experience life "in the full.",I24 Kennedy argues: "Tm Guten" [in the
good], perhaps; "Im Schonen" [in the beautiful], often; but "Im Vollen" [in full, in
plenitude], never.' His main concern is to argue for the replacement of the current
feminist values, values which reflect a problematic sex psychology of devotion and
discipleship, with new ones, based on an ethic of self-creation and self-governance.
It comes as no surprise that further down Kennedy talks about a 'third and
unnamed category' of individuals, a class 'as yet so small that we have no name for
it' in which naturally belong 'all the great artists of both sexes - all real creative
artists' .125They are the only ones who seek their virtue in an ethic of creativity which
122 Ibid., p. 16.
123 Ibid., p. 16.
124 As Lucy Delap notes, The Freewoman debates about emancipation reveal a conflict between, on
the one hand, women's political role as characterized by service, duty, and nurturance, an
argument resting on a discourse of 'sexual difference, and which highlighted the moral,
emotional or biological divide between the sexes' - and on the other on 'an individualistic
account of women's emancipation through self-interestedness. Lucy Delap, 'Philosophical
Vacuity and Political Ineptitude: The Freewoman's Critique of the Suffrage Movement',
Women's History Review, 4 (2002), 613-630 (pp. 616-620).
125 Kennedy, p. 16. My emphasis.
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serves both the 'body' and the 'intellect'. By this third class, those who live "1m
Vollen", he means
not mere romanticist writers; but men like Goethe. It is this third and
select class for which there is at present no definite organization; no
definite organ. It is, indeed, sincerely to be hoped that there will never be
need for any; for an organization or a movement is a bed of Procrustes, a
destroyer of individuality.V"
Here Kennedy aims to replace the romanticized ethic of feminist virtue with a
new one of vitalistic creativity, one interested in living out its theory. This ethic
envisions a free-spirited modem consciousness which will serve not the collective
cause of feminism but rather the individual 'causes' of its members. For him, as for
Marsden, freedom from prescribed social and gender roles and the promise of
emancipation is reserved for those individuals with a state of consciousness equal to
that of creative artists.
In other words, what he seems to suggest is that true individuality and freedom
are saved for those consciously corporeal creative individuals who are not afraid to
make art out of life. On the whole, it seems that the kind of creative individualism to
which Kennedy refers - this state of living life and its ideals aesthetically, fully, with
an interest in the 'body' - is not far from what we saw Marsden advocating
previously. As with Marsden before, what seems to be proposed here is an alternative
to current feminist discourses of emancipation, a new kind of discourse of
Nietzschean individualism which supports the virtue of self-creation and agency, and
which employs women to become' artists, creators of themselves. Kennedy here
deploys a Zarathustrian rhetoric which advices one to 'Go away alone [v..']. One
repays a teacher poorly if one always remains only a student'127 - an individualist
rhetoric which serves as a useful antidote to the prevalent rhetoric of 'virtue and
devotion' of the feminists and suffragists alike. In other words, this kind of
126 Ibid., p. 16.
127 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'Of the Bestowing Virtue', p. 68.
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'Nietzschean-like' type of emancipation, one which advocates a deeper questioning
/
of the principles and the causes that direct one's actions, lends further support to
Marsden's own ideal of the 'freewoman'. In essence, this kind of Nietzschean
discourse, one grounded upon the notion of a self-governed creative spirit ('a
growing Ego', as Marsden would soon call it soon)128 seeking its causes, its
alternatives and its possibilities of change not in some abstract theory or principle but
within itself, is, in my view, a radical alternative to the then-current fashionable
Nietzschean discourses of Edwardian feminism.
Kennedy's understanding of Nietzsche in terms of an ethic of the 'body' and
'creative individualism' needs to be pursued a bit further. In addition to playing an
active role in Levy's translation project, Kennedy was also responsible for translating
Professor Lichtenberger's well-known study La Philosophie de Nietzsche (1898)
from French.129 This study was a follow-up from a course of public lectures on
Nietzsche read by Lichtenberger at the University de Nancy during the mid-1890s
and was instrumental in establishing Nietzsche's credibility in academic circles. As
128 Dora Marsden, 'The Growing Ego', The Freewoman, 8 August 1912, pp. 221-222. In this article,
Marsden introduces Max Stirner and reviews The Ego and his Own: 'We may have laid aside
one of the profoundest of human documents, Max Stirner's, The Ego and his Own. A
correspondent has asked us to examine Stirner's doctrine, and shortly we intend to do so. Just
now we are more concerned to overcome its penetrative influence on our own minds [... ]. The
entire conceptual world, the complete thought-realm he attacks and overcomes and lays at the
feet of the Ego. Morality, religion, God, and man are all brought low. They no longer rule as
external powers influencing the Ego. To the Ego they are as his footstool. Scarcely so, indeed,
for, save as error, they do not exist. The Ego is supreme, and reigns in his lonely kingdom. His
joy lies in self-enjoyment, he reigns over himself; his business is "to use himself up". It seems
a strange anti-climax, at first sight -;-so great means, and such small ends. The solution, we
must believe, is to be found in the unfolding of the content of the term - the "Satisfaction of
the Ego". If the ego is supreme, its satisfaction is a necessity. What it seeks after it must find;
what it wants it must have. If its satisfactions do not already exist, they must be created. Hence,
if the Ego needs the realization in itself of morality, or religion, or God, then, by virtue of its
own supremacy, the realization will be forthcoming' (pp. 221-222).
129 Henri Lichtenberger, Friedrich Nietzsche: The Gospel a/Superman, trans. J. M. Kennedy (London:
Foulis, 1910; New York: Macmillan, 1912). In his book on the French reception of Nietzsche,
Forth observes that Lichtenberger 'must be credited with conferring upon Nietzsche a degree
of bourgeois respectability that helped to deliver him from the relative obscurity of avant-garde
literature [...]. Committed to the project of rendering Nietzsche acceptable in European cultural
circles, Lichtenberger executed in more academic terms the specifically literary project of
Henri Albert. Lichtenberger published biographical and critical studies on Nietzsche as well as
some translated fragments and letters, all of which served to temper both the unbridled
enthusiasm of the avant-garde and the ad hominem scorn of the literary traditionalists', p. 55.
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Forth notes: 'one could legitimately study and even admire the works of Nietzsche
,
within the academy provided that these texts were explicitly viewed as literature
rather than philosophy.' 130 It is interesting to note that although the English
translation appeared later, The Eagle and the Serpent had been advertising the
Lichtenberger book to prospective students of egoism even before the tum of the
century. In general, Lichtenberger's study addresses the issue of Nietzsche's
stylistics and provides a theoretical basis for appreciating them.
On the whole, the study introduces Nietzsche as a new kind of philosopher who
is modeling a radically innovative philosophical method that departs from classical
models. Applauding Nietzsche's creative individualism, Lichtenberger contends that
Nietzsche is dedicated to a philosophy that leads us away from the outside reality and
focuses on the inner awareness of our own existence. As he notes, 'whereas every
philosopher pretends to bring us his system as a purely logical construction, as a
work of pure reason', Nietzsche claims that 'this is an illusion.' For Nietzsche, 'the
conscient life of every man has its roots in the inconscient life.' The quest for truth,
'however disinterested it may appear, acts in reality for the profit and under the
inspiration of another more powerful and hidden instinct.' 131 Lichtenberger notes that
Nietzsche's philosophy should be credited for attempting, through his take on the
will-to-power, to contest the model of pure philosophical reason in our conception of
the world. As Lichtenberger maintains, Nietzsche's new individualistic philosophy
departs from the traditional philosophical model of mind/reason as the highest
authority, stressing the importance of the self as the basis of knowledge
For Nietzsche all those mysterious and superhuman metaphysical entities
which man has always believed to be without himself, and which has
reverenced under different names - 'God', the world of the 'Thing-in-
130 Forth, pp. 55-56.
131 Lichtenberger, p. 158.
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Itself, 'Truth', the 'Categorical Imperative' - are merely phantoms of
our imagination.132
Further, for this scholar, Nietzsche's eschewing of pure reason as the standard
of judgment, and of the notion of 'absolute truth' in general, carries a lot of weight.
In other words, he continues, while philosophical tradition has valued objectivity and
impartiality, Nietzsche challenges the classic models of Truth and proposes the self
and the creative will as the true determinants of human knowledge and reason: 'he
has but little regard for human reason [... ] sensitiveness and intelligence are,
according to him, the instruments and playthings of an unseen power which masters
them and utilizes them for its own ends.' 133 Lichtenberger borrows a passage from
Thus Spoke Zarathustra to illustrate his claim:
Behind thy feelings and thy thoughts, 0 my brother, is to be found a
powerful master, an unknown sage-he is called 'self (selbst). He lives in
thy body; he is thy body. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 'The Despisers of the
Body,).134
As such, Nietzsche's overall skepticism and his psychological insights into the nature
of human truths and valuations deserve praise, as they help us understand the
artificial nature of our beliefs. For Lichtenberger, Nietzsche's questioning of
objectivity, his belief that 'a philosopher's theories are his confessions, his
memoirs'v" moves the emphasis of philosophy from the quest for an external and
objective reality to an internal and subjective one. By turning his back on notions of
'pure reason' Nietzsche redirects our attention towards a new kind of 'reason', an
132 Ibid., pp. 115-116.
133 Ibid., p. 3.
134 Ibid., p. 3. The translated passage continues: 'The most immediate reality, which is permitted us to
know, is the world of our desires, our passions. All our deeds, wishes, and thoughts, are, in the
end, governed by our instincts, and these instincts all spring from our primordial instinct, the
"will-to-power", which suffices ~ according to Nietzsche's hypothesis ~ to explain by itself
alone all the manifestations of life of which we are witnesses', ibid., p. 3.
135 Ibid., p. 158. This is expressly conveyed in 'Part 1. On the Prejudices of the Philosophers', in
Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 5-25, where Nietzsche tells us: 'I have gradually come to realize
what every great philosophy so far has been: a confession on the part of its author, and a type
of involuntary and unself-conscious memoir', Section 6, p. 8.
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inner reason which is grounded within the body and its instincts. As Lichtenberger
tells us:
The body with its instincts, with the 'will-to-power' that animates it, is
what Nietzsche calls man's 'great reason'; as for man's 'little reason',
upon which he plumes himself so readily, of the sovereign liberty of
which he so often boasts, it is a precious instrument, it is true, but an
imperfect and fragile one, which the 'self makes use of to extend its
range of power [...] all else counts for nothing.l "
For Lightenberger, Nietzsche's interpretation of philosophical truth as the
unconscious record of our individual passions becomes an important aspect of his
legacy both as an artist and a philosopher. Nietzsche's emphasis upon the self and its
unconscious will as the true sources of our moral and mental reasoning paves the
way for a new kind of philosophy - philosophy as psychology and as aesthetic
becoming. He borrows a passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra to illustrate this:
'What does thy conscience tell thee?' he asks. 'Thou must be what you
art'. Man, then, must above all know himself, must know his body
thoroughly, his instincts, his faculties [... ]. Each of us performs this task
as well as he can: there are no general and universal rules for becoming
one's self.137
Overall, for Lichtenberger, Nietzsche's philosophical individualism is
important in that it offers a non-dogmatic philosophy of the body as a new
philosophical paradigm; one that 'does not profess to bring men a new credo, a body
of ready-made doctrines,' 138 but one that puts faith in the body, and the body's
'reason':
Whilst the majority of philosophers glory in impersonalizing themselves,
in giving them their ego, in 'letting their eye become light', to use
Goethe's expression, Nietzsche makes his own personality the kernel of
his philosophy he spends his life in seeking himself out, and is letting us
know the result of his investigations. His philosophy is therefore, above
all, the history of his soul. [...] He does not set up merely for a thinker.
He does not say to mankind: 'I bring you truth, an impersonal, universal
truth, independent of what I am myself, and before which all human
reason must bow down', but on the contrary: 'Here I am, with my
136 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
137 Ibid., p. 2.
138 Ibid., p. 3.
156
instincts, my beliefs, my truths, and doubtless my errors also; such as I
am I say "yea" to existence, to all its joys, as likewise to all its sorro~s;
see whether you too cannot find your happiness in the thoughts which
have made mine.' 139
Ultimately, he argues, Nietzsche's eschewing of the objective validity of
philosophic Truth (Kantian-Aristotelian categories included) leads to a new type of
creative individualism, where philosophy becomes art, performance, experience, and
passion. 'In the first place Nietzsche's philosophy is strictly individualistic. One of
Nietzsche's most profound beliefs is that 'everyone should create his own truth and
morals for himself.' 140 His own style of writing is an illustration of this new kind of
philosophy as self-discovery and self-creation: 'in short, then, all that a thinker can
do is to tell the story of his soul, to say how he has discovered himself, in what
beliefs he has found inward peace, and, by his example, to exhort his contemporaries
to do likewise, to seek themselves and to find themselves.' 141
Kennedy's translation of the Lichtenberger study appeared at a time when
Nietzschean debates were becoming more centered on the psychological significance
of a self-reflexive and individualistic philosophy. As Lichtenberger's account of the
philosopher suggests, the 'inwardness' of Nietzsche's philosophy, rather than a
symptom of pathological degeneracy and egotism, is to be regarded as a significant
aspect of the kind of philosophy he envisions, a certain type of creative individualism
which shifts attention from the outer to the inner 'reason', a new way of capturing
reality. Considering The Freewoman's drive towards a radical new morality, its anti-
idealism, and its championing of a new kind of vitalistic aesthetic, it is not surprising
to see an appreciation of Nietzsche similar to that of Lichtenberger.
139 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
14°Ibid., p. 2.
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Besides Marsden's own call for an introspective and self-conscious doctrine of
individualism, which as I tried to show has a distinctly Nietzschean underpinning, a
physiological and psychological interpretation of Nietzsche came from such regular
contributors such as Charles W. Whitby. Dr. Whitby, a frequent contributor to The
Freewoman and The New Age (we followed his argument on sexuality and genius in
Chapter One) in the debates around sexuality, Uranianism, literature and aesthetics,
offers a decisively more sympathetic evaluation of the previously labeled
'degenerate'. In 'The Tragedy of the Happy Marriage', 142 for example, Whitby
claims that Nietzsche, in his insights into the human unconscious, is, in fact, a
brilliant psychologist: 'I know of no keener psychologist - the "will-to-power" is an
absolutely universal characteristic of all conscious beings, and one of the deepest, if
not the deepest, of all.' 143 In The Freewoman the shift to an affirmative
understanding of Nietzsche's psychology seems to move beyond the debate of
pathology and creativity. In this article, Nietzschean psychology is employed to
support Whitby's argument against the conventions of what he refers to as the
mainstream type of sex literature, a fiction dealing only with 'models, types of
usually melodramatic love conflicts [... ] directed to the experience of common man,
whose notion of love is manipulated through such commonalities.' 144 In this context,
Nietzsche's introspective style is framed into a discussion of new psychological
literature. In particular, Whitby draws correspondences between Nietzsche's
psychological insights and D. H. Lawrence, arguing that Nietzsche's philosophical
style is taken as having inaugurated a new type of psychological literature. As
Whitby argues for young writers such as Lawrence, the focus has shifted away from
the established pattern of Edwardian sentimental fiction, its high moral tone, and the
142 Charles W. Whitby, 'Tragedy of the Happy Marriage', The Freewoman, 30 November 1911, pp.
25-26.
143 Ibid., p. 25.
144 Ibid., p. 25.
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images and stereotypes of male-female relationships - towards a new form of anti-
.r
idealistic literature, one that does away with conventional 'fictions' and 'types'
altogether.
That is how things always happen in fiction: the pity is that they do not
happen so in life. But, after all, we need not concern ourselves with the
opinions or deprecate the condemnation of the average Philistine: what
do we have to do with him? We address that select audience which has at
least some inkling of psychology; which knows therefore that human
nature cannot submit kindly to constraint, and that the last word has not
yet been said about a given union [... ]. The members of our select
audience are not unacquainted with Boswell, who recorded this
memorable saying of his hero: 'It is so far from being natural for a man
and woman to live in a state of marriage that we find all the motives they
have for remaining in that state, and the restraints which civilized society
imposes to prevent separation are hardly sufficient to keep them
together.,145
This kind of literary orientation of individualism is encountered again in such
articles as Edmund. B. Auvergne's 'The Case of Penelope' .146This is another very
interesting article which utilizes a discourse of individualism to talk about the
tyranny of words and ideals, urging readers to question ideals and romanticized
fictions of the past. Drawing on the figure of the chaste and faithful Penelope, the
wife of Odysseus, Auvergne refers to this paradigm as another 'mischievous ideal,
which runs through all Western literatures, and poisons the lives of everyday men
and women.' 147Auvergne's article interprets such feminine examples as 'eloquent
fables', 'disguised moral decrees', legitimized through Western literature and
religious tradition for the purpose of perpetuating patriarchal moral temperaments.
By employing the image of the chaste and patient Penelope, his article aims to make
the reader conscious of the artificiality of such self-sacrificial models of feminine
virtue. As he argues, duty, chastity and self-sacrifice are not innate but artificial
145 .Ibid., p. 25.
146 Edmund B. Auvergne, 'The Case of Penelope', The Freewoman, 22 August 1912, pp. 265-266.
147 Ibid., p. 266.
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qualities determined by social conditions and it is important to recogmze the
underlying forces and behind such 'beautiful words' and ideals:
Chastity and fidelity - what beautiful words they are, and how much
unhappiness they have spelled, how many lives have they not withered!
The one is the tragedy of celibacy, the other of married life. The Irish are
proud of the woman in Shaw's play who wasted' her sex and her
affections and sat down to wait fifteen years for a lover who had
forgotten her. While such ideals are upheld, I marvel how the British
Government had the hardihood to tear Hindoo widows from their
husband's funeral pyre. But the same mischievous ideal runs through all
Western literatures, and poisons the lives of everyday men and women
[... ] the virtue of Penelope consists in refusing to herself and others
pleasure which she cannot possibly share with some one other absent
person. In what respect her abstinence benefited her absent lord it is not
easy to see.148
In this chapter I have attempted to extend my discussion of radical egoism to include
the presence of Nietzschean ideas in another London little coterie The Freewoman. I
discussed how The Freewoman's discourse of creative individualism engages with
Nietzschean theory and the extent to which this discourse provides a
reconceptualization of contemporary views about gender and identity. In my view,
the individualistic current that runs through the entire 'New Morality' series and
which is also evident in the thought of the other articles under examination here, is
meant to enrich our understanding of the early modernist response to Nietzsche,
shedding light in some little known aspects of Nietzschean literary and cultural
reception.
Initially, the rhetoric of Nietzschean radicalism acted as an agent of
provocation and change, announcing a break with the past. My examination of The
Eagle and the Serpent and The Leeds Arts Club in Chapter One provided insights
into the early accommodation of Nietzschean ideas to the English intellectual scene,
and revealed a certain kinship between anarchist politics, socialist ethics and early
148 Ibid., p. 266.
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modernism.149 In the present chapter, I sought to demonstrate that a certain
~/
continuity of this tradition of radical egoism associated with the philosophy of
Nietzsche can be clearly discerned in the early agenda of The Freewoman, as
mirrored in Marsden's advocacy of free creative individualism. To a certain extent,
the Eagle and the Serpent's' godless' rhetoric of insurgency and renewal, its promise
to re-evaluate all those blessed words' and ideals are once more evoked in Marsden's
long campaign for a new morality. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that that the
ambitious, utopian enterprise initiated there begins to take definite shape in The
Freewoman's project of 'a master morality', through a commitment to remove the
debris of the past, and to create a new moral consciousness.
As it has already been argued early varieties of Nietzschean egoism are
important for appreciating the complex origins of later forms of radical individualism
such as the one envisioned in The Freewoman. The Freewoman shared the anti-
idealist, anti-bourgeois and rebellious sentiment of early Nietzschean egoism. Dora
Marsden endorsed a similar editorial ethic of openness and heterogeneity that we see
in The Eagle and the Serpent and The New Age. Yet, there are also important
differences that need to be taken into account. The critical way with which Marsden
and some of the contributors engage with Nietzschean egoism in this early phase of
The Freewoman (a response which refrains from any explicit identification with the
more mainstream currents of Nietzscheanism), while it retains most of the original
spirit is considerably more systematic and theoretical in nature. In the pages of The
Freewoman the rather bombastic rhetoric of the early Nietzschean radicalism gives
gradually way to a more refined and mature discourse, in which, Nietzsche becomes
provocative in a different sense.
149 Which announced the twilight of the old idols and espoused a rhetoric of renewal and reformation.
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That said, it is my impression that in The Freewoman we are witnessing a
gradual transition from an early tradition of radical egoism to a more sophisticated
reading of Nietzsche and philosophic individualism, which evolves through a careful
thinking of the ramifications of the former discourses. The shift in attitude can be
seen best in this periodical's gradual abandonment of a rhetoric of individual genius,
and its endorsement of a more introspective kind of vitalism, one willing to fight its
battles in the more dark and unknown recesses of individual consciousness. Rather
than battling with outward material, Marsden's vitalism is driven inward,
increasingly placing greater emphasis on 'inner experience'. In The Freewoman and
later on in The New Freewoman, Marsden's critical reflections will progressively
lead her to propose a unique type of vitalism, one which places greater emphasis on
internalization as the precondition for independent thought and action. While a
clearer tie between Nietzsche's literary reception and the emerging episteme of
psychoanalysis becomes more apparent later (in The New Age for example where
Nietzsche is seen respectively as a cultural therapist, a precursor of the
psychoanalytic novel and is compared to Dostoevsky) - it is my suggestion that the
psychological and literary underpinnings in the reception of Nietzsche announce
themselves in The Freewoman, and provide, to some degree, the basis for the
eventual transformation of Marsden's radical movement into an artistic and literary
avant-garde.
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Chapter Four
//
Egoistic Chimpanzees and Murderous Nihilists: Types of Artists and Lovers in
Wyndham Lewis's Tarr
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I aim to discuss the extent to which aspects of this tradition of radical
individualism find their way into the work and thought of Wyndham Lewis, a writer
whose affinities to Nietzsche have been a subject of great interest to scholars of
modernism. Lewis's association with avant-garde factions such as the Little Review,
The New Age and The Egoist are by now fairly well-established. A comprehensive
account of Lewis's aesthetic and intellectual development in the context of the avant-
garde aesthetic agenda of modernism is offered by Paul Peppis in Literature,
Politics, and the English Avent-Garde.' There Peppis argues that one way to begin
understanding the complications and nuances of the political and aesthetic discourses
of writers such as Wyndham Lewis, Ezra Pound, and T. S. Eliot, is to consider their
claims vis-it-vis 'the broad body of public discourse they originally engaged' _2 For
Peppis recovering those dynamics is essential for dealing with the contentious issue
of the 'reactionary' character of modernist radical politics and for providing a.more
sober, critical and reflexive account of these writers' position in the cultural history
of the prewar avant-garde.
The current chapter focuses on Lewis's first novel, Tarr. Tarr's intellectual
value for the tradition of aesthetic individualism is, as will be demonstrated,
multifold. To begin with, it was serialized in The Egoist, the successor of The New
I Paul Peppis, Literature, Politics, and the English Avant-Garde: Nation and Empire, 1901-1918
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
2 Ibid., p. 3.
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Freewoman from April 1916 to November 1917, and offered, at least to some extent,
"
a response to the intellectual debates current there. It is potentially fruitful, in my
view, to consider Tarr as in a kind of dialogue with the other art-debates offered
there either in the form of essays or serialized novels, which included Joyce's A
Portrait which had appeared serially a year before (1914-1915), as well as Remy de
Gourmont's The Horses of Diomedes, which appeared in nine issues of The New
Freewoman (August-December, 1913), and which was continued in The Egoist
(January-March, 1913). Each of these texts contains evidence of a consistent
preoccupation with the tradition of aesthetic individualism - suggesting important
continuities between earlier and later expressions of Nietzschean aesthetic and
literary concerns. In addition, Tarr's interesting choice of time and setting (Paris,
early twentieth century) is also potentially valuable as it expands our knowledge
about the early phase of this tradition, providing early links between individualistic
aesthetics and Nietzsche's reception on the Continent. In Tarr we see crystallized the
mood of avant-garde Parisian culture, a culture which provided many of the crucial
influences of Lewis's formative years and helped to encourage a certain aesthetic
vitalism, an aesthetic that as Bernard Bergonzi points out, was not unconnected with
the interest in Nietzsche.'
Overall, it seems to me that Tarr is a servant of two masters: the one is
English, the other French. An account of the genesis of the text, its progress through
various drafts, and its publication history, allows us to view this novel as an elaborate
record of Lewis's cosmopolitan concerns from 1907 till 1917. One way to approach
the aesthetics of the text is through Lewis's portrait of the artist-individualist,
Frederick Tarr, a character who, as will be shown, transgresses, in a way, the novel's
typical time-space coordinates, becoming a dynamically volatile figure operating
3 Bernard Bergonzi, 'Coming to Terms with the Enemy: Some Recent Studies', in Wyndham Lewis:
Letterature/Pittura, ed. by Giovanni Cianci (Palermo: Selleno, 1982), pp. 246-259.
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simultaneously within a two dimensions: Paris 1907 - London 1917. Interestingly,
J
Tarr, an English expatriate artist in Paris, inhabits the same aesthetic territory as
Lewis himself did from 1903 until 1908, trying to cast off the 'bad effects' of
'English education'." It will be my concern to show how his aesthetic worldview, as
well as that of the other artist in the novel, the German Otto Kreisler, may be
understood more effectively when placed in the intellectual environment of which
they are both part. In my view, despite the very important fact that Tarr was
published in The Egoist, an evaluation of these characters' relation to Nietzschean
aesthetics would be incomplete, were it independent of the novel's intellectual and
cultural frame. I shall discuss this particularly in relation to the aesthetic ideas and
romantic activity of these two artists, which form the basis of the two interrelated
central themes of the novel: the theme of aesthetic dualism on the one hand and
philosophic pessimism on the other. Lewis deals with these two important questions
through featuring two contrasting female characters, Bertha and Anastasya, whom
Tarr and Kreisler approach and perceive in accordance with the philosophical
outlook that informs their aesthetic/philosophical thinking and view of life in
general. Overall, I propose to read Tarr as a narrative that dynamically evolves to
recapitulate the aesthetic development of Lewis himself within the cross-cultural
dynamics of what may be seen as a cosmopolitan avant-garde intellectual current.
My analysis aims to explore how via Tarr's intellectual landscape, a fictional space
where the cultural scene of pre-war 'Paris bohemia journeys over to inhabit the pages
of Marsden's individualistic review, Lewis's text recounts a tale of two cities which
simultaneously historicizes and provides a critique of their aesthetic trajectories.
The question of sex politics in Tarr becomes central for those critics who have
chosen to read Lewis's work through the lens of Nietzsche's contemporary reception.
4 Wyndham Lewis, Rude Assignment (London, New York: Hutchinson, 1950), p. 113.
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Toby Foshay's Lewis and the Avant-Garde' and Andrzej Gasiorek's Wyndham Lewis
and Modernism6 are equally concerned to draw attention to the ties between
Lewisian and Nietzschean aesthetics. Foshay recognises in the crux of Lewis's
aesthetic 'an indebtedness to and difference with Nietzschean nihilism and
devaluation of values in which [Lewis] explores the structure of the will-to-power
and ressentiment. ,7 According to him, 'the fuller implication of Lewis's development
as an artist and critic centres on his relation to Nietzsche, his attempt to answer and
to circumvent him.,8 In particular, Foshay reads Tarr's dualistic struggle to become a
creative man as a direct reflection of the author's own aesthetic agon, which is in
tum grounded upon a Nietzschean aesthetic ambivalence, an overall 'questioning of
the very grounds and possibility of both truth and goodness in a post-classical
world':" 'Lewis's aesthetic development was caught on the horns of ambivalence, in
a dualistic response to Nietzsche's invocation of Dionysian tragedy and will-to-
power', and his inability to resolve the dualism resulted in his personal vorticist
manifesto, Foshay continues.l" In Tarr's tragic conception of the self, one might see
Lewis's ultimate failure to integrate art into an aesthetic whole, hence leading to a
defective egoism which 'refuses to accept the self as artistically and sensuously
creative' .11 Tarr's individualism is reduced to a false aesthetic formula, which leads
to an alienation of the senses and, ultimately, of his own creative will.12 Such a
vision, the critic concludes, involves a profound isolation both deadly and
unproductive.
5 Toby Avard Foshay, Lewis and the Avant-Garde: The Politics of the Intellect (Montreal; Buffalo:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992).
6 Andrzej Gasiorek, Wyndham Lewis and Modernism (Devon: Northcote House, 2004).
7 Foshay, p. 19.
8 Ibid., p. 43.
9 Ibid., p. 43.
10 Ibid., p. 48.
II Ibid., p. 53.
12 Ibid., p. 57.
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In a similar vein Andrzej Gasiorek argues that the affinity of two male
d
protagonists, which is expressed through a 'shared obsession' with 'death', 13 evinces
a correspondence between Lewis's standpoint and Nietzschean aesthetics. These
characters' wish to break out of the nihilistic impasse of existence leads either to a
cold aesthetic purism and contempt for life (in the case of Tarr), or to vindictive
ressentiment (in Kreisler). According to this critic, 'the flight from abjection leads
either to the immolation of life to art or to self-murder', revealing how 'modernism -
Lewis's own - may entomb reality in a mausoleum.i'" He concludes that, '[i]t was
not until texts such as The Revenge for Love that Lewis was able to go beyond this
renunciative conception of self and art.' IS
As Shane Weller argues, such positions differ radically from the critical
position held by Lewis' scholars twenty years ago. For instance, in John Carey's
1992 book The Intellectuals and the Masses Lewis's relation to Nietzsche is labelled
'proto-fascist', identifying Lewis's intellectual and aesthetic elitism with the more
sinister expressions of Nietzsche's radical aristocracy in the ideologies of
nationalism and war. In his article 'Nietzsche among the Modernists: the Case of
Wyndham Lewis', Weller discusses the way in which the recent interpretations of
Lewis's relation to Nietzsche take a tum towards a more informed understanding.
Radically opposed to Carey's strategy of tarring Lewis with Nietzscheanism·(as a
kind of proto-fascism or proto-Nazism) there is the position taken by more
theoretically informed commentators such as Toby Foshay, Paul Edwards and Andrej
Gasiorek, he argues. The Lewis-Nietzsche kinship emerging from such sophisticated
theoretically based approaches is as Weller notes one that shows a 'fully-fledged
13 Gasiorek, p. 29.
14 Ibid., p. 33.
IS Ibid., p. 33.
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postmodernism in the heart of modernism' .16 As he points out, in order to recover
some aspects of Lewis's aesthetic agenda that otherwise would remain
misrepresented, one needs to draw attention to the self-referential aspects of
Nietzsche's philosophy which mock its own authority. Lewis's reflexive, self-
examining prose, his texts' overall resistance to 'grand narratives, to the dream of
transcendence, to the very idea of authenticity', 17 reinforces the Nietzschean
underpinnings of the writer's aesthetic position. The text's self-critical reflections on
the status of art have led critics such as Peppis to describe Tarr as a parody of
Individualistic aesthetics, and a direct assault in its movement.l" As he maintains,
Lewis implemented his critical assault on English Individualism by writing Tarr as a
'harsh satire of the contemporary sub-genre that articulate[ d] and idealise[ d] the
Individualistic world view.' 19 'In this context', he continues, 'Tarr works as a literary
corrosive to the Individualist ideals Portrait seems to have embodied [...] refuting the
Egoists' representation of persons as self-defining beings capable of personal
liberation [...] and their model of the novel as a Bildungsroman narrating the
progressive education of a single subjectivity. ,20
Indeed, through parody (including self-parody) the text offers a reflective
account of this tradition of individualism and Lewis's positioning within it -
something that becomes particularly evident in the artist-ascetic Tarr, who -finds
himself in a continuous state of bafflement throughout the novel, a character
perpetually torn between love and a carefully tailored egoism. However, rather than
simply renouncing this tradition it is my view that Lewis's text purposely sets out to
re-write some of its doctrines (or at least begin to). While I agree with Peppis's
16 Shane Weller, 'Nietzsche Among the Modernists: the Case of Wyndham Lewis,' Modernism/
modernity. 14 (2007), 626-643 (p. 628).
17 Ibid., p. 627.
18 Peppis, p. 135.
19 Ibid., p. 135.
20 Ibid., p. 136.
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assessment that the central contribution of Tarr lies in its criticism of the idealism
that underlies this tradition, I tend to disagree with his view that, through Tarr, Lewis
aims to disown allegiance altogether. The novel assumes a self-reflective tone in
connection to its own status and the notion of individualism, but, simultaneously, the
insertion of the character of Anastasya, a fellow egoist (and a woman) into the
narrative, offers an interesting (affirmative) twist. Rather than reading the novel
along these established lines, I would like to see whether Tarr is offering any
'alternatives', whether the partnership of Tarr with Anastasya does in any way
contribute to a revised assessment of the relationships between art and life,
individualism and affirmation, thus providing a certain resolution. By taking into
consideration the intellectual and cultural framework in which the text was conceived
(Paris, turn-of-the-century), and in particular the early debates about Nietzsche,
Schopenhauer, Wagner, pessimism and art, I will attempt to understand Tarr on its
own terms and within its own original context.
4.2 Lewis in Paris: Turn-of-the-century Aesthetic Individualism. Schopenhauer,
Wagner, and Nietzsche
It may be argued that Lewis's ethics of creativity develop against the backdrop of
European nihilism, which in art found expression in aesthetic decadence, symbolism,
and Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Nihilism is the conviction that life is meaningless,
it is not worth living. Nietzsche's philosophical (and aesthetic) project consists in
determining whether there is a way to move beyond this condition, by proposing a
certain kind of philosophic pessimism of affirmation, a certain joyful pessimism born
out of the spirit of art. In what follows I will attempt to understand what Lewis
means by 'Panurgic Pessimism' and 'sex duality' in the context of the text, and
whether these notions might be seen as having any relevance to the then-current
avant-garde debates about Nietzschean and Schopenhauerian aesthetics. Whether the
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main character's art-positions echo themes and traces of an early individualistic
k
idiom grounded upon a Shopenhauerian-Nietzschean dialectic. And finally whether
through them Lewis manages to construct some kind of compromise, offering a new
conception of art that pushes the boundaries of the question of aesthetic dualism
beyond a concern with the autonomy of art - towards engagement and participation.
In his autobiography Lewis provides a mature retrospect in which he cites the
people, philosophies and events that influenced him during his formative years.
Dostoevsky' (who exerted 'a magic influencej", Schopenhauer, and most
importantly Nietzsche, who was, as he claims, 'the paramount influence' and, more
specifically, 'that side of his genius which expressed itself in La Gaya Scienza' were
some of his favorite readings during his early days as a student-bohemian in Paris.z2
In a letter to Augustus John dated 1906, Lewis recommends Baudelaire's Petites
Poemes en Prose, the entire works of Voltaire, and Nietzsche.23 Lewis's early
interest in philosophy was a natural corollary of this contact with French culture and
letters; 'attendance at Bergson's lectures at the College de France [was] one evidence
of that,24 as well as his familiarity with the work of such intellectuals as Remy de
Gourmont, who played an instrumental role in the dissemination of Nietzsche in
Parisianjeune culture. These early philosophical impulses had their roots in French
soil, and had a lasting effect upon his later life:
My literary career began in France, in the sense that my first published
writings originated in notes made in Brittany [... ]. During those days I
began to get a philosophy [... ]. Paris [... ] was beautiful and free [... ] it
was still la nouvelle Athenes, divinely disputatious, with an immense
student population for whom the publishers poured out 'libraries' of
. 25masterpieces.
21 Rude Assignment, p. 144.
22 Ibid., p. 120.
23 Augustus John Papers: A Schedule of Papers Purchased in 1988 and 1989 (London: Royal
Commission of Historical Manuscripts, 1991), p. 133.
24 Rude ASSignment, p. 113.
25Ibid.,p.113.
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'Those primordial literary backgrounds'r'" as he calls them, expressed themselves in
J
a kind of youthful 'vitalistic' ethic, celebrating characters 'immersed in life [... ]
something like a wild garden - full, naturally, of starlight and nightingales, of
sunflowers and the sun.,27 However, both in the Rude Assignment and in the 1915
preface to Tarr, Lewis is particularly careful to distinguish his own youthful vitalism
(and his Nietzscheanism) from the kind of 'vitalistic gospel' of George Soret2s as
well as that 'curious obsession of the modem intellectual with the warlike virtues'
manifested in the works of such contemporary thinkers as Peguy, Maurras, Barres_29
While the nature of Lewis's own flirtation with such political views remains
complex, even a cursory reading of Rude Assignment and the 1915 preface reveals
Lewis's unambiguous hostility to this intellectualism of action, accusing them of
'detachment' and irresponsibility: 'There was a beautiful detachment about Sorel
[" .]. Of all the apostles of dangerous living, pure action, "heroism", blood and iron,
[he] was the worst - the most shrewd and irresponsible. ,30 This is not surprising,
given the increasingly nationalistic uses to which such rhetoric was put in the years
before the outbreak of the war. Lewis is careful to shun these more popular aspects
of Nietzschean vitalism, especially in its most 'supermanic' tones, which struck a
popular cord with the popular cultural conscience of the prewar days:
26 Ibid., p. 117.
27 Ibid., p. 117.
28 As Forth tells us, 'closely linked to the anarchist literary avant-garde, it was perhaps inevitable that
Nietzschean individualism [...] would become an important ingredient in the ideological
experiments of revolutionary syndicalism'. In their writings French revolutionary syndicalists
cited a variety of thinkers whose works proved an inspiration, especially philosophers like
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Henri Bergson, and Nietzsche. A link between Nietzsche and Sorel
was quickly established by the latter's adherents who saw in Sorel's Reflections Sur la
Violence, and particularly in his praise of 'the use of violence for its capacity to revitalize
society' and his idea of an 'all-out class war between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as a
means of doing just that', pp. 122-125.
29 It is doubtless that Lewis had ample opportunity to think about the ideas of Nietzsche in this
context. Lewis's ambiguous flirtation with the neo-royalist Action Francaise and early
anarchistic leanings are only one indication. For Lewis's account of these early interests see
Rude Assignment.
30 Rude Assignment, p. 33. This notwithstanding, Lewis is quick to note that 'Sorel's masterpiece of
incitement to violence was not, however, directed to inflaming chauvinism but to providing the
maximum of class-hatred', ibid., p. 33.
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A majority of people, I daresay found in the author of Zarathustra a sort
of titanic nourishment for the ego treating in fact this great hysteric.as a
power-house. At present that is what I like the least about Nietzsche and I
was reasonably immune then to Superman. The impulse to Titanism and
supernatural afflatus pervading German romanticism has never had any
interest for me. On the other hand that side of his genius which expressed
itself in La Gaya Scienza, or those admirable maxims [... ] which he
wrote after the breakdown in his health, were among my favorite reading
in those years.3)
The preface to Tarr In The Egoist represents more than a general
disenchantment with the propagandistic usages of Nietzsche's philosophy and
politics in general, a disillusionment shared also by the editor herself who in the
December issue 1914 commented on the popular vulgarization of Nietzsche:
Nietzsche is now popular [...] [he has] just become popularised, not
indeed because the people have read him, but because it chances that at a
time when a great war breaks out, and all our prophets and scribes are
enlarging upon the wickedness of such as will dare to make war against
us, someone happens to say that the enemy possesses a great philosopher,
who maintains that on occasion war is a good and necessary thing.32
It seems that by that time Lewis, Marsden and other writers, such as T. S. Eliot for
instance, would have resolved to associate themselves only with that side of
Nietzsche that remained unaffected by the war. Interestingly, T. S. Eliot's (otherwise
favorable) review of A. Wolfs The Philosophy of Nietzsche, written in 1916, starts
with the statement: 'Nietzsche is one of these writers whose philosophy evaporates
when detached from its literary qualities'<' - suggesting a kind of careful distancing
from the political Nietzsche which we find also in Lewis's 1915 preface to the novel.
In it Lewis writes:
This book was begun eight years ago; so I have not produced this
disagreeable German for the gratification of primitive partisanship
aroused by the war [... ]. He has been on my consciousness (my
consciousness as an artist, it is true) for a long time.i"
31 Rude Assignment, p. 120.
32 Dora Marsden, 'Views and Comments', The Egoist, 15 December 1914, pp. 452-453 (p. 452).
33 T. S. Eliot, 'Review of A. Wolf's The Philosophy of Nietzsche', International Journal of Ethics, 26
(1916),426-427 (p. 426).
34 Wyndham Lewis, Tarr: The 1918 Version, ed. by Paul O'Keeffe (Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press,
1990), p. 13. My emphasis.
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Lewis in Blasting and Bombarding called the First World War his political
education and it was the moment when, as Foshay maintains, 'his aesthetics took a
significant departure' from his earlier looking at 'the psychological, social, and
political worlds from the point of view of art, [and] turned toward looking at art from
the point of view of its role - or, rather, lack of role - in a society which valued it, as
he saw it, wrongly or not at all. ,35
This critical tone is preserved in the war preface and is carried even further in
the first pages of Tarr. The oneiric (dream-like) opening of the novel transfers us to a
city aesthetically withdrawn and aloof. Rather than the vibrant and cosmopolitan
setting we read about in Lewis's autobiography, here we are transported to a setting
which exhibits sighs of a life lived in seclusion, of decadence and retreat:
Paris hints of sacrifice. = But here we deal with that large dusty facet
known to indulgent and congruous kind .[ ... ] It is not across its Thebaide
that the unscrupulous heroes chase each other's shadows. They are
largely ignorant of all but their restless personal lives."
Lewis's opening of Tarr suggests a remote, almost desert-like landscape, steeped in
self-indulgent aestheticism, a place of artistic seclusion. This picture of Bohemian
life is trying to tell us something about the state of the Parisian art world, a state
which might be seen to resemble the withdrawn, hidden life of the anchorites, for
whom isolation, the breaking of social bonds, and asceticism constitute the path to a
freer form of life. This description of Paris as a kind of space set apart, as a kind of
refuge, an aesthetic sanctuary, detached and purposely self-indulgent; and of artists
as a kind of aesthetic hermits might remind us of one of Augustus John's drawings
for the New Age, titled 'The Bohemians'. In this drawing, two mysterious cloaked
and hooded figures (a man and a woman perhaps), holding each other in embrace,
dominate the foreground. These two hermit-like silhouettes are placed in a strange
35 Foshay, p. 4.
36 Tarr, p. 21.
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desert-like setting, a background that conveys, to some extent, the sense of
/
disengagement that sets la vie Boheme on a plane of its own, quite detached and
insulated.
Given the circumstances at the time when the text was published, it is not
surprising to see Lewis problematising the notion of autonomous art, along with the
aesthetic practices surrounding it. This critical tone, I believe, has much to do with
Lewis's evolving political consciousness as an artist and might be interpreted as a
conscious move away from an avant-garde heritance, which he has now grown to see
as irresponsible and naively egoistic - guilty of being completely out of touch with
the social. The 1915 preface reveals a Lewis distinctly overwhelmed by the reality of
history and the nightmare of war which comes to violently upset the Arcadian vision
of his artists' aesthetic detachment, 'this famous feeling of indifference' ,37 that the
main character Tarr is so fond of. In effect, the outbreak of the war seems to have
rendered the reality of Bohemian autonomy somewhat doubtful, an empty chimera
deformed by the bare reality of power.
On first reading Tarr one cannot but become interested in the picture of Paris
and its Bohemians. Despite its dreamy opening, overall, the Paris of Lewis's
narrative is a bohemian capital immersed in a spirit of cosmopolitanism. As Lewis
claims in the preface, he began writing the novel sometime in 1907 or 1908, while he
was still living in Paris. Lewis's text masterfully communicates the spirit of fin-de-
siecle Bohemian life. Set in the Latin Quarters and the art-cafes, it is populated by a
very international cast of artist-bohemians, English, French, Russian, German,
Italian, who give themselves up to discussions about contemporary art and
philosophy. As PaulO' Keeffe informs us the text of Tarr is a series of layers built
up over seven years and several periods of revision, arguing that the thematic
37 Tarr, p. 49.
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inconsistencies and satiric energies that characterize Tarr reflect, in a way, Lewis's
growing aesthetic sense and his literary concerns in general. 38 As he notes, in ~rder
for one to get some idea of Lewis's intentions, one needs to take into account the
text's various stages of development. It is true that the diverse intellectual and
aesthetic energies of Paris take up a large part of the novel, and this has led some
critics to consider it as a kind of Parisian memoir, which, to some extent, it certainly
is. However, the novel is undoubtedly more than that.
The first title considered was 'Bourgeois-Bohemians', possibly an indication of
the author's focus on depicting his own life among the bohemians. Sometime around
1912, Lewis came to favor 'Otto Kreisler's Death' (Otto Kreisler being of the
character that epitomizes the mood of decadence and nihilism in the novel). Finally,
however, the text appeared under the title Tarr.39 Such alterations, I believe, mirror
the expanding thematic dimensions of the novel. If we choose to interpret the
Parisian setting as something more than Lewis's youth memory and consider the
aesthetic and philosophic discussions of some of the characters in light of the then-
prevalent aesthetic trends, then the text acquires a new purpose. Lewis's introduction
to artist-bohemians such as Tarr, Kreisler, Anastasya, and Bertha is very significant
from the point of view of gaining insight into a variety of philosophical viewpoints
and ideas that seem, as I will try to show, consistent with certain overriding aesthetic
concerns connected to such pivotal figures as Schopenhauer, Wagner and Nietzsche.
In that respect, the main characters might be seen as embodiments of particular art-
notions current among the avant-garde, ideas which the text explores and assesses. In
other words, what I want to discuss is how Paris, chosen as the backdrop of the
38 As O'Keeffe tells us: 'The novel must have been started, or the idea of it germinated, in 1907 or
1908 while [Lewis] was living in Paris. Between then and the writing of the Epilogue, the work
underwent a series of revisions and a process of expansion from long story to seven-part
novella. While none of these earlier versions have survived, the work in progress can be traced
through Lewis's correspondence 1909-1915.' 'Afterword', in Tarr, pp. 361-382 (p. 361).
39 Lewis's own account of this change of heart is given in 'The Schicksal.-The German in my Fiction',
in Rude Assignment, pp. 148-152.
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narrative, plays a significant role in the novel, how the art-discussions and general
J
aesthetic attitudes provide a useful framework for examining particular doctrines and
traditions - as well as for expanding them further.
It is important to note that during the time when the novel was being developed
the interest in the philosophy of Nietzsche had already found resonances in the
aesthetic preoccupations of the burgeoning literary avant-garde. As Forth in
Zarathustra in Paris has shown, the philosopher had been hailed with enthusiasm by
an emerging avant-garde culture committed to experimentation and artistic
innovation. This warm response is said to have had a direct effect upon French
intellectual life, serving various purposes and continuing uninterrupted through the
1890s and the early 1900s, until about 1910, when the international tensions
escalated, and Nietzsche's reputation fell under the shadows of the war clouds over
Europe." In this context, Nietzsche's ideas were employed to help combat the more
decadent strand of the symbolist movement, one which shared affiliations with the
aesthetics and philosophy of Richard Wagner and Arthur Schopenhauer."
Nietzsche's refreshing boldness and confidence offered an alternative aesthetic
vision, outlining the aesthetics of a young literary generation seeking to detach itself
from the decadentism it saw inherent in such aesthetic forms. Through such vehicles
40 During this time Nietzsche would become a philosopher non grata - and in France, as well as
Britain (as for instance in The Egoist) vitalistic philosophies such as Bergson's would be
promoted in place of Nietzsche's as a more desirable alternative. In England only The New
Age would continue to praise Nietzsche (and only from a few loyal cohorts) and in France only
the NRF. As Forth argues 'by the time of the Great War, Nietzscheanism clearly represented an
un-French phenomenon as was cited as one of the primary intellectual sources of German
aggression', p. 14.
41 As Shehira Doss Dacezac points out, Schopenhauer's philosophy was to become a staple of the
French Symbolist movement, and it was primarily his pessimism that first attracted this
generation of writers and poets of the 1880s to him. For example, Schopenhauer's existential
position is evoked all the time in such novels as Huysmans's A Rebours (1884), which was
considered by many the' literary incarnation of Schopenhauer's metaphysics.' Des Esseintes,
the 'decadent hero' of the novel is given the following words: 'Schopenhauer extolled to you
no panacea did not lull or distract you as a remedy for inevitable ills [ ... ]. He pretended to heal
nothing, offered the sufferer [... ] not the slightest hope; but his theory of Pessimism was [... ]
the great consoler of [ ... ] higher souls.' Shehira Doss Dacezac, 'Schopenhauer According to
the Symbolists: the Philosophical Roots of Late Nineteenth-Century French Aesthetic Theory'
in Schopenhauer, Pessimism and the Arts, ed. by Dale Jacquette (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 249-276 (p. 251).
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as the little magazines (les petites revues) Le Banquet (1892)42 and Le Mercure de
France." they faithfully promoted a figure of Nietzsche consistent with their cultural
and aesthetic outlook, one which sought opposition to the atmosphere of decadence
surrounding contemporary art. In such an environment, Nietzsche gradually came to
represent the ideal of a social aesthetic which sought renewal in all aspects of
cultural life, effecting a rupture with 'the Wagnerian Church' as well as the
Schopenhauerian pessimism, 'a break that would by implication seriously undermine
one of the foundations of decadent symbolism as well. ,44 As Forth suggests, the
propagation of the aesthetic views of the avant-garde of the 1880s,45 the principle of
I 'art pour I 'art, and aesthetic disinterestedness in matters of artistic experience and
value would come under careful scrutiny by the new generation. This attitude of
systematic detachment which manifested itself most visibly in the literary school of
symbolism.l'' an attitude which resulted in 'the resignation to and even the
glorification of "decadence" ,47would be energetically challenged by an emerging
avant-garde in search of a new aesthetic (and a new social consciousness). For this
young generation, Nietzsche would come to designate an alternative new aesthetic of
the affirmative, one praising 'vitality and action rather than impotence and escape. ,48
This kind of aesthetic would mostly favor the kind of Nietzsche who emerges from
such works as The Gay Science (first published 1882 and revised in 1887), The Case
of Wagner (1888), and The Anti-Christ - all mature works that represent a break with
such aesthetic/philosophical traditions as Schopenhauer's and Wagner's.
42 As Forth tells us, 'Le Banquet was formed in 1892 by several recent graduates of the Lycee
Condorcet, the most prestigious of the right-bank Parisian high schools. The leader of this
literary coterie was Daniel Halevy, and grouped around him were a number of young Jewish
intellectuals, including Fernand Gregh, Robert Dreyfus, and Marcel Proust', p. 24.
43 Le Mercure de France also published the collected writings of Nietzsche in French.
44 Forth, p. 23.
45 For instance, the French writers Gautier, and later Baudelaire and Flaubert renounced all social (and
political) ties.
46 Which arose during the 1880s, and included among its members such renowned writers as
Stephane Mallarme, Paul Verlaine, Gustave Kanhn, loris-Karl Hysmans and others.
47 Forth, p. 17.
48 Ibid., p. 26.
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It is general knowledge that both Schopenhauer and Wagner served as early
/
mentors for young Nietzsche, and their impact can be felt in such early works as The
Birth of Tragedy (1781). But it is also equally well-known that in his later works
Nietzsche would tum away from such influences, offering an incisive criticism of
them. In the retrospective preface to the Birth of Tragedy, (also written around the
same time (1886), Nietzsche writes about the decadent 'Germanism' of his former
'masters':
How differently Dionysus spoke to me! How far removed from all this
resignationism! [... ] I have learned to consider this 'German spirit' with
a sufficient lack of hope or mercy; also, contemporary German music,
which is romanticism through and through and most un-Greek of all
possible art forms - moreover, a first- rate poison for the nerves, doubly
dangerous among a people who love drink and who honor lack of clarity
as a virtue, for is has the double quality of a narcotic that both intoxicates
and spreads afog.49
Nietzsche's later works written in the years 1882 to 1888 mark a decisive tum in his
vision. Largely in response to the nihilistic dicta of Schopenhauer's pessimistic way
of thinking, as seen for instance in the doctrine that 'the world's non-existence would
be preferable to its existence', 50 the works of this period aim to build a more
constructive philosophical approach. In Henri Lichtenberger's La Philosophie de
Nietzsche (1898), a study that played an important role in the way in which
Nietzsche's philosophy was conceived in French (and not only French intellectual
circlesr" Nietzsche's individualism is taken to constitute both a response and a
reaction to such immediate predecessors as Schopenhauer and Wagner. 52 In the
49 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, in The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, trans.
by Walter Kaufmann (Michigan: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 24-25.
50 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (Dover: Courier Dover Publications,
1969), p. 171.
51 As mentioned in Chapter One The Eagle and the Serpent had made sure to recommend
Lichtenberger's book to all students of Egoism and included it in its Lending Library together
with Georges Brandes's and Havelock Ellis's studies on Nietzsche.
52 Early connections between Nietzsche and individualism in a French context can be seen, as already
shown in the previous chapter, in Henri Lichtenberger's La Philosophie de Nietzsche, which
appeared in 1898 (English translation by 1. M. Kennedy in 1910) - the first serious academic
French study of the philosopher.
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chapter 'the Character of F.N', Lichtenberger talks about 'the harmonious unity' that
,/
characterizes the individualism of Nietzsche, an 'individuality as powerful as it is
rich,53 which seeks an aesthetic justification of life in the binary synthesis of the two
unique states - the Apollonian-Dionysian duality as discussed in the Birth of
Tragedy. Or Hellenism and Pessimism." As Lichtenberger continues, Nietzsche's
primary concern in this text is to deal with 'the problem of existence by studying the
solution given to it by the Greeks', a solution quite distinct from that of
Schopenhauer:
Nietzsche's starting point is Schopenhauer's metaphysics. He admits,
with the great pessimist, that the essence of the world is will [... ]. This
will is a painful desire, thanks to which the life of man is a never-ending
struggle with the certainty of being defeated [... ] and which may be
summed up thus: to will without cause, to suffer continually, and so on
[... ]. From this point of view the point of view of intelligence, the world
does not justify its existence, the amount of suffering is far greater than
the amount of happiness, and hence concludes that man should aim at the
b 1· . f i '1155a 0 ition 0 Its WI .
While Nietzsche recognizes the truth behind Schopenhauer's existential view
of the suffering and misery of the world, he proposes a new affirmative credo of life
and art that effectively counterbalances Schopenhauer's nihilism by interpreting the
world as an aesthetic phenomenon, affirming the idea of the world in terms of the
will-to-power as perpetual inventiveness - as a kind of 'self-generating work of
art'. 56 On the subject of art, particularly tragic art, while Nietzsche agrees with
Schopenhauer's metaphysical thesis on the idea of the tragic (in Schopenhauer's
account, the will-lessness of sublime resignation in the face of the Idea, is the key of
tragedy unlike him). He sees the beauty of a work of art in its ability to affirm the
human condition, participating (joyfully) in its sorrows.
53 Lichtenberger, pp. 34-35.
54 In 1886 Nietzsche added the subtitle 'Hellenism and Pessimism' to the work, a philosophic
pessimism associated with his own pessimism of the future (a Dionysian Pessimism), in many
ways distinct of Schopenhauer's.
55 Lichtenberger, p. 44.
56 Ibid., p. 143.
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As Lichtenberger continues, despite the irrational character of existence, for
/
Nietzsche 'the world, unjustifiable from a rational point of view may perhaps be
justified as an aesthetic phenomenon, as a vision of the demiurge-artist, as the
supreme work of art, causing its creator to feel a supreme, aesthetic
voluptuousness. ,57 This aesthetic 'voluptuousness' is born of the Apollonian-
Dionysian duality - a union of the 'Apollonian artist in dreams' and the Dionysian
Artist in ecstasies. ,58For Nietzsche, the Apollonian represents restraint, serenity - it
stands for aesthetic permanence and the 'sublimity' of aesthetic contemplation, and
desires intelligible order. The Dionysian, on the other hand, represents excess,
unconsciousness - it affirms the irrational and dissonant that lies behind the
Apollonian surface of culture. While mere Apollonian semblance is rejected, the
union of the Apollonian with the Dionysian is seen by Nietzsche as essential for
counteracting nihilism and aesthetic withdrawal. According to this hypothesis, the
creative (truly fecund) artist/individual is offering an aesthetic justification for a life
of Apollonian beauty that contains Dionysian wisdom. This is a new pessimist,
Lichtenberger tells us, one who does not stop, 'like Schopenhauer, in the negation of
the will to live', but who finds in art a new strength, a strength that leads him to
exclaim, in the same way as the true tragic Hellene: 'I desire thee; for thou art eternal
life!,59
In Nietzsche's later writings a related example of binary synthesis underlies his
argument. The Gay Science's version of the tragic artist extends the earlier tragic
aesthetic solution with a playful, mocking one. Indeed, 'gay science' for Nietzsche
signifies 'the saturnalia of a mind that has patiently resisted a terrible, long pressure'
announcing a new kind of art. Having shunned away from the 'romantic uproar' and
57 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
58 The Birth a/Tragedy, p. 38.
59 Lichtenberger, p. 46.
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the 'aspirations towards the sublime' of modem German aesthetics in this book he
demands 'for those [artists] convalescents [... ] another kind of art - a mocking
fleeting, divinely untroubled, divinely artificial art" - this is a vision of art which
having witnessed the painful truth of Schopenhauer, chooses the truth of the artist-
parodist, the one who, like the Greeks, remains on the surface 'out of profundity! ,60
This is a new kind of philosophy, a philosophy of 'strength', comedy and illusion,
the philosophy of Nietzsche's Dionysian-like pessimist who invites men to:
[...] learn the art of this worldly comfort first; you ought to learn to laugh,
my young friends, if you are hell-bent on remaining pessimists. Then
perhaps, as laughters, you may some day dispatch all metaphysical
comforts to the devil- metaphysics in front. Or, to say it in the language
of that Dionysian monster who bears the name ofZarathustra [... ].61
An instance of early correspondences between Nietzschean egoism and such
forms of vitalism in an English context is found in The Eagle and the Serpent. There
we find some of the earliest references to Nietzsche's Dionysian philosophy of
'tragic passion' in its discussions concerning the nature of artistic inspiration.
Drawing on the aesthetic pronouncements, as set forth in The Birth of Tragedy, its
author, writing under the pseudonym 'Melpomene' (the muse of drama), discusses
the function of 'passion' (sensual passion) in the development of great artists:62
Music, according to Nietzsche's essay The Birth of Tragedy from the
Spirit of Music, is, in its origin a least, the idealised language of pain.
Whether we think of Chopin, whose music was in its every note a
patriotic elegy, of Tchaikovsky, with his incommunicable marriage
secret, which drove him to the brink of suicide and insanity, of
Beethoven, Wagner of Schubert, we find that musical biography lends
abundant sanction to the thesis [... J tragic humour, said Nietzsche, is the
essence of love. 63
60 The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix a/Songs (New York: Vintage Books,
1974), 'Preface for the Second Edition', pp. 32-38.
61 The Birth a/Tragedy, pp. 26-27.
62 Melpomene, 'Tragic Theses: The Function of Tragedy in the Development of Great Composers',
The Eagle and the Serpent, I July 1901, pp. 43-44 (p. 43). This issue was a special 'Emerson
Number' and provided parallelisms between Emerson and Nietzsche.
63 Ibid., p. 43. With reference to the novel, and particularly as concerns the kind of aesthetic questions
that preoccupy Tarr's discussion with Hobson there can be seen another characteristic example
of the closeness of the text to contemporary artistic matters of the day - and further emphasis
on the link between the novel's key art-debates with Nietzschean current aesthetics.
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Discussions of the relationship between Nietzsche and love repeatedly surface in this
periodical. 64 Reprinted with permission from another little periodical, Beaut/and
Life, the author, writing under a nom de plume, borrows Nietzsche's argument of
'tragic passion' from The Case of Wagner in order to oppose the Kantian ideal of art
as purity and disinterestedness. I quote the passage in full:
We propound an important question - Should Artists love? A question
not to be confounded with the totally different question Should Artists
marry? The reply to the question Should Artists Love, is - that it is the
only thing they should do. [...] If we have correctly indicated the
conditions of artistic greatness, then it follows that the true artist seeks to
be perpetually in love and seeks to have his heart broken over and over
again. Only in the tragic soil of such sweet sorrow can his highest genius
realise itself. [... ] When the artist realizes that his Carmen is among his
hearers or is intent upon his every action, and he can repeat to her the
words of Escamillo [... ] it is just at such a time that he will surpass
himself. Have you not incidentally solved the old question How should
we listen to music? In listening to tragic music we should baptise
ourselves in a flood of tragic recollections - the profoundest tragedies
that have touched our lives, pre-eminently the course of thwarted love -
that is, for us, the composer's theme. And if one has no personal
tragedies to dwell on - well he would do well to get some. One of
London's ablest critics has controverted our teaching, our teaching on
this point, maintaining that the deepest appreciation of music arises not
out of its emotional implications, but is intent alone upon purity of
artistic form. [... ] Until a composer arises who will set Kant's abandoned
Critique of Pure Reason to music we must maintain that the emotions are
the raw material in which composers work/"
4.3 Tarr and Anastasya: A Joyful Union
All these themes are present in Tarr. Most of Lewis's characters are preoccupied by
the questions of art and love. While often their aesthetic ideas and romantic tastes
may appear conflicting, they inevitably revolve around the same axis: the human
condition and art as a means of confronting the chaos of life. In fact the problem
64 For instance see, 'To Revive the Ancient Glory: Suggestions towards a Classical Drama Based on a
Heroic Philosophy of Life', The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 October 1899, pp. 148-149. The
subtitle reads: 'Extracts from Nietzsche's Writings illustrating his Aesthetic and Philosophical
Principles', p. 148.
65 'Tragic Theses: The Function of Tragedy in the Development of Great Composers', pp. 43-44.
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'Should artists love?' is a recurrent question, one that cannot be put aside either by
Tarr or Anastasya, and which acquires deadly and even murderous connotations in
the case of Kreisler. What Lewis is attempting here might be understood in the
context of the novel's elaborate pattern of antithesis (Tarr-Anastasya and Tarr-
Kreisler). The corresponding antitheses are also all represented in the mind of the
conflicted egoist-ascetic Tarr himself with his inner struggles with the aesthetic
ideals he so cherishes. Tarr's answer to the question about love, for instance, tells us
something about himself and his art:
What is love? he began reasoning. It is either possession or possessive
madness [... ]. She had captured a bit of him and held it as a hostage [... ].
Love performs a natural miracle and they become part of us; it is a
dismemberment to cast them off [... ]. Or love was a malady; it was
dangerous to live with those consumed by it. He felt an uneasiness.
Might not a wasting and restlessness ensue? [... ]. We are all sicknesses
for each other. Such contact as he had with Bertha was particularly
risky."
Kreisler, in his tum, has elevated love to a religious status - it serves the purpose of a
soporific which induces escapism and death-like stupor:
When the events of his life became too unwieldy or overwhelming, he
converted them into love, as he might have done, with specialized talent,
into some art or other [... ]. The tragedies played there purged you
periodically of the too violent accumulations of the too violent
accumulations of desperate life. Love too, always meant unhappy love
for him [... ] he would be killed by a woman he sometimes thought
[ ... ]. 67
In spite of their apparent differences in matters of art, both Tarr and Kreisler never
stop reminding us of the reality of life which is fundamentally sorrow, pain and
death: both suffer the pangs of ennui and discontent. The 'nausea' brought about by
life, (which often stands in the way of art) is a perpetual sentiment they both share, a
worldview that in a way, recalls the pessimism of the Schopenhauerian universe:
'Work over, his depression again grasped [Tarr], like an immensely gloomy
66 Tarr, p. 72.
67 Ibid., pp. 102-103.
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compamon [... ]. Nausea glared up at him from every object met.,68 This is the
typical existential position that Kreisler holds as well. He involves himself in
romantic and desperate goals largely to keep off his general sense of 'void' and
emptiness.i" As a true 'German sculptor of a mock-realistic and degenerate school,7o,
Kreisler through the course of the novel clings desperately to a mystical, over-
sentimental idealism. This materializes in the form of a desperate (and quite
ludicrous) love passion for Anastasya which ultimately turns deadly. His outlook,
both aesthetic and romantic, is primarily a consequence of his dissatisfaction with
reality, displaying a tendency to deception and melodramatic exaggeration. These
qualities of Kreisler, who according to Lewis represents, in a way, 'the melodramatic
nihilism of the generations succeeding to the great era of philosophical pessimism'?',
suggests to me a certain affinity towards the kind of decadent aestheticism that
Nietzsche attacks in Wagner, an affinity that will be explored in the later section of
this chapter.
Kreisler's character is limited - he is not destined to become either a true artist
or an efficient lover. Nor does he offer a satisfying solution to the problem of
existence - he ultimately chooses death and hatred, which philosophically translates
into nihilism and ressentiment. The portrait of the ascetic-egoist Tarr, on the other
hand, appears to represent a different aspect of aesthetic pessimism. In the context of
the novel, Tarr proves a highly controversial character, whose paradoxes and the
stark irony he often employs problematise the key aesthetic notions that the text as a
whole is concerned with. As Lewis claims in the preface to the novel the text is
concerned primarily with the theme of art and most particularly with 'the sex conflict
68 Ibid., p. 207.
69 Ibid., p. 103.
70 Ibid., 102.
71 Rude Assignment, p. 149.
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[as] a key to the definite duality of the artist today,.72 This duality is perhaps best
exemplified in the ambiguities that surround the portrait of Tarr. In his case, the sex
versus art question becomes a matter of great concern and causes great anxiety to
both himself and the women in his life. His discomfort stems from his inability to
reconcile his theories about art with his inner impulses, from an attempt to live by an
individualistic credo which defies 'emotion' and sexuality as immoderate passions.
Tarr 's conflicted persona sometimes evokes the image of an ascetic-egoist - who
restricts himself to the Apollonian component of art, and at other times, the image of
a 'Panurgic-Pessimist'<' one who, like a Dionysian satyr, half-man, half-beast, 'bites'
reality and laughs at it. In the early parts of the novel, Tarr is dressed in the part of
the artist-recluse basking in his wild solitudes. He is often seen theorizing about love
and art, about aesthetic passion and sexual passion, typically championing the
former: 'All the delicate psychology another man naturally seeks in a woman [...]
love and passion, I seek in my work and not elsewhere'r'" Like Schopenhauer, he
assumes a connection between will, worldliness and sexual passion and calls himself
an 'Homme egoiste' because 'Homme sensuel' would be 'an exaggeration'r" 'His
concupiscence had been undeveloped', 76 he admits. By implication, any appeal to the
emotions gets listed as a fallacy and stands in the way of pure contemplation, and, by
extension of art, which for him is the exclusive domain of beauty: 'Surrender to a
woman was a sort of suicide for an artist.' 77 'Why should sex still be active?' he asks
Hobson early on: 'That is a matter Of heredity that has nothing to do with the general
72 This quote comes a cancelled section of the Prologue from 'The Egoist Edition' Prologue (1918).
Published with the permission of the Poetry/Rare Books Collection, University Libraries, State
University of New York at Buffalo, 'Appendix 3', in Tarr, p. 360.
73 Ibid., p. 26.
74 Ibid., p. 30.
75 Ibid., p. 212.
76 Ibid., p. 212.
77 Ibid., p. 214.
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energies of the mind.' 78 His notion of love is hardly the healthy enthusiasm with
which Anastasya, for instance, approaches the subject. Love is seen as 'madness', as
'malady', and although he, as he says, is 'afraid of giving up or repudiating this
particular madness' ,79 he denies that it is proper material for a first-rate artist like
himself. Subsequently, love, which by definition belongs to the sphere of the
material, physical reality cannot but be of lesser (secondary) importance and may be
taken only' in carefully prepared doses' .80
One might argue that Tarr's retreat into a cloistered preoccupation with ideal
forms serves largely to keep the commonplace elements in check - but instead of
disencumbrance, his Apollonian individualism itself proves a heavy burden, one
impossible to shake off. He continuously struggles to fit into the role of the ideal
ascetic intellectual, of the 'reasonable man'. 81 At the same time he is drawn, almost
unconsciously, back to his carnal habits and Bertha, always with the same sense of
dread. Favouring pure form - he begins despising humanity and, of course, himself:
Tarr looked with slow disdainful suspicion at Hobson's face staring at the
ground. 'You have understood the nature of my secret? = Half of myself
I have to hide. I am bitterly ashamed of a slovenly, common portion of
my life that has been isolated and repudiated by the energies I am so
proud of.82
Faithful to his Apollonian side, he wishes not only to be disassociated from others
but also from that ungraceful part of himself which is his vile body. He is proud to
say that his friendships and his relationships in general, serve merely as a mirror
where he can see himself reflected:" A man only goes and confesses his faults to the
world when his self will not acknowledge or listen to them. The function of a friend
78 Ibid., p. 30.
79 Ibid., p. 72.
80 Ibid., p. 293.
81 Ibid., p. 295.
82 Ibid., p. 31.
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is to substitute this defective self, to be the World and the Real without the disastrous
consequences of reality. ,83
Seeking relief from reality and the senses, Tarr indulges in fantasies of
'disengagement' from Bertha, which for him represent all at once the mundane, the
real and the common everyday experience: 'I do not mean that sex is my tragedy, but
art. = I will explain why I am associated sexually with this pumpkin' ,84 he tells
Hobson. It is a fantasy that indicates his own unstable, disorderly and inefficient
relation to life and experience: His wish to 'break off his engagement" and 'discard
the girl', 86 a wish that however sincere it seems, is never fully pursued, seems to
indicate a deep-seated existential angst - resting on his Apollonian ideal of art. In a
way, his vacillation voices, his inner antagonism. He is tom between two conflicting
states: on the one hand, an Apollonian, artistic nature which seeks serenity, plasticity,
severance from all worldly ties and cares; on the other, an almost unexplainable
impulse that renders him unable to cut himself off completely from common
experience 'it appeared a matter of physical discomfort to leave her [Bertha]
altogether' :87 'The secret of his visits to Bertha and interminable liaison was that he
never really meant to leave her at all, he reflected [...] But it would have been absurd
not to try to escape.i"
In these passages, the text neatly illustrates Tarr's divided allegiance to the
world of experience (the senses), at one end, and to that of artistic experience, where
'beauty' is sought in aesthetic contemplation, at the other. This understanding of art
83 Ibid., p. 31. At this particular point Tarr's egoism cannot avoid revealing its solipsistic outlook.
Instead of providing release from the prison of the self, a friend serves to highlight this sense of
aesthetic detachment, revealing the intensity of his alienation from the world and from others.
Here, specifically, Tarr's self-professed solipsism reminds more of the self-indulgent
asceticism that informs such characters as James Duffy, providing a parody of aesthetics and
individuality.
84 Ibid., p. 29.
85 Ibid., p. 43.
86 Ibid., p. 43.
87 Ibid., p. 49.
88 Ibid., p. 308.
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reflects a metaphysical thesis - the doctrine that only through disinterested
contemplation that 'beauty' can be conceived. This rather Kantian/Schopenhauerian
understanding of art results in a conflicting dualism, one perpetually troubled by the
very boundaries it sets for itself: '[Tarr] was ashamed of his sudden interest [...] and
instinctively hid it. He was committed to the role of a reasonable man. ,89 As already
seen, debates over the subject of asceticism and passion were frequent in all the
periodicals under examination in this thesis. From The Eagle and the Serpent, to The
New Age and The Freewoman, discussions about the relationship between genius and
creativity, passion and madness, with particular reference to Nietzsche, were frequent
and animated. This often Nietzschean-inspired debate is continued further in The
New FreewomaniThe Egoist where it takes various forms, either in articles such as
'Intellect and Culture' ,90 'Beauty and the Senses' ,91 'Modem writers on Chastity',92
'Reality and Truth' ,93 to name but a few, or literary texts. In particular, in Marsden's
series 'Reality and Truth', which appeared in three consecutive issues from March
until May 1915 (Joyce's A Portrait was still appearing - and Tarr was being
prepared), the editor of the journal (by now The Egoist) writes:
The Despising of the World of Sense in favour of Reality is the despising
of Being in favour of non-entity. To encourage a distaste for 'this world'
in favour of some 'other' non-sensible world is to encourage the distaste
for life itself: a phenomenon which Nietzsche has christened Nihilism
[...]. The great artist would be the Mind which could achieve the
synthesis of the two - imaging and realizing: such a Mind as would be
able to apprehend the new vision so clearly that he could recreate and
reproduce it with precision."
89 Ibid., p. 295.
90 Dora Marsden, 'Intellect and Culture', The New Freewoman, I July 1913, pp. 21-23.
91 Dora Marsden, 'Beauty and the Senses', The New Freewoman, 15 November 1913, pp. 201-203.
92 Beeban Porter and Noel Teulon Porter, 'Modem Writers on Chastity', The Egoist, 16 February
1914, pp. 77-78. They write: 'The influence of Nietzsche, direct and indirect, has been on the
side of the virtue of chastity in its modem sense', (p. 78).
93 Dora Marsden, 'Reality and Truth-I', The Egoist, 1 March 1915, pp. 33-37, 'Reality and Truth-If',
The Egoist, 1 April 1915, pp. 49-53, The Egoist, 'Reality and Truth-III', pp. 65-69.
94Dora Marsden, 'Reality and Truth-Il', The Egoist, 1 April1915, pp. 52-53. My emphasis.
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At another point in the essay Marsden notes that the problem of the distinction
between Reality and Truth, appearance and the 'thing-in-itself, is a chronic problem
that faces both the artist and the philosopher. Marsden sees the artist both as a
spectator and a maker. The fashioning of art is a continual growth: 'We have no
interest in the Permanence of a non-sensible "Reality" [...] the hope of immortality is
that we shall continue to "be": that we shall continue to feel, to sense that is. ,95
Experiencing life in such dualistic terms deprives the true creative individual from
his potential - his vision remains confined within the parameters of an aesthetic
asceticism, threatening to barricade him from life altogether. As she points out:
'There is no reality outside the realm of Sense, lying "there" ready-made until such
time as sense can gnaw its way towards it.,96 'Metaphysics', according to her, is 'a
verbal disease arising out of grammatical form, and since grammar - very bad
grammar - rules the human world in its cultural parts, Gods, Externality, Reality, the
Absolutes, Categorical Imperatives, all the fruit which blossoms on the Illusion-
yielding branches springing from "There is" have become an inevitable portion. ,97
The problematic nature of dualistic conceptions, (i.e., Senses-Intellect,
Appearance-Reality, Asceticism-Passion, Art-Life, Apollonian-Dionysian), and their
ramifications (nihilism - the common lot of the artist-pessimist), is a theme touched
on variously by other contributors, providing the backbone not only for Tarr but also
for such texts as Joyce's A Portrait and Remy de Gourmont's The Horses of
Diomedes. Gourmont's novel belongs to the fin de steele French literary tradition and
the serialization of his novel (translated by Cecile Sartoris) in The New
Freewoman/The Egoist indicates parallel intellectual concerns and theoretical
foundations between French and English individualism. The editor of Le Mercure de
95 Ibid., p. 53.
96 Ibid., p. 65.
97 Ibid., p. 69.
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France, a prolific writer and an art critic, Gourmont belonged to the circle of
intellectuals who were involved In the avant-garde dissemination of Nietzsche's
thought. 98 Such intellectual influences can be found in the theoretical works of the
early 1900s, as for instance the Physique de l'Amour: Essai Sur l'Instinct Sexuel
(1904), which would later be translated in English by Ezra Pound as Natural
Philosophy of Love (1926). Pound was directly responsible for the serialization of
Gourmont's novel in the periodical, a philosophical novel which, interestingly, offers
an inside view of the turn-of the century aesthetic debates within French intellectual
circles regarding passion and asceticism, intellection versus sensation, individualism
and love. Like in Tarr, such tensions are presented through the two main characters:
the artistic pair of Diomedes and Cyran. Gourmont, who in one of his essays,
(reprinted in The Egoist) would note that, '[m]y tradition is not only French; it is
European. Icannot deny [... ] Schopenhauer, who began my philosophical education:
I cannot deny Nietzsche who gave a principle for my repugnance to spiritualist
morality [... ] ,99 - makes the artist Diomedes a mediator of a kind of individualistic
sensualism. Diomedes introduces a new aesthetic with the capacity to disrupt the
more ascetic version advocated by the artist Cyran, wishing to be led far from 'the
hermit's hut with its thatched and perhaps reeded roof.' 100 Unlike Cyran's sober
aestheticism, which stands for immaterial, unadulterated art, Diomedes asserts a
more sensual credo, remaining perpetually in love, harmoniously undecided between
his Apollonian lover, the 'ideal' Christine, and the more 'fleshy' affairs that come his
way.IOI
98 Forth, p. 31.
99 Remy de Gourmont, 'Tradition and Other Things', The Egoist, 15 July 1914, pp. 261-262.
100 Remy de Gourmont, 'Chapter I11.-The Girdle', The Horses of Diomedes, The New Freewoman, 1
September 1913, pp.llO-113 (p. 110).
101 'All of Christine's appearances are chaste: she is always innocent and of a virginity continually
renewed by grace. Each one of her lovers, sees her different, following the seasons and the
hours; she is, sometimes, always and, sometimes, never the same; she is the field, the heath, the
river, the sea; the clouds influence her, and the sun [...]; but Christine is immortal. Gourmont,
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The aesthetic dialectic represented through the artistic duo Diomedes-Cyran is,
in my view, being internalized in Tarr's own character, a character perpetually tom
between aesthetic and sensual pleasure. Despite his statements of aesthetic
asceticism 102 and alleged obedience to the mandates of ideal form, the 'sex problem'
is a continuous distraction for the young Tarr. At moments his persona reads almost
as a caricature, offered by Lewis as a parody or criticism of such ascetic-aesthetic
models. Like other literary egoists, as for instance the saturnalian James Duffy of the
Dubliners, Tarr, also enjoys contemplating about the impossibility of human
relations and comically enough delivers his monologues in empty studios:
[H]e came back to his earlier conclusions. = Such successful people as
Anastasya and himself were by themselves. It was as impossible to
combine or wed them as to compound the genius of two great artists. = If
you mixed together into one whole Gainsborough and Goya you would
get Nothing, for they would be mutually destructive. [...] = Co-operation,
group-genius was, he was convinced, a slavish pretence and absurdity.l'"
In the context of the novel Tarr seems determined to preserve the boundaries of
life and art intact. And his existential trouble arises from the realization of both the
necessity and the impossibility of such a task. In a way, both the Kantian distinction
between the world of truth, namely the world of unchanging things, and the world of
the senses, that is the world of delusion and impermanence, and Schopenhauer's
pessimism penetrate him deeply. In a way, Tarr's consciousness seems persecuted by
this kind of tension, an aesthetic subtext that underlies the conflicting attitude
towards Bertha. Tarr's reference to Schopenhauer whilst observing Bertha's naked
body indicates this further: 'A complicated image developed in his mind as he stood
with her. He was remembering Schopenhauer [... ]. Something was explained. Nature
'Chapter VI - The Marigold', The Horses of Diomedes, The New Freewoman, 15 September
1913, p. 131.
102 As he likes to tell Hobson: 'The tendency of my work, as you may have noticed, is that of an
invariable severity. Apart from its being good or bad, its character is ascetic rather than
sensuous, and divorced from immediate life. There is no slop of sex in that', Tarr, p. 30.
103 Ibid., p. 313.
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was not friendly to him; its metallic tints jarred.' 104 One might argue that for Tarr,
Bertha comes to symbolize what in Schopenhauerian terms is defined as the 'Will'.
In her, Tarr sees the uncontrollable forces of nature which as an artist, a lover of the
'ideal', he violently resents. A similar frustration is expressed later on in the
restaurant scene. His comment: 'I realize I'm in life, darling. But I don't like being
reminded of it in that way. It makes me feel as though I were in a mauvais lieu'los
indicates that for him nature is neither welcoming nor pleasing. While the
debauchery of 'being' in life, as it were, has a rather seductive appeal to Tarr the
Man - his artistic side displays a less charitable temper - relegating life to a
subordinate position. As he tells Anastasya, art connotes stasis, permanence, a
condition that resembles 'death': 'death is the thing that differentiates art and life.
Art is identical with the idea of permanence. It is a continuity and not an individual
spasm. ,106 His conception of art reveres Apollonian stasis - the plastic form which
arrests the dynamics of temporality in the deadness of shape: 'Deadness, then, in the
limited sense in which we use the world, is the first condition of art.' 107
While this life-less 'dream-like' art is advocated by both male artists (Tarr and
Kreisler that is), the character of the Russian belle, Anastasya, is brought in, I
believe, in order to inform and vitalize the novel's art-hypothesis. It is important here
to note that the lengthy dialogues between Tarr and Anastasya in Parts V arid VII
were written quite late, and the final revising of this material took place just a few
months before the novel's completion. lOS In a way, it seems to me that such
compositional details matter greatly as these sections evoke an aesthetic agenda quite
104 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
105 Ibid., p. 303.
106 Ibid., p. 299.
107 Ibid., pp. 299-300. It is a kind of notion that considers the aesthetic as a route to a kind of Buddhist
liberation from all willing and suffering, evoking Schopenhauer's understanding of the
relationship of art and the Will. For Schopenhauer art confronts the question of existence and
provides a temporary escape from it, from the tyranny of desire.
IOs'Afterword' in Tarr, pp. 363-364.
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distinct and more promising - and one closer to that of the later Lewis. That said, it is
my view that in the parts of the novel that belong to the later writing (the restaurant
scene, as well as the scene of Tarr's 'seduction' by Anastasya), Lewis moves beyond
the parody of the 'lifeless' aesthesis that both Kreisler and Tarr represent, and
engages in something else. In a way, the confrontation of Tarr and Anastasya, yields
something new and different, a new set of ideas coming together (a 'healthy dualism'
perhaps?)
As noted earlier, the initial aesthetic thesis of The Birth of Tragedy was built
upon an Apollonian/Dionysian dialectic. For Nietzsche, the Dionysian evokes excess
and unconsciousness, a 'sacred' animalism. The Apollonian, by contrast, belongs to
Schopenhauer's world of representation.l'" In Schopenhauer's and Kant's
metaphysics there is a sharp distinction between the real world of things as they are
in themselves and the apparent world of things as they feature in experience (the
world of representation and experience), which in Schopenhauer's idiom becomes
the distinction between the Will and 'representation of the Will.' Wary of such
metaphysical divisions, the Nietzsche of The Gay Science reconceived the
Apollonian and the Dionysian as states immanent in nature, in an effort to return art
into the real world of human experience.l '? According to this new non-metaphysical
thesis, art exists as a thorough affirmation of nature and nature's power, expressed in
the form of a 'joyful' naturalism which extols the worldly and its folly as the only
true reality: 'We have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent
109As Ruben Berrios and Aaron Ridley point out: 'Aesthetically, the Apollonian is the beautiful, the
world experienced as intelligible, as conforming to the capacities of the representing intellect'.
Ruben Berrios and Aaron Ridley, 'Nietzsche', in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, ed.
by Berys Gaut and Dominic Lopes (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), pp. 98-108 (p. 98).
110 'In fact', as Sallis notes in Crossings, 'Nietzsche's critique concludes by analysing Schopenhauer's
theory of the intellect in such a way as to attempt to show that the distinction between will and
the world as represented by the intellect (that is, the world of appearances) cannot be
sustained.' While for Schopenhauer the role of art would be to offer a temporary respite from
the natural, phenomenal world, 'a contemplation without interest' that disengages the will,
Nietzsche promotes an aesthetic temper that suggests a dynamic rather than a static metaphor.
John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991),p.66.
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world perhaps? ... But no! With the real world we have abolished the apparent
world! ,III As Stem and Silk point out in Nietzsche on Tragedy:
[I]n the perspective of Nietzsche's whole career, his relationship with
Schopenhauer seems like an unending agon in which he either follows
his predecessor or attacks him. Tragedy, says Schopenhauer, gives the
spectator a premonition of 'a different kind of experience'. Nietzsche
agrees, but asks what kind of existence, and answers: not some nirvana,
but the 'eternal life' which we glimpse through our 'knowledge' that
despite the destruction of individuals - because of the destruction of
individuals - we share in the underlying and indestructible unity of
being. Tragedy, says Schopenhauer, gives its spectator 'an exalted
pleasure'. Nietzsche agrees again, but asks what kind of pleasure, and
answers: not the pleasure of mystical resignation from the world but a
'higher joy', an overwhelmingly affecting experience which is capable of
reconciling the mystical and worldly instincts. This is the crux of
Nietzsche's first overt argument with Schopenhauer, and it is the model
of all subsequent arguments with him.112
As Foshay notes, Lewis's own aesthetic agon might be understood as a long
quest for a 'harmonious and sane duality', a certain affirmation of the tension of
opposites in the tradition of Nietzsche. From the 'nihilistic void' 113of the Enemy of
the Stars to Tarr and the vorticist manifesto of Blast, this notion increasingly
occupies a central place. In the second issue of Blast for instance Lewis tells us how
to 'BE THYSELF':
There is nothing as impressive as the number TWO.
You must be a duet in everything.
For, the Individual, the single object, and the isolated, is, you will admit,
an absurdity.
III Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight a/the Idols, 'How the "Read World?' at last Became a Myth', p. 51.
As Berrios and Ridley point out: 'With this new conception, the appearance/reality distinction
is not a distinction between two logically differentiated 'worlds' - an apparent one and a real
one - but a distinction that falls squarely within the ordinary, everyday world of actual
experience', p. 99.
112 Michael S. Silk and Joseph P. Stem, Nietzsche on Tragedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), p. 331. As Stem notes: 'When Nietzsche rejects a Buddhistic-pessimistic
negation of the will in favour of the Greek 'pessimism' of strength' (as he labels it in the Self
Criticism), or when he denies the meaning of an opposition between objective and subjective
art, he is conducting a straightforward dialectical argument with the philosophy of which he
was so recently a wholehearted partisan. Schopenhauer is by no means an isolated influence. In
tone and in content Nietzsche's book presupposes the cultural and spiritual aspirations of
German Romanticism in the Sturm und Drang. His aesthetic theories, as we shall see, belong
as firmly to that German context as does his Dionysian-Apollonian antithesis. But it is a
German context of which Schopenhauer remains, for him, a crowning representative', p. 222.
113 Foshay, p. 45.
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Why try and grve the impression of a consistent and indivisible
personality?
Hurry up and get into this harmonious and sane duality.
The thought of the old Body-and-Soul, Male-and-Female, Eternal Duet
of Existence, can perhaps be of help to you, if you hesitate still to invent
yourself properly.
No clear outlines, except on condition of being dual and prolonged.'!"
Indeed, as Foshay notes, if one considers Tarr on his own, there is not much more
there than a mere 'caricature of the artist caught in a dialectic of Apollonian and
Dionysian impulses (ascetic art/sexuallife), an art-position 'unable to make the leap
to a concrete and synthetic will-to-power.' liS However, when put side by side with
Anastasya, a different interpretation might perhaps be possible. A thorough analysis
of Anastasya's art and life position, which has, in my view, not yet received the full
critical attention it deserves, and the effect she has on Tarr, provides new, alternative
ways of approaching the text's aesthetics.
Interestingly enough, Anastasya's love ethics look very different from the
standard accounts of love that Lewis attributes to the other characters. For instance,
she does not stand for 'passion' in the same way that Bertha does. In her, 'passion'
becomes a virtue; it is born out of a fullness of life and displays a measured intensity
that sharply contradicts the vulgar sensuality typical of her rival. In fact, she is the
very antithesis of Bertha, in whom passion is firmly tied to a self-sacrificial ethic
points towards a Christian ethic of self-renunciation and chastity (which evokes
Nietzsche's parody of Wagner's women): '[Bertha] has a [... ] penchant for self-
immolation [... ]. She is apt to lie 'down on the altar at the wrong moment - even to
mistake all sorts of unrelated things for altars.' 116 Neither is Anastasya's idea of
passion in any way comparable to the vulgar sexuality that Tarr alludes to in the
114 Wyndham Lewis, 'BE THYSELF', BLAST: Review of the Great English Vortex: War Issue, July
1915, p. 91.
115 h 4Fos ay, p. 7 .
116 Tarr, p. 39.
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course of the novel. In effect, the figure of Anastasya, Tarr's 'perfect bride' 117and
fellow 'individual-genius'P comes along to rouse Tarr out of his Apoll~nian
slumber, troubling the essential presuppositions that his former aesthetic self seems
bound to. Their encounter makes him eventually realize that '[h]e was not an artist in
anything but oil-paint.,I 19 By appearing on the scene, like an aesthetic 'dea ex
machina', she serves as Tarr's rescuer from the dead end of pure intellectual
contemplation and brings him 'Back to the Earth!,120 Indeed, the invocation of
Anastasya signals a turn in Tarr former sex-presuppositions. After their initial
encounter he goes on to confess: 'It was a queer feeling, after all, to see his
sensuality speaking sense. He would marry her!,121 Anastasya's invitation to make
him 'drunk' in the restaurant scenel22 ('they began with oysters. He had never eaten
oysters before. Prudence had prevented him,)123. as well as the 'seduction scene' of
'Swagger Sex' in Chapter Three are both, in a way, intended as Tarr's re-education
in the issues of life: 'he followed obediently and silently. He was glad Anastasya had
taken things to her hands [... ]. 124 For instance, in the restaurant she employs him to
drink 'to Waste':
'I'll drink to that!' said Anastasya, raising her glass [... ]. 'Here's to
Waste!' he said loudly. 'Waste yourselves, pour yourselves out, let there
be no High-Men except such as happens. Economy is sedition. Drink
your blood if you have no wine! 125
Significantly enough, the scene where Anastasya 'seduces' Tarr takes place in the
private space of Tarr's art-studio - a place which Bertha has never managed to
117 Ibid., p. 320.
118 Ibid., p. 313.
119 Ibid., p. 297.
120 Ibid., p. 307.
121 Ibid., p. 295.
122 Ibid., p. 302.
123 Ibid., p. 297
124 Ibid., p. 297.
125 Ibid., pp. 302-303. My emphasis.
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penetrate. With 'the key' finally 'in her possession'{", Anastasya begins the
education of the artist-convalescent by assigning to him a new role, that of the
collaborator. Poignantly, she reassures him: 'You won't hear marriage talked about
by me. I want to rescue you from your Bertha habits. = Allow yourself to be
rescued!,127 In some respects Anastasya's scheming and seduction tactics recall Ann
Whitefield's boa-constrictor powers in Man and Superman. However, in this case the
female heroine is brought in to save rather than hinder Tarr's individualism.
Anastasya is not Ann's equivalent, although it would be easy to see her as a kind of
caricature of Shaw's vitalistic model. In my view, if one were to look for the
congruities between Shaw's and Lewis's Nietzschean heroines, this should be in the
earthly, sensual image of Bertha, and Tarr's almost involuntary attraction/repulsion
towards her. Anastasya, on the other hand, is a character in her own right, positing
questions and trying out answers, which Tarr has not been able to consider yet. Such
rigid definitions of art as the ones Tarr sets forth are put up for examination. In the
restaurant scene Anastasya goes on to ask Tarr 'Still, what is it? What is art', and in
reply to his remark that art is the state where 'it is ourselves disentangled from death
and accident' she says humorously: 'Art is Paleozoic matter, Dolomite, oil-paint, and
mathematics; also something else. Having established that, we will stick a little flag
up and come back another day. = I want to hear now about life. ,128
Anastasya, in some way, achieves a synthesis which Tarr seems unable to
grasp in its entirety. Her notion ofiove, and consequently of art, seems to be inspired
by the Nietzschean notion of the will-to-power, a love which connotes energy and
strength, as well as self-mastery, which does not mean the conquest of the passions
126 .Ibid., p. 306.
127 Ibid., p. 307.
128 Ibid., p. 300.
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but rather their cultivation. 129Furthermore, for her the practice of art is more than the
production of artworks. Her notion of life and art as mutually interdependent offers a
different perspective to that of the Apollonian Tarr:
[Tarr]: 'Listen. Life is art's rival and vice versa.
[Anastasya]: 1don't see the opposition!
[Tarr]: No, because you mix them up. You are the arch enemy of the
picture.l "
With Anastasya, Tarr's categories are for the first time blurred: mind and body,
intellection and sensuality, knowledge and experience, subject and object, life and
art, they all become tangled. By being the 'arch enemy of the picture', the foil to
Tarr's version of Apollonian plasticity, she brings a new fresh gospel of art and life
to the novel - to the surprised, but not disagreeably surprised, Tarr. She tells him:
'Forget those silly words of yours [... ] Ha! We're in life, my Tarr. We represent
absolutely nothing = thank God!,131 For her, the world's essence lies in its Will- not
in its representation, to use Schopenhauer. The artist's Apollonian instinct to
dominate, to gain mastery over form, to impose order is troubled by Anastasya who
refuses to be passively possessed by Tarr:
[Tarr] 'I don't want you!' Tarr said.
[Anastasya]'Oh! = Tell me what you want?'
[Tarr] 'I want a woman!'
[Anastasya]'But 1am a woman, stupid!'
[Tarr] 'I want a slave.'
She whispered in his ear, hanging on his neck.
[Tarr] 'No! You may be a woman, but you're not a slave.'
[Anastasya] 'Don't be so quarrelsome. = Forget those silly words of
I ,132yours - s ave, woman.
129 In the very interesting article 'The Virtues of Passionate Life: Erotic Love and "the Will to
Power''', the Nietzsche scholar Robert C. Solomon discusses Nietzsche's concept of the Will in
relation to current philosophical approaches to love and life. For him Nietzsche's love ethic is
based on impassioned engagement and emotion, in the cultivation of passion and as such it
moves away from Schopenhauer and Kant's theories of love as 'compassion'. Robert C.
Solomon, 'The Virtues of Passionate Life: Erotic Love and "the Will to Power", Social
Philosophy and Policy 15 (1998), 91-118 (p. 97).
130 .Tarr, p. 299.
131 Ibid., p. 304.
132 Ibid., p. 304.
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By not subjecting herself, not letting herself become objectified by the artist's gaze,
she transgresses the traditional boundaries between artist and art-object, subject and
object. Drawing Tarr into a real reciprocal relationship with a woman (Eternal-
Feminine is the Will-to-Life in Nietzsche) she enables him to overcome the
principium individuationis, the divisive world-view of neatly ordered distinctions
which defines him as an individual and as an artist. It may be argued that Anastasya
introduces the idea of reciprocity between art and life. Like love, aesthetic
experience entails surrender of the whole self; 'I am your slave' Tarr exclaims, and
she replies: 'Thank you Tarr. That's better than having a slave, isn't it?'; '[Tarr:]
Yes, I think everything is in order.' 133 In a way Anastasya awakens him from his
ascetic aestheticism providing alternative ways of conceiving the creative enterprise:
'[Anastasya:] Then you're my efficient chimpanzee?' '[Tarr:] No, I'm the new
animal; we haven't found a name for it yet. It will succeed the Superman. Back to the
Earth!,134
While on his own, Tarr is portrayed as a genuine puritanical egoist, but when
he is paired with her, the picture is radically altered. Their early rapport, and Tarr's
long conversation with her in their stroll through the Luxembourg Gardens in
Chapter Seven of Part V, 'A Megrim of Humour' begin sketching a different portrait
of Tarr, conveying somehow Lewis's altered attitude towards him. We read for
instance:
There was no other pair of people who could talk like that on those
terraces. They were both of them barbarians, head and shoulders taller
than the polished stock around. And they were highly strung and
graceful. They were out of place. 135
Such accounts seem to me to trouble the early portrait of Tarr in Part I, suggesting
perhaps the evolving aesthetic concerns of the writer. Interestingly, in this passage,
133 Ibid., p. 304.
134 Ibid., p. 307.
135 Ibid., p. 236.
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Lewis has the pair 'promenad[ing] their sinuous healthy intellects [... ] [t]here was no
other pair of people who could talk like that', speaking seriously, exploring the
dialectic between shifting notions of egoism art and genius, traditional ideals of
vitalism, conversing about what it means to be an 'efficient' artist as well as an
efficient man. Their discussion over the nature of the creative artist is only one
instance of this:
[Anastasya] 'Your philosophy reminds me of Jean-Jacques [Rousseau],'
she said.
[Tarr] 'Does it? Well, how do you arrive at this conclusion?'
[Anastasya] 'Well, your hostility to a tidy rabble, and preference for a
rough and uncultivated bed to build on brings to mind "wild nature" and
the doctrine of the natural man [... ].'
[Tarr] 'I see what you mean. But I also notice that the temper of my
theories is the exact opposite of Jean-Jacques [... ]. I do not for a moment
sentimentalize crudeness [... ]. The conditions of creation and life disgust
me [... ]. Similarly, you must praise chaos and filth [... ]. When you see
men fighting, robbing each other, behaving meanly or breaking out into
violent vulgarities, you must conventionally clap you hands. If you have
not the stomach to do that, you cannot be a creative artist. If people
stopped behaving in that way, you could not be a creative artist.' 13
In such moments, one is tempted to think that Tarr, in a genuinely Lewisian spirit,
aims to move away from satire and provocation to a more mature and reflective view
of individualism and art. Tarr's artistic 'shyness' with regard to matters of life seems
to be efficiently complemented by the reassuring symmetry of Anastasya's form:
[Tarr] 'You tempt me to abandon art. Art is the refuge of the shy.'
[Anastasya] 'Are you shy?'
[Tarr] 'Yes.'
[Anastasya] 'You need not be. ,137
Seen from this perspective; the text's art hypothesis appears to expand to
encompass the notion of life and art as proposed by the harmonious duet Anastasya-
Tarr. If the question with Bertha was how to be a true ascetic artist - how to extract
himself from materiality - with Anastasya the emphasis is shifted. It is the question
of finding the means to reconcile the two realms: how to be an individual without
136 Ibid., p. 236. My emphasis.
137 Ibid., p. 237.
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conceding his identity as an artist. It might be argued that this union suggests an
attempt on Lewis's part to negotiate a revised aesthetic position that moves away
from the sterile aestheticism which haunts this narrative and the individualistic
tradition in general. In my opinion, this pairing of 'genius-individuals' (as Tarr refers
to them during their conversations) indicates that reconciling and integrating
opposites is central to Lewis's idea of individuation in the text.
Clues concerning the role of such characters as Anastasya, who acts as an
important adjunct to Tarr's aesthetic development in the later part of the novel, in my
view enable one to appreciate the text's aesthetics under a new way. It is possible to
argue that, through this pair, Lewis outlines a hypothesis about how the hiatus
between life and art might be crossed. Thus he extends the purposes of his comedy
and satire, and calls for a new vitalistic aesthetic. Given Tarr's declaration early on in
the novel about being the 'new sort of pessimist', 'the Panurgic-Pessimist', 'drunken
with the laughing gas of the Abyss' in light of Anastasya's life and art ethic, one
might begin to wonder whether the text is offering something to counteract the 'spirit
of gravity' or the spirit of ressentiment (Nietzschean terms for nihilism) that is so
conspicuously present in the text. Tarr's own sense of aesthetic and moral trial can be
seen in his constant battle with the spirit of 'squalor and idiocy', his effort to remodel
the Flaubertian pessimism and aestheticism into a more affirmative vision:
I gaze on squalor and idiocy, and the more I see it, the more I like it.
Flaubert built up his Boulevard et Pecuchet with maniacal and tireless
hands. It took him ten 'years. That was a long draught of stodgy laughter
from the gases that rise from the dung-heap? He had an appetite like an
elephant from this form of mirth. But he grumbled and sighed over his
food. I take it in my arms and bury my face in it! 138
The Rabelaisian traits of Tarr's Panurgic 'appetite' aside, this pessimism of good
health, which Tarr refers to in this passage, might plausibly be a reference to
Nietzsche's proposition of affirmative pessimism as expounded in The Gay Science.
138 Ibid., p. 27.
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Such an interpretation of the aesthetics in Tarr is further reinforced by a passage in
the preface which was cut from the original published version. There Lewis tells us:
more than a rant of a bitter comedian, Tarr's credo is meant to present us with a
healthy type of pessimism of 'joy' and 'unconsciousness':
[Tarr's] message, as he discourses, laughs, and picks his way through the
heavily obstructed land of this story, is a message of a figure of health.
His introspection is not melancholy [... ]. He exalts life into a Comedy
when otherwise it is, to his mind, a tawdry zone of half-art, or a silly
Tragedy.139
This kind of new Nietzschean-like pessimism seems to be a start towards addressing
anew the issue of aesthetic dualism and pessimism that faces individualistic
aesthetics. As Lewis further notes in this unpublished part of the preface, the
character of Tarr is meant to stand for unconsciousness and health, he is an artist who
needs to find the means to dispose of such contradictory aesthetic 'tremors' 'to his
. ~ . ,140satisfaction .
That said, in my view, Tarr's calling for a new earthy aestheticism in Chapter
Three of Part VII 'Swagger Sex', connotes Lewis's challenge to stereotypical notions
of aesthetic egoism, as well as the traditional image of individual genius-artist
Ubermensch. Lewis here, through Tarr, his new animal, his 'Egoist-chimpanzee',
aims to refine the crude divide between vitalism and idealism which haunts
individualism, thus attempting to bridge the gap between reason and imagination, to
ease the tension between life and art. Most importantly, through Anastasya, who may
be seen as a catalyst to Tarr's creative vision, the text attempts to conceive a union of
oppositions, a union incited by a certain joyful spirit which promotes not only a
carefree existence but one requiring cunning, wisdom and strength, the same
worldly, light-hearted forbearance as that advocated in The Gay Science. Seen in this
light, the text might be said to echo the yes-saying of 'la gaya scienza' - the spirit of
139 Ibid., p. 387.
140 Ibid., p. 387.
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joyful wisdom seen according to Nietzsche in the art of the medieval Provencal
~/
troubadours.l'" Going beyond the idea of Tarr as a direct expression of Lewis's
aesthetic cul-de-sac, this kind of reading reveals Tarr as a kind of egoist
'convalescent', who seeks new (affirmative) ways of dealing with reality.
4.4 The Case Against Kreisler: Lewis's Critique of Decadence
At the other end of the narrative we have characters such as Otto Kreisler, a German
art-student, who has sought refuge in Paris, possibly as a result of his father's
betrayal (he has married Kreisler's fiancee). As Lewis's himself acknowledges in
Rude Assignment, Kreisler is a character at the same time 'aloof and violent', who
'enjoys drifting silently with time,142 and for whom 'the brink is never far off.'143As
he adds, the pessimism of this character is a pessimism that comes close to that of
Shakespeare's "'signifying nothing!",144, a reference, most probably, to Macbeth's
famous soliloquy about the meaninglessness of human life:
MACBETH Out, out, brief Candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothingt/"
141 As Kathleen Marie Higgins tells us in Comic Relief Nietzsche's Gay Science, for Nietzsche la
gaya scienza represents an entire culture that grew up in medieval Provence and was celebrated
by the troubadours. The motifs of art and courtly love hint at the way of life and thought that
Nietzsche was trying to advocate. The term 'troubadour' itself conveys an adventurous
attitude. The opening poem of the German rhymes, 'Joke, Cunning and Revenge', that appears
as 'prelude' to the philosophy urges the reader, as Higgins puts it, 'to be bold enough to try the
"fare" that is offered and patient enough to acquire the taste for it.' Poem 28, similarly, 'offers
encouragement to those who begin their journey, and describes the process of growth
(revaluation) as gradual and initially clumsy, just as a toddler taking his first steps. Kathleen
Marie Higgins, Comic Relief Nietzsche's Gay Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), pp. 16-19.
142 Rude Assignment, p. 151.
143 Ibid., p. 150.
144 Ibid., p. 152.
145 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, The Riverside Shakespeare, Vol. I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1998), p. 1385.
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The text's emphasis on Kreisler's craving for nothingness and the series of events
that together chart the trajectory of his inward emotional degeneration, all point to
the kind of pessimism Kreisler represents. As mentioned already, for Lewis, Kreisler
is the heir of German romanticism, a degenerate artist who seeks to be distracted by
his art, an art of extravagant love and despair.!" As Gasiorek rightly infers, this sort
of degenerate pessimism may be understood more fully in the light of Nietzsche's
notion of ressentiment. As the critic points out, Kreisler's ressentiment may be traced
to 'the relationship to the father [... ] to what the Father symbolizes: the social realm
of privilege and position from which the son is excluded.' 147 Indeed, Kreisler's mode
of existence could be sought in Nietzsche's man of ressentiment, namely the weary
individual unable to come to terms with his experience of life (his deeds and
misdeeds included). Like him, he suffers from the same psychological 'indigestion'
that Nietzsche talks about in On the Genealogy,148 resorting to other means of
1· , ., '11" ,J49 f 11 hvnnoti fconso ation, narcotics or pa iatrves 0 sorts, as we as a ' ypnotic sense 0
nothingness' 150 - which in Kreisler's case, at least in part, becomes translated into a
dream of mystical union with Anastasya, promising a death-like return to the womb.
In him, it is not difficult to see the same kind of existential pessimism and ennui that
so often afflicts Tarr, but here it has degenerated into a resentful conscience that lusts
for revenge and death - a nihilism turned sour, underpinned by an ultimate craving
for nothingness. The duel with Soltyk - a protracted scene with an absurd and
unfulfilling outcome - instead of providing relief, exaggerates even further Kreisler's
feeling of ressentiment. In such moments, Kreisler's gloomy seriousness and worn-
out chivalry may be seen as Lewis's parody of a certain aesthetic ideal. From
146 Rude Assignment, p. 150.
147 28Tarr, p.. '
148 On the Genealogy, p. 129.
149 Ibid., p. 130.
150 Ibid., p. 134.
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Kreisler's treatment of love to the fantasy of himself as a vengeful aristocrat one may
see traces of a hysterical fatalism which has turned voyeuristic and irrational.
As seen already in Chapter Three, ressentiment refers to a psychological state
where reaction and not action makes up the individual. 'Bad conscience', as defined
by Nietzsche, has its origins in the internalization of aggressive impulses and the
feeling of ressentiment it generates. Ressentiment, in tum, is an unconscious rage, an
incurably persistent hate that interferes with vitality (the will-to-power), denoting a
failure on the part of the individual to become master of himself, that is, a
'sovereign' and 'free' spirit. The expression of this sick conscience in contemporary
art is one of the major themes of The Case of Wagner. There 'bad conscience' and
ressentiment are diagnosed in aesthetic terms (rather than psychological) - and are
discussed in relation to Schopenhauer and Wagner, Nietzsche's two most
representative examples of cultural degeneration and decadent modernity.P" As
Lichtenberger tells us in his study, in this book Nietzsche deals with a 'new
problem':
A new problem appeared to Nietzsche, a problem which never ceased to
to occupy his mind until the end of his conscient life: what does this
modem decadence consist of? What are the symptoms which characterise
it, the signs that reveal it? What is the depth and breadth of the nihilistic
evil? How can it be cured? As soon as the matter appeared to him in this
light, his judgment of Wagner and Schopenhauer was modified from top
to bottom.152 .
More particularly, in the polemical tract The Case of Wagner, which calls for a
complete renunciation of prevailing German aesthetics, one can read the attack on
Wagner as an attack on all that was artistically degenerate in modem culture.l53 A
closer examination of Nietzsche's treatment of contemporary German art in this book
151 The Case a/Wagner, p. 156.
152 Lichtenberger, p. 83.
153 For an informed recent account, see Bruce Ellis Benson, Pious Nietzsche: Decadence and
Dionysian Faith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), and more particularly chapter
six, titled 'Wagner's Redemption', pp. 97-118.
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raises interesting correspondences between the aesthetics of Lewis's decadent anti-
/
hero and such forms of art-conscience. Interestingly, in The Case of Wagner the
German composer is often accused for his proclivity toward the sensationally
exceptional and artificial. In particular, Nietzsche tells us that in Wagner's case the
conception of love is all about overt 'sentimentality' and mere 'sensuality'P"; that
his music (which is Schopenhauerian in tone) is 'sick', made for those 'weariest' in
life:
[Wagner] flatters every nihilistic (Buddhistic) instinct and disguises it in
music .[...] Open your ears: everything that ever grew on the soil of
impoverished life, all of the counterfeiting of transcendence and beyond,
has found its most sublime advocate in Wagner's art - not by means of
formulas: Wagner was too shrewd for formulas - but by means of
persuasion of sensuousness which in tum makes the spirit weary and
worn-out.P'
And his polemic continues: 'Our physicians and physiologists confront their most
interesting case in Wagner' he points out:
The problems he presents on the stage - all of them problems of hysterics
- the convulsive natures of his affects, his overexcited sensibility, his
taste that required ever stronger spices, his instability which he dressed
up as principles, not least of all the choice of his heroes and heroines -
consider them as physiological types (a pathological gallery)! - all of this
taken together represents a profile of sickness that permits no further
doubt.156
It is not perhaps impossible to argue that Kreisler, this 'romantic German,157 could
perhaps be a part of such a pathological gallery. His sanctification and fetishization
of the Russian belle are perhaps the most convincing evidence as to that. His
penchant for theatricality and artificiality, his perception of life as a kind of drama
enacted almost 'cinematographically', 158his preference for illusion over reality (a
cunning device to keep himself perpetually distracted), also add to this impression.
154 The Case of Wagner, p. 158.
155 Ibid, p. 183.
156 Ibid., p. 166.
157 Rude Assignment, p. 151.
158 3Tarr, p. 10 .
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One of Nietzsche most frequent accusations against Wagner in his book is the
latter's bad taste in 'love'. Unlike Bizet's conception of love, which is 'love
translated into nature' 159,Wagner's is one that lures one away from nature: 'What a
clever rattlesnake! It has filled our whole life with its rattling about "devotion," about
"loyalty," about "purity"'; and with its praise of chastity it withdrew from the
corrupted world. ,160Nietzsche's polemic continues: 'Wagner is incapable of just
'put[ting] forth the human condition and celebrate[ing] it; he has to fix it by way of
redemption. ,161All of the composer's operas are, in away, stories of redemption,
according to him. This is presented as one of his most serious faults:
The problem of redemption is certainly a venerable problem. There is
nothing about which Wagner has thought more deeply than redemption:
his opera is the opera of redemption. Somebody or other always wants to
be redeemed in his work: sometimes a little male, sometimes a little
female - this is his problem. 162
Nietzsche, who at the end of the book pleads that 'music should not become an art of
lying',163 accuses Wagner's aesthetics of 'redemption'I'" as being merely a
passionate love of beautiful form, inducing a flight from reality into a lie. They are
meant to corrupt by their beautiful lies ('Music as Circe'),165 to seduce by their
heroic ideals, becoming thus a 'stimulanti[um] of the exhausted.V" Ultimately, and
perhaps most importantly for Nietzsche, Wagner is a 'nevrose',167 a symptom, 'a
child of this time.I68 to be associated with the age's cultural and social neurosis, and
in particular with a new ideal of virtue which requires 'training, automatism, "self-
159 The Case a/Wagner, p. 158.
160 Ibid., p. 160.
161 Benson, p. 111.
162 The Case a/Wagner, p. 160.
163 Ibid., p. 180.
164 Ibid., p. 160.
165 The Case a/Wagner, p. 183.
166 Ibid., p. 166.
167 Ibid., p. 166.
168 Ibid., p. 155. My emphasis.
207
denial''', which denotes a constitution 'Teutonic' in spirit.169 In his conclusion to the
book he announces prophetically:
It is full of profound significance the arrival of Wagner coincides in time
with the arrival of the 'Reich': both events prove the very same thing:
obedience and long legs. - Never has obedience been better, never more
commanding. Wagnerian conductors in particular are worthy of an age
that posterity will call one day, with awed respect, the classical age of
war. f70
To return to Tarr, as Lewis notes in Rude Assignment, Kreisler's 'romantic
involvements' (which are in the sharpest contrast with Tarr's), are 'always
melodramatic and rooted in a stormy pessimism and painful wonder' .171 For this
character the story becomes 'an unrelievedly gloomy epic of spiritual freedom -
which the further you went, for to look more and more like predestination.' 172
Indeed, in reading Kreisler's account of his life, one sees reiterated the same theme.
Kreisler remains perpetually entangled in the folds of a quasi-Nietzschean pattern of
'eternal return'. Through Kreisler-Anastasya-Soltyk he reenacts old traumatic themes
(Son-Mother-Father) - experiencing the recurrence of the same repressed feeling
anew, yet without the hope of true redemption.
A central problem that troubles him is the problem of 'indifference' in life.
Unable to transform his 'bad conscience', so to speak, into anything active, his
character resorts to a romantic pessimism which allows to take leave from those
'many empty and depressing hours he had lived.' 173 In fact, his longing for love is
irreparably associated with his longing for 'redemption' from those aspects of life
that seem too great for him to handle: 'When the events of his life became too
unwieldy or overwhelming, he converted them into love, as he might have done, with
169 Ibid., p. 180.
170 Ibid., p. 180.
171 Ibid., p. 151.
172 Rude Assignment, p. 146.
173 Tarr, p. 284.
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specialised talent, into some art or other.' 174Consequently, it may not unreasonable
to argue that the theatrics of his supposedly threatened honor (in the case of Soltyk),
as well as his mock-role as a tragic lover (in the case of Anastasya), might be a
means to compensate for an otherwise mundane existence. Such '[t]ragedies', we
read at one point, 'purged [him] periodically of the too violent accumulations of
desperate life.' 175 Particularly with regard to Anastasya, Kreisler's suspiciously
sudden interest in her is never far from the mood of existential resignation that
haunts him. The salvific character of his passion for her can be seen as one
manifestation of his spiritual trouble. Like a hypnotic siren, romantic passion
provides a temporary comfort from '[ t]he useless ennui of his life', from the
knowledge that 'sooner or later he must marry and settle down [...] multiply his
image. Things had gone too far".176 It is important that Kreisler's chance encounter
with Anastasya at the cafe is turned into an imaginary tale of unrequited love. The
mysterious sudden passion that he declares for her, her total idealization, reads as a
parody of chivalric romance: 'He realised suddenly all the possibilities of this chance
acquaintanceship, plainly and cinematographically. [...] There he was like some
individual who had gone nonchalantly into the presence of a prince.' 177 What is
more, the love story he contrives, his fantasy of redemption by her which becomes
increasingly more vicious, violent and desperate: (' [C]asting about desperately for
means of handling the situation he remembered she had spoken of getting a dog to
guide her [...]. He would be her dog! Lie at her feet!,)178, and, ultimately, his duel
with Soltyk, all evoke a vision of life and art which is as artificial as it is escapist.
174 Ibid., p. 102.
175 Ibid., p. 102.
176 Ibid., p. 123.
177 Ibid., p. 103. My emphasis.
178 Ibid., p. 103.
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It seems that Kreisler is prone to two kinds of moods, that of the stoic ascetic
on the one hand: 'This life was now settled, pressure ceased. He had come to a
conventional and respectable decision [... ]. Death like a monastery - was before
him, with equivalents of a slight shaving of the head merely, a handful of vows,
some desultory farewells, very restricted space, but none the worst for that [... ].
Instead of rearing smooth faces of immense stone against it, you imagine an
unparalleled immobility in life' 179 - and that of the dramatic hero on the other. A true
actor, he assumes different roles, both as a victim and as an avenger, a master and a
slave. Following carefully the events that lead to Kreisler's suicide, we discover that
his art consists of his having transformed his life into a tragic melodrama, at the
center of which one finds an understanding of existence never far off from the
irrational, absurd, impersonal picture of nature we see in Schopenhauer. Instead of
affirming it, as Tarr wishes to do, ISOKreisler, this existential 'snob', vehemently
repudiates it:
The mood [...] was virulent snobbery. [...] He had, at his last public
appearance, taken the role of a tramp-comedian. [...] The world seemed
to wish to perpetuate this part for him. But he would not play! He
refused! A hundred times, he refused!! lSI
Increasingly unhappy with the role assigned to him by life, he takes up a new
one - one that seems to suit his decadent mood better. Seeking to salvage some part
of 'the beloved self, IS2Kreisler's growing indifference ('he was almost dead,)IS3
finds refuge in a chivalric daydream: 'A beautiful woman' was at the bottom of it.
[...] Tant pis for the other man who had been foolhardy enough to cross his path.,IS4
One might argue that beneath all these heroic fantasies and exaggerated stage-acting,
179 Ibid., p. 164.
180 Tarr tells Anastasya in Chapter Seven of 'A Megrim of Humour': 'Similarly, you must praise
chaos and filth. It is put there for you [...]. If you have not the stomach to do that, you cannot
be a creative artist.' Tarr, p. 236.
181 Ibid" p. 263.
182 Ibid., p. 263.
183 Ibid., p. 263.
184 Ibid., pp. 267-268.
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one is able to read Lewis's parody of a certain decadent form of art. In the course of
the novel Kreisler emerges as a true virtuoso in his own right. Like Wagner, he turns
into a maestro of 'hypnotic tricks',18s a 'first-rate actor',186 'very decadent',187
conjures up 'tragedies' to entertain 'weary nerves.'188 Kreisler's tempestuous love-
ethic might even remind one of Wagner's 'Flying Dutchman', constantly in search of
a woman who will redeem him through her love.189Kreisler too is doomed, not by
the devil, but by his 'bad conscience', and throughout Part II 'Doomed, Evidently -
The "Frac"', seeks some sort of redemption. His rather perverse view of himself as
Anastasya's slave, his wish to be her 'dog', and his obsessive determination to rescue
her, 'to fill [...] the void that must exist in her spirit,190masks his own emptiness and
malady. The appearance of 'Woman', which, as we are told was 'Art or expression'
for him, his imagining of himself both as a humble rescuer and a loving servant,
represent his avoidance of reality, his own impotence, and his pursuit of illusion. In
one of the recurrent fits of ennui, while walking down the dark boulevard, he
suddenly remembers Anastasya. Thinking of 'his weakness', 'the vortex', Kreisler
seeks anything to help him feel better: 'Anything, death and annihilation was better
than going back into that terrible colourless mood.,191 At this moment, the
reminiscence of Anastasya - or rather the idealized form in which Kreisler has cast
185 The Case of Wagner, p. 166.
186 Ibid., p. 172.
187 Ibid., p. 175.
188 Ibid., p. 166.
189 Wagner's main literary source for The Flying Dutchman was Heinrich Heine's Memoirs of Herr
von Schnabelewopski (1834), in which a Dutch captain, who rashly swears "by all devils in
hell" to round a certain Cape, is doomed by the devil to sail the seas until the Last Judgment,
unless he is redeemed by the fidelity ofa woman's love. Wagner's Dutchman, allowed to come
ashore every seven years to seek redemption (a central and recurring theme in Wagner's
operas), is rescued from his plight by Senta who, filled with pity and a deep sense of destiny,
forsakes her lover Erik and assures the Dutchman that she will be true to him unto death. At the
end, in an ultimate act of sacrifice, she hurls herself over a cliff into the sea, so ensuring the
Dutchman's salvation.' Howard Gray, Wagner (London: Omnibus Press, 1990), p. 38.
190 Tarr, p. 103.
191 Tarr, p. 124.
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her, serves to somewhat lessen the overwhelming darkness of the abyss, alleviating,
at least for a time, his suffering:
His weakness drew him on, back into the vortex. [...] He had escaped
from it for a time. Late agitations had given him temporary freedom, to
which he was now committed. If Anastasya was there [...].192
Kreisler's love vision however is nothing more than peevishness turned inward and
sublimated into saintly submission and sacrifice:
But he wanted to suffer still more by her: physically, as it were, under her
eyes. That would be a relief from present suffering [...]. The bitter
fascination of suffering drew him on, to substitute real wounds for
• . ,193imaginary.
In such moments, one may see suppressed traces of an exhausted conscience.
On the whole, it appears that Kreisler's redemption through love is a means to
overcome weariness. His aesthetic taste, however, proves somewhat unsavory as it is
permeated by death, hate and ressentiment. His conscience - a bad resentful
conscience that Kreisler always carries with him - remains always limited, signifying
a will to eros turned thanatos, one which 'cannot get rid of anything, one cannot get
over anything, everything hurts' .194 That said, the histrionics of Kreisler's modus
amore, his fantasy of himself as an obedient, self- denying canine lover reveal a
fatally bad taste in love that spells decadence. One might even go further and suggest
that Kreisler's taste for the sublime, the inauthentic, reads as a critique of the kind of
decadence we read of in Nietzsche's polemic.
Overall, one might argue that Kreisler's grandeur, his simultaneously pompous
and masochistically slavish adoration and false pomposity, the empty and false
language of sacrifice in love, are all things Nietzsche associates with aesthetic
corruption. Furthermore, his aesthetics of 'love and death' and his yearning for ideal
comfort, echo the kind of unhealthy escapism that Nietzsche detects in the romantic-
192 Ibid., p. 124.
193 Ibid., pp. 124-125.
194 On the Genealogy of Morals, p. 27.
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Wagnerian formula. In the course of the novel, the dream of 'redemption' is turned
J
into a neurotic love-game for Kreisler which reeks of decay and death. Far from
being creative and affirmative, Kreisler's commitment to the role of the love-stricken
courtier reveals a masochistic conscience which chooses to takes pleasure in cruelty,
particularly in cruelty to oneself. Ultimately, Kreisler's aesthetic turns out to be the
end product of a degenerative will turned back upon itself, an intimation, perhaps, of
the period's 'bad conscience', a conscience about to turn deadly.
To conclude: Tarr is a complex novel that operates on several levels at once.
As this chapter aims to illustrate, the Nietzschean aspects of Lewis's novel are tied
into the then-current discourses of Nietzsche and aesthetics. Taking into
consideration Peppis's claim regarding the significance of situating Tarr in its
original context, my account attempts to consider Tarr's contribution to the
contemporary debates about individualism and aesthetics. In my view, establishing
the place of artist figures of Tarr and Kreisler within the Parisian bohemian milieu
helps Lewis to communicate more powerfully the particular artistic outlooks these
characters embody and to provide an assessment of them. The contrasting aesthetic
attitudes attributed to them, might be seen to serve simultaneously as a critique of
particular aesthetic trends and as an extension of some of Lewis's aesthetic ideas that
had been brewing and fermenting within him during this period. That said, Tarr may
also be read as a record of the wider turn-of-the-century aesthetic debates concerning
Schopenhauerian, Wagnerian and Nietzschean aesthetics, and as a contribution to the
discourses of aesthetic individualism present in the Egoist. The novel critiques and
extends some of the traditional notions of aesthetic individualism, suggesting an
attempt to overcome some of its limitations. More than a simple parody of
individualistic aesthetics, the sane (but not unproblematic) pairing of Tarr and
Anastasya, in my view, attempts to dissemble and reconfigure some of the traditional
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notions of aesthetic egoism and Nietzschean vitalism. Lewis's quest for a 'healthy
duality' in the narrative is mediated through this pair of fellow egoists (a man and a
woman at last). In particular, Tarr's and Kreisler's addressing of Anastasya as an
'individual-genius' and a 'prince' respectively, their shared conception of her as
'master', adds an interesting angle to the novel's treatment of sexual politics in
aesthetic dualism. In my view, it is Anastasya that gives flesh and urgency to Tarr's
words on 'Panurgic Pessimism', and, through her mediation, a new egoistic
animalism can finally be conceived. While Kreisler is a man broken, whose aesthetic
appreciations can never lift him out of a decadent existence, but with the 'pair of
egoists' the narrative reaches beyond the established traditional notions of the
genius-artist as an ascetically withdrawn over-man, towards a more joyful and wise
individualism that indicates Nietzschean convalescence. I propose that, by way of
such artistic models, we can start exploring Lewis's developing concerns with regard
to a certain tradition of individualism - one that might be viewed as seriously
committed to exploring possibilities of cultural rejuvenation and individual
emancipation. In Tarr one sees the traces of a tradition of aesthetic egoism-
individualism in transition: from an idealistic conception of genius and art, as
formulated in the earlier Obermensch-like artist-types, towards a more animalistic,
down-to-earth conception which attempts to bridge the gap between the real and the
ideal, the self and the other, offering an alternative approach to the problem of
nihilism via the route of Nietzsche an affirmation.
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Chapter Five
Chapter Five - James Joyce and Nietzschean individualism: 'The Death of God' in
Stephen Hero and A Portrait ofthe Artist as a Young Man
5.1 Introduction
This chapter exammes James Joyce's reworking of the figure of the artist-egoist,
starting from Stephen Hero and going on to A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. I
attempt to contextualise Joyce's interest in egoist aesthetics within a certain kind of
radical Nietzscheanism contemporary to the writer while focusing on Joyce's ongoing
preoccupation with different models of egoism, as evidenced in the character of Stephen
Dedalus. Jean-Michel Rabate was the first to discuss Joyce's interest in the aesthetics of
egoism: from his 'early view of life modelled on Ibsen and Nietzsche' to the 'collective
utopia blending language and politics with avant-gardist and anarchistic overtones of
Finnegans Wake'. I Rabate discerns elements of an egoistic attitude going back to 1903,
in the unpublished manuscript of Stephen Hero, linking this early egoism with Joyce's
youthful Nietzscheanism. As already seen in this thesis, the earliest little magazine that
functions as a platform for both Nietzsche and radical egoism/individualism in England
was the fin-de-siecle The Eagle and the Serpent. Chapter One discussed this periodical
as a fascinating site of Nietzschean activity in an English context, helping construct a
map of the avant-garde reception and accommodation amongst radical and literary
coteries. In order to support the fresh critical insights of critics such as Rabate, in the
first part of this Chapter I return to the curious case of The Eagle and the Serpent. This
I lean-Michel Rabate, James Joyce and the Politics of Egoism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), p. 2.
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contextualisation aims to begin positioning Stephen Hero's systematic egoism within
the intellectual framework that first accommodated Nietzsche. To start unraveling what
Rabate and others have loosely seen as a Nietzschean thread running through Joyce's
early thought, my analysis will attempt to situate Stephen Dedalus's early egoistic
notions of cosmopolitanism, art, and love in the tum-of-the-century debates of this
periodical.
Stephen Hero, the manuscript that makes up a first inconclusive draft of A
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is a largely autobiographical narrative quite
different from the published version. Written in realistic style it may be read as a
youthful sketch of Joyce's university days, including events that the final version leaves
out. It might have been started in 1900 or 1901 when Joyce himself was nineteen or
twenty, and it offers a detailed portrait of Stephen Dedalus as an emerging egoist-artist.
This egoism, as will be argued, suggests complicated correspondences between the
early Joyce and tum-of-the-century Nietzschean notions of art and life. To say the least,
this 'ineradicable,2 and 'unapologetic egoism" of Stephen is difficult to establish. Its
part Byronic, part Mephistophelian fashioning denotes a kind of radicalism tied equally
to the past and the future. The early text draws constant attention to a temper which is as
heroic as it is mocking, as visionary as it is idealistic. Like all new organisms, it relies
on its vitality and instinct for survival.
Both Stephen Hero and A Portrait are texts focused around Stephen, however
each does it in its own distinct way. Meticulous revising of the early draft from 1907
onward would culminate in the version of the novel as it appeared in the Egoist
(February 1914-September 1915, The Egoist; 1916, book form). The version serialized
in Marsden's periodical is undeniably a completely different text in terms of narrative
2James Joyce, Stephen Hero, (New York: New Directions Book, 1963), p. 34.
3 Ibid., p. 151.
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style and perspective. In the first place, it proves difficult not to notice Joyce's dropping
,/
of the term 'egoism' in the published version. A close. look confirms that not even a
single reference survives from the early draft to suggest a connection between Stephen
and his attempt toward an egoist outlook of life. This omission is significant as it might
lead us to think that by that time Joyce had arrived at a negation of that ideology.
Further, the question of self-emancipation seems to acquire renewed strength in the
published version. The stylistics of introspection in A Portrait return to the original
thesis of Stephen Hero and his decision to renounce God, Truth, and all Absolutes for
Art as the only vehicle towards self-individuation. As a consequence, we experience a
'fall' of sorts, from the early heroic and visionary tone to the inward, esoteric and
private sphere of Stephen's guilty conscience in the published version. Rather than
another polemic treatise on egoism, we are presented with what, as will be argued in the
second part of this chapter, constitutes Stephen's 'ascetic' aesthetic, one formulated
upon a dialectic of sin and redemption. In the published version the early idiom of
egoism gives way to a discourse of priesthood and asceticism and an aesthetic which
leads Stephen to assume the role of an artist ascetic, 'a priest of the eternal
imagination' ,4 half artist, half monk.
Further, just as the early character of the artist-egoist is suggestively remodelled,
so is Joyce's perspective and objective there. Stephen Hero, a text rich in detail,
dialogue and incidents, presents the contradictions between the outside world and
Stephen. In A Portrait, on the other hand, the text attempts to expose these
contradictions further, as interiorized tensions which express themselves indirectly and
suggest themselves in what I propose forms what Nietzsche calls a 'bad conscience'. To
further clarify this point the second part of Chapter Five turns to examine how these
4 A Portrait, p. 116.
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inner tensions manifest themselves in Stephen's ascetic and aesthetic consciousness in
/
the published version. Breaking with realistic conventions, A Portrait's concern with
form and perspective offers a Nietzschean 'vivisection' of Stephen's inner mind through
a narrative of psychological introspection.
5.2 The Eagle and the Serpent: Wit, Wisdom, and Nietzschean Egoism in James
Joyce's Stephen Hero
In the first part of Chapter Five I tum to discuss James Joyce's Stephen Hero. In
particular, I aim to examine James Joyce's early preoccupation with an aesthetic of
egoism, as conveyed in Joyce's portrait of Stephen Dedalus in this early text, and show
how this may help to understand better what aspects of Nietzsche's initial reception
might have been most appealing for the young Joyce. Considering how Joycean
scholarship has consistently drawn correspondences between Joyce's early
individualism and Nietzsche.i this part aims to see whether it is possible to begin
situating this relation historically, in the context of turn-of-the-century avant-garde
thought.
In discussing Stephen Dedalus, mainstream scholarship has consistently
overlooked Stephen Hero's account of egoism, despite the obvious presence of many
references to it in the text. Literary criticism has been more eager to approach Stephen's
aesthetics through the more canonical routes of Ibsen, Aquinas and Aristotle. On the
5 With regard to Joyce's early affinity with Nietzschean thought, Jacques Aubert and Klaus Reichert point
out several lines of intersection, mostly in terms of Joyce's early theoretical essays. For Aubert,
whereas these aesthetic concerns are more often seen as articulated through Joyce's references to
Ibsen's 'new drama', these are not without echoes of a Nietzschean aesthetic of individuation.
Jacques Aubert, The Aesthetics of James Joyce (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1992),
pp. 24-26. As Reichert adds, it 'may be safely be assumed that [Joyce] read the German
philosopher [ ... ] before the tum of the century, and that it was to Nietzsche that he owed the
radicalness, the fierce impetuosity and the acid irony of his early essays'. Klaus Reichert, 'The
European Background of James Joyce', in The Cambridge Companion to James Joyce, ed. Derek
Attridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 55-83 (pp. 69-70).
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other hand, the importance of egoism, a notion to which Stephen returns in many
instances in the early novel, had, at least until recently, escaped their attention." Jean-
Michel Rabate was the first to stress the importance of the running association between
egoism and aesthetics in Joyce's work in James Joyce and the Politics of Egoism. In
Chapter Three, 'Joyce the Egoist', he discusses Joyce's involvement in a tradition of
philosophical egoism and draws fascinating connections between Joyce's own version
of (aesthetic and social) egoism and that of The New FreewomanlThe Egoist, in which A
Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man originally appeared. As Rabate tells us, 'that
Joyce's work should have found its way into the pages of Marsden's journal was more
than mere coincidence." Founded in 1911, the periodical went through various names:
The Freewoman (1911-1912), The New Freewoman (1912-1913), and The Egoist
(1914-1918). The main editor throughout most of its existence was Dora Marsden
whose more autonomous-minded vision of feminism and literary concerns led her to
start The Freewoman, aimed at providing 'a fighting weapon for pure disinterested
individualism,.8 While The New FreewomanlThe Egoist is regarded as being of great
importance as an active organ of high modernism, the earlier Freewoman is significant
for another reason. As demonstrated in Chapter Three The Freewoman occupies a
crucial place in the transition from earlier forms of egoism and Nietzscheanism to the
more introspective literary forms of philosophic and aesthetic individualism generally
associated with the Egoist group." Further, while Marsden's periodical provides clear
6 Ibid., p. 53.
7 After 1914 Dora Marsden became a contributing editor (with Harriet Shaw Weaver, Ezra Pound and T.
S Eliot joining the editorial staff), increasingly devoting her energies to her exposition of a
personal philosophy of egoism, as presented in articles for The New Freewoman and The Egoist,
as well as in the form of treatises as The Definition of the Godhead (1930) and The Mysteries of
Christianity (1935).
8 Clarke, p. 91.
9 Cary Franklin's recent thesis 'Freewoman: Dora Marsden and the Politics of Feminist Modernism'
sheds light in the early phase of Marsden's periodical and discusses its role in this transition. Cary
Franklin, 'Freewoman: Dora Marsden and the Politics of Feminist Modernism' (unpublished
doctoral thesis, Oxford University, 2002).
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links between Joyce and egoism, Rabate sees Joyce's encounter with some aspects of
this philosophic tradition dating from much earlier. He suggests that a con~istent
preoccupation with aesthetic egoism might be traced from as far back as Joyce's
youthful flirtation with anarchism and Nietzsche. This attitude is more clearly
manifested in 'what remains of Stephen Hero and the 1904 "Portrait of the Artist", all
stress[ing] the need of systematic egoism.' 10 Rabate points out entries in Stanislaus
Joyce's diary from that period, where the latter describes his brother's nature as
'naturally antagonistic to morality' and his conduct of life as grounded upon 'a principle
of impulse [... ] [a] conduct of life which bristles with contradictions.' II Rabate attempts
to put this egoism into perspective. Such an attitude, he notes, suggests 'a combination
of lax socialism and easy Nietzscheism that was so dominant a pose among young
esthetes at the turn of the century [... ] [and] a major component of 'early Modernism'
with which Joyce himself seemed to be in contact. 12
While Marsden's periodical undoubtedly provides an invaluable source of
reference and connection with regard to Nietzsche and radical strains of thought, it
belongs to a somewhat later stage of Nietzsche's reception in an Anglophone context. In
order to get a proper view on the turn-of-the-century 'Nietzscheism' that Rabate refers
to, one should look earlier in time. In this part of the chapter I want to focus on The
Eagle and the Serpent, which, as already shown, offers interesting insights into
Nietzsche's initial reception from the time that Joyce began writing. Beginning its
publication in 1898, the year in which the young Joyce entered University College
Dublin, it was the first little periodical which spoke of Nietzsche and radicalism, egoism
and vitalism, art and life in the same breath. Interestingly, its life span loosely coincides
10 Rabate, p. 54.
II Ibid., p. 54:
12 Ibid., p. 54.
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with the period the manuscript of Stephen Hero covers.i ' Even more importantly, the
periodical's brand of radical Nietzscheanism provides insights into some previously
unknown aspects of the early reception of Nietzsche among the avant-garde - a kind of
early aesthetic egoism which might prove useful when thinking about Joyce's own
intellectual sympathies during this period. Considering the evidence of the presence of a
radical type of egoism in Joyce's early fiction (as the various references in Stephen
Hero suggest), as well as Joyce's youthful fascination with Nietzsche (as Richard
Ellmann has shown), it would be worthwhile to consider more carefully whether there
might be a connection between the two - and therefore begin situating Stephen's (and
Joyce's) early 'egoism' historically.
Richard Ellmann informs us that by 1903 Joyce had already become familiar with
'the writings of Nietzsche, "that strong enchanter" whom Yeats and other Dubliners
were also discovering.' 14 In his view, being a Nietzschean in early twentieth century
Dublin would imply an interest in the 'extraordinary', centring around the 'cult of the
Ubermensch', an impression most probably based upon the idealist and spiritualist
proclivities of Yeats's circle, and their subsequent understanding of Nietzsche on such
grounds. IS Hence while EHmann notes how it was most probably upon Nietzsche that
Joyce drew when he expounded to his friends 'a neo-paganism that glorified selfishness,
licentiousness, and pitilessness, and denounced gratitude and domestic values'., he also
adds how: 'at heart Joyce can scarcely have been a Nietzschean [... ] his interest was in
the ordinary even more than in the extraordinary.' 16 Indeed, Joyce's could hardly be
labelled a 'Nietzschean' in the sense that Ellmann understands the term - a claim
13 The discrepancies regarding its inception seem to settle, as Theodore Spencer has noted in his
introduction to the manuscript, on a date around 1901, when Joyce himself was nineteen or twenty.
Stephen Hero, pp. 8-9.
14 Richard EHmann, James Joyce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 142.
15 Yeats's understanding of Nietzsche was based upon his earlier reading of William Blake and occult
literature, and suggests a mystical, hero-like kind of Nietzscheanism. For further discussion see
Bridgwater, pp. 67-90.
16 EHmann, p. 142.
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further strengthened by the mocking references to the concept of the Ubermensch in
Joyce's letters from the period and later works such as Utyssest' Ellmann rightly points
out how this kind of Nietzscheanism could not have had any lasting effect on Joyce, but
he seems to overlook the fact that the early avant-garde Nietzscheanism was hardly a
uniform phenomenon, and cannot be confined or be determined exclusively by way of
the intellectual agendas of prominent writers such as Yeats. The initial favourable
response to Nietzsche and the relationship between tum-of-the-century aesthetics and
his thought was more diverse and more complex as this thesis has tried to show so far.
The literary generation of the nineties credited Nietzsche for his aspiration to re-
evaluate traditional values and for his praise of individual creativity. As Carolyn F.
Ulrich, Frederick J. Hoffman, and Charles Allen have pointed out, Nietzsche's name
would gain currency in the fin-de-siecle avant-garde scene as 'an important
accompaniment to the criticism of society advanced by the men of the nineties [... ] a
spokesman for the artist.' 18Although this is true, still, different 'Nietzscheans' chose to
express their 'Nietzscheanism' differently, as the examples of writers and intellectuals
such as Arthur Symons, John Davidson, Havelock Ellis, and G. B. Shaw were already
showing. The mixture of radicalism and anarchism that informs Joyce's own
Nietzschean 'gospel of churchless freedom' seems to me also quite particular and
unique. Joyce, as an avid Ibsenite with an anarchistic sense, would have been
understandably reluctant to rely on such readings as that ofYeats's.19 Joyce's emerging
interest in anarchism and radicalism (as Ellmann informs us, by 1904 he had
complemented his Nietzschean insurgency with works of Bakunin, Proudhon, and
17 A card to George Roberts of July 1904 asks for a pound and is signed 'James Overman.' In Letters of
James Joyce, ed. by Stuart Gilbert (London: Faber, 1957), p. 56.
18 Allen, Hoffman, and Ulrich, pp. 72-73.
19 It does not seem particularly likely that the idealistic and visionary elements of Yeats's Nietzscheanism
would have appealed to the young Joyce, whose essay 'Drama and Life' (1900), 'The Day of
Rabblement' (1901), 'James Clarence Mangan' (1902), all express disillusionment and discontent
with such models.
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Benjamin R. Tucker), and, in tum, his unique vision of art, seem to indicate a different
/
kind of reading, and one closer to the kind of Nietzscheanism we encounter in this
rather queer little periodical.
As Ulrich, Hoffman, and Allen say in their study of the little periodicals,
Nietzsche's early legacy may be traced primarily in the literary experiments of The
Savoy and The Eagle and the Serpent?O If the Savoy is important for introducing
Nietzsche to an English public (Havelock Ellis's study of Nietzsche was published in
instalments there in 1896 - and subsequently collected in his volume Affirmations in
1898), The Eagle and the Serpent is important for being the first English periodical to
associate Nietzsche's affirmative pessimism with philosophical egoism, as well for
beginning to make Nietzsche's texts accessible to a larger audience. Chapter One of
this thesis offered an extensive discussion of the early correspondences between
radicalism, egoism, and Nietzsche. Two years before Joyce began the composition of
Stephen Hero, The Eagle and the Serpent would announce its plans to 'save the world'
employing an interesting mantra of 'Wit, Wisdom and Wickedness'<' As shown
already, in this periodical there are suggestive connections between anarchism,
socialism, Nietzscheanism and aesthetics. Broadly speaking, the periodical liked to
fantasize a project of cultural revival inspired by a Nietzschean social ethic of self-
creation and self-knowledge. Several files of so-called 'radical literature' were prepared
as part of its education project. It proposed the study of Thus Spoke Zarathustra
alongside Benjamin Tucker's Instead of a Book: a Fragmentary Exposition of
Philosophical Anarchism, as well as books of renowned anarchists such as Proudhon
and Bakunin, advancing an understanding of Nietzsche alongside principles of radical
20 Allen, Hoffman, and Ulrich, p. 73.
21 It has to be noted here that in the Edwardian context the terms egotism and egoism tend to be used
interchangeably, though the first with increasingly uncomplimentary connotations, implying an
unhealthy type of egoism, an aesthetic withdrawal into one's self, and moral degeneration.
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individualism and anarchism. Further, the projects of translating Nietzsche's oeuvre
(Thus Spoke Zarathustra appeared in serial form there), of French modem authors (a
project continually promised but never materialized), and its 'Egoist Circulating
Library', all convey the central role literature played in the programme. The distinctive
tone of this kind of Nietzscheanism was even reflected in its choice of title. Alluding to
Zarathustra's two favourite animals, the eagle and the snake, it indicated its allegiance
to a kind of subtle, surreptitious form of radicalism, in which knowledge, danger and
concealment coexist with health and life.22 The editor referred to the periodical as a
'rostrum' for 'all radicals (atheists and egoists alike) who aim at a consistent philosophy
of life [... ] promoting the gospel as transvalued by Nietzsche's religion of Joy.' As its
subtitle announced The Eagle and the Serpent was 'A Journal for Free Spirits and for
Spirits Struggling to be Free', a further allusion to Nietzschean transvaluation and self-
overcoming. Such connections are evident in some of the editorial notes where
Nietzsche is 'prescribed', so to speak, as one of the two remedies for modem culture.
'Nietzsche and Music', John B. Barnhill announces are the only two consolations for
those seeking to 'escape the mad house', those free spirits in need of convalescence.r'
Imbued with a millennial outlook, the periodical aspired towards a gradual change in
prevailing norms and valuations. Its Nietzschean mission to 'save the world' out of the
spirit of music suggests an affirmative stance, a certain heroic positivism which should
aim at helping one get in touch with what best enhances individual expression and
autonomous self-creation. Imploring individuals to live life aesthetically, as Nietzsche
does in The Birth of Tragedy, it praised 'the art of life and the life of art - we stand for
that freedom which is the life of art and can alone teach us the art of living', proposing
22 For a discussion on the snake imagery in Nietzsche see Nicholas Pappas, 'The Eternal Serpentine', in
The Bestiary in Nietzsche, ed. Christa Davis Acampora and Ralph R. Acampora (Maryland:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 71-82.
23 Me, Call, 'Reformer's Consolations', The Eagle and the Serpent, 1 September 1900, pp. 9-10 (p. 9).
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the mutual interdependence of life and art as 'the only way out of three thousand years
of sorrowful experience' .24
Joyce's Stephen Hero captures some of the subtleties of such a vision as it
becomes crystallized in Stephen's redeeming egoism. It offers a vivid account of the
intellectual development of Stephen Dedalus, an egoist-artist in progress, which breaks
abruptly with Stephen's decision to discontinue his studies at University College
Dublin. In contrast to the introspective narrative of Joyce's completed novel, this
unpublished text is a fragmentary draft based on dialogue and semi-autobiographical
realism. What is striking is the detailed emphasis on Stephen's conversations and his
interaction with his surroundings - mapping Stephen's mind within the intellectual
tapestry of turn-of-the-century Dublin. Although there are no direct references to
Nietzsche, the early text's suggestive allusions to a serpent-like form of 'egoism', and
its references to a 'vivisective' vitalistic aesthetic present interesting parallels between
Joyce's artist-hero and contemporary Nietzschean discourses of genius and creativity.
The text seems to simultaneously respond to and vividly record the intellectual-cultural
dynamics of fin-de-steele Dublin, presenting us with a character who contemplates his
own formation as a cosmopolitan intellectual-cum-aesthete in the increasingly
alienating environment of his native country. Stephen, 'this fantastic idealist' ,25 seeks
redemption in his imagining of himself as a wicked renegade aesthete-egoist, 'that
ineradicable egoism which he afterwards to call redeemer' in alliance with a 'some
movement already proceeding out in Europe. ,26 In contrast to the taciturnity and
aloofness conveyed by another of Joyce's famous egoists, James Duffy of 'A Painful
Case', here we are presented with a character who is as solitary as he is militant. In
Stephen Hero, as it will be shown, Stephen's egoistic discourse sanctions to a great
24 McCall, 'A Creed and Aim', The Eagle and the Serpent, 1 September 1898, p. 50.
2S Stephen Hero, p. 36.
26 Ibid., p. 35.
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extent his campaign to escape Ireland and the moral obligations which nation, religion
and family place upon him, while inciting him to a journey of self-discovery and self-
growth.
Although we cannot know for sure whether Joyce had any direct contact with the
radical spirit of The Eagle and the Serpent (at least not until 1918 when bound files for
it would be available for sale from the Egoist Press) - his artistic counterpart, the early
Stephen Dedalus, would have been a keen reader. In this early manuscript, the 'young
eccentric'< does not miss the chance to reiterate again and again the blessings and
curses of a serpentine gospel of 'unapologetic egoism'f" before an inartistic and passive
audience of fellow university students. There are several references to egoism
(especially in the discussions of Stephen with Madden and Cranly), all of which are
omitted in A Portrait. In this version, Stephen's persona advocates his belief in 'an
egoism which proceeded bravely before men,;29 'that ineradicable egoism which he was
afterwards to call redeemer'r'" and an 'egoism' to take him off 'the path of
. bili ,31remuneratIve respecta 1 ity.
The context of these allusions is critical as it paints a portrait of Stephen as a
young artist very different from the one in A Portrait. Stephen's egoistic idiom, his
extrovert, self-assured persona in Stephen Hero markedly clashes with the later Stephen.
The early Stephen's 'ineradicable' and 'unapologetic' egoism expresses positivism and
strength - colouring an outlook at once godless and confident. In this early text Stephen
is introduced as a youthful forward-looking revolutionary, a 'renegade from the
Nationalist ranks [...] [who] professed cosmopolitism.r''' He shares a reputation for
27 Ibid., p. 39.
28 Ibid., p. 151.
29 Ibid., p. 162.
30 Ibid., p. 34.
31 Ibid., p. 49..
32 Ibid., p. 50.
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upholding 'dreadful ideas, that [he] read[s] dreadful books [...]. That [he] [doesn't]
believe in God', as Emma tells US.33 Indeed, throughout the narrative, we see Stephen's
parading his guilt-free godlessness, an egoist-artist who despite his wish to be alone, is
often seen debating his views on art and life - and getting into trouble for it. A character
'fond of saying that the absolute is dead' ,34 he is prepared to bear his cross of unbelief
with a resolute and steady heart, acknowledging that at heart he is 'a product of
Catholicism': 'I was sold to Rome before my birth. Now I have broken my slavery but I
cannot in a moment destroy every feeling in my nature. That takes time. ,35 This
knowledge, that he too is a product of this past, instead of confounding him or making
him tame, bolsters his sense of selfhood and his wish to create himself in his own
image:
[...] can we not root this pest out of our minds and out of our society that
men may be able to walk through the streets without meeting some old stale
belief or hypocrisy at every street corner? I, at least, will try. I will not
accept anything from them. I will not take service under them. I will not
submit to them, either outwardly or inwardly. A Church is not a fixture like
Gibraltar: no more is an institution. Subtract its human members from it and
its solidity becomes less evident. I, at least, will subtract myself [...].36
While this is how Stephen is portrayed in this early draft, in the later novel we watch
Stephen nervously oscillating between a belief in God and a belief in art (which is
offered as a substitute). The aesthetic experience of Stephen there, is, in my view,
significantly altered: his ascetic-based vision markedly clashes with the healthy dualism
proposed in the early text, one trying to balance successfully the demands of life with
those of art. Significantly, Stephen"s aesthetic vision in A Portrait bears the interiorized
torment of his sense of sin and guilt; it is chaste and withdrawn. There are no such
contradictions to be found in Stephen Hero. The early Stephen is presented as a kind of
33 Ibid., p. 103.
34 Ibid., 206.
35 Ibid., p. 73.
36 Ibid., p. 233.
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artist-genius in progress, for whom this 'silent self-occupied honest egoism,37 offers an
//
alternative to the intellectual parochialism of Dublin and prevailing models of art. In
particular, Stephen's 'honest egoism'r" is evoked simultaneously as resistance to and
potentially escape from Irish tradition, where art is turned either into a dogmatizing
mouthpiece, 'an ally of collectivist politicians'v" or a lifeless, 'cynical' romanticism
which withdraws from the social.4o Stephen's discussions with Cranly and Madden
express his overall mistrust regarding indigenous cultural forms (Irish Nationalism that
is) and mark his attempt to find an alternative suggestion. In particular, Stephen's essay
'Art and Life', which '[e]xcept for the eloquent and arrogant peroration [...] was a
careful exposition of a carefully meditated theory of esthetic' ,41 marks the beginning of
his career as a renegade-artist, as a misunderstood radical. More specifically, Stephen's
essay, which as Stephen proudly confesses 'is the first of my explosives'Y can be read
as a pointed retort against Irish Revivalism and cultural insularity. The scene between
him and Madden, where the latter offers to read Stephen some of Hughes's verse is also
quite revealing and indicates further the youth's sense of resentment and frustration:
Madden took from his inside pocket a sheet of foolscap folded in four on
which was inscribed a piece of verse, consisting of four stanzas of eight
lines each, entitled 'My Ideal.' Each stanza began with the words 'Art thou
real?' [...]. After this mournful idealism the final stanza offered a certain
consolatory, hypothetical alternative to the poet in his woes: it began
somewhat hopefully:
Are you real, my Ideal?
Wilt thou ever come to me
In the soft and gentle twilight
With your baby on your knee?
37 Ibid., p. 33.
38 Ibid., p. 146.
39 Ibid., p. 147.
40 Ibid., p. 174.
41 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
42 Ibid., p. 81.
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The [combined] effect of this apparition on Stephen was a long staining
blush of anger. The tawdry lines, the futile change of number, the ludicrous
waddling approach of Hughes's 'Ideal' weighed down by an inexplicable
infant combined to cause him a sharp agony in the sensitive region. Again
he handed back the verse without saying a word of praise or of blame but he
decided that attendance in Mr Hughes's class was no longer possible for
him [....].43
For Stephen, this kind of mournful idealism is regarded as a poor substitute for real
living experience and is mocked for its idealistic and chaste tone. As he confesses, 'art'
should not be 'an escape from life': 'That is wrong: this is the great mistake everyone
makes [...]. Art, on the contrary, is the very central expression of life.,44 Stephen's
conviction that art should not be offered as an escape and that '[a]n artist is not a fellow
who dangles a mechanical heaven before the public. The priest does that. The artist
affirms out of the fullness of his own life, he createsv" - as well as his objection to
Madden's calling his ideas 'mystical' ('But there's nothing mystical in it I tell you. I
have written it carefully', he tells him), all are important for the anti-idealistic, anti-
romantic, and anti-moralizing tone they evoke. It is not surprising then that we see
Stephen's theories derided and remorselessly attacked by an inquisitor-like audience at
the meeting of the College Literary Society:
The essay was pronounced a jingle of meaningless words, a clever
presentation of vicious principles in the guise of artistic theories, a
reproduction of the decadent literary opinions of exhausted European
capitals. The essayist was supposed to intend parts of his essay as efforts at
practical joking [...J. Ancient art loved to uphold the beautiful. and the
sublime: modem art might select other themes: but those who still preserved
their minds uncontaminated by atheistic poisons would know which to
choose. The climax of aggressiveness was reached when Hughes stood up.
He declared in ringing Northern accents that the moral welfare of the Irish
people was menaced by such theories. They wanted no foreign filth. Mr
Daedalus might read what authors he liked, of course, but the Irish people
had their own glorious literature where they could always find fresh ideals
to spur them on to new patriotic endeavours."
43 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
44 Ibid, p. 86.
45 Ibid., p. 86.
46 Ibid., p. 102-103.
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Stephen's 'art and life' credo, its fervent anti-idealism on the one hand, and its
j
confidence in life experience on the other, seem to me not far from the youthful
aesthetic egoism encountered in The Eagle and the Serpent. Not only this but also the
allusions to serpents, animalism, and sanity with regard to Stephen's egoism throughout
the text seem to support this impression as well. In Chapter XVII for instance, the
passage where Stephen recalls his classmates' response to his views on classical
tradition reveals not only Stephen's increasing isolation from the college community but
also gives an interesting description of his character as a 'serpent':
A great contempt devoured him for the critics who considered 'Greek' and
'classical' interchangeable terms and so full was he of intemperate anger
that [all week Saturday] when Father Butt gave 'Othello' as the subject for
the essay of the week Stephen lodged on the following on day a profuse,
downright protest against the 'masterpiece'. The young men in the class
laughed and Stephen, as he looked contemptuously at the laughing faces,
thought of a self-submersive reptile."
Perhaps this can be read as a kind of reference for the distinct type of egoistic
temperament that Stephen's character evokes, one that like The Eagle and the Serpent's
is cunning, wicked, and self-assured. While in A Portrait the text's allusions to serpents
evoke Stephen's sense of guilt and desolation - Stephen's moral 'battle' with the sting
of Catholicism, as John Paul Riquelme has illustrated'" - here the serpentine metaphor
can be read differently. Whether the epithet is here used to describe Stephen himself or
the men in the class the allusion to Lynch and Stephen as 'shrewd animals' later on in
the text seems to confirm its connection to Stephen:
Stephen had lent his essay as he had promised to do and this loan had led to
a certain Intimacy. Lynch had almost taken the final vows in the order of the
discontented but Stephen's unapologetic egoism, his remorseless lack of
sentiment for himself no less than for others, gave him pause. His taste for
fine arts, which had always seemed to him a taste which should be carefully
hidden away, now began to encourage itself timidly. He was very much
47 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
48 John Paul Riquelme, 'Desire, Freedom, and Confessional Culture in A Portrait a/the Artist as a Young
Man'; in Cambridge Companion to James Joyce, ed. Richard Brown (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2008), pp. 34-54 (pp. 44-45).
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relieved to find Stephen's aestheticism united with a sane and
conscienceless acceptance of the animal needs of young men, for, being a
shrewd animal himself [...].49
In this particular passage the animal imagery is used with reference to Lynch and
Stephen's 'respective taste for fine arts', an aesthetic predisposition 'carefully hidden
away' and one related to the 'remorseless', 'animal', 'sane', and 'unburdened' ethic of
Stephen. This kind of surreptitious, defiantly serpentine logic invoked in these passages
is central, I believe, to the conception of egoism Stephen adopts. Egoism, in this
context, will serve as a kind of cunning device helping him to slither through the
paralytic and deadening intellectual environment that constrains him. The frequent
references to health, sanity (and equally madness and decadence) throughout the text
serve to describe two distinct states: the 'moral state' (society) and the aesthetic state
(individuality), which Stephen conceives as being antagonistic and irreconcilable.
The description of Stephen as a kind of aesthetic madman may be taken to suggest
further correspondences between Stephen's ego-styled aesthetic and then-current
debates about artistic genius and Nietzsche's individualism. He is said to be one for
whom 'the representations of authority cherished the hope [... ] that they would one day
have the pleasure of receiving him officially into some hospital or asylum' ,50 an
aesthete formed (or deformed) in the manner of the 'mad fellows he is reported to
read"." As seen already, Nietzsche's individualism and perspectivism, his reliance on
experience and life as material for proper for philosophy, while unsanitary for some,
would prove nothing less than a healthy alternative to conventional art and culture for
others. One is not at all surprised to see the studies of Shaw, Ellis, Brandes and
Lichtenberger's recommended for study in The Eagle and the Serpent's 'Egoist
Library', nor is it difficult to imagine how Stephen, an ardent student of egoism himself,
49 Stephen Hero, p. 151.
50 Ibid., p. 179.
51 Ibid., p. 39.
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would have found them particularly enlightening. 52 It is important here to note that in
spite of Stephen's wish to 'subtract' himself from organized and institutionalised
society" and his contempt for the 'sense' and 'sanity' of conventional life, his is not
merely a passively self-absorbed form of egoism. While it indicates Stephen's gradual
disengagement from involvement in the social and cultural life of Dublin, this is neither
the result of indifference nor aloofness. As he tells us, if he remains 'silent' this is
because: 'No-one would listen to his theories: no-one was interested in art [...]. The
young men in the college regarded art as a continental vice [...] They didn't want that
kind of thing in their country.v" And when someone finally does listen, it never ends as
Stephen would have hoped. Convinced that 'the tomahawk, as an effective instrument
of warfare, had become obsolete' ,55 Stephen, throughout the course of the narrative
seeks more 'noble means'j" to express his apostasy. For him, a reputed 'eccentric=" and
a 'notable-extraordinary' ,58 the only appropriate attitude seems to be that of:
a silent self-occupied, contemptuous manner [...]. He acknowledged to
himself in honest egoism that he could not take to heart the distress of a
nation, the soul of which was antipathetic to his own, so bitterly as the
indignity of a bad line of verse: but at the same time he was nothing in the
world so little as an amateur artist. He wished to express his nature freely
and fully for the benefit of a society which he would enrich and also for his
own benefit, seeing that it was part of his life to do so. It was not part of his
life to undertake an extensive alteration of society but he felt the need to
express himself such an urgent need, such a real need, that he was
52 G. B. Shaw's understanding of the concept of the Superman as a regenerative-therapeutic force in The
Sanity of Art (1895); Havelock Ellis's affirmation of Nietzsche's model as 'pensee literature', a
philosophy that finds all its material in experience, dealing 'with art, religion and morals and the
relation of all these to life' (Excerpt from Affirmations in The Eagle and the Serpent, 1 December
1898, p. 76); and Henri Lichtenberger's dealing with Nietzsche's amor fati wisdom as strictly
empirical and individualistic (The Philosophy of Nietzsche 1893 ;trans., 1910), all illustrate the
positive shift in Nietzsche's reception.
53 Ibid., p. 233.
54 Ibid., p. 34.
55 Ibid., p. 146.
56 'The life of an errant seemed to him far less ignoble than the life of one who had accepted the tyranny
of the mediocre because the cost of being exceptional was too high.' Ibid., p. 179.
57 Ibid., p. 39. The whole sentence reads: 'Many risked the peril of rebuff to engage the young eccentric in
talk but Stephen preserved a disdainful silence', ibid., p. 39.
58 Ibid., p. 39.
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determined no conventions of a society, however plausibI; mingling pity
with its tyranny, should be allowed to stand in his way [...].5
J
Put together, those aspects of Stephen's egoism considered so far begin to
assemble a sketchy but illuminating picture of the kind of egoism proposed in the early
text. It may be argued that in such a strait-jacketed environment, Stephen's kind of
egoism functions as a 'silent' presence. Unwilling 'to sacrifice reality to an
abstraction' ,60 nor individuality for the tyranny of the many, Stephen's egoism is 'as
much in love with laughter as with combat' ,61 and considers self-exploration as the first
step towards any form of liberation, be it individual or collective. As we read further on,
Stephen increasingly comes to realise that although he:
at least nominally so far, was still in amity with the order of society into
which he had been born, he would not be able to continue so [... ]. He, at
least would live his own life according to what he recognised as the voice of
a new humanity, active, unafraid, and unashamed.P
These qualities of Stephen's egoism discussed so far seem to me to be close to the
vision of egoism prophesied in the pages of The Eagle and the Serpent. In the passages I
have discussed the notion of radical egoism is fruitfully tied to a discourse of heroic
genius and self-creation which was a staple of the periodical throughout, and illustrates
the positivism and sense of renewal that underpins its philosophy of life and art.
Romantically anti-idealistic, this youthful egoist seeks the means to defend himself
against ideals which he does not recognise as his own, choosing instead the life of the
errant, the exile, the outcast, as the only path for self-creation. As seen already, egoism
in The Eagle and the Serpent connoted a constant conflict between individual and social
morality. Stephen's proud contempt of others, his warning against all saintly forms of
59 Ibid., pp. 146-147.
60 Ibid., p. 147.
61 Ibid., p. 74.
62 Ibid., p. 194.
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art and empty causes echo, in a way, the egoistic maxims adopted there. In the 'Egoist
Sayings for Saving the World' one is told that:
THE VIRTUE CONSISTS IN THE THIRST OF DANGER AND
COURAGE FOR THE FORBIDDEN.
HE WHO TELLS THE TRUTH IS TURNED OUT OF NINE CITIES.
THE WORLD NEEDS A NEW RELIGION: CONTEMPT FOR THE
PUBLIC OPINION.63
All these sayings seem to accurately describe the motif of ostracism, self-exile and
apostasy that runs through Joyce's early text. What is more, Stephen's radicalism is
presented as an implicit saviour, in a way; a quiet but active agent against the spirit of
paralysis, 'the hemiplegia of the will', as Stephen calls it:
The deadly chill of the atmosphere of the college paralysed Stephen's heart.
[... ]. He seemed to see the vermin begotten in the catacombs in an age of
sickness and cruelty issuing forth upon the plains and mountains of Europe.
[... ] Contempt {of the body} of human nature, weakness, nervous
tremblings, fear of day and joy, distrust of man and life, hemiplegia of the
will, beset the body [... ] every natural impulse towards health and wisdom
and happiness had been corroded by the pest of these vermin."
In an effort to combat this spirit of degeneration, the sickness of tradition and
culture, Stephen uses his egoism with, on the one hand, an 'aestheticism united with the
sane and conscienceless acceptance of the animal needs of young men,65 and, on the
other hand, what he calls a truly modem method of 'vivisection'." 'The modem spirit is
vivisective. Vivisection itself is the most modem process one can conceive [...J. The
modem method examines its territory by the light of day. ,67 The term 'vivisection' in
the context of Stephen's remark may be taken to refer to Nietzsche's psychological
critique of modem consciousness as expounded in his Essay II of On the Genealogy of
Morals. As Nietzsche puts it:
63 'Saving the World: Egoism's Saints and their Sayings', The Eagle and the Serpent: Special Issue on
Socialist Stupidities, [1902(?)], p. 94.
64 Stephen Hero, p. 194.
65 Ibid., p. 151.
66 Ibid., p. 186.
67 Ibid., p. 186.
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We modems have inherited millennia of conscience-vivisection and animal-
torture inflicted on ourselves: we have had most practice in it, are perhaps
artists in the field, in any case it is our raffinement and the indulgence of our
taste. For too long man has viewed his natural inclinations with an 'evil
eye', so that they finally came to be intertwined with 'bad conscience' in
hi 68im.
Nietzsche's genealogical method as practiced in On the Genealogy is often described as
a kind of 'vivisection' of morals. The three treatises in the book are concerned with
exposing the origins of our 'human-all-too-human' moral values. This new genealogical
method would at the time have held particular interest for fellow 'vivisectionists':
aesthetes, and radicals alike. In The Eagle and the Serpent this impression of Nietzsche
as a kind of 'vivisectionist' of modem morals is tied with the kind of philosophy
expounded there. Inspired by the pride and wisdom of Zarathustra's two favorite
animals, its radical philosophy hoped to educate the individual so that he could one day
rise above 'herd morality' (as he termed institutionalized morality and altruistic ethics)
instead of being subdued by them. Using Nietzsche's call for re-evaluation and self-
creation, The Eagle and the Serpent attacked such ideals as altruism, pity, self-
abnegation, and humility, with an ideal based on a re-evaluation of old valuations and
an overcoming of nihilistic modes of thought. In one of its first issues the editor makes
the observation:
We trust that we have sufficiently indicated the type of altruism against
which the proudest animal under the sun and the wisest animal under the
sun wage uncompromising warfare [...J the altruism by which the exploited
are taught to bless (and curse not) the Shylocks who despitefully use them
and to enter an imaginary heaven through the pu(t)rifying process of a living
hell.69 .
Returning to Stephen, who is described in Stephen Hero as this 'free-spoken
individual [... J one who had not forsaken the world, the flesh and the devil,7o we may,
once more, suggest parallel concerns. As all references indicate, this early portrait of
68 Nietzsche, 'Essay II', Section 24, p. 66.
69 'Valedictions and Benedictions', Eagle and the Serpent, 15 April 1898, p. 48.
70 Stephen Hero, p. 73.
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Stephen as egoist is associated with his wish to be redeemed from the various forms of
servitude evident in the intellectual, artistic and social life of Dublin. Invested' with a
Zarathustrian-like mood, his egoism serves simultaneously as an attack against the
'faith and fatherland' rhetoric of both Catholicism and National Revivalism, as well as a
symbolic act of defiance against what he sees as inaesthetic and parochial. Stephen
wishes to express his defiance and contempt against a localised authority of Irish State
and Catholic Church, releasing himself from priestly vows of chastity, servility and
obedience. His egoism is meant to redeem Stephen from the claims to 'altruism' which
for him is nothing but an empty concept; it serves as a prophylactic from an ethic of
altruism which threatens to impose a moral debt, a duty upon him: 'Daedalus, said the
Auditor crisply, you are a good fellow but you have yet to learn the dignity of altruism
and the responsibility of the human individual.t " In Stephen Hero Stephen's egoism
offers a powerful retort to the rhetoric of altruism and opens up the possibility for self-
emancipation. In A Portrait, however, Stephen's 'ascetic-like' attitude to art and life
leads to a different situation. Stephen's religious apostasy leads him to seek redemption,
catharsis in self-renunciation (first in the form of religion and ultimately in art): 'His
soul was made fair and holy once more holy and happy [...] to live in grace a life of
peace and virtue and forbearance with others.,n In Stephen Hero, conversely, Stephen's
discourse indicates a guilt-free, unrepentant conscience. Unafraid of the. sting of
religion, in this version he confidently renounces this 'kind of Christianity which is
called Catholicism' for a cult of the self. While in A Portrait Stephen's religious
apostasy acquires tremendous power and leads him to a kind of ascetic aestheticism' /3
71 Ibid., p. 52.
72 James Joyce, A Portrait of an Artist as the Young Man (New York: Penguin Classics, 2000), p. 157.
73 As Colleen Jaurretche argues, in A Portrait Stephen's creates a 'monastic persona', which 'merges the
aesthetic with the ascetic'. Colleen Jaurretche, The Sensual Philosophy: Joyce and the Aesthetics
of Mysticism (Wisconsin: Wisconsin University Press, 1997), p. 70.
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in Stephen Hero religion is experienced as a burden, as something that 'seemed to him
to stand in his way and forthwith he removed it' .74
Significantly, in the earlier text not only social but also sexual nonconformism is
treated as a path towards emancipation and self-expression. Rather than the sanitized
aestheticism of A Portrait, in this text sexuality signifies a threat only when perceived
within the parameters of social convention, that is, in terms of its operation within
wedlock. Early on we read that: 'On [Stephen's] side chastity, having been found a
great inconvenience, had been quietly abandoned and the youth amused himself in the
company of certain of his fellow-students among whom (as the fame went) wild living
was not unknown.t " Further, in Chapter XIV we see him trying to explain his sex-ethic
to Emma, but without much success:
Do you know, Emma, even from my window I could see your hips moving
inside your waterproof? I saw a young woman walking proudly through the
decayed city. Yes, that's the way you walk: you're proud of being young
and proud of being a woman. Do you know when I caught sight of you from
my window - do you know what I felt? [...] - I felt that I longed to hold you
in my arms - your body. I longed for you to take me in your arms. That's all
[...]. Then I thought I would run after you and say that to you [...]. Just to
live one night together, Emma, and then to say goodbye in the morning and
never to see each other again! She tried to take her arm away from his and
murmured as if she were repeating from memory: --You are mad, Stephen
[...]. Stephen let go her arm and took her hand in his, saying: [...] You say I
am mad because I do not bargain with you or say I love you or swear to you.
But I believe you hear my words and understand me, don't you? [Emma] If
I had known [ifJ it was for this mad talk [...]. You must not speak to me any
]
76more [... . _
Stephen's bold and unconventional declaration of love - his unwillingness to use the
romantic language of passion and- chastity in this scene is quite significant. Stephen's
'mad' talk, as Emma calls it, points to a certain free love ethic linked to his wish to
break away from the decay and hypocrisy around him. As before, he refuses to conform
to any ideal of chastity and ideal passion. His imploring her to 'live one night together',
74 Stephen Hero, p. 147.
7S Ibid., p. 35.
76 Ibid., pp. 197-198.
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the 'unholy' discourse used to declare his love, rather than mere licentiousness, is
consistent with a serpentine-like vision of selfhood and life, his wish to create himself
unconstrained by any conventions opposing his will.
Overall, it appears that the kind of egoism to which Stephen returns time and
again in the text communicates a fresh and uncompromising vision of life and art - one
suggesting interesting correspondences with early radical Nietzscheanism. This is, one
might say, a kind of egoism that conveys the youthful spirit of an age in transition.
Thus, it is not surprising that this early portrait of Stephen here differs so much from the
later versions of A Portrait and Ulysses. In Stephen Hero, Stephen opts for exile
towards what he calls 'art and life' but this is different from the Stephen we meet in the
first chapters of Ulysses, who is, by then, a spectre, a dismembered Dionysus; for whom
exile has now been interiorised, leaving him cynically sober:
Cousin Stephen [... ]. You were awfully holy, weren't you? [... ]. You
prayed to the devil in Serpentine avenue {italics mine} [... ]. I was young.
You bowed to yourself in the mirror, stepping forward to applause earnestly,
striking face. Hurray for the Goddamned idiot! Hray!77
I would suggest, then, a fresh way of approaching Stephen Hero by proposing that
it can be analysed in relation to the intellectual climate at the turn-of-the-century,
specifically the radical spirit of modernity embodied in the philosophy of Nietzsche. As
well as pointing to some direct links between Nietzsche's texts and Stephen Hero, I
have focused on the ways in which a particular strand of the avant-garde responded to
these works in relation to the interrelated subjects of aestheticism and egoism, and have
tried to show that it is fruitful and legitimate to position Stephen Hero in dialogue with
these ideas as much as with Nietzsche's texts themselves. The Eagle and the Serpent
serves as an early example of the ways in which Nietzsche's ideas informed notions of
77 James Joyce, Ulysses (London: Penguin Edition, 2000), pp. 49-50.
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aesthetic and social egoism, and I have argued that it is possible to identify a certain
J
level of congruence between such conceptions and Joyce's engagement with these
subjects in Stephen Hero. The portrait of the artist-egoist in Stephen Hero suggests an
immersion in the' period's intellectual climate: it registers the tone of radical
Nietzscheanism and the affirmative spirit of the age, and it thereby provides some
tentative links between Joyce and contemporary responses to Nietzsche. I believe that
the period's little periodicals can provide a new framework for expanding our
knowledge of Joyce's engagement with the egoistic discourses that were engendered by
Nietzsche's works, and here I have attempted to provide a foundation from which the
correspondences between The Eagle and the Serpent and Joyce's Stephen Hero can be
further illuminated in relation to this topic.
5.3 Stephen's Portrait as an Ascetic Priest: Nietzschean 'Guilt', 'Bad Conscience',
and the Solution of Art in A Portrait
As seen in Part I of this Chapter Stephen Hero raises important questions about the
belief in absolute truths and values. Stephen's expression of unbelief and godlessness
communicates an enthusiasm for a new ideal of selfhood, and a youthful confidence in
his own powers to fulfil it. As argued already, Stephen's egoism - which echoes that of
The Eagle and the Serpent (e.g.: 'God is the centre and soul of most altruistic codes.
Man is the centre and soul of all egoistic codes'j ", shares the aphoristic heroic rhetoric
78 'Distinctions and Definitions', The Eagle and the Serpent, 15 February 1898, pp. 11-12 (p. 11).
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of its brand of radical Nietzscheanism. On the whole, Stephen's wish to rid himself of
J
attachments, religious, spiritual, and moral has a very Nietzschean feel. His art and life
credo in the early text seems prompted by the desire to dispel the shadow of the 'dead
God' (to use Nietzsche's term here), a potent wish to overcome nihilism and decadence,
'the age of sickness and cruelty issuing forth', as Stephen calls it. This optimistic view
could be understood, in my view, as evocative of the temper of the age, one eager to
recuperate from the 'bad conscience' of millennia, hopeful of affirming itself anew.
Like Nietzsche's assertion of 'the death of God', Stephen's claim that 'the
absolute is dead' however is not a simple matter, and is one that we see Joyce
expanding, reflecting on and problematising later in A Portrait. One might argue that A
Portrait offers a vivid psychological portrait of Stephen in the wake of his loss of faith
- dealing with the consequences and implications of this former assertion. In the course
of the novel Stephen's aesthetic and ethical emancipation is made increasingly difficult
- becoming his greatest burden, stigmatizing him emotionally, spiritually and
intellectually. The end of A Portrait, where we have Stephen's defiant cry of non
serviam, 'I will not serve that in which I no longer believe'v" has been often interpreted
as this character's overcoming of God through the medium of creative selfhood, an
aesthetic apotheoses, in a way - but in my reading the novel presents this as a more
complex and ambiguous process than it was in Stephen Hero.
Closely connected with this theme in the novel is the gendering of art and its
intimate association with the image of the feminine. Sexuality, a key aspect in the
psychological anatomy Joyce practices here (especially in the episodes dealing with
Stephen's change of faith, from a religious to an aesthetic one) is, one might say,
conspicuous by its absence. Interestingly, it is the figure of the feminine at the juncture
79 James Joyce, A Portrait a/the Artist as a Young Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 208.
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of Stephen's spiritual crisis, a potent symbol that seems likely to offer a plausible
liberation when transmuted into aesthetic vision. The psychological profile of the
ascetic-turned-artist in these final chapters helps establish implicit connections between
the different kinds of emotion and the different kinds of desire Stephen experiences. His
nervous ambivalence between a sensual and a chaste life, as well as his thoughts of guilt
and anxiety, prompt images of religious and ultimately aesthetic redemption. In this
context, Stephen's spiritual journey through an uncompromising asceticism to art is
presented, in a way, as liberation from former crutches. Nevertheless, whereas this
liberation is announced as a kind of leap from faith, suggestive in a way of Stephen's
growing recovery, from his own 'bad conscience', so to speak - this, I want to argue is
hardly the case. Notwithstanding the ostensible sincerity of Stephen's declamation,
Stephen, in my opinion has been (wilfully) duped. While the final scene seemingly
indicates an overcoming of religious, moralistic, ethical boundaries, symbolizing rebirth
and the beginning of selfhood, his vision of a sea girl suggests another kind of religious
fervour, aesthetic this time. The ultimate aestheticism he embraces retains a great deal
of the structure and psychology of his earlier position - turning Stephen into a servant
of another God: this time romantic art. More particularly, it is my intention to show that
the theme of asceticism and religious piety on the one hand, and that of aesthetic
expression on the other, share common characteristics despite their ostensible disparity.
While the religious realm and the realm of art are presented as being opposing, it is my
view that they are prompted, at least in some respects, by similar psychological motives.
Drawing upon Nietzsche's views about art and truth, and in particular his discussion of
the aesthetic as a problem of 'physiology', this part of the chapter discusses Stephen's
aesthetic emancipation - whether his art offers a fully satisfactory alternative to faith.
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5.3.1 Nietzsche and Aesthetic Idealism: 'The Death of God' and the Problem of Art
Nietzsche's mature philosophical writings propose a systematic critique of any so-called
truths and ideals. They may be understood as a warning against the dangers lurking in
the plane of metaphysics and religious foundations modern man inherits. In this respect,
the event of God's death represents 'the passing away of religion, philosophy, and
morality', namely '[t]he Good, the Beautiful, and the true for Plato and Greek
philosophy [...] the Way, the Light, and the Truth for two thousand years of Western
thought' as we have come to know it.80 While on the whole the event has been positive,
it is not without complications. As Nietzsche maintains although the belief in God as
such has decreased (namely the belief in a metaphysical being functioning as the main
source of truth, permanence and solace), the shadows of the deceased God (including
belief in metaphysical realities) are still lingering, for they still serve pervasive
psychological needs. David B. Allison provides a summary of the death of God and its
effects as understood by Nietzsche:
The first effect of God's death is to remove the universal foundations of
morality [... ] there is no longer an absolute or transcendent ground for
ethics and morality; the second effect is that we will continue to live under
the shadow of the dead God, we will continue to display his raiments and
trappings for some time. There will begin an age of metaphysical nostalgia
[...] a period that shall be carried along by the mere inertia and habit of
theology and metaphysics; a third consequence is that we enter an age of
ambiguity and transition, characterized precisely by the nostalgia of the
earlier age [...]. Like young Oedipus, we have each killed our father and we
are condemned to leave our father's home [ ][;] the forth consequence of
God's death is the recognition of man 's birth [ ] without God's support, we
become divine. We now become the responsible bearers of world and
history. Our existence will embrace this whole, and no other, world; it will
invoke no sanction or salvation outside the world. For Nietzsche we shall
embrace the thought of 'eternal return' and this will be our newly found
significance, a significance that will transfigure reality, humanity, and
history as we know them. Indeed, this shall be our 'gay science' .81
80 David B. Allison, Reading the New Nietzsche (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp. 91-92.
81 Ibid., pp. 96-99.
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In this passage above, Allison eloquently summarizes Nietzsche's understanding of how
things may look after the end of God, namely, the end of metaphysical truth. According
to him there will be a good deal of confusion, nostalgia and insecurity which will mark
the transition from the past to the future. Nietzsche presages a transitional period in the
course of which the need for 'truth' continues unabated as the need for solace and
stability is still very much present. Dependence on a higher authority for direction,
safety and purpose is one of the symptoms of resistance to growth and self-
actualization, and is a natural corollary of the process of individuation and the new type
of humanity as envisioned by Nietzsche. The metaphysical nostalgia described above
can take many forms (artistic, philosophical, and scientific), all of which however are
merely variations of one theme: the quest for an absolute, uniform and stable truth -
which in reality is a by-product of a bad moral/intellectual conscience. This period may
be extended as long as the individual continues to operate within the principles of the
former models of faith, until humanity finds a way to move past such dualistic,
transcendental propositions, the residues, as it were, of old Christian moralism. As
mentioned already, Nietzsche's whole philosophical project can be seen as an attempt to
challenge and to dispense with all such former philosophical, theological and aesthetic
ideals. Particularly in connection to art, his Dionysian formula may be taken to propose
the beginnings of a remedy against aesthetic ideals that are based on metaphysics, a
higher truth, a reality beyond - all of which are subordinate to the ascetic ideal, as
Nietzsche suggests in On the Genealogy. As Lawrence J. Hatab notes in 'How Does the
Ascetic Ideal Function in Nietzsche's Genealogy', 82 rather than attempting to reform
lived experience by way of moral or aesthetic transcendence, Nietzsche's aesthetic
82 Lawrence J. Hatab, 'How Does the Ascetic Ideal Function in Nietzsche's Genealogy', The Journal of
Nietzsche Studies, 35/36 (2008), 106-123 (p. 108).
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naturalism restores legitimacy to the world of lived experience.f Contrary to the type of
J
art which becomes 'an advocate of the beyond', 'the great slanderer of life,84 (an art
which rests on the same base as the ascetic ideal), he speaks of an art that has 'a good
conscience on its side', 85is of this world and its goal is to arouse the will, placing it on
the side of life:
Beginning with The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche seems to shape his
naturalism in part by way of an intimate connection among nature, art, and
tragedy, with the latter presenting an art world that best 'imitates' the
surging creative/destructive dynamic of nature and that least alienates
humanity from finite nature.t"
More specifically, Nietzsche's notion of art is closely related to his critique of 'truth' in
Essay III of On the Genealogy as well as his critique of the ascetic ideal. His aesthetic
offers 'a nature-attuned alternative to the counter-natural nihilism of the ascetic truth
ideal' ,87 by acknowledging the absence of any secure foundation and truth and by
exhibiting a commitment to an empirically based truth. This is opposed to the idealistic
'ascetic' type of art which seeks refuge in some secured higher meaning. As discussed
in the previous chapter the classic example of aesthetic asceticism for Nietzsche can be
sought in Wagner. In the On the Genealogy Nietzsche refers to him as:
An oracle, a priest, in fact, more than a priest, a sort of mouthpiece of the 'in
itself of things, a telephone of the beyond [ein Telephon de Jenseits], from
now on this ventriloquist of God - he talked metaphrsics: hardly surprising
that one day he ended up talking ascetic ideals, is it?8
Taking his cue from Schopenhauer, Wagner translated metaphysics into a 'chaste'
aestheticism, one 'never tired of singing the praises of this escape from the "will" as the
great advantage and use of the aesthetic condition.,89 For Nietzsche such a definition of
83 Ibid., p. lOS.
84 On the Genealogy, p. 114.
85 Ibid., p. 114.
86 Hatab, p. 117.
87 Ibid., p. lIS.
88 On the Genealogy, p. 73.
89 Ibid., p. 75.
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beauty, one which seeks to disassociate itself from lived reality and nature and
respectively pays homage to ascetic ideals is suggestive of an art which serves as a
refuge, which wants to free itself from 'torture', to provide an escape of the reality of
the Will, namely life.90 In fact, for Nietzsche this type of art is essentially the aesthetic
equivalent to the ascetic ideal.
Not only is Nietzsche refuting the 'chaste' form of art as proposed by Wagner, but
is also objecting to Schopenhauer's notion of beauty as will-lessness, and in particular
the latter's view that proper aesthetic appreciation of nature demands disinterestedness,
namely, the absence of passion. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche tells us in Essay III of On the
Genealogy, understands the aesthetic as a result of the subduing of sex drives. For
Nietzsche however, the relation of sensuality to art is more complex and is intricately
related to his ideal of art as will-to-power." In contrast to the 'chaste', disinterested
contemplation proposed by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche suggests that the aesthetic form is,
in reality, desire disguised, even from itself. According to him, not only sensuality is not
removed by the approach of the aesthetic state, as Schopenhauer believed, but the
aesthetic state is in fact underscored by desire, a desire however sublimated and
sanctified.92 As Matthew Rampley notes, the Schopenhauerian model of aesthetic
90 It is important to remember that the ascetic ideal may be equally of positive or negative value;
depending on the kind of use it is put. As Nietzsche tells us : '[A] certain asceticism, a hard and
hearty renunciation with a good will, belongs among the most favourable conditions for the
highest spirituality', ('Essay Ill', Section 9, p. SI); '[t]he ascetic ideal points the way to so many
bridges to independence that no philosopher can refrain from inwardly rejoining and clapping
hands on hearing the story of all those who, one fine day, decided to say "no" to the curtailment of
their liberty, and go off into the desert', (Essay III, Section 7, p. 77). As Nietzsche argues further,
ascetic values such as poverty, humility, and chastity are to a certain extent to be welcomed as
they are 'the most proper and natural prerequisites' for optimum existence and productivity, p. 7S.
91 As Matthew Rampley notes, Nietzsche's philosophy of art is expressed through a critique of Kant's and
Schopenhauer's notion that aesthetic experience should be disinterested. Matthew Rampley, 'The
Physiology as Art: Nietzsche on Form', British Journal of Aesthetics, 33 (1993),271 -2S2 (p. 273).
92 Nietzsche, 'Essay III', Section S, pp. SO-SI. The passage is meant as an introduction to Nietzsche's
theory of the 'physiology of aesthetics', as he calls it: 'Let us now apply this interpretation to what
we are saying about Schopenhauer: the sight of beauty clearly worked by stimulating the main
strength in his nature (the nature to contemplate and penetrate deeply); so that this then exploded
and suddenly took control of his consciousness. But this certainly does not exclude the possibility
that that remarkable sweetness and fullness characteristic of the aesthetic condition might well
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experience as disinterested contemplation, an aesthetic that Nietzsche equates with the
Christian ethic of self-sacrifice and self-chastisement, is ultimately self-defeating." This
is because for Nietzsche the aesthetic is invested with a particular function or use value
which enmeshes it within the system of means and ends, in short, the economy of
desire." Nietzsche opposes Schopenhauer to Stendhal, for whom 'le desinteressement,
is rejected and eliminated' ,95 and concludes by saying that aesthetic idealism (a form of
aesthetic asceticism in a way) as theorized by Schopenhauer, and as practiced by
Wagner, conceals within it ample traces of an aesthetic of the body and its will. He tells
us: 'Idealism [oo.] that sweetness and fullness characteristic of the aesthetic condition'
springs directly from the ingredient of sensuality." And he adds: 'When our
aestheticians tirelessly rehearse, in support of Kant's view, that the spell of beauty
enables us to view even nude female statues "disinterestedly" we may be allowed to
laugh a little at their expense.i'" This suggestion will lead to the point made later in the
essay that 'all art is applied physiology', an idea which binds the notion of art, artistic
creativity and aesthetic experience to desire and willing."
5.3.2 A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Ascetic
He stands and harks: what does he hear?
What sound is ringing in his ear?
What struck him down? What mortal fear?
Who once wore chains, will always think
That he is followed by their clink.
descend from the ingredient 'sensuality' Gust as that 'idealism' characteristic of nubile girls
descends from the same forces) - that in this way, sensuality is not suspended as soon as we enter
the aesthetic condition, as Schopenhauer believed, but is only transfigured and no longer enters the
consciousness as a sexual stimulus', ibid., pp. 80-81.
93 Rampley, p. 274.
94 Ibid., p. 274.
9S Nietzsche, 'Essay III', Section 6, p. 74.
96 Ibid., p. 85.
97 'Essay Ill', Section 6, p. 75.
98 Rampley, p. 275.
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'The Unfree Man', Friedrich Nietzsche"
One aspect of individualism, the prioritising of personal agency over the burden of
moral and social conscience, informs to a large extent the motif of freedom and self-
creation in A Portrait. From a first reading, it is clear that there are significant
variations, both stylistic and thematic, allowing one to say that the Stephen of A Portrait
is a much more complex, divided and potentially conflicted character than his youthful
counterpart. On the whole, A Portrait as it appeared in The Egoist may be seen as a
portrait of Stephen's disillusionment, providing one with a thorough re-evaluation of
Stephen's youthful doctrine of egoism and godlessness. Stephen's resolute claim of
renouncing religion for the cult of the self in Stephen Hero, his view of Catholicism as a
burden, proves to be an issue far more complex that formerly thought, and one that the
published text returns to and develops at length.
As seen already, in The Gay Science Nietzsche warns us: 'God is dead; but given
the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow
will be shown. - And we - we still have to vanquish his shadow, too.')OOStephen's
'new religion of unbelief reminds us of what Nietzsche says in this passage, for
instance when he says in Stephen Hero that: 'I am a product of Catholicism; I was sold
to Rome before my birth. Now I have broken my slavery but I cannot in a moment
destroy every feeling in my nature. That takes time.' )0) The differences between the
two texts in literary form and perspective suggest a shift in authorial perspective lending
the portrait of Stephen a more mature, critical and self-reflective dimension. In this
inward-looking narrative, the question of belief proves to be much less simple and
straightforward, and the account of Stephen, may serve as a warning: that although the
99 The Gay Science, 'Joke Cunning and Revenge', Poem 32, p. 53.
100 Ibid., Section 109, p. 167.
101 Stephen Hero, p. 73.
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passing away of the old faith is considered a finished thing, its effects are nevertheless
still lingering.
Joycean criticism has regularly drawn attention to the overall structure of the A
Portrait as a means to address Joyce's authorial intentions in the shaping of his artist-
aesthete. Wayne C. Booth's classic essay, 'The Problem of Distance in A Portrait of the
Artist',102 notes how Joyce's carefully constructed structure sustains the inherent
ambiguity of the novel's ending:
The structure of this 'authorless book' is based on the growth of a sensitive
boy to young manhood. The steps in his growth are obviously constructed
with great care [...]. Now here is clearly a careful structural preparation - for
what? For a transformation, or for a merely cyclical return? Is the final
exaltation a release from the depressing features of Irish life which have
tainted the earlier experiences? Or is it the fifth turn in an endless cycle?
And in either case, is Stephen always to be viewed with the same deadly
seriousness with which he views himself? Is it to artistic maturity that he
growS?103
The issue of authorial irony, that is, the question 'to what extent A Portrait's structure
conforms or not to the form of the Bildungsoman', is one that has and continues to
invite varied critical responses. The problematic status the concept of 'development'
occupies in the novel can be felt in the tension between the more traditional tendency to
interpret Joyce's careful arrangement of events as suggestive of an essentially
progressive sense of development of the character's spiritual and intellectual growth -
and those who regard it with doubt. Tobias Boes for instance in 'A Portrait of the Artist
as a Young Man and the "Individuating Rhythm" of Modernity', 104troubles the text's
linear status by pointing out that: .
Any approach to Joyce's work that conceives of Bildung as a teleological
process, a smooth and gradual journey towards individual and collective
102 Wayne C. Booth, 'The Problem of Distance in A Portrait of the Artist', in The Rhetoric of Fiction
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 323-336.
103 Ibid., p. 327.
104 Tobias Boes, 'A Portrait of the Artist as a YoungMan and the "Individuating Rhythm" of Modemity',
ELH 4 (2008), pp. 767-785.
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destiny, is bound to be frustrated by the contradictory dynamics of his
novel. lOS
Calling attention to the main character's inherent contradictions, the critic discusses
Stephen's nervous 'oscillating back and forth between those influences that urge him to
move forward in life and those who encourage him to linger and. thus to see his identity
as essentially predetermined by the past.,106 Stephen's perpetual back and forth motion
clashes with the ostensible linearity of the text, uncovering an underlying structure of
recurrence and cyclical return, an 'internally contradictory' pattern of 'radical
polyrhythmicality' ,107On the whole, Boes's proposition of a model of recurrence is
quite fascinating, providing the text with an open-ended and ongoing potential: A
Portrait is meant 'neither [as] a eulogy to lost possibility, nor as a quiet resignation',
It offers a celebration of life in a colonial society 'caught between tradition and
modernity in all its confusing, contradictory, and sometimes also disheartening
complexity', one 'filtered through the mind of an individual desperately trying to
compose his "individuating rhythm" amidst a polyrhythmic tapestry',108
Both Kenner's and Boes's suggestions are, it seems to me, particularly
relevant to the theme of individuality and art in the novel. The kind of 'internally
contradictory'109 structure discerned by them seems particularly useful when
turning to consider the psychological dynamics of Stephen's heretic-turned-
ascetic-turned-aesthetic persona throughout the novel. The variety of
contradictions and eccentricities, the elusive tensions between belief/unbelief,
heresy/obedience, sin/repentance, good conscience/bad conscience,
rebellion/obedience, and self-growth/self-mortification, state a great deal, in my
105 Ibid., p. 768.
106 Ibid., p. 771.
107 Ibid., p. 771.
108 Ibid., p. 773.
109 Boes, p. 772.
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view, about Stephen's notion of selfhood and art-faith. In particular, in my view
~/
what starts as a progressive movement ends as a regression. As I will try to argue,
Stephen's shift from an ascetic to an aesthetic persona in Chapters IV and V as well as
his ambivalent attitude towards the 'Feminine' throughout the course of the novel,
seems to suggest a motif of recurrent stasis, one that if considered in the light of
Nietzsche's notions of 'bad conscience' and the 'ascetic ideal' provides interesting
insights regarding the notion of self-becoming and individuation in the text.
To begin with, a motif of conflict and tension can be traced throughout,
manifesting itself in the mixed portrait of Stephen who appears at times as a heroic
sinner and at others as a saintly ascetic. At the beginning of Chapter III, Stephen's
restless night strolls about 'the squalid quarter of the brothels' 110 and occasional visits to
the prostitutes, may be taken in a way as symbolic of his desire to sin and rebel in the
face of death. In this passage, Stephen, in 'sinloving' fashion' III enacts a certain
worldly sacrament of the flesh, as it were, - symbolic of his initiation (via sexuality)
into the ways of the world. As he works his way through his mathematic assignment his
mind drifts back to memories of the night before and we follow his emotion while it
transforms itself into a vision of a dying star. Feeling enraptured by 'a sudden
movement' of 'his own will or a sudden call to his sinloving soul', 112 we read how
Stephen finds himself drawn by a mysterious 'will' ordering him to sin, a 'will' that
relishes in the thought that it can challenge God. In his imagination he re-experiences
once again the incident with a certain irreverent pride, one that while knowing it has
sinned 'fatally', however, delights in bearing the burden of sin, as a token of power and
independence: 'A certain pride, a certain awe, withheld him from offering to God even
one prayer [...J. His pride in his own sin, his loveless awe of God told, him that his
110 A Portrait, p. 86.
III Ibid., p. 86.
112 Ibid., p. 86.
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offence was too grievous to be atoned.'113 Stephen's thoughts on moral burden, sin and
atonement are particularly interesting here.114 His statement might be taken to suggest a
personal striving for autonomy.
His divided self indicates a battle of two faiths: The faith of Stephen to himself
and his faith to God and the moral law. His 'conscious heresy' suggests a 'deliberate
kind of sinning', as Richard Brown has very well pointed outllS; a deliberate statement,
as it were, of free will and agency: a victory of the will of the self over the will of God.
Stephen's resolution that despite the knowledge 'it was in God's power to take away his
life while he slept and hurl his soul hellward ere he could beg for mercy [...] he will not
obey', might be taken to denote a moral self-consciousness, which feels confirmed in
the pleasure of mastering its sense of fear and anxiety in the face of Authority.
Stephen's imagination of his soul as impenitent and his lusting after experience is
vividly reflected in the imagery he employs of the soul as both a star and self-
annihilating will:
Going forth to experience, unfolding itself sin by sin, spreading abroad the
balefire of its burning stars and folding back upon itself, fading slowly,
quenching its own li~hts and fires. They were quenched: and the cold
darkness filled chaos. I 6
This representation of the soul 'unfold[ing] itself 117 going forth into experience,
and the image of the self as a product of sin, affirmed in all its destructive force, is
particularly poignant. It is notable that an image of 'burning stars' with strong life-
113 Ibid., p. 87.
114 It has to be noted here that guilt is not something that Nietzsche rejects altogether. As Stephen
Houlgate points out, Nietzsche wants us to come to a positive, tragic evaluation of guilt, rather
than a negative, moral one. To accuse someone of sin in a moral sense, Nietzsche believes is to
burden them with bad conscience'. The opposite, however, is the case for the Nietzsche's tragic
artist however, the one whose aim is through art to 'imbue sacrilege with dignity', to 'celebrate
human power audacity and independence, and thereby to banish bad conscience', Stephen
Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), pp. 194-195.
115 Richard Brown, James Joyce and Sexuality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 161.
116 A Portrait, p. 86.
117 Ibid., p. 87.
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generating connotations is evoked by Stephen's memory of his encounter with the
"/
prostitute the previous night. At this point Stephen's memory of sinning generates a
vivid vision of life as rapturous, wasteful - extending the analogy between the life and
experience as both will to creation and destruction. This might be taken to echo one of
Zarathustra's most celebrated sayings: 'One must still have chaos within, in order to
give birth to a dancing star'. 118 Stephen's imagery (of the dissipation of the self into
orderless dust), seems to hold positive connotations, affirming both the chaos and
squandering inherent in life. Like a rite of passage, sexual experience may be taken in
the above passage to suggest Stephen's initiation to the world of animal energies,
marking, in effect, the end of innocence; or, rather, the beginning of selthood. Desire
and its satisfaction here can be read as a metaphor for the affirmation of self-
consciousness, setting in motion Stephen's destiny towards growth, individuation and
life. In this context, the figure of the 'woman' comes to signify Stephen's entrance into
the life of experience, and may function as a trope of life, an all-powerful nature
imposing itself to Stephen, animating his will to experience while binding him
inexorably with death and finality. Interestingly, Nietzsche's own star-imagery appears
in Zarathustra's opening speech, the part that announces 'the death of God' and outlines
his new worldly gospel:
Once blasphemy against God was the greatest blasphemy; but God died and
therewith also those blasphemers. To blaspheme the earth now is the
dreadful est sin, and to rate the heart of the unknowable higher than the
meaning of the earth! Once the soul looked contemptuously on the body,
and then that contempt was the supreme thing.-the soul wished the body
meagre, ghastly, and famished. Thus it thought to escape from the body and
the earth. Oh. This soul was itself still lean, ghastly, and starved; and cruelty
was the lust of this soul! 119
The message of Zarathustra's 'sermon of the body', as it were, in the passage above,
may be taken to provide some interesting comparisons and links with the teaching of
118 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 15.
119 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 11-12.
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Father Arnall's teachings about the soul in Chapter III, as well as with the theme of
//
dualism and conflict between mind and soul personified in Stephen himself. As Ofelia
Schutte points out in Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks, Zarathustra's
'overcoming of morality requires the overcoming of one's present understanding of the
self.120 It symbolises 'the end of dualism between body and spirit that has fragmented
the lives of human beings':
What is called for is the complete transformation of the divided self which
claims us at present [...]. The dismissal of the ego-consciousness as the ruler
of the organism as well as the overcoming of resentment indicated thetypes
of radical psychological changes that need to take Rlace before one can
approach the possibility of living a fully creative life. I I
Such overcoming, as conceived by Nietzsche, is, however, not something yet possible
for Stephen despite his celebration of chaos and experience in the passage above. Partly
in his 'visions of hell', partly in his model of ascetic resignation, in the latter part of
Chapter III the Zarathustrian energies which had hitherto supported Stephen's pride
seem quenched, broken up under the weight of the religious doctrine and its burning
threat of eternal punishment. Contrary to the picture of Stephen as a panegyrist of
nature, in the scene following this one, 'nature' comes to designate 'death' - and in
turn, the body is condemned as a source of sin, guilt and suffering.
The text's emphasis on these two states, from Stephen's early affirmation of
sexuality as proud, to a state wherein the former affirmation of the will of the self, and
subsequently sensual desire, degenerates into a wound, a mark of shame and sin, serves
to underline the powerful, and for a large part covert effects of moral consciousness. As
Nietzsche says in the On the Genealogy the genesis of 'conscience' or else, of 'the soul'
has a dark and painful history. Moral conscience is the product of internalized cruelty,
arising out ofa memory of punishment. 'Bad conscience' or the 'memory of the will', is
120 Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986),
p.120.
121 Ibid., p. 120.
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characterized by a sense of guilt, debt and duty, and carries within it a history of pain
'/
and cruelty: Nietzsche asks in the second treatise how the moral conscience is born:
This age-old question was not resolved with gentle solutions and methods,
as can be imagined; perhaps there is nothing more terrible and strange in
man's pre-history than his technique of mnemonics: 'A thing must be burnt
in so that it stays in the memory: only something that- continues to hurt stays
in the memory' - that is the proposition from the oldest (and unfortunately
the longest-lived) psychology on earth. When man decided he had to make a
memory for himself it never happened without blood [...] the cruellest
rituals of all religious cults (and all religions are, at their most fundamental
systems, systems of cruelty.122
The Hell sermon in A Portrait is a good example of one such cruel ritual - and it is
there to remind the impious Stephen his debt to God, introducing the theme of moral
burden and 'bad conscience' in the novel. In Chapter III, Joyce's text begins to draw
attention to the psychological mechanisms of guilt operating within Stephen,
uncovering the inner conflict of Stephen and his conscience. Just after the school rector
announces the religious retreat, mixed thoughts about debt, justice and punishment rush
almost involuntarily through the young man's mind:
As he sat in his bench gazing calmly at the rector's shrewd harsh face his
mind would itself in and out of the curious questions proposed to it. If a man
had stolen a pound in his youth and has used that pound to amass a huge
fortune how much was he obliged to give back?123
The questions that begin to arise in the imagination of Stephen progressively fuel his
mind with images of torture, punishment and pain: evidence of a latent sense of guilt
Stephen would rather deny. Such questions, of whether the 'debt' can be paid in full,
how does one pay back a wrongdoing, and whether the culprit can truly redeemed, serve
as powerful metaphors for the sense of guilt and moral consciousness that haunts
Stephen. What is more, they uncover an almost involuntary sense of duty, an
unconscious awareness of a moral contract, whose terms Stephen confesses have been
122 'Essay Il', Section 3, p. 38.
123 A Portrait, p. 89.
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broken 'not once but many times' .124Interestingly, Stephen understands sin and guilt in
J
terms of monitary value. The link between debt and punishment that the On the
Genealogy identifies is essential in Nietzsche's understanding of the origin of moral
consciousness of guilt ('bad conscience'). There, he goes on to ask:
How, then, did that other 'dismal thing', the consciousness of guilt, the
whole 'bad conscience', come into the world? [...] Have these genealogists
of morality up to now ever remotely dreamt that, for example, the main
moral concept 'Schuld' ('guilt') descends from the very material concept of
'Schulden' ('debts,)?125
Nietzsche believes that from very early times the relation between individual members
and the community was based in the contractual relationship between creditor and
debtor. Through a process of moralization (religion) 'debt' was translated into guilt, and
duty into moral duty, our creditor being in fact 'God,.126 The vivid imagery of crime,
judgment and punishment employed in the course of the sermon, the rhetoric of debt
and obligation (all techniques intended to instil moral memory and guilt according to
Nietzsche), gradually elicit a latent sense of guilt in the mind of Stephen: The rector's
words: 'He who remembers the last things, says Ecclesiastes, shall not sin for ever. He
who remembers the last things will act and think with them always before his eyes,;127
his advice to 'think only of the last things, death, judgment, hell and heaven' bring into
the surface images of death and judgment: 'The next day brought death and judgment
stirring his soul slowly from its listless despair. The faint glimmer of death became a
terror of spirit as the hoarse voice of the preacher blew death into his soul.' 128Clearly,
the priest's mnemotechics here areused as a mechanism for eliciting responses of regret
and guilt after transgression. Indeed, in the course of the sermon, the nightmare of moral
124 Ibid., p. 87.
125 'Essay II', Section 4, p. 39.
126 For full analysis see Maudemarie Clark's 'Nietzsche's Immoralism and the Concept of Morality', in
Nietzsche, Genealogy, and Morality, ed. by Richard Schacht (University of California Press.
1994), pp. 15-34.
127 A Portrait, p. 93.
128 Ibid., p. 94.
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debt and its punishment is something that Stephen is not allowed to forget, one played
j
and replayed several times over. Moral memory, as Nietzsche argues in the second
treatise, is the one 'real problem of mankind', a sickness which can only be
counteracted by an active ability to forget, to shut 'the doors of consciousnesses for a
while':
Forgetfulness is not just a vis inertiae, as superficial people believe [...]. To
shut the doors of consciousness for a while; not to be bothered by the noise
and battle with which our underworld of serviceable organs work with and
against each other; a little peace, a little tabula rasa of consciousness to
make room for something new [...]. 129
Such forgetfulness is something that Stephen can find hard to achieve. The memory of
history is a nightmare Stephen finds it hard to awake from, as he tells us in Ulysses, and
which he experiences as something painful and agonizing throughout that text.
In the second essay of the On the Genealogy, a text which provides valuable
insights into the psychology of torture and cruelty, Nietzsche tells us that the birth of the
'soul' has its origin in 'animosity, cruelty':
The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as through between two
layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth
and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man's
instincts was obstructed. 130
In turn, moral conscience has its residues in practices of cruelty throughout history: the
most disgusting mutilations, torments and punishments 'all this has its origin in that
particular instinct which discovered that pain was the most powerful aid to
mnemotechnics.l'<' Peter Sedgwick summarises Nietzsche's mnemotechnics for us:
The individual, initially a creature dominated by the drives and the whim of
the moment, is by degrees transformed into a being of culture [...] the moral
memory that characterises and differentiates humankind from animals was
therefore quite literally, battered, burnt and stamped into existence by way
of force being exerted over the body.132
129 'Essay II', Section 1, p. 35.
130 Ibid., Section 16, p. 57.
131 Ibid., Section 3, p. 38.
132 Peter R. Sedgwick, Nietzsche: The Key Concepts (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 12.
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It is not surprising to see then that the rhetoric of Divine punishment in the ,~ermon
makes ample use of images of physical pain, invoking thus a half-unconscious memory
deeply ingrained, traces of which soon become apparent in Stephen. It is the images of
'the flesh [... ] tortured,l33 that Stephen fears most, a fear that may imply a sense of
moral conscience waiting to be awakened. Throughout the course of the Hell-sermon
Stephen mind seems arrested by the intensity of the Father Arnall's Christian rhetoric
and its imagery of cruelty and physical torture:
As the waters of baptism cleanse the soul with the body, so do the fires of
punishment torture the spirit with the flesh. Every sense of the flesh is
tortured and every faculty of the soul therewith: the eyes with impenetrable
utter darkness, the nose with noisome odours, the ears with yells and howls
and execrations, the taste with foul matter, leprous corruption, nameless
suffocating filth, the touch with redhot goads and spikes, with cruel tongues
of flame. And through the several torments of the senses the immortal soul
is tortured eternally in its very essence amid the leagues upon leagues of
glowing fires kindled in the abyss by the offended majesty of the
Omnipotent God and fanned into everlasting and ever increasing fury by the
breath of the anger of the Godhead.l "
Tom, lacerated and inflicted by the cruel sting of morality, Stephen's desire appears
worn out, and we see him relapsing into a state of helplessness he seems unable to rise
from. In away, this passage helps bring out the consonance of the novel's notion of the
punishment and cruelty that underlies Catholic morality with the concept of 'bad
conscience' as set out in On the Genealogy, a notion that (together with the principle of
'the ascetic ideal'), suggests the psychical incarceration of one's conscience in the face
of culture and tradition. Stung by moral guilt, the portrait of the moral convalescent
which Joyce offers here, suggests the kind of process experienced as a result of the
individual's confinement (conscious and unconscious) within the oppressive narrowness
and etiquette of custom. As Nietzsche put it, 'bad conscience' is the inevitable outcome
133 A Portrait, p. 103.
134 Ibid., pp. 102,103.
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man undergoes when he becomes enclosed within the walls of society and peace. In the
face of culture and tradition man is turned into:
[T]his animal that rubbed itself against the bars of its cage as one tried to
'tame it'; this deprived animal, racked with homesickness for the wild, who
had to tum himself into an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and
dangerous wilderness - this fool, this yearning and desperate prisoner
became the inventor of 'bad conscience' .135
The passage describing the harrowing impact of the spiritual exercises upon Stephen, as
well as scene of repentance in Chapter IV, both become enormously expressive of the
irreconcilable tensions between morality and selfhood, soul and body. Stephen's
imaginary repentance and the attendant fantasies of punishment, torture and
mortification serve as a symbolic purification of this guilt, providing a sense of religious
catharsis. On the whole, the feeling of guilt that appears to curtail the young aesthete's
intellectual energies in Chapter IV, where Stephen is confronted by Father Arnall's
incarcerating rhetoric, reveals the dynamics of morality and tradition that undercut
Stephen's progress towards selfhood. It is in the hands of the priest, a master in the art
of guilt, ('this real artist in feelings of guilt', Nietzsche says), that guilt takes form and
shape.136 That 'the priest rules through the invention of sin', is further manifested in the
imagery of the sadistic imagery of the threefold sting of conscience. 137 The 'rebellious
pride of the intellect', 138 the quest for knowledge, experience, selfhood so proudly
proclaimed earlier on, degenerate into a festering wound burned into Stephen's
memory. Stephen's tortured dwelling upon the notions of sin and repentance, his fears
and doubts about nature and God that reach their paroxysm in the scene of repentance
and his subsequent 'retreat' back to God, may be taken in a way as signifying instances
of Nietzsche an 'bad conscience'.
135 'Essay II', Section 16, p. 57.
136 'Essay III', Section 20, p. 104.
137 The Anti-Christ, Section 49, p. 178.
138 A Portrait, p. 112.
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Joyce's sense of entrapment felt by the moral individual, who finds himself
incarcerated by the Catholic code of guilt which constitutes, regulates, and penetrates
the self is powerfully evoked in Stephen's imagining of how '(t)he preacher's knife had
probed deeply into his diseased conscience and he felt how now how his soul was
festering in sin.' 139 Stephen's sin of sexual knowledge is burned into his diseased
conscience suggesting that his Christianity functions as an open wound. In the course of
the novel this symbolic branding of the self materializes itself fruitfully in the discourse
of cruelty and suffering of Father Arnall's sermon. Stephen's progress towards
individuation is cut short by the priest's graphic vision of Hell as an eternal life of
torture. In the context of the sermon Stephen is asked to imagine Hell as an eternal
recurrence of physical suffering
And through the several torments of the senses the immortal soul is tortured
eternally in its very essence amid the leagues upon leagues of glowing fires
kindled in the abyss by the offended majesty of the Omnipotent God and
fanned into everlasting and ever increasing fury by the breath of the an§er of
the Godhead. It is the eternity of Hell that is offered as the last torture. 1 0
In the course of the novel Stephen finds it difficult to come to terms with moral guilt
and the will of the body. A fascinating account of Stephen's own 'dread [... ] of the
mystery of his own body'!" unfolds in the scene at the beach where Stephen watching
his friends bathing imagines 'their bodies, corpsewhite or suffused with a pallid golden
light or rawly tanned by the sun'. 142 The expression of terror and disgust in the face of
the 'pitiable nakedness' of life and the images of corpses and flesh decaying, the body
as powerless in the face of death and time could stand as a powerful metaphor for the
way Stephen interprets nature as threatening, deadly, and in extension of himself as
weak and finite. Moreover Joyce's vivid description of Stephen's psychological crisis in
139 Ibid., p. 97.
140 Ibid., p. 110.
141 Ibid., p. 96.
142 Ibid., p. 141.
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Chapter III accentuates how sensual knowledge fuels Stephen's sense of powerlessness
with images of despair and futility:
He felt the deathchill touch the extremities and creep onward towards the
heart, the film of death veiling the eyes, the bright centres of the brain
extinguished one by one like lamps, the last sweat oozing upon the skin, the
powerlessness of the dying limps, the speech thickening and wandering and
failing, the breath, the poor breath, the poor helpless human spirit, sobbing
and sighing, gurgling and rattling the throat. No help! No help! He, he
himself, his body to which he had yielded was dying. Into the grave wit hit!
Nail it down into a wooden box, the corpse.143
Stephen's body and soul dualism is confirmed no less by Stephen himself in the famous
scene where Stephen confesses to Cranly and Lynch his desire to flee the constricting
strictures of family, religion and State:
The soul is born, he said vaguely, first in those moments I told you of. It has
a slow and dark birth, more mysterious than the birth of the body. When the
soul of a man is born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back
from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to
fly by those nets. 144
His declaration of freedom of conscience, his claim that he is determined to fly by the
constricting strictures of Catholicism, Nationalism and tradition, is, in my view, rather
restricted and limiting, for it is informed by the very dualism it seeks to overcome. In
this passage, Stephen's understanding of the nature of the self is constituted in clearly
dualistic terms, and the soul's primacy as the first and foremost actuality in the process
of self-creation may be seen as decisive role in his ethic of self-creation.
This soul-body dichotomy is a notion increasingly relevant in the course of the
novel, taking on the unique form of Stephen's ascetic persona. Interestingly, the Hell-
sermon passage is followed by a certain restoration of faith which culminates in
Stephen's vision of his soul finally being restored. It is a panegyric to chastity, to a
child-like innocence of how: 'It was easy to be good. God's yoke was sweet and light. It
143 Ibid., p. 94.
144 Ibid., p. 171.
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was better never to have sinned, to have remained always a child [.... ].,145 This is
perhaps one of the most characteristic displays of Stephen's wish-fulfilment fantasy of
redemption, indicative of a sickened 'bad conscience' willing its retreat to the
comforting burden of Godly Truth and Authority: 'It was a terrible and sad thing to sin.
But God was merciful to poor sinners who were truly sorry' .146In Stephen's trading of
his former rebellion for this new selfhood one reads in Nietzschean terms, the marks of
a nauseated 'bad conscience' that seeks to absolve itself from the guilt of the body and
its affects. Stephen is paralysed by the consequences of his act, as expressed in his
image of the 'threefold sting of conscience': 'the pain of loss', that is, 'to be separated
for ever from God [... ] who had called that soul into existence from nothingness,;147
'the pain of conscience', and 'the pain of eternity' .148Nauseated by a vision of Hell as a
vision confirming the terrifying nature of existence 'for all eternity', a vision where the
senses are eternally doomed to suffer their sin in 'the greatest physical torment(s)';149
pained by the loss of God, the loss of origin, purpose and truth that is, and equally, by
the fear of a life eternally unredeemed is more than he can bear. Rather than journeying
towards selfhood, he wanders back into a child-like dependency, sinless and lifeless at
the same time.
In Chapter IV agam, the dialectic of 'fall' and 'redemption' as well as the
fascination with death and cruelty is continued unabated as it comes to be materialized
in the ascetic discipline to which Stephen resorts. The tension between chastity and
sensuality within Stephen (dualism) and its related matters (sin, guilt, 'bad conscience')
finds vent in resolute piety and an ethic of self-abnegation. 'What is the meaning of
ascetic ideals', Nietzsche asks us in the opening of the third essay:
145 Ibid., p. 120.
146 Ibid., p. 120.
147 Ibid., pp. 108-109.
148 Ibid., p. 1.03.
149 Ibid., p. 101.
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What do ascetic ideals mean? - With artists, nothing, or many different
things [...]; with priests, the actual priestly faith, their best instrument of
power and also the 'ultimate' sanction of their power; with saints, anexcuse
to hibernate at last, their novissima gloriae cupido, their rest in nothingness
(,God,).150
In some way or another all these impulses: the impulse to 'hibernation', the will to
the unreal, to be removed from the world, the quest for solace and harmony, redemption
from the burden of sin - are all explicitly or implicitly present in Stephen's thoughts.
The tum from sensual to chaste, from life-affirming to life-denying, from sinner to saint
in this Chapter provide interesting questions about the purpose and uses of the
asceticism. Either in the form of religious asceticism or romantic-chaste idealism, the
'ascetic ideal' as practiced by Stephen implies the need for redemption (from his 'bad
conscience', from his body, from life in general), a salvation or escape of sorts. Unable
to accept the natural order on its own terms Stephen transforms life into 'a divine'
reality151 as an effort to resolve, at least temporarily, his problematic relationship to
nature, the body and the self: 'Life became a divine gift for every for every moment and
sensation [...]. Meek and abased by this consciousness of the one eternal omnipresent
perfect reality [...].,152In purifying himself he seeks redemption; in making himself pure
he yearns to elevate himself beyond mortality (paradoxically by mortifying the senses)
creating a life beyond. In self-chastisement, which is nothing but mortification of the
will and life, Stephen seeks escape from what is real, substituting this life with a
consoling vision of one beyond. As seen already, Schopenhauer's and Wagner's
aesthetic is based upon a claim that the value of art lies in its ability to appease the will
and relieve suffering. In his discussion of the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche parallels the
renunciation of the will of the ascetic and the quest for redemption with the type of
detached disinterested aestheticism proposed by Schopenhauer and practiced by
150 'Essay III', Section 1, p. 68.
151 A Portrait, p. 126.
152 Ibid., p. 126.
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Wagner. In these figures, Nietzsche detects an outlook which is locked within a tension
of contradictory values. For Wagner for instance he tells us that 'he has within his body
values, words, phrases and morals of contrasting origins.' In physiological terms, he is
false 'always sitting on the fence, with one breach saying "yes", and with the other
"no",.153
As in Chapter III, in similar fashion this connection between 'bad conscience' and
cruelty is largely present in the covert sadomasochism that underpins Stephen's ascetic
practices. In Stephen's seeking of a kind of trusting mysticism by way of an anti-natural
scholastic ethic, one may read a symbolic lapse into a former state of innocence,
symbolic of a will which, once faced with the agony of the absence of the old faith,
circles back to deify the old God in order to find repose and solace. Stephen's process of
ascetic catharsis is taken to constitute a kind of imaginary flee, elevating Stephen into
oneness with a higher reality beneath the world of the senses, a likely solution to the
spiritual crisis he experiences so far: 'His soul was made fair and holy once more holy
and happy. It would be beautiful to die if God so willed. It was beautiful to live if God
so willed, to live in grace a life of peace and virtue and forbearance with others ..I54 In
this moment in Stephen's self-development (a moment witnessing Stephen's giving
over to afterwordly illusions as a means to relieve his nausea with the realities of
individuation), the will to life, the call to growth (and hence selfhood), seems too
overwhelming and heavy a burden. In Chapter IV the religious regime that Stephen
imposes upon himself, a self-imposed mortification of the mind and the flesh, seeks to
correct, discipline the body, desire and its venomous ramifications, and subsequently
153 As Nietzsche tells us in Essay III, the ascetic ideal serves many purposes for different types of people
(the artist, the philosopher and the ascetic priest respectively). It has both positive and negative
associations and may serve both to enhance and inhibit life and new values. Particularly in relation
to the type of ascetic philosopher (example: the nihilism of Schopenhauer), and idealistic art
(Wagner), Nietzsche argues that the ascetic ideal is an effort to resolve man's problematic
relationship to nature the body and its desire/will that is.
154 A Portrait, p. 122.
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expiate the self from the tripartite schema of pain, sin and loss to which one feels
subjected:
Each of his senses was brought under a rigorous discipline. In order to
mortify the sense of sight he made it his rule to walk in the street with
downcast eyes [... ]. To mortify his hearing he exerted no control over his
voice which was then breaking, neither sang nor whistled and made no
attempt to flee from noises which caused his painful nervous irritation such
as the sharpening of knives [... ]. He had no temptations to sin mortally. J55
Taming and chastising the body serves to redeem Stephen from the burden of 'bad
conscience'. A psychological invention of sorts that compensates for his feeling of guilt
and shame following Father Arnall's sermon, Stephen's self-torture, the fantasy of self-
annihilation suggests a will that remains ambivalently divided between a sense of
individuality, an emerging ego-consciousness and moral guilt. For Schopenhauer denial
of the will is likened to the experiences of ascetics and mystics. Both denial of the will
and mystical experience are accompanied by the disappearance of the phenomenal
forms of space, time and subject-object duality (what belongs to the realm of
appearances, especially through the senses and immediate experience that is).
Schopenhauer speaks of salvation (aesthetic salvation as well), as the process through
which one transcends the illusion of the self as one and undivided (principle of
individuation), and becomes aware of himself as part the world-will.1S6 Redemption
from the ego, the silencing of individual will is sought by way of virtue and morally
right conduct, holiness and asceticism:
Salvation comes from a metaphysical understanding of ultimate reality
which leads one towards a blissful state of peace. Yet one must begin to
follow this path by seeing the world as it is in all its horror. Hence the path
of salvation involves coming to the realization that the world is best
interpreted as a vale of tears. The true sense of tragedy is the deeper insight
that what the hero atones for is not his own ,Particular sins, but original sin,
in other words, the guilt of existence itself. IS
155 Ibid., p. 127.
156 'Schopenhauer, Religion and Morality', p. 17.
157 Ibid., p. 17. My emphasis.
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Ascetics, these 'sportsmen of "holiness"', 158according to Nietzsche, finally rid
themselves of that deep, physiological depression (in Stephen's case the burden of
experience, the body and the self), with the help of a system of hypnotizing methods.
Loss of the self, sanctification what in aesthetic terms translates into romantic idealism,
suggest interesting parallels between ascetics and aesthetics, according to Nietzsche. As
seen already in his writings Nietzsche exposes the essence of religious belief as a truism
and its doctrines (original sin) as a moral fiction that need to be overcome and
ultimately replaced by a different kind of faith, an intelligent self-conscious
understanding of one's position in relation to one's self and the world. In the aftermath
of the loss of the belief in a transcendent purpose, there has to be conjured a
counterpart, a new humanity or selfhood in touch with concrete, bodily experience.
Ultimately, for Nietzsche, the reality principle that serves as a countermeasure for such
truisms is simply 'the body and the world it inhabits'. In the words of Zarathustra:
The self says to the ego, 'Feel pain here!' Then the ego suffers and thinks
how it might suffer no more - and that is why it is made to think. The self
says to the ego, 'Feel pleasure here!' Then the ego is pleased and thinks how
it might often be pleased again - and that is why it is made to think.159
Contrary to such advice, Stephen's sense of nostalgia and guilt (a restless feeling of
guilt would always be present with him: he would confess and repent and be absolved,
confess and repent again and be absolved again, fruitlessly'),160 seems to lead to the
abandonment of the reality of this world for 'a faded world of fervent love' beyond.l'"
A true ascetic artist of the will, Stephen emerges as a tamer of the natural self, and
constructs himself as an artefact not less purified and chaste than his idealized feminine
imaginaries later on. Stephen's formation of the ascetic self as a moral offering, as a
will resisting the penetrating rawness of the natural elements echoes one type of ascetic
158 'Essay III', Section 17, p. 97.
159 For a thorough discussion see Allison, especially pp. 135-140.
160 A Portrait, p. 129.
161 Ibid., p. 128.
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aestheticism, one that, as Nietzsche argues, offers redemption through the hypnotization
of the senses, the denial of the will: this need for aesthetic and existential redemption
has its sources for Nietzsche in the Christianity, it is 'the quintessence of all Christian
needs' .162Stephen's commitment to a scholastically rigid ritual of piety and prayer, this
mechanical practice of the daily prayers, are there to lull his conscience to sleep, to
suppress the moral power of guilt and sin inside:
Every part of his day, divided by what he regarded now as the duties of his
station in life, circled about its own centre of spiritual energy. His life
seemed to have drawn near to eternity; every thought, word, and deed, every
instance of consciousness could be made to reverberate radiantly in heaven:
and at times his sense of such immediate repercussion was so lively that he
seemed to feel his soul in devotion pressing like fingers the keyboard of a
great cash register and to see the amount of his purchase start forth
immediately in heaven, not as a number but as a frail column of incense or
as a slender flower.i'"
Through prayers, 'the rosaries too which he said constantly - for he carried his
beads loose in his trousers' 164pockets that he might tell them as he walked the streets'
Stephen performs a kind of aesthetic ascesis, namely the mastering of the spiritual over
the natural self. In particular, the imagery of the rosaries, and Stephen's imagining of
them as 'coronals of flowers of such vague unearthly texture that they seemed to him as
hueless and odourless as they were nameless,;165 and of himself as bearing a wreath
invoke somewhat Stephen's ascetic will to an immaterial and disembodied self. In this
'unearthly' crown, in essence an emblem of victory of the spirit over matter, Stephen
imagines his self as having become being 'nameless' at last, ego-less and feels to be
redeemed. The angst of existence becomes transmuted into moral conscience and
eventually into a metaphysical craving for a life beyond. In much the same terms as
those used to address aesthetic composition, Stephen's ascetic apraxia reveals a practice
162 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Case a/Wagner, p. 191.
163 A Portrait, pp. 124-125.
164 Ibid., p.125.
165 Ibid., p. 125.
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that wills of divesting the self of its 'dark' realities, wishing to live' (i)n vitam eternam',
as if 'in a waking dream [... ]. Another life! A life of grace and virtue and happinessl'I'"
In a way one might argue, instead of a drama of tragic rebellion, Chapter V prepares as
for one of redemption through the ascetic performance of Stephen himself.
Whereas Stephen's reverting to an ascetic selfless aesthetic in Chapter IV may be
translated into moral and spiritual angst, nevertheless, paradoxically enough, resistance
to the power of the flesh could also be taken to underscore an unbridled yearning for
self-empowerment. By renouncing one's own will by means of self-torture, or by
employing painful cruelties, the saint, Nietzsche tells us, practices the defiance of the
self and symbolically gains control over life (exercising will-to-power). In a paradoxical
fashion, asceticism, Nietzsche tells us, is, ultimately, a strategy for the preservation and
enhancement of power:
Now the saint practices that defiance of oneself that is a close relation of
lust for power and bestows the feeling of power even upon the hermit; now
his distended sensibility leaps out of the desire to allow his passions free
rein over into the desire to break them like wild horses under the mighty
impress of a proud soul; now he desires a complete cessation of sensations
of a disturbing, tormenting, stimulating kind, a waking sleep, a lasting
repose in the womb of a dull, beast-and plant-like indolence; now he seeks
conflict and ignites it in himself, because boredom has shown him its
yawning face: he scourges his self-idolatry with self-contempt and cruelty,
he rejoices in the wild riots of his desires, in the sharp sting of sin, indeed in
the idea that he is lost, he knows how to lay a trap for his affects, for
example that of the extremest lust for power, so that he passes over into the
extremest abasement and his hunted soul is wrenched utterly out of joint by
this contrast.167
In this respect Stephen's self-denial suggests a parallel emotion, one that years to be
master, via the symbolic triumph of the spirit over the ego's natural proclivities:
The idea of surrender had a perilous attraction for his mind now that he felt
his soul beset once again by the insistent voices of the flesh which began to
murmur to him again during his prayers and meditations. It gave him an
166 Ibid., p. 123.
167 Ivan Soli, 'Nietzsche on Cruelty, Asceticism, and the Failure of Hedonism', in Nietzsche, Genealogy
and Morality, ed. by Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 168-
192 (p. 184).
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intense sense of power to know that he could bla a single act of consent, in a
moment of thought, undo all that he had done. I 8
In an oxymoronic manner, 'fall' and the journey towards 'redemption', turns into
a narrative of empowerment for Stephen via the route of asceticism. In this context
Stephen's confessional of the body is expressive of a certain will-to-power that
succeeds in taming the natural, that is, the body and its instincts. Stephen fashioning
himself to a new ego-less/unegoistic self in order to attain an ideal of higher beauty
provides a kind of 'aesthetic resolution' that craves a higher abode, one which would
allow him to resist 'merging his life in the common tide of other lives.' 169 Stephen's
own performance (mastering of desire) in this part of the novel, one seeking a higher,
elevated (god-like) status, seems particularly interesting given Nietzsche's
understanding of the ascetic ideal (and in extension of 'bad conscience') as a kind of art
form. Allison notes: one hurts oneself, and takes pleasure in it, by fashioning oneself to
the new ego ideal of the selfless individual, the morally responsible, self-sacrificing
subject.17O And the critic continues: for Nietzsche this self-transformation is likened to
the process of artistic creation, 'whereby the artist imposes an enormous task or burden
upon him - or herself - along with the rigid determination and self-discipline this
creative task involves - attaining an ideal of beauty' .171
One might argue that Joyce's depiction of the youth as a young repentant given to
ascetic resignation provides an interesting psychological case for the loss of faith. In my
view, as in the case of the sublime female symbols Stephen evokes in the course of the
novel, this parable of sin and redemption proves, however, not absolved from desire and
its affects. Ironically the ritual of the 'Blessed Sacrament' fails in consecrating
168 A Portrait, p. 128.
169 Ibid., p. 128.
170 Allison,.p. 232.
171 Ibid., p. 232.
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Stephen's desire which m turn, IS internalized and sublimated into a discourse of
'Mariolatry':
A faded world of fervent love and virginal responses seemed to be evoked
in his soul by the reading of its pages [... ]. An inaudible voice seemed to
caress the soul, telling her names and glories, bidding her arise as for
espousal and come away, bidding her look forth. A spouse, from Amana and
from the mountains of the leopards; and the soul seemed to answer with the
same inaudible voice, surrendering herself: Intern ubera mea commorabitur
[... ]. He seemed to feel a flood slowly advancing towards his naked feet and
to be waiting for the first faint timid noiseless wavelet to touch his fevered
skin. Then almost at the verge of sinful consent, he found himself standing
far away from the flood upon a dry shore, saved by a sadden act of the will
or a sudden ejaculation. I72
Not incidentally, Stephen's 'anger' at hearing his mother sneeze' a few pages later is
only to be relieved in the immaculate embrace of the symbolic chaste 'Mother'. The
former anxiety-driven instinct is soothed by her virginal 'glories', plunging him back
into a maternal world of comfort and safety. To some extent, the conflicting association
the image of the mother holds here, both as an envoy of nature and all-forgiving
sanctuary, conveys the irreconcilable contradictions in Stephen's psyche. And further,
more importantly, it suggests Stephen's ultimate failure to annul the instincts - as
indicated in a language that cannot resolve the tensions of his flesh and craving for
chastity. As mentioned above, Nietzsche's ascetic ideal focuses on contemporary
religion, aesthetics and morality, tracing the development of moral codes from the
social sphere to the internalised sting of conscience in the individual. For Nietzsche
'internalisation' of instinct is defined as 'all instincts that do not discharge themselves
outwardly turn inwards - this is what I call internalisation of man: with this there now
evolves in man what will later be called his "soul'" .173 To some extent in A Portrait the
language of piety, not unlike that of art, bespeaks of this kind of internalised desire. In
the passage where Stephen contemplates the vision of the Virgin Mary as his ideal
172 Ibid., p.12S.
173 'Essay II', Section 16, p. 57.
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spouse describing as well as the passages of Stephen's self-fashioning as a ascetic
forger of will-less ness, one that seeks to 'be held captive,174 via a chaste ideal union, the
narrative draws attention to the ambiguous language employed by Stephen, one in
which mysticism is interwoven with images of sexuality and desire. Paradoxically, one
might argue, piety in Stephen's case is but desire turned around, a language of chastity
mischievously expressing desire through its very contradiction. In effect, the conflicting
feelings of morality and desire linger in Stephen's consciousness and come frustratingly
to the surface as to parody Stephen's plea for redemption. His religious vision expresses
something perpetually left unsaid, figuring Stephen's now unconscious sexual impulses
in the very conflation of religious and sexual discourse. In this respect, the text's
slippery discourse indicates a connection between his desire and piety. And while as
very poignantly Gerald Doherty notices, 'strictly speaking A Portrait has no language
for masturbation beyond the highly judgmental one of the moralists'I" - nevertheless,
in this passage, spiritual piety is drawn into a discourse closely associated with the
pleasures of sexual desire. Almost unconsciously, in the very discourse and ascetic
paradigm offered here one reads Stephen's unwilling confession of an internalized
desire where sexual energy finds itself eventually sublimated. In my view. Stephen's
discourse projects a repressed and inverted will. one simultaneously seeking to escape
the eternal cycle of suffering of the moral body, while mourning for the loss of 'truth'
and permanence. A powerful testimony of Stephen's failure to truly outgrow both the
sting of life and that of morality, Stephen's sexual sin is written into a body (and a
language) that bears the markings of 'bad conscience'.
The same drive that seems to direct his earlier oath of chastity could be applied to
the notion of aesthetics. Stephen's recollection of Emma suggests further parallels with
174 A Portrait, p. 88.
175 Gerald Doherty, Pathologies of Desire: The Vicissitudes of the Self in James Joyce's A Portrait of the
Artist as a Young Man (New York: Peter Lang 2008), p. xiii.
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his performing of himself as an ascetic, a 'monk'. Not incidentally, Stephen's
remembrance of her brings to mind the collected poems of Lord Byron suggesting
perhaps his identification of her with an ideal yet unattainable conception of love, a
symbolic incestuous imaginary, suitably placed in an ideal beyond. He turns her into an
ideal soul-sister, making her possession impossible, both as a means to 'protect' himself
from the actual fulfilment of his yearning, as well as for safeguarding his ideal of beauty
from what he perceives as a worldliness too vulgar to receive it. Stephen's will to
overpower, tame and ultimately possess the female form, the truest symbol or Life
Force for Nietzsche, can only occur through re-inventing the female body into a holy,
pure and eternal artefact that promises no threat to his puerile notions of selthood.
It is Stephen brooding over the memory of E.C, consuming himself in her
romantic contemplation, when suddenly he sees another woman forming before his
eyes. It looks like he involuntarily transfers the image of her to that figure, dissolving
Emma's reality to the unreality of poetic creation. Sexual guilt is transfigured into a
kind of aesthetic that Stephen can only gaze at a distance, the girl in the sea may not no
less another 'Emma' transfigured and deprived of her bodily self. The notion of guilt
and redemption can be brought to bear in the way in which Stephen experiences the
joyful purification and sentiment of liberation evoked by this epiphanic vision. In the
image of the lady at the sea, an amalgam of the Christian and mythological aspects that
determine Stephen's psychosynthesis one may see projected various otherwise disjoint
elements fused together. As formerly with religion Stephen seems capable of 'taming'
the feminine (life) only in contemplation. The image of the girl is stripped of its
physical attributes; its corporeality is sublimated into ethereal beauty, indicating further
that what Stephen cannot emotionally and morally fathom is eventually sublimated,
chastened, and disensualised. As Bonnie Kime Scott maintains, the bird-girl Stephen
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views at the close of Chapter IV is 'a suspiciously religious icon' and the effect of such
a vision on him, Stephen's plunging into 'a nurturing mother earth', a sleep-like state,
this 'fall into a flushed womb.'176 In reality, one might add, this aesthetic vision is
placed in direct contradistinction to the structural progression of the novel towards an
individualistic sense of selfhood, marking the dissolution, rather than the making of
Stephen's creative ego.
Ultimately, only by turning himself into an aesthetic priest of the ethereal and
eternal form 'a priest of the eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of
experience into a radiant body of everlasting life' 177,Stephen may finally embrace his
idealized 'woman' in a chaste union of souls. This knowledge intensifies his aesthetic
tendencies into a more or less absolute will-less aestheticism that seeks beauty in an art
of distance and permanence. Religious and aesthetic practice, namely, ascetic self-
abnegation and Apollonian chaste art forms, work to some degree synergistically to
provide a sort of psychic remedy. The aesthetic chaste art underscores Stephen's will to
tame, master and ultimately overcome existence as circumscribed by reality and life.
The binary structures to which Stephen resolves, both his ethic of self-denial, as well as
his model of aesthetic experience as disinterested contemplation, serve as deliverance
from the tyranny and pathos of sexuality. However, inasmuch as Stephen remains
divided by a moralizing conscience that equates sexual desire with suffering and
subsequently life with the horror of existence, he runs the danger of becoming
nauseated by his own deepest instincts. In the end, Stephen's metaphoric ascent into an
aesthetic heaven, like his former ascent into Heaven through ascetic self-abnegation,
signify one and the same origin. Ultimately, as Deborah Pope suggests, 'both visions
(religious/aesthetic) are traps, each something more and something less than Stephen
176 Bonnie Kime Scott, James Joyce (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1987), p.
88.
177 A Portrait, p. 186.
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would have them [...] the bird-girl perhaps more the Virgin of the nets he so desperately
longs to fly by-setting the stage for the deflected, bedevilled artist of Ulysses.' 178
Ironically, Stephen's aesthetic reveals its susceptibility to a morality of custom which he
considers surpassed. Stephen's reverie is led by the divinely aesthetic contemplation to
comfort him with its plasticity, its static character. What is more, Stephen's aesthetic
calling is no less a kind of trading of his former religiosity for a new one, and one which
seems more to retain much of the former sensual guilt than he consciously admits.
Understood in these terms, Stephen's change of heart in the last chapter of A Portrait
might come to be read as a variation of the earlier theme, with the earlier religious
asceticism giving way to an aesthetic one: an aesthetic also acting as prison. Ultimately
Stephen emerges no less redeemed than before, his art serves as a means of internalizing
and desensualising desire, a caged will, which, rather than becoming transfigured,
remains perpetually caught in the binary opposition and repeats what it is meant to
overcome.
178 Deborah Pope, 'The Misprision of Vision: A Comparison of Stephen's Heaven and Hell in A Portrait
of the Artist as a Young Man', James Joyce Quarterly, 17 (1980), 263-270 (p. 269).
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Conclusion
This thesis attempted to determine how one might go about placing the question of
Friedrich Nietzsche within the context of an emerging literary tradition of early
modernism and modernity. The thesis has two main lines of thrust: the relationship
between the reception of Nietzsche's ideas and the little magazine culture in general,
and the role of individual writers and intellectuals, looking at how they chose to respond
to this phenomenon and how this is presented in their work from the period. More
specifically, Chapters One and Three supplied information about the cultural and
intellectual context within which Nietzsche's literary reception occurred, focusing
particularly on the culture of little periodicals. The study of some of the most
representative and fascinating sites of Nietzschean activity in pre-war and wartime
England (The Eagle and the Serpent; the Leeds Arts Club; The New Age; The
Freewoman; The New Freewoman; and The Egoist), helps considerably to illuminate
the character of this phenomenon, and to demonstrate how Nietzsche was integrated
into the cultural and literary discourses of the day (and for what purposes). Chapters
Two, Four and Five, in turn, situated particular authors within this context of literary
and cultural production, and suggested new ways of approaching their texts, as viewed
through the lens of this particular tradition.
As is shown in these periodicals, 'radical Nietzscheanism' appears to have
developed in tandem with an interest in philosophic egoism/individualism. This study
has made it its primary concern to examine this relationship in depth. The selection and
arrangement of the material, not only thematically, but also chronologically, have
allowed a more nuanced understanding of the kinship between Nietzsche's literary
legacy and individualistic currents within a wider avant-garde milieu, shedding light on
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the origins, shifts, and different branchings and crossovers taking place in the course of
this development. Overall, the articles and literature examined show evidence of a
persistent discourse of 'radical Nietzscheanism', one deeply critical of the social and
cultural dynamics of the period. In the broadest sense, radical Nietzscheanism served as
a kind of cultural pharmakon, an emerging intellectual trend attentive to new
perspectives, new sciences (such as psychology), and new experimental approaches to
literature and aesthetics. Assimilated into the individualistic discourses of the
periodicals in question, it served as a tool of critique and resistance, working at several
levels at once: attacking traditional systems of thought (philosophical, aesthetic, social)
and demanding the erection of new ones more in tune with the modem temper.
Its early phase can be traced back to the tum of the nineteenth century. It is
characterised by such terms as: heretic, iconoclastic, boisterous, and untraditional. The
earliest example in periodical form was The Eagle and the Serpent, and in chapter One
we saw how Barnhill's main purpose was to shake up old ideas via provocation: his
Nietzschean aphorisms were explosives meant to demolish social conventions, public
opinion, moral codes, ideals, duties - all, according to him, institutional efforts to put
the 'self under restraint.
The later phase is quite different in style and tone, more critical and increasingly
more preoccupied with the emerging science of psychoanalysis. This preoccupation is
one of its most salient characteristics. Chapter Three demonstrated how, while
Marsden's Nietzscheanism has similar ideological roots and purposes to Barnhill's, it is
radically different in choice of expression. In the particular case of Marsden, I identified
radical Nietzscheanism's transition from being a general anarchist avant-garde trend to
one with a more systematic orientation towards aesthetics and psychology. In her early
articles, for instance, we saw her arguing about the materiality of truth, that all values
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have a historical genealogy and constitute mere human constructs, stemming from
socio-political and psychological needs and desires. In The New Freewoman and The
Egoist, like Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals, she seems to argue that there can
be no free-standing truth or purely objective knowledge, only the perspectives taken by
the different instances of the Life-Force (another name for the Nietzschean will-to-
power). But hers is a self-critical and introspective type of individualism, which posits
that social and cultural change should first stem from the individual's realization of his
self, his psychological and ethical bondage to values and norms. Her editorial
statements from 1913 aptly capture this new philosophy. On different occasions we read
how:
We prefer to say we 'stand' for nothing, since the 'selves', to whose power
and satisfaction this effort administers, are too changeful for anything which
'stands' to keep up with; their satisfactions must move forward.v"
And how:
[The New Freewoman] is not to bring new thoughts to individuals, but to set
the thinking mechanism to the task of destroying thoughts [... ] to set free
life impulses. Its effect will be as though it has created new life-force. ISO
Having outlined the individualistic debates in such a way, the rest of the study
aimed to focus on individual writers and the Nietzschean undercurrent that is present in
some of their key texts. As shown already, an immediate contextualization of G. B.
Shaw, Wyndham Lewis, and James Joyce within the little magazines reveals a thorough
and persistent preoccupation of these writers with Nietzsche on a far deeper and more
interesting level than typically assumed. After setting the cultural and intellectual
background in such a way, a reconsideration of these writers' kinship with Nietzsche
seems a necessary and promising avenue of analysis, which sets their writing within the
179 Dora Marsden, 'Views and Comments', The New Freewoman, 15th December 1913, pp. 222-225 (p.
224).
180 Dora Marsden, "Views and Comments", The New Freewoman, 151July 1913, pp. 23-25 (p. 25).
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context from which it originated and was in dialogue with. For instance, as we saw in
Chapters One and Two, early Nietzschean periodicals, such as The Eagle of the Serpent,
can provide a useful and relevant framework for situating the frequent references to
radical egoism/individualism invoked in the early works of Shaw and Joyce, confirming
thereby an ongoing concern of these authors with the then avant-garde discourses
surrounding Nietzsche's legacy. This study demonstrates that it is necessary to
understand works such as Stephen Hero, The Horses of Diomedes, A Portrait of the
Artist as a Young Man, The Philanderer, The Devil's Disciple, and Man and Superman,
not as edifices within a vacuum, but as works existing within this frame of reference to
appreciate them as alternative discourses contributing to, and, equally, drawing from a
common pool of ideas. Tarr, in reflecting on intellectual and aesthetic debates over
Wagnerism and Symbolism, which were current at the time of the novel's inception,
while being simultaneously conversant with the strain of aesthetic individualism in The
Egoist, constitutes a representative example, which allows us to examine many of the
literary aspects of this wider tradition. Marsden's case is also worthy of note. Placed
vis-a-vis Joyce, her editorials from the period when A Portrait was published are truly
revealing - especially in the way they address and compliment issues raised in Joyce's
novel. 'Why we are Moral,l8I, 'Authority: Conscience and the Offences,)82, for
instance, address issues relevant to the analysis of Joyce and Nietzsche in Chapter Five
of the thesis. They point at correspondences between her and Joyce not sufficiently
treated by scholars.
As discussed earlier in the introduction, Nietzsche's ideas permeated the culture
of early modernism and modernism extensively. My dwelling on the little periodical
culture grew out of a desire to understand the breadth of this phenomenon, which feeds
181 Dora Marsden, 'Why are we Moral', The Egoist, l" December 1914, pp. 433-436.
182 Dora Marsden, 'Authority: Conscience and the Offences', The Egoist, 1st August 1914, pp. 281-284.
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into surprisingly many areas of literary inquiry. I particularly wished to focus on some
of the most representative sites of Nietzschean activity, to begin exploring the
phenomenon of reception. Although, I feel, the periodicals examined here as key
disseminators of Nietzsche's ideas among the avant-garde present us with a good handle
on the phenomenon, there are still sites of interest which, for reasons of space and
structure were not included in this study. For instance, Nietzschean ideas spread across
the Atlantic. Periodical sites such as M'lle New York (New York, 1895-1899)
demonstrate the early incorporation of Nietzsche into aesthetic debates (i.e. James
Huneker's series of articles later published in book form as Egoists: A Book for
Supermen, [1909]). Margaret Anderson's The Little Review (Chicago, New York, Paris,
1914-1919) is another important site of Nietzschean activity. Back in London, such
periodicals as The Signature (London, 1915), the short lived little periodical that D. H.
Lawrence edited with the help of K. Mansfield and J. Middleton Murry, as well as
London Aphrodite (London, 1928-1929), both warrant deeper study as sites of
Nietzsche's initial intellectual reception. In The Signature one can glance through the
first three parts of 'The Crown' (4th and 18th October, and l " November 1915 issues),
where we have Lawrence reinterpreting the Nietzschean notions of will-to-power and
the Dionysian-Apollonian duality in an early effort to develop his own philosophical
system and personal worldview.P'' London Aphrodite also deserves attention. Started by
two Australians in London, Jack Lindsay and P. R. Stephensen, it is quite unique in its
character and convictions, and very important in terms of the later phase of Nietzsche's
literary reception. This publication offers an alternative to modernist literary aesthetics.
183 As Michael Herbert informs us, 'The Crown' is a very important text in terms of Lawrence's
philosophical development and literary production for at least a decade, from 1915 to 1925. It marks an
intermediate state between The Rainbow and Women in Love, between the 'Study of Thomas Hardy' and
Lawrence's later philosophy. Michael Herbert, The Cambridge Edition of the Letters and Works of D. H.
Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), xix.
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Interestingly enough, it reconciled its Nietzscheanism with an anti-modernist stance. In
its editorial manifesto we read:
We stand for a point of view which equally outrages the modernist and the
reactionary. It is certain that J. C. Squire and T.S. Eliot, Wyndham Lewis
and Dean Inge, Humbert Wolfe and Robert Graves, E. E. Cummings and
Alfred Noyes, Maritain and James Douglas, Roger Fry and William Orpen
would, if compelled by physical force to read our magazine, heartily (or at
least irritatedly) dislike it [... ]. We affirm Life, and for the definition quote
Nietzsche: Spirit is that life which itself cuts into life. We affirm Beauty,
and by that term understand a sensual harmony, a homogeneous ecstasy,
which constructing intellectually, yet hates nothing so much as the dry cogs
of the objectified and objectifying intellect.184
It is my strong belief that, while they remain beyond the scope of the present study,
these periodicals certainly stand to contribute much to our understanding of Nietzsche's
impact on literary modernism. In fact, not only may they open up new links, but they
are also viable objects of study in their own right.
The same can be said about the authors selected for this study. They are writers
who form an important link within the literary tradition under investigation. There is,
however, a substantial list of lesser-known writers and intellectuals, men and women,
who made noteworthy contributions to the discourse around Nietzsche. Popular
Nietzschean literature by authors who are currently little-studied and in many cases
little-known, such as The Warstock: A Tale of To-Morrow (1898)185 by Gerrare Wirt
[William O. Greener's pseudonym]; Upton Sinclair's The Overman (1907)186; A
Superman in Being by Litchfield Woodsl87. Superman-inspired short stories, like 'A
Superman', by Ruffy Hall in Rhythml88; articles on Nietzsche, Freud, Jung, drama and
literary aesthetics by intellectuals such as C. E. Bechhofer, 'Tales of To-day:
IS4 'Editorial Manifestos', The London Aphrodite, 1 August 1928, p. 2.
ISS William O. Greener, The Warstock: A Tale of To-Morrow (London: W. W. Greener, 1898).
IS6 Upton Sinclair, The Overman (New York; London: Doubleday, 1907).
IS7 Litchfield Woods, A Superman in Being (London: Stephen Swift, 1912).
IS8 Ruffy Hall, 'A Superman', Rhythm, Winter 1911, pp. 11-16.
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Dostoievsky in Nysad89; 1. A. M., Alcock, 'Nietzsche and the Mahabharata'I'"; Paul V.
Cohn, 'An Echo from Hadesd91, reflect yet another chapter in the history of Nietzsche's
reception. So do the works of Margaret Anderson, Dorothy West, and Storm Jameson,
who also need to be studied as examples of women writers responding to this tradition
ofNietzscheanism in a positive yet critical way. Not unlike Marsden, these women were
'freewomen' and 'Nietzscheans' in their own right, contributing challenging and
original interpretations of Nietzsche's ideas on aesthetics as well as the wider social and
cultural issues of their day. These women authored articles, essays and published
studies. In the case of Jameson in particular, her Nietzschean credentials can be sought
in Modern Drama in Europe (1920),192 a revised thesis submitted for an MA at the
University of Leeds. The treatise opens with a foreword titled 'Nietzsche in Modem
Drama', discussing his significance and place in the dramatic thought of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Margaret Anderson's own blend of Nietzschean
thought and anarchist ideals is also of interest, as it links up with the overall concerns of
the The Little Review (of which she was the founding editor), and its broader aesthetic
and cultural vision. In the first issue Nietzsche figures prominently, becoming the main
frame of reference in discussions of the new journal's direction and purpose. We read in
'The Prophet ofa New Culture':
Why, then, should not a magazine of the Future interpret Nietzsche the
prophet of a new culture? Man as the goal, beauty as the form, life as the
law, eternity as the content of our new day - this is Nietzsche's message to
the modem man.193
Overall, I hoped that I have managed to demonstrate how Nietzsche's reception
by the literary modernist milieu was a far less marginal phenomenon than many
189 C. E. Bechhofer, 'Tales of To-day: Dostoievsky in Nysa', The New Age, 3 August 1916, pp. 330-331.
190 J. A. M. Alcock, 'Nietzsche and the Mahabharata', The New Age, 13 May 1920, pp. 27-28.
191 Paul V. Cohn, 'An Echo from Hades', The New Age, 3 April 1913, pp. 525-526.
192 Storm Jameson, Modern Drama in Europe (London: W. Collins, 1920).
193 G. B. Foster, 'The Prophet ofa New Culture', The Little Review, March 1914, pp. 14-17 (p.17).
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established scholars like Thatcher and Bridgwater tend to suggest. To understand it
properly, we have to look at the wider picture and consider in detail the many
communication pathways within the bohemian circles of the period. I aimed to select
material which would demonstrate how radical Nietzscheanism connects to a critique of
modernity itself and how it originates in the turn-of-the-century social, cultural, and
aesthetic discourses of self-creation and re-evaluation. There was, I believe, a close
connection between literary modernism and wider radical thought. In the portraits of
free individuals and artists envisioned by the writers and intellectuals in question, we
can discern a pattern of self-reflection and self-examination through creativity and
regeneration, self-perfection through 'Becoming'. Of course, the story of Nietzsche's
impact on the modernists still has many relatively uncharted areas. The initial response
to Nietzsche's legacy deserves to be explored further; this study is but a starting point
for further exploration. Nietzsche certainly deserves to be a full member of the
modernist canon. He has done so much to shape it.
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